

## RELIGION AND CONFLICT: THE CASE OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA

**Abstract:** *The text discusses the role of religion in the Bosnian conflict, based on data on attitudes and behaviour in Bosnia and Herzegovina, collected by a survey undertaken in 1999. To what extent did religion – understood as individual religiosity – actually shape people’s attitudes towards the conflict? Are religious people more prone to nationalism and xenophobia than others? Analyses of cross tables were ambiguous; there was no linear effect of religiosity on attitudes to the war or the future of Bosnia.*

*Using structural equation modelling (SEM) it was assumed that religion and nationalism, understood as multidimensional concepts (second-order factor structures), cause xenophobia. It turned out that, while there was a correlation between nationalism and religion, only nationalism, not religion, was directly affecting xenophobia. The basic features of the model, both causal relations and dimensions of religion and nationalism were found among the three major ethnic communities in Bosnia.*

**Keywords:** *religiosity, national identity, xenophobia, war, Bosnia*

## RELIGIJA I KONFLIKT: SLUČAJ BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE

**Sažetak:** *U tekstu se govori o ulozi religije u sukobu na teritoriji BiH, na osnovu podataka o stavovima i ponašanju u Bosni i Hercegovini, prikupljenih istraživanjem sprovedenim 1999. godine. U kojoj meri je religija – shvaćena kao individualna religioznost – zapravo oblikovala stavove ljudi prema sukobu? Da li su religiozni ljudi skloniji nacionalizmu i ksenofobiji od drugih? Analize unakrsnih tabela bile su dvosmislene; nije bilo linearnog uticaja religioznosti na stavove prema ratu ili budućnosti Bosne i Hercegovine.*

*Koristeći modeliranje strukturalnih jednačina (SEM) pretpostavljeno je da religija i nacionalizam, shvaćeni kao višedimenzionalni koncepti (faktorske strukture drugog reda), uzrokuju ksenofobiju. Ispostavilo se da, iako postoji korelacija između nacionalizma i religije, samo nacionalizam, a ne religija, direktno utiče na ksenofobiju. Osnovne karakteristike modela, kako uzročne veze, tako i dimenzije religije i nacionalizma, pronađene su među tri najveće etničke zajednice u Bosni.*

**Cljučne reči:** *religioznost, nacionalni identitet, ksenofobija, rat, Bosna*

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## Introduction

The topic of my discussion is the role of religion in a society plagued by war, based on data from an empirical investigation in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, undertaken in late 1999. Here I will concentrate on Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the sample contained about 3000 respondents, around 1000 in each of the regions dominated by Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs.

The issue of religion in the Balkans is specific, due to its social and political role during history. Although in most parts of former Yugoslavia people were speaking the same language, a common nation was never formed, like in Germany or Italy. Centuries of foreign dominance interrupted both state formation and nation building, and religious differences became the most important identity marker among those speaking what was once called Serbo-Croat.

The link between religion and nation is most obvious in the case of the Muslims or Bosniaks, but the situation is essentially the same with Serbs or Croats. Ernest Gellner (1983) speaks about the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina as former Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims. In a sense it is true, as the assimilation of Muslims into Croats or Serbs, maybe Yugoslavs, expected by the Communists (Isaković 1990, Suljević 1981), did not occur, since secular Croat and Serb identities were related to a culture based on a distinct religious tradition.

The situation is not common, although the cultural divisions in Ukraine are of a similar complexity. It is also true that the “old” states in Europe, formed in the 16<sup>th</sup> or 17<sup>th</sup> centuries (England, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, or Sweden) are clearly related to specific religious cultures. In Sweden Lutheran protestantism has profoundly influenced institutions, culture, and mentality. But the distinguishing difference among countries in the protestant North was language.

Thus, In most of former Yugoslavia, before, during, and after the wars in the 1990s religion played an important symbolic role. Religious buildings and other aspects of a cultural-religious heritage were targeted during the fighting, and mobilization along religious lines were frequent, as well as initiatives to use religion as an instrument of peace (Perica 2002, Velikonja 2003a, 2003b).

On the other hand, there is an ongoing process of secularization in Europe. Recently the French anthropologist and historian, Emmanuel Todd (2024), in his book *The Defeat of the West*, refers to a decline of religion in three stages. On its way to the disappearance, religious institutions and cultures are going through an intermediate stage referred to by Todd as *zombie* religion, where participation in religious rituals, apart from baptism, marriage, and funeral, is declining. This stage is replaced by irreligion, where society is no longer infused with moral values of a religious origin.

It seems premature to speak about the death of religion in a Balkan context. Besides, there are differences between Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics as to the character of religious institutions and cultures. In addition, communist rule had important consequences, especially in areas where religious institutions were weak. To this may be added an uneven process of modernization. When I did my investigation there were distinct religious models, especially in terms of religious behaviour. In Catholic areas of Bosnia, people regularly participated in Sunday mass, to a larger extent than in Croatia, and differed dramatically from the Orthodox in Bosnia. However, the institutional religiosity of Muslims in Bosnia was also very high.

**Table 1. Weekly participation in religious service.  
Nationality and Education**

Level of Education	Participation in religious service	Bosniak/Bosnia	Croat/Bosnia	Serb/Bosniaw	Croat/Croatia	Serb/Serbia
Primary/Less	Once a week	40.6%	61.5%	13.8%	27.2%	6.5%
Secondary	Once a week	19.8%	49.7%	3.9%	17.5%	3.0%
Higher	Once a week	13.2%	38.1%	2.9%	18.9%	1.8%
Magnusson 2019						

## Religion and War

My surveys dealt with attitudes and behaviour reported by respondents, i. e. individual religiosity. So, what was, actually the role of *religiosity* in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s? Let us first look at a few tables illustrating very different views among the three major nations – Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs – concerning the breakup of Yugoslavia, or the status of Bosnia after the war, as well as on ethnic violence and atrocities.

The differences are clear. Bosniaks and especially Serbs regard the breakup of Yugoslavia as a tragedy, whereas Croats understand the dissolution as inevitable, perhaps even something positive. Similarly, to Muslims, the massacres that occurred are unforgivable, while a substantial part of Serbs and Croats think they are a regrettable but natural effect of war.

There is, further, an interesting difference between Serbs and Bosniaks on the one hand, and Croats on the other. The former is less willing to forgive and forget the atrocities during the war, while the Croats, to a larger extent, believe one should forgive, although not forget.

The results also show that a majority of Croats and Serbs are against a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina, while a majority of Bosniaks wish to abolish the Serb republic and are against any Croat autonomy in Bosnia. Similarly, a large part of the Serb or Croat respondents are for a division of Bosnia, i.e. Serb-dominated areas should join Serbia and Croat-dominated areas be part of Croatia. At the same time, while Croats and Serbs to a certain extent show understanding of the other people's ambitions, it is not complete. Bosniaks are totally against these solutions.

Are there any differences between secular and religious people in these respects? Are those who frequently go to Church and mosque, or regularly pray, or who subscribe to central religious beliefs more or less nationalist than secular Bosnians?

**Table 2. Views on the Breakup of Yugoslavia [Bosnia 1999]**

	<b>Bosniak</b>	<b>Croat</b>	<b>Serb</b>	<b>Total</b>
It was a tragedy	54.3%	14.7%	64.9%	44.4%
It was inevitable	35.8%	56.0%	24.8%	39.0%
It was something positive	5.8%	24.1%	5.3%	11.9%
NA	4.1%	5.2%	5.0%	4.8%
Total	100.0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
N	961	1009	998	2 968

**Table 3. Bosnia should be a unitary state [Bosnia 1999]**

	<b>Bosniak</b>	<b>Croat</b>	<b>Serb</b>	<b>Total</b>
Strongly agree	77.9%	11.9%	2.1%	30.0%
Somewhat agree	8.5%	11.1%	4.4%	8.0%
Somewhat disagree	2.4%	14.3%	13.0%	10.0%
Strongly disagree	5.0%	42.1%	74.6%	41.0%
NA	6.1%	20.7%	5.8%	11.0%
Total	100.0%	10.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	961	1009	998	2 968

**Table 4. Atrocities during the War [Bosnia 1999]**

	<b>Bosniak</b>	<b>Croat</b>	<b>Serb</b>	<b>Total</b>
A necessary aspect of war	2.4%	13.3%	14,8%	10.3%
A regrettable but natural effect of the war	10.3%	28.4%	40.7%	26.7%
Unforgivable and must be condemned	85.4%	53.9%	40.3%	59.5%
There were no atrocities	0.1%	6.5%	11,3%	6.0%
NA	3,1%	5,9%	9,8%	6,3%, ,3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	961	1009	998	2 968

**Table 5. Forgive the perpetrators? [Bosnia 1999]**


	<b>Bosniak</b>	<b>Croat</b>	<b>Serb</b>	<b>Total</b>
No, one should never forgive	73.3%	43.3%	65.9%	60.6%
Yes, one should forgive and forget	2.1%	8.4%	2.3%	4.3%
One should forgive, but must not forget	22.4%	43.8%	28.9%	31.8%
NA	2.3%	4.6%	2.9%	3.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N	961	1009	998	2 968

If we compare participation in religious service and ethnicity, we will see the same differences between the three groups, where certain attitudes and behaviours are accentuated. For example, it turns out that among those who often participate in religious service, the dissolution of Yugoslavia is understood differently among Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox. Among Bosniaks, those who seldom go to the mosque are more inclined to view the end of Yugoslavia as a tragedy, than those who often participate in ritual.

The tendency is similar among Serbs, although the percentage among regular churchgoers is higher than for Bosniaks. As to Croats, the pattern is the same, although very few do perceive the dissolution of the common state as a tragedy. One could say that religious people were less concerned with Yugoslavia, especially Croats, but also a fairly large part of Muslims and Serbs regarded the breakup as inevitable.

However, the relationship is not linear. Often the middle category, those participating once a month in religious service have higher values than others.


Figure 1



As far as the character of Bosnia is concerned, among the Bosniaks, degrees of religiosity do not make a tangible difference. Around 90 percent are totally against a division in Bosnia, and around 77 percent strongly agree that Bosnia must be a unitary state. Among the Serbs, those who go to church every week are much more in favour of a unification with Serbia. In the same way, religious Croats are more favourable to joining Croatia. A large majority of Serbs and more than half of the Croats are against a unitary Bosnian state. Among the Croats, the DK answers are very high, almost one-fourth, especially among the most religious. Again, it should be pointed out that one cannot say that the more – or less – religious people are, the more they will favour a nationalist solution.

Figure 2


BiH should be a unitary republic. The Federation and Republika Srpska should be abolished.



Looking at the data concerning atrocities, the result is similar. To a large majority of Bosniaks they are unforgivable, between 85 and 90 percent, among Croats between 50 and 60 percent, and Serbs between 33 and 42 percent. Among Bosniaks and Croats, those who seldom participate in ritual, are more condemning, among the Serbs not. The answer is similar if we ask whether it is acceptable to drive people from their homes. About 98 percent of Bosniaks regardless of ritual reference, say it is never right, compared about 90 percent of the Croats. And 69 73 percent among Serbs. Again, the relations are not linear.

**Figure 3**


Views on atrocities during the wars in the Balkans



On the issue of whether one should forgive the perpetrators of atrocities, Bosnjaks who frequently participate in religious service are somewhat less willing to forgive, although a great majority of those who seldom pray in the mosque have the same view. Similarly, the percentage of those who are willing to forgive is higher among the less religious, although the difference is not large. The pattern among the Serbs is similar to that of the Bosniaks, whereas the Croats differ. On the one hand, those who seldom go to church are more inclined not to forgive than those who participate every week. That group is also more prone to forgive, without forgetting. The Croats is the only group where religious people to some extent want to both forgive and forget. So, it is tempting to speak about differences in religious traditions.

**Figure 4**

Should one forgive those who tortured and killed your countrymen?



On the whole, there is no clear-cut answer to the possible effects of religiosity. There are differences between Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox, but relationships are not linear. In general, it seems difficult to say anything definite on the basis of cross tables.

One possibility would be to perform a regression analysis, but in practice, there is the difficult issue of collinearity, since very often relevant variables are correlated with each other. We will return to the issue of analysing individual variables, but before that, we will use SEM, structural equation modelling, in order to account for the role of religiosity.

### Structural Equation Modelling

The basic idea of SEM is that theoretical concepts in the social sciences, such as religion or nationalism, are not directly accessible to analysis. They are referred to as latent variables, which are measured indirectly through indicators. A SEM model consists of assumed relationships between latent variables, and a measurement model where the relations between indicators are estimated. The goal is to assess whether the proposed model fits the data.

### The Model

In this case, the model consists of three latent concepts: religion, nationalism, and xenophobia. Religion and nationalism are defined as second-order factors. Religion is thus, in a traditional manner, based on three dimensions: religious belief, religious behaviour, and religious experience. Nationalism has two

dimensions, first, the salience of national identity, and second, self-image or view of history. Both are supposed to influence or predict xenophobia.

The following variables constitute the factor structures:

*Religious Belief* concerns

Belief in God, i.e. the conviction that God exists

Belief that Jesus is the son of God, respectively, Muhammed the Messenger of God

Belief that the Quran or the Bible is the word of God

*Religious behaviour* refers to

Frequency of participation in religious service

Frequency of individual prayer

Reading of scripture

By *Religious experience* is meant the feeling of divine presence during

Religious service

When praying alone

In nature

*The salience of national identity* denotes

The importance of national identity

Pride in being a member of a given ethnic group or nation

*Self-Image* or *View of History* is based on answers to the statements

My people have only conducted defensive wars

My people have suffered more throughout history than others


My people are not perfect but their cultural tradition is superior to others

This dimension expresses a certain ambivalence characteristic of nations, with a conflictual and dramatic history, whose identity has been questioned.

Xenophobia is understood in its lexical sense, as an attitude expressing uneasiness and distrust in contact with others.

There is thus a distinction between nationalism as understood by social scientists studying the process of nation-building, like Gellner (1983) or Hroch (2000), and nationalism used as an equivalence of ethnic prejudice, chauvinism, or xenophobia; phenomena which are better explained by the social psychological tradition of Henri Tajfel (2010) and his followers (Brewer & Hewstone 2004), referred to as Social Identity Theory.

**Figure 5. Model of Relations between Religion, Nationalism, and Xenophobia**



The analysis was undertaken with *Jamovi* [<https://www.jamovi.org/>], a statistical software, similar to *Jasp* [<https://jasp-stats.org/>]. It may be used without cost and is a sophisticated program for a variety of statistical analyses, including SEM. Of particular importance is the possibility to perform a *multilevel analysis*, that is, to simultaneously study a proposed model in different groups. In our case the three nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.

The results, which may be examined in the following pages, show that the actual factor structures and relationships are very similar among Bosnjaks, Croats, and Serbs. At first, religion and nationalism are multidimensional phenomena which may be described as second-order factors. Moreover, the structures are the same in the three cases. For example, the same type of ambivalent nationalism appears among the three Bosnian nations, as do the religious dimensions. It is interesting to note that religious experience is a weaker factor than belief and ritual, especially among Muslims and Orthodox. The factor loadings of Xenophobia are also very similar, although the loading of the variable expressing distrust of other nations is weaker among Bosnjaks, than among Croats and Serbs.


If we look at the relations between the major latent constructs, religion, nationalism, and xenophobia, there is a correlation between religion and nationalism, 0.57 among Muslims, 0.52 among Catholics, and 0.46 among Orthodox.

The most interesting result is that in all cases Nationalism strongly predicts Xenophobia: among Bosniaks 0.69, Croats 0.69 and Serbs 0.68, while Religion


does not, or only to a low degree. Among Bosnjaks the figure is -0.10, Croats, -0.20, and Serbs 0.07.

Figure 6. Multilevel SEM-Analysis. Religion, Nationalism, and Xenophobia


**Bosniak**



**Croat**



**Serb**



This is confirmed by the table below. The estimates and Beta-values show that the effect of nationalism on xenophobia is very high compared to that of religion. This is verified by the p-values which indicate that there is a high probability that nationalism predicts xenophobia, while this is not true of religion.

**Table 6. Parameters estimates Model 1**

Group	Dep	Pred	Estimate	SE	95% Confidence Intervals		$\beta$	z	p
					Lower	Upper			
Bosniak	Xenophobia	Nationalism	0.899	0.2265	0.4551	1.3428	0.6905	3.970	<.001
	Xenophobia	Religion	-0.127	0.1351	0.3914	0.1380	0.0973	0.938	0.348
Croat	Xenophobia	Nationalism	1.774	0.5953	0.6074	2.9409	0.9363	2.980	0.003
	Xenophobia	Religion	-0.375	0.2357	0.8374	0.0865	0.1981	1.593	0.111
Serb	Xenophobia	Nationalism	0.964	0.2488	0.4765	1.4517	0.6768	3.875	<.001
	Xenophobia	Religion	0.100	0.0928	0.0815	0.2823	0.0705	1.082	0.279

In order to assess the relevance of a SEM model, several measures are used. The comparative Fit Index (CFI) is .995, whereas the index for a robust solution, the GFI goodness of fit index, which may be used when variables are not multinormal, is also high: .978. A score above .95 is generally regarded as a good fit. Here the fit is very good.

**Table 7. User model versus baseline model**

	Model
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	0.995
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)	0.994
Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI)	0.994
Relative Noncentrality Index (RNI)	0.995

**Table 8. Additional fit indices**

	Model
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)	0.978
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI)	0.966
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI)	0.638
McDonald Fit Index (MFI)	0.994

Similarly, the RMSEA is 0.01. a measure where 0.08 is acceptable, and below 0.06 is considered good. SRMR should be less than 0.08, which is also the case.

**Table 9. Fit indices**

		95% Confidence Intervals		
SRMR	RMSEA	Lower	Upper	RMSEA p
0.040	0.011	0.000	0.016	1.000

One aspect deserves mentioning. The model assumes that there is a *correlation*, but not a *causal relationship* between religion and nationalism. However, in view of history and for theoretical reasons, such a link might be postulated. The results are shown in the table below.

Interestingly enough we get the same results for both models as far as relevant indexes and parameters are concerned. The fit indexes shown above are the same. Also, the results are to a large extent similar. The second model also shows that religion does not predict xenophobia, which nationalism does. In addition, there is a fairly strong direct effect of religion on nationalism in all three categories.

There is an important implication, however. According to the methodology of path analysis one should account for both direct and indirect effects. The indirect effect of religion is the effect of religion on nationalism, multiplied by the effect of nationalism on xenophobia.

**Table 10. Parameters Estimates Model 2**

Group	Dep	Pred	Estimate	SE	95% Confidence Intervals		$\beta$	z	p
					Lower	Upper			
Bosniak	Xenophobia	Nationalism	0.7814	0.1792	0.4302	1.1327	0.6905	4.361	<.001
	Xenophobia	Religion	-0.0875	0.0885	0.2610	0.0860	-0.0973	0.988	0.323
	Nationalism	Religion	0.4510	0.0577	0.3378	0.5642	0.5674	7.810	<.001
Croat	Xenophobia	Nationalism	1.4038	0.2219	0.9690	1.8386	0.9364	6.327	<.001
	Xenophobia	Religion	-0.2466	0.1090	0.4602	0.0331	0.1982	2.263	0.024
	Nationalism	Religion	0.4352	0.0506	0.3361	0.5344	0.5243	8.606	<.001
Serb	Xenophobia	Nationalism	0.7527	0.1699	0.4198	1.0856	0.6768	4.431	<.001
	Xenophobia	Religion	0.0605	0.0603	0.0576	0.1787	0.0705	1.004	0.315
	Nationalism	Religion	0.3562	0.0370	0.2837	0.4287	0.4613	9.627	<.001

Although there is no direct effect of religion on xenophobia, it turns out that the total effect of religion, i.e. the direct and indirect effects is rather high. In that sense, the second model is an example of a mediator model, where religion, mediated by nationalism, does have an effect on xenophobia, although weaker than nationalism. In fact, a large percentage of the total effect is due to nationalism: 80, 71, and 82 percent.

**Table 11. Direct and Indirect Effects of Religion on Xenophobia**

	Direct Effect	$\beta$	Indirect Effect	$\beta$	Total Effect	
	Bosniak	Religion $\rightarrow$ Xenophobia	0.097	Rel $\rightarrow$ Nat * Nat $\rightarrow$ Xenoph	0.392	0.49
	Nationalism $\rightarrow$ Xenophobia	0.691			0.59	Nat

Croat	Religion → Xenophobia	0.198		0.491	0.69	Rel
	Nationalism → Xenophobia	0.936			0.93	Nat
Serb	Religion → Xenophobia	0.071		0.312	0.38	Rel
	Nationalism → Xenophobia	0.677			0.68	Nat

**Table 12. Importance of Nationalism for total Effects of Religion on Xenophobia. Percent**

	Nationalism	Religion
Bosniak	80%	20%
Croat	71%	29%
Serb	82%	18 %

The question is whether the reasoning concerning direct and indirect effects are relevant when discussing a latent model, which consists not of single variables, but of factor structures on perhaps two levels. It is also a theoretical and methodological question of what causality actually means. There is obviously a covariance of religion and nationalism, but some dimensions of religion will be more important than others in a multifactor model.

This may be illustrated by measuring indirect and direct effects of path analysis where theoretical concepts are represented by single variables. If we look at a model of how education, participation in religious service, predicts xenophobia, and where the importance of national identity is a mediator, the direct effect of religious service compared to the effect of importance of national identity is small or very small. In addition, most of the total effect of religion is explained by nationalism. The direct effect as part of the total effect is low, except for Serbs. Even then, the effect of nationalism is stronger than that of religion.

The results are similar if we perform the same analysis on the earlier tables concerning possible effects of religion and nationalism on the breakup of Yugoslavia, the character of the Bosnian state, or views on atrocities and whether one should forgive perpetrators.

Neither the direct nor the total effect of religion is significant, except in four cases: There is a direct and total effect of religion on the breakup of Yugoslavia among Bosnjaks and Croats and on Serb attitudes to a unitary Bosnia, as well as a total effect on Bosnjak views of forgiving. This is in accordance with the unclear results in figures 1-4. On the other hand, in all cases participation in ritual is significantly related to importance of national identity (cf Appendix).

In other words, when looking at the breakup of Yugoslavia, nationalism as well as religion has a tangible effect in two cases. As to the issue of a unitary Bosnia, nationalism is, however, relevant, in all three cases, and religion among


Serbs. As far as views on atrocities are concerned, the importance of national identity has a significant p-value among Bosnjaks, Croats, and Serbs, while the direct and total effects of religion are not relevant. Finally, on the question of whether perpetrators should be forgiven, the importance of national identity is significant among Bosniaks and Serbs, but not among Croats, whereas the total effect of religion is noticeable among Bosniaks.

Of importance, however, is that in most of these cases, nationalism has a statistical effect on a given variable, but functions as a mediator of religion in four of twelve cases. Also, there is generally a relationship between religion and nationalism, which, again is similar to the SEM-models.

Another interesting point is that the level of education has a weak effect on both the importance of national identity and distrust of members of other nations, while the correlation between the level of education and participation in religious service is rather strong, as we also saw in table 1 in the introduction.

**Figure 7. GLM Mediation Analysis. Path Model Bosniaks**


Q71	Attending religious service
Q60	Level of Education
Q48	Pride in being member of a nation
Q51e	Cannot trust members of other nations



Type	Effect	Estimate	SE	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 → Q48 → Q51E	0.0430	0.00853	0.0695	5.04	<.001
	Q60 → Q48 → Q51E	0.0431	0.01548	0.0335	2.78	0.005
Component	Q71 → Q48	0.1084	0.01790	0.2201	6.06	<.001
	Q48 → Q51E	0.3970	0.04359	0.3157	9.11	<.001
	Q60 → Q48	0.1085	0.03712	0.1062	2.92	0.003
Direct	Q71 → Q51E	0.0233	0.02244	0.0377	1.04	0.298
	Q60 → Q51E	0.0871	0.04576	0.0678	1.90	0.057
Total	Q71 → Q51E	0.0689	0.02284	0.1108	3.02	0.003
	Q60 → Q51E	0.1407	0.04733	0.1092	2.97	0.003

