

ETHICAL STANDARDS OF RELIGION IN THE LIGHT OF GLOBAL CRISIS

(Consumerism, Ecology, Conflicts)

Abstract: *The paper argues the ethical code/standards of religion as the core of its anthropological essence. The main aspects of contemporary global crisis, among them consumerism, ecological problems, and conflicts/wars are described in the light of the main religious values: humility, poverty, love of one's neighbor and compassion. A conclusion is drawn that the majority of the societies and peoples of Late Modernity, and especially its political and economic elites, do not accept the ethical messages and the values of religion as respectable forms of regulation of spiritual and practical attitudes. The results of sociological surveys are applied to support the thesis.*

Keywords: *religion, ethical standards, humility, poverty, love of one's neighbor, compassion, consumerism, conflicts, ecological crisis.*

ETIČKI STANDARDI RELIGIJE U SVETLU GLOBALNE KRIZE

(konzumerizam, ekologija, konflikti)

Sažetak: *U radu se argumentuje etički kod, odnosno standardi religije kao srž njene antropološke suštine. Glavni aspekti savremene globalne krize, među kojima su konzumerizam, ekološki problemi i sukobi/ratovi, opisani su u svetlu glavnih verskih vrednosti: poniznosti, siromaštva, ljubavi prema bližnjem i saosećanja. Izvodi se zaključak da većina društava i naroda kasne moderne, a posebno njene političke i ekonomske elite, ne prihvataju etičke poruke i vrednosti religije kao respektabilne oblike regulacije duhovnih i praktičnih stavova. Rezultati socioloških istraživanja idu u prilog tezi.*

Ključne reči: *religija, etički standardi, poniznost, siromaštvo, ljubav prema bližnjem, saosećanje, konzumerizam, sukobi, ekološka kriza.*

The Moral Dominant of Religion

For centuries, religion, and Christianity in particular, has been closely associated with certain moral standards, i.e. an ethos: humility, love of one's neighbor, asceticism in relation to possessions, passions, goods of all kinds, valuing poverty, the transcendent at the expense of the immanent in all its forms - wealth,

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power, greed, careerism, etc. Both during the Enlightenment and today, a number of authoritative scholars in the field of humanities have continued to associate religion primarily with morality, even tying its decline to the decline of religion itself.

Along with the processes of industrialization and secularization, which brought with them the spirit and value of the present, of the earthly, of activism and consumerism, the transcendent ethos of religions gradually recedes and becomes marginalized. This is especially clear during crises of a different nature: military conflicts, environmental problems endangering the very life of our planet, etc. It is not that the above-described religious ethos has changed. It continues to exist as a text in the Holy Books, in sermons, in theological theories and doctrines, but it seems to have lost its quality as a norm, a standard, or a regulation that societies comply with. On the contrary, it is a traditional practice that, in the conditions of such crises, religious institutions and their messages usually comply and adapt to the conflicts, passions, interests of individual groups or societies experiencing such crises.

It is not by chance that in recent decades, more and more authors have defined religion as a primarily subjective endeavor - subjective in both form and content. This subjectivizing tendency produces forms and syntheses alternative to the traditional religions: hybrid, syncretic forms, esotericism, neomagic, new religions, alternative religions, or implicit religion. Behind these numerous and vague concepts, the very concept of "religion" often slips away or is replaced, to the extent that football, sex, gourmet restaurants, etc., i.e. various popular phenomena and extreme experiences are included in the sphere of the sacred and religious.

Religion and Consumer Society

Indicative in this regard is the impotence of religion, and more precisely of the religious institution, to apply its ascetic ethos in the broadest sense of the word and settle the consumerist passions of modern developed societies - the unbridled consumerism both in relation to natural resources and the continuous activation of new needs and their satisfaction with new products. It is an endlessly winding spiral, driven by the greed of the rich and reproduced by the consumerist attitude of citizens, enfolding new and new societies and social forms. I had the opportunity to become acquainted with the various interpretations of the role of religion in this process (or rather the lack thereof); its inability to enforce or at least more strongly valorize the ascetic core of its ethos to curb this dangerous consumerist element that may in the future lead to the destruction of life not in individual countries or regions, but rather on planet Earth.

On a broader socio-philosophical plane, a number of authors connect secularization or changes in the religious field with changes in the new type of

modern society, characterized by the consumer ethos, hyper-media and market logic, which replaced the previous political-theological symbolic order (Bankov, 2009). But according to some of them, this should not lead to the penetration of these concepts and categories to explain and understand the religious. the metaphors of the religious market, Weber's and Bourdieu's concepts of the demand and supply of goods for salvation, etc.

This topic was widely discussed during the 30th conference of one of the most authoritative international associations for the study of religion - ISSR (International Association for the Sociology of Religion), titled: *The Challenges of Religious Pluralism* (Santiago de Compostela, Spain, 2009). For more than 6 decades, this organization has held major international conferences biannually, bringing together religious researchers from around the world (in 2009 these originated from 50 countries) - not only sociologists, but also anthropologists, philosophers, political scientists, historians, ethnologists and etc.

For example, the British researcher Andrew Dawson in his report presentation at the 30th conference of the ISSR interprets the new spiritualisms as "mystified consumption", using the late modernity theories of Bauman, Beck, Bourdieu, etc. According to him, late modern societies are constituted by radicalization of the existing processes responsible for the emergence of the modern paradigm. This dynamics influences the religious sphere at the macrostructural level (detraditionalization and deinstitutionalization), at the medium level (hybridization and marketization) and at the microsocial level (so-called bricolage level). They lead to a cosmic enlