



SOCRATIC DIALECTIC AND PERSONAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE PLATONIC DIALOGUE *LACHES*

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Abstract:

The investigating direction of this study refers to the twelfth chapter (187b-e) of the Platonic dialogue *Laches*, which belongs to the early period of the writing production of the Academy founder, that is also characterized as Socratic. Our approach to this chapter - which we perceive as a somewhat autonomous textual unit - follows a special, methodological course, branched into two parts. In the first one we exhaustively present an extensive part of the syntactic phenomena found in this chapter, in order to highlight its degree of diversity in relation to what is defined as the syntagmatic axis. We believe that this approach ensures the objective measure that can highlight the deeper theoretical objectives of the chapter. The characterization of the syntagmatic axis of the sentence will offer us the conditions of a specific expression in order to reconstruct the chapter scenographically and lead us, initially, in a detailed and, later, in a synthetic way to the personality of one of the protagonists of the dialogue (of Lysimachus). We aim to detect the mental and evaluative world of this person who is directly or indirectly involved in the structure of the dialogue's observations, in order to show that he is a carrier and an active mediator of the meanings that are expressed. The second part refers to what is defined as a paradigmatic or interpretive axis and aims to highlight the chapter's semantic forms as well as how it is possible for their content to describe the general atmosphere of the collective conditions in which they develop as spiritual concerns. to virtue and, in particular to a part of it, bravery.

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INTRODUCTION

The investigating direction of the following study refers to the twelfth chapter (187b-e) of the Platonic dialogue *Laches*, which belongs to the early period of the writing production of the *Academy* founder, which is also characterized as Socratic.¹ Our approach to this chapter - which we perceive as a somewhat autonomous textual unit - will follow a special, methodological course, which will be branched into two parts. In the first we will exhaustively present an extensive part of the syntactic phenomena found in this chapter, in order to highlight its degree of diversity in relation to what is defined as the syntagmatic axis. We believe that this approach ensures the objective measure that can highlight the deeper theoretical objectives of the chapter. The characterization of the syntagmatic axis of the sentence will offer us the conditions of a specific expression in order to reconstruct the chapter scenographically and lead us, initially, in a detailed and, later, in a synthetic way to the personality of one of the protagonists of the dialogue (of Lysimachus). We aim to detect the mental and evaluative world of this person who is directly or indirectly involved in the structure of the dialogue's observations, in order to show that he is a carrier and an active mediator of the meanings that are expressed. The second part refers to what is defined as a paradigmatic or interpretive axis and aims to highlight the chapter's semantic forms as well as how it is possible for their content to describe the general atmosphere of the collective conditions in which they develop as spiritual concerns.

The protagonist of this chapter is Lysimachus, who addresses his interlocutors (Melesias, Nicias and Laches) and urges them to turn to Socrates and advise him on the education of their children, on a subject of major moral, political and pedagogical importance. In fact, this importance expands even further, as the issue that concerns the interlocutors refers in general to virtue and in particular to a part of it, to bravery. Already in the previous chapter (186a-187b) this question has been systematically addressed by Socrates, who has examined the criteria which define the commendable and effective teacher in regard to the offering of knowledge. This is a critical issue presented by the Athenian dialectic and of fundamental importance for the accurate knowledge of such a scope, as is the virtue of bravery, moral and political value.

In our estimation, however, in the elaborated chapter, an additional and rather interesting issue emerges, which we will try to document in the appropriate analytical way. Specifically, our report will focus on the appearance of Lysimachus, who despite being the son of Aristides The Just, according to the relevant information he was not of particular spiritual and political performance. However, the fact that from the beginning of the dialogue he is interested in the education of his son, proves that he follows the path of ancient Athens governed by the spirit of the Enlightenment. But the most important thing is that within the dialogue he moves with self-awareness, a detail that needs attention regarding the way Plato structures his anthropography. In what we shall elaborate, we will observe Lysimachus who goes far beyond his former presence and proves, through his reasoning, that he has utilised the dialectical atmosphere of the spiritual gathering

1 For the relevance *Laches* with the dialogues of *Euthyphron*, *Charmides* and *Lysis*, see indicatively Goldschmidt, V. 1971, *Les dialogues de Platon*, ed. P.U.F, Paris, pp. 32-75.



in which he participates. This is an achievement that Plato attributes mainly to Socrates as a personality who inspires the new (*καινόν*) at the gathering he participates; Thus, we verify that the founder of the Academy raises the issue of personal evaluations on a different scale than that of current social stereotypes.

A. SYNTAGMATIC AXIS

A1. "Genetic" presentation of Lysimachus' reasoning-argument.

In what will follow, we will divide Lysimachus' reasoning-argument, regarding the presentation and evaluation of Socrates as an emblematic advisor and educator, into individual proposals in order to understand its gradual evolution and its probative foundation.

1. **"Καλῶς μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὧ ἄνδρες, Σωκράτης λέγειν"** (main clause): it is formulated with epistemological and evaluative status, with Lysimachus stating that in his estimation Socrates has formulated a correct and aesthetically remarkable speech. Caution is required regarding the fact that there is presently no certainty projected but an exclusive one as to the approach of the orator. Let us clarify that the verb "λέγω" does not only mean that I speak but also that I have gathered all the necessary information to support it. And that there has been, in fact, a previous deliberative elaboration before I formulated it. Thus, reason is exhibited more coherently. On the other hand, it is internal (the one that is internally composed), while on the other hand, it is oral (the one that is externalised as a product of the internal process).

2. **"Εἰ δὲ βουλομένοις ὑμῖν ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτᾶσθαί τε καὶ διδόναι λόγον"** (conditional clause): A state of intention is expressed in the perspective of a contingency, with reference to the terms of construction of that dialectical detection which is required for the disputed issue. It should be noted, however, that a particular syntactic scheme appears here. Specifically, we encounter a so-called absorbing affinity of the verb with the participle, which is not explained by the formal terms of the syntactic articulation in the context of a sentence. Usually, the verb should have a subject, in order to construct what is defined on the basis of normative-expressive and factual relations as a personal predicate. But the semantic weight of the sentence is expressed through the subject of the participle "βουλομένοις", that is, from "ὑμῖν". The explanation of this phenomenon can be derived from two reasons: a semantic one, which affects the syntactic one. We could therefore argue that Plato intends to state that the meaning contained in the participle intervenes and overlaps the meaning which he originally intended to formulate with the verb. So, while he begins to formulate his speech, he realizes that the linguistic formulas he has chosen do not lead to the meaning that according to the current argument should have been emphasized and, in fact, under certain stylistics. He thus retains his expressive starting point, which at least formally held the responsibility of the central circulation of the meaning, and inserts a new one without any formal observance of the syntactic rules, along with the sequences followed. The sentence under conditions of regularity should be formulated as follows: "ἔστιν ἡ βούλησις ὑμῖν", where "ὑμῖν" would hold the role of the dative case referring to possession or ethic.



Plato, however, realises that in cases of intention the weight must be given not so much to the mood-property as abstract situations or as general concepts but to its actors. Thus, he transforms “βούλησις” to “βουλομένοις”. It is interesting, furthermore, that the sentence is neither formed as follows: “εἰ ὑμεῖς βούλεσθε”, a wording which would be the most normal. This is where the central role of replacement is played by the dative case according to the following, in our estimation, reasoning: since the field of reasoning refers to intentionality, the primarily typical case must be used in such a situation. And this is the dative case, which is eminently communicative and makes the inner mood an act. We would note, then, that the founder of the Academy is moving in a direction which challenges him to make continuous transformations on the syntagmatic axis, which he completely subordinates to the paradigmatic. And all the above, in fact, without resorting to allegories and metaphors.

3. “Αὐτοὺς δὴ χρὴ γινώσκειν, ᾧ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης” (main clause): An epistemological situation of powerful certainty is formulated under conditions of motivation, resulting from a regularity derived from the general line of reasoning. In the previous hypothetical sentence, the perspective of dialectics in the form of questions and answers was set. However, the terms underlying it were not mentioned. Therefore, in order for a consultation to have a methodological and scientific weight, it is necessary for those who participate in its articulations to know the topic of discussion. The cognitive parameter will introduce details of structure but also protection from any erroneous diversion or ideological dogmatism.

4. “Ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ Μελησία τῷδε δῆλον (ἐστί)” (main clause): A state of obviousness is recorded, though its content is specified with what will follow. The style here is accentuated, highlighting a certainty aimed at understanding the behavior and the intentions of the individuals involved in a consultation by their interlocutors. Probably “μὲν” should be translated as “at least”, which aims at its generalisation.

5. “Ὅτι ἠδομένοις ἂν εἴη” (subordinate clause): Plato makes an exception to the syntactic rules, for a second time in a minimal textual area, emphasizing not on the mood-attribute but on their actor. We would expect the following wording: “ὅτι ὑμεῖς ἠδοισθε ἂν”. This sentence as introduced with “ὅτι” clearly refers to a certain information, but is subjected to the following conditions with the immediately following sentences. It is possible, however, that since it is expressed with potential optative, it refers to an expectation fulfilled only under the realisation of specific cases. However, it is not excluded that it moves in the perspective of rhetorical schemes, as the supported position was a very common one for individuals of intellectual and institutional competence at the city of Pallas Athena.

6. “Εἰ πάντα ἐθέλοιτε λόγῳ διεξιέναι” (conditional clause): a state of intent is recorded in a hypothetical discussion field. First of all, it should be noted that a difference between the conditional and the causal clause, under the criterion of their introduction with the linker “εἰ”, comes to the fore. Under their co-examination, we would underline that the conditional clause defines possible levels of certainty, while the causal defines definitive and recorded ones. But one detail about dependency is crucial regarding the preposition. Specifically, when a verb of mental passion is preceded just as in the thematic relevance here: “ἠδομένοις”-, the clause introduced with the conjunction “εἰ” is



mainly causal. However, it is not convenient to support such a version here, as all reasoning is inscribed on the axis of contingency, validated by the use of optative mood. Lysimachus does not refer evaluatively to a situation that has happened, but to what would be desirable to happen. He introduces a presumption of value order, which is of such foundation that it does not depend on time relativism. Therefore, from his point of view, it is legitimate to support causation. We should add at this point that the meaning of “λόγω” as framed by the verb “ἔρωτᾷ” of the previous sentence and by the infinitive “διεξιέναι” of the conditional clause here, must mean, in addition to coherence and rationality, also resort to dialectics.

7. “Ἄ Σωκράτης ἐρωτᾷ” (defining relative clause to “πάντα”): it reflects a contingency and should basically be translated as “in which case”, with present continuous, not limited only to what is discussed here. However, according to what is said by Lysimachus, we would note that the logical-temporal sequence of the three sub-meanings-propositions of the syntagmatic axis here could be classified as follows: the relative clause precedes, the conditional follows and the meaning ends with the main clause. However, the reasoning as a whole is determined by the conditional linker “εἰ”, which belongs to all three sentences. Thus, the following path is formed: if Socrates formulates questions and if Nicias and Laches have the desire to answer, then and only then, under the present semantic structures, will Lysimachus and Melesias feel intense pleasure. Thus, not only a simple thought of the speaker is expressed, but, and above all, an intention, based on the normativity of value schemes, which also represent the principles of the ancient Greek Enlightenment.

8. “Καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐντεῦθεν ἤρχομην λέγων” (main clause referring in a concise-reminiscent way to what has preceded): Here an activity is announced, which, however, has started from the past and is not registered outside the limits of the interlocutors’ experience. Note that participle “λέγων” in this sentence is predicative, because it depends from a verb which also means movement. In such cases the verb is inscribed in the perspective of the content of the participle. From a synthetic point of view, we would argue that this is also a final (telic) participle, the content of which can be attributed to predicative expressions along with evaluative judgments. So, the clause can evolve from analytical to synthetic. However, another note is needed, relating to verbal uses. First of all, it should be emphasised that there is no verbal form in future tense in this sentence. The verb is past continuous “ἤρχομην” and therefore refers to a repetitive duration. In fact, as it was underlined, its main meaning does not arise from its content but from the participle “λέγων” and simply states the starting point of the verbal act. Past continuous, however, attaches intention to this act, resulting to the highlighting of the importance of the participle “λέγων” that is registered in an intense mobility, and can only be repeated as such in any kind of consultation.

9. “Ὅτι εἰς συμβουλήν διὰ ταῦτα ὑμᾶς παρακαλέσαιμεν” (subordinate clause): it indicates not only an information or an event but an intention and is the object of the participle “λέγων” of the previous sentence. The statement here, however, is characterized by the meaning, which, precisely because it is prepositional, it is expressed in an optative mood. A question arises regarding why it would be obligatory to use an optative mood in past tense, a verb tense which is not previously noted. So basically, it



must have the meaning of past continuous and it is used on a permutation, as this tense does not have an optative mood. Certainty therefore is defined in terms of whether the orator is sure of his intentions and a similar attitude is expected from the recipients of this prompting, which has not yet been secured, at least in full. “ὅτι” is therefore defined as to the orator, while in terms of the recipients “ὥς” would be more accurate, which does not have the same level of certainty as “ὅτι”. In the end, although it is a subordinate clause, it is mainly a clause of wish, or it records a wish.

10. “Ὅτι μεμεληκέναι ὑμῖν ἡγούμεθα [...] περὶ τῶν τοιούτων” (reason clause): This is clearly a clause of judgment, but not with strong certainty, because the verb “ἡγούμεθα” means having an opinion or a belief about something. It serves as a prepositional modifier of cause for “διὰ ταῦτα” in the previous sentence. So here we find an explanatory reasoning. However, “ὑμῖν” is in optative mood showing judgement of the person who has been led to evaluative assessments and in fact, in the long run, based on the present perfect infinitive “μεμεληκέναι”. It should be noted that we have an infinitive before us that does not simply express an interest, but one which is governed by aesthetic features, referring to the in-depth care of the object of reference, or the options-movements for the realisation of a goal.

11. “Ὡς εἰκός (ἐστί)” (relative clause): reference is made to the anthropologically normal of what is being discussed here. Thus, any non-response to their content constitutes a contradictory or an alienating state, or a deviation from the regulatory scale.

12. “Ἐπειδὴ οἱ παῖδες ὑμῖν ὀλίγου ὥσπερ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἡλικίαν ἔχουσι παιδεύεσθαι” (reason clause): here the sentence aims at one of the central themes of the dialogue, namely the education of the youths, which is considered as an act of paramount importance for parents, even on a global scale. Parents need to make their children's education a personal concern and not just delegate the responsibility to special educators. Thus, a more general educational programming emerges, which is also political and brings to the fore a generalised regulatory system of values. Regarding the infinitive “παιδεύεσθαι”, we would note that it can be both of purpose and of result. An organic connection is developed between the two meanings and the result appears as the expected realisation of the purpose, which rather moves in the area of a theoretical design that imposes the necessity of securing its reasonable “tools”. The reason clause here is linked to the previous one by juxtaposition. However, with one difference: from the general objective determination of the first, introduced with “ὅτι”, reference is made here to a temporal development related to the age of the children. Thus, “Ἐπειδὴ” is explained, which with “καί” becomes imperative and is translated “even more so”. The first reason clause puts forward a regulatory principle, while the second presents its specialised update.

13. “Εἰ οὖν ὑμῖν μή τι διαφέρει” (conditional clause): a possibility of minimal probability is recorded, as its realization would be in contradiction with the “Ὡς εἰκός”, which already appeared to have a fundamental evaluative interest and refers to a regularity of duty for anyone who is aware of the anthropological principles regarding qualitative transformations. However, in the context of a democratic consultation, it is necessary to consider all possibilities.



14. “Εἶπατε” (main clause): a prompting is made as a necessary parameter in order to develop the consultation on the major issues that have come to the fore. In other words, a common acceptance regarding the general view of an issue is considered necessary, but what we mentioned in the previous proposal is still taken into account.

15. “Κοινῇ μετὰ Σωκράτους σκέψασθε, διδόντες τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ’ ἀλλήλων” (main clause): here a supplement to the previous sentence in the form of a specialisation is outlined. The interlocutors -all being parents-, are invited to meet with Socrates recording the whole process in the framework of the dialectical method. It is a method that presupposes reciprocity, on the basis of an exchange of arguments, which will feed the reflection in order to lead to valid conclusions about the general and specialised views of the subject matter. In this sentence, too, reason is motivating, obviously under a model which has historically and politically guaranteed objectivity.

16. “Εὖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο λέγει ὅδε” (main clause): here a remarkably evolving and epistemological situation emerges. It functions as a portent and awaits its clarifications. It is characterised by an emphasis colouring, which is determined not only by “εὖ” but also by the transition from “τοῦτο” to “ὅδε”, with the latter being translated into “this exactly”.

17. “Ὅτι περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου νῦν βουλευόμεθα τῶν ἡμετέρων” (subordinate clause explaining “τοῦτο” and “ὅδε”): here a strong certainty comes to the fore, held on objective bases, with the term “μέγιστον” playing a central role and referring to the capital importance of the youths’ pedagogy both anthropologically and culturally, in the broad sense of the term. The genitive case of “ἡμετέρων” does not express as much possession as the scale of values that have been adopted. And these are none other than those brought to the cultural forefront by the ancient Greek Enlightenment. The verb “βουλευόμεθα” promotes a collective dimension of values, the understanding-interpretation of which presupposes the dialectical meeting of the citizens, and in fact with an intention to do so. We should clarify that “νῦν”, due to the importance of what is said does not only refer to the present moment but over a long period of time, so consequently we might discuss of its historicity.

18. “Ἄλλ’ ὁρᾶτε” (main clause): here it is not a prompting that comes to the fore but its examination from the point of view of reflection. “Ἄλλά” constitutes the central meaning, as it comes to rule out any possibility of an axiomatic truth, which could arise from the fact that the issue at hand is of paramount importance. The consultation has a broader regulatory content, so its details need to be considered in its entirety.

19. “Εἰ δοκεῖ χρήναι οὕτω ποιεῖν” (subordinate clause of indirect question and conditional altogether): here the content of the previous clause, which had remained in a general prompt, is added. This sentence, despite its concise scope, is semantically multifactorial. First of all, it should be noted that it is an indirect question regarding the orator and conditional for the recipients of his prompting. But the central interest comes from the words themselves. Specifically: a) “δοκεῖ”, which is a verb expressing an opinion or thought, focuses the reference on the present moment and can be related to the Aristotelian “ἐνδοξα”,² which clearly do not refer to a composed cognitive content.

2 For the Aristotelian “ἐνδοξα” see *Topics*, 100a-101a. For a systematic reading see the introductory chapters and comments of Brunschwig in *Topics* 5-8 (J.) Brunschwig (ed., trans.) 2007. *Aristote: Topiques. Livres V-VIII*. (Collection des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé.) Pp. Ixiii + 333. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.



It highlights a strong inner possibility, but not an absolute certainty. Thus, it leaves the subject open to new, potential, readings. In addition, we have to note that “δοκεῖ” includes a meaning that is not identical with “ἔξεσσι”. These are two impersonal verbs (with “δοκεῖ” also having a personal use), the content of which moves in the area of contingency. The verb “δοκεῖ” is composed mainly of epistemological terms and indicates an assessment that arises from the contemplative activities of the intelligent subject that has already processed specific data. The verb “ἔξεσσι” is composed mainly of ontological terms and results from the image formed by external conditions as terms of possibility. The most valid, in terms of the certainty it can provide, is “ἔξεσσι”, as it is based primarily on objective-tangible and verifiable data or even on necessities that are imposed on human consciousness by their presence. It refers mainly to a factual structure, which also makes synthetic judgments possible - and not just detailed descriptions. It should be noted that Nicias speaks next, proposing to Socrates a broader approach, in order to further substantiate the argument for his value as a counselor and educator. This argument will be completed in the next chapter (187e-188c).

A2. The function of the adverb in Lysimachus' speech

In this subchapter we shall attempt to show the role of adverbs in Lysimachus' argument as the part of his speech which introduces functionality in a way of articulating some of his thoughts. First of all, we should note that, generally, the adverb is an uninflected part of speech, which identifies or complements semantically (adverbs of manner and time etc.) a verb or its infinitive form. The adverb thus eliminates the domination of the verb. On the other hand, its relation to the noun or the adjective, from which it etymologically derives, is limited by the fact that within the relevant text field it does not have, more or less, the full semantic scope which they express. However, its syntactic position in the sentence presupposes the presence of at least one verb form and is indicative of a specific situation which is experienced - processed - manifested by the subject.

The interest regarding its use is that it performs a dual function: a) it does not only have the meaning of the etymological root from which it derives, but b) also expresses that meaning in terms of modality, causality, finality, etc. It is a carrier of a new specialised and functional causality, in addition to its general, and through its content it expresses the dynamic character of life, both personal and collective. For example, the adverb “καλῶς” with which Lysimachus begins his speech, states, as a modal-evaluative adverb, the general expressive choice by which the search for arguments about the teacher -or for any other of high-quality issue- emerges in the specific atmosphere; on the other hand, it states a specific expressive choice with which the beauty of arguments is projected under particular circumstances of expressive and factual conditions. It should be noted, however, that while the verb (time, moods, numbers), the noun (numbers) and the adjective (genders, numbers) are inflected parts of speech, the adverb is uninflected. And this difference is due to the following: although it takes its syntactic position and function from the other parts of the sentence and mainly from the verb, it can be used in any other case, having a clear generalized content, but also adaptable in each particular atmosphere. In particular, the verb directly indicates the person in question



and, therefore, there is no further need to re-add the reference to its specificity, as in fact such a possibility does not exist. Its statutory position is given and unique. However, the meaning of an adverb -although it does not have the absolute characteristics of the noun from which it derives and the central role-mission of the verb in this sentence- is broader than the content of the presence-action indicated by the verb. That is, the adverb can be attributed to as many possible cases as can be highlighted by the inflection of the specific verb or any other. However, the verb of a sentence in each specific case refers only to the action of a subject, unless of course it has an impersonal expression. Thus, the adverb is semantically more general than the verb, more flexible and also capable of numerous and varied categorical definitions. With the use of the adverb speech discovers and describes the variety of everyday life and makes us suspicious even of the fact that in most cases it is unpredictable. Specifically, in the textual unit we analysed: a) "ἐντεῦθεν" refers to a reason for reflection b) "ἄλλως" to a variety of reasons, c) "κοινῆ" (as a dative adverb) in a communicative way of thinking, d) "εὔ" in the aesthetic way of formulating the speech and e) "οὕτως" in the particular way of an act. Thus, through this variety, a dynamic narrative atmosphere is formed. All five adverbs play a central role in the semantic completeness of the syntactic-grammatical form in which each of them is inscribed and, therefore, we could characterise them as "clausal". Finally, it should be noted that in this section the adverbs have no historical function or significance, as they focus exclusively on a current reasoning and a research direction. So, we could generally characterise them as the "in-text" elements of a sentence for the formation of a specific meaning.³

B. GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL EVALUATION OF LYSIMACHUS'S SPEECH – FURTHER ASPECTS

From what we have examined, we consider that Plato brings to the forefront intention of social foundation to define how and for what reasons the argument should be based on dialectic, that is, on collective detection and not on subjective expediency.⁴ In fact, the above are supported even more when it comes to examining issues of major interest for personal and socio-political life, as well as for the evolution of the new generation. The expressions used are indicative of the above: "ἔρωτᾶσθαι", "διδόναι λόγον", "ἔρωτᾶν", "ἀντί δεξιᾶν", "μεμεληκέναι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων", "κοινῆ σκέψασθε", "διδόντες καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον", "περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου βουλευόμεθα". The above expressions are placed in a communication context that is not of a simple and facile consensual character. The word of communication will lead to the search for valid proposals, initially for the description and then for the scientific demarcation of a topic of significant scope for the essential issues of the city. These proposals are called to be reasonable and coherent, while at the same time they will have a complete texture and thus will not undermine the thematic balance of the current discussion by introducing other issues. Therefore, their selection will be excluded with subjective and arbitrary criteria, a detail that in fact applies here by definition.

3 For the content of the main and secondary clauses in the ancient Greek literature see HUMBERT, J. 1954. *Syntax of the ancient Greek language*. Translated by G. Kourmoulis, Athens pp. 126-235 and Tzouganatos, N. 1963. *Syntaxis of the Ancient Greek Language*. Athens: Hestia Bookstore.

4 For Plato's method of dialectic see Santas, G. 1979. *Socrates: Philosophy* in. *Plato's Early Dialogues*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.



Therefore, it is about expressions that will not have a conventional or superficial mission, but will in-depth detect fundamental issues, such as the education of the youth. Such an education is not confined to the limits of a training that is individualistic or serves utilitarian professionalism and efficiency, but rather radiates out a political perspective for the development of the social body in further and further conquests. Moreover, the status of the so-called democratic quality instrumental discourse is attributed to education and is put to the service of the political entelechy, which as a final purpose exceeds its value. In other words, political life is the ultimate cause of individual activities, while the chosen pedagogical system is structured as the possibility of highlighting all those qualities that will fulfill it. We would therefore argue that such an education has sound moral foundations and justifications. The aspect of consulting therefore is dominant at this point, under conditions of necessity, and resorting to Socrates becomes inevitable, as a thinker who, as we know from elsewhere, has emerged as an example of high, unequivocal performance of top political morality. Another interesting issue that arises is that the pedagogical-ethical political proposals that are formulated are not exhausted in their abstract content but individual actors are also sought in order to assimilate and implement those proposals at the level of a welfare state. Thus, generalised realism is pervasive and moves in terms of generalizations or universal applications.

CONCLUSION

From what we have examined, we can argue that in the processed chapter of *Laches*, no philosophical issue with the broader meaning of the term is developed. However, details of philosophical reflection arise, since in every Platonic text even the most superficial -at first glance- propositions regarding the content are proved to be of substantial theoretical interest and are able to reach further fields of fundamental research as well as scientific and semantic extensions. We would therefore note that the insistence attached to the essential importance not only of the educational orientation but to its authentic actors, registers the examined chapter in what is defined as the ancient Greek Enlightenment. More specifically, an estimation about the strengthening of the already cultural acquis through its assimilation and utilisation by the respective new generation has already been formed in Lysimachus' consciousness. The dialogue's protagonist constitutes a holistic reasoning with deep structural expressions. His motive is obvious, his mediating thoughts are perfect and his aim is morally and politically justified. So more generally: he appears to be aware of his historical position and mission, details which will be added later by Nicias. And the reference actor for the fulfillment of the above is Socrates, who is projected by Plato as the only possibility -even after his death- to deal with the geometrically expanding moral and political degeneration of the fourth century. Thus, dialectics undertakes a mission of subversive and, at the same time, creative orientation. It emerges in the par excellence revolutionary collective tone with the consequence that it leads even Lysimachus to high performances and transformations. *Meno* dialogue will soon confirm the above.



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ΣΩΚΡΑΤΙΚΗ ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΗ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΙΚΕΣ ΜΕΤΑΜΟΡΦΩΣΕΙΣ ΣΤΟΝ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΙΚΟ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟ ΛΑΧΗΣ

Summary:

Σύμφωνα με τα όσα εξετάσαμε, μπορούμε να υποστηρίξουμε ότι στο επεξεργασθέν κεφάλαιο του διαλόγου Λάχης δεν αναπτύσσεται ένα με την ευρεία σημασία του όρου φιλοσοφικό ζήτημα. Ωστόσο, λεπτομέρειες φιλοσοφικού προβληματισμού τίθενται, καθότι σε ένα πλατωνικό κείμενο ακόμη και οι πιο επιφανειακοί, εκ πρώτης προσέγγισης, σε περιεχόμενο προτάσεις αποδεικνύεται ακολούθως ότι έχουν ουσιαστικό θεωρητικό ενδιαφέρον και ότι ανοίγουν σοβαρά ερευνητικά πεδία όχι μόνον επιστημονικών αλλά και σημασιολογικών προεκτάσεων. Θα σημειώναμε λοιπόν ότι η επιμονή που αποδίδεται στην κεφαλαιώδη σημασία όχι μόνον του εκπαιδευτικού προσανατολισμού αλλά και των αυθεντικών φορέων του εγγράφει το εξετασθέν κεφάλαιο σε ό,τι ορίζεται ως αρχαίος ελληνικός Διαφωτισμός. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, στη συνείδηση του Λυσιμάχου έχει διαμορφωθεί και υποστηρίζεται η εκτίμηση περί της ενδυνάμωσης του ήδη πολιτιστικού κεκτημένου διά της αφομοίωσής του και της αξιοποίησής του από την εκάστοτε νέα γενεά. Ο εν λόγω πρωταγωνιστής του διαλόγου συγκροτεί έναν ολιστικό συλλογισμό με εκ βαθέων δομικές αρθρώσεις. Η αφορμή του είναι εμφανής, οι διαμεσολαβούσες σκέψεις του άρτιες και η στόχευσή του ηθικά και πολιτικά αιτιολογημένη. Γενικότερα λοιπόν: εμφανίζεται να έχει συνείδηση της ιστορικής θέσης και αποστολής του, λεπτομέρειες οι οποίες θα προστεθούν ακολούθως από τον Νικία. Και το πρόσωπο αναφοράς για την επιτέλεση των ανωτέρω είναι ο Σωκράτης, ο οποίος προβάλλεται από τον Πλάτωνα ως η μόνη δυνατότητα -έστω και μετά τον θάνατό του- για την αντιμετώπιση του γεωμετρικά διευρυνόμενου ηθικού και πολιτικού εκφυλισμού του τέταρτου αιώνα. Έτσι, η διαλεκτική αναλαμβάνει μία αποστολή ανατρεπτικού και εν ταυτώ δημιουργικού προσανατολισμού. Αναδεικνύεται στον κατεξοχήν επαναστατικό συλλογικό τόνο με συνέπεια να οδηγεί ακόμη και τον Λυσίμαχο σε υψηλές επιδόσεις και μεταμορφώσεις. Μετ' ολίγων ο διάλογος Μένων θα επικυρώσει τα ανωτέρω.

Keywords:

Διάλογος,
Λάχης,
Πλάτων,
Σωκράτης,
Λυσίμαχος,
Διαλεκτική,
Διδάσκαλος,
Συνταγματικός-παραδειγματικός
άξονας.