**Figure 8. GLM Mediation Analysis. Path Model Croats**


Q71	Attending religious service
Q60	Level of Education
Q48	Pride in being member of a nation
Q51e	Cannot trust members of other nations



Type	Effect	Estimate	SE	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.0733	0.0109	0.0929	6.72	<.001
	Q60 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.0325	0.0139	0.0253	2.34	0.019
Component	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.1328	0.0151	0.2792	8.81	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.5520	0.0531	0.3328	10.40	<.001
	Q60 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.0588	0.0245	0.0760	2.40	0.016
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.0379	0.0253	0.0480	1.50	0.135
	Q60 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.1122	0.0397	0.0874	2.83	0.005
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.1122	0.0256	0.1423	4.37	<.001
	Q60 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.1384	0.0417	0.1081	3.32	<.001

**Figure 9. GLM Mediation Analysis. Path Model Serbs**

Q71	Attending religious service
Q60	Level of Education
Q48	Pride in being member of a nation
Q51e	Cannot trust members of other nations



Type	Effect	Estimate	SE	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q60 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.00517	0.01101	0.00451	0.4692	0.639
	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.05745	0.00933	0.07913	6.1607	< .001
Component	Q60 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.01187	0.02527	0.01535	0.4698	0.639
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.43526	0.04699	0.29351	9.2634	< .001
	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.13199	0.01600	0.26962	8.2497	< .001
Direct	Q60 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	.00280	0.03633	0.00244	0.0771	0.939
	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.10661	0.02382	0.14685	4.4754	< .001
Total	Q60 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.00872	0.03760	0.00765	0.2319	0.817
	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q51E	0.16304	0.02391	0.22480	6.8184	< .001

**Figure 10. Parameter Summary**

	Estimates	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Beta	Bosniak	Croat	Serb
q71 Ritual	q51a Distrust	0.02	0.04	0.11	q71/51e	0.04	0.05	0.15
q 48 Nat Pride	q51e Distrust	0.40	0.55	0.44	q48/51e	0.32	0.33	0.29
q71 Ritual	q48 Nat Pride	0.11	0.13	0.13	q71/148	0.22	0.28	0.27
Ritual / Distrust	Indirect	0.04	0.07	0.01	Indirect	0.07	0.09	0.08
Ritual / Distrust	Direct	0.02	0.04	0.11	Direct	0.04	0.05	0.15
	Total	0.07	0.11	0.16	Total	0.11	0.14	0.23
Ritual Direct/Total	Percent					36%	36%	65%
Ritual Direct comp	to Nat Direct					13%	15 %	52%
Ritual Total Effect	Perc. Distrust					26%	30%	44%

### Concluding Remarks

We have analysed two SEM-models which according to parameters and p-values show that the direct effects of religion on xenophobia are negligible or weak. In the first model, there is a correlation between second-order factors of religion and nationalism, and no direct statistical effects of religion on xenophobia, while the effects of nationalism are comparatively strong in all three cases. If the model is modified, if it is postulated that religion does not *correlate with* but

*predicts* nationalism, the total effects of religion are significant, although there are no direct effects of religion.

It should be noted that the usual indices accounting for model fit, are the same in both cases.

In order to further illustrate the problem, a *general linear model* with a *mediator* was applied to the variables' *level of education*, *participation in religious service*, *the importance of national identity* and *distrust of members of other nations*, which was part of the factor of xenophobia. The result is similar to the SEM models, i.e., there are no or weak direct effects of religion, but when indirect effects are added, there is a total effect of religion, which among Croats and Bosniaks is moderate, but among Serbs rather strong.

Is it reasonable to assume indirect effects of this kind? If the direct effect of religion is non-existent or not significant, how should one understand the total effects based on a multiplication of the relationship between religion/nationalism and nationalism/xenophobia? It turns out that between 71, 80, or 82 percent of the total effect of religion is explained by nationalism. As far as the other GLM models are concerned, we note a relationship between participation in religious service and the importance of national identity. In two cases there is a direct effect of religion, as well as a total effect. In another two there is a total, but not a direct effect.

From a purely linguistic or social psychological point of view, the assumed total effects are not self-evident. Especially since there is no direct effect of religion on xenophobia in the SEM-models. It seems, therefore, more prudent to accept the first model. It assumes a correlation of .57 (Bosniaks), .52 (Croats) and .42 (Serbs), between factorial structures of religion and nationalism, which makes it theoretically possible that nationalism, but not religion, is directly associated with, or predicts xenophobia.

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## Appendix Effects of religion and nationalism. GLM summaries <sup>2</sup>

Variables

q 71 = participation in religious service

q 48 = importance of national identity

### Views on Breakup of Yugoslavia Q26

#### Bosnjak

Type	Effect	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	-0.01974	-2.31	0.021
Component	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.22081	6.11	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	-0.08942	-2.49	0.013
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	-0.22175	-5.94	<.001
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	-0.23495	-6.50	<.001

#### Croat

Type	Effect	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	-0.06525	-5.575	<.001
Component	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.26718	8.448	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	-0.24421	-7.420	<.001
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	-0.10533	-3.204	0.001
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	-0.17161	-5.277	<.001

#### Serb

Type	Effect	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	-0.03875	-3.6461	<.001
Component	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.28138	8.5455	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	-0.13771	-4.0315	<.001
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	0.03990	1.1276	0.259
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q26 -	0.00177	0.0516	0.959

<sup>2</sup> Simplified tables. Values for Level of Education are not given.

**Bosnia should be a unitary state q 29****Bosniak**

Type	Effect	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	0.0288	2.956	0.003
Component	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.2327	6.382	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	0.1237	3.335	<.001
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	0.0460	1.189	0.234
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	0.0245	0.653	0.514

**Croat**

Type	Effect	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	0.05632	4.330	<.001
Component	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.30561	8.909	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	0.18428	4.954	<.001
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	0.00638	0.171	0.864
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	0.05720	.586	0.113

**Serb**

Type	Effect	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	0.06454	5.3829	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	0.23330	7.0286	<.001
	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.27665	8.3713	<.001
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	0.08604	2.5002	0.012
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q29C	-.14891	4.3777	<.001

**Views on Atrocities Q 34****Bosniak**

Type	Effect	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.01671	1.990	0.047
Component	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.21896	6.109	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.07631	2.105	0.035
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.04665	1.231	0.218
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.02874	0.785	0.433

**Croat**

Type	Effect	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.00757	0.847	0.397
Component	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.26149	8.319	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.02894	0.851	0.395
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.02749	0.809	0.419
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.01668	0.509	0.611

**Serb**

Type	Effect	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.03162	3.070	0.002
Component	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.11087	3.278	0.001
	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.28515	8.764	<.001
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.02056	0.586	0.558
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q34	0.01121	0.332	0.740

**Forgive Perpetrators? Q 39c  
Bosnjak**

Type	Effect	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q39 -	0.0323	3.40	<.001
Component	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.2200	6.13	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q39 -	0.1467	4.09	<.001
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q39 -	0.0943	2.51	0.012
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q39 -	0.1276	3.49	<.001

**Croat**

Type	Effect	$\beta$	z	p
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q39	0.01368	1.457	0.145
Component	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.27121	8.611	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q39 -	0.05044	1.478	0.139
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q39 -	-0.09350	-2.738	0.006
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q39 -	-0.07943	-2.419	0.016

**Serb**

<b>Type</b>	<b>Effect</b>	<b><math>\beta</math></b>	<b>z</b>	<b>p</b>
Indirect	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q39 -	0.07971	6.1181	<.001
Component	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q48	0.28042	8.6250	<.001
	Q48 $\Rightarrow$ Q39 -	0.28425	8.6797	<.001
Direct	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q39 -	-0.07660	-2.2622	0.024
Total	Q71 $\Rightarrow$ Q39 -	-0.00182	-0.0538	0.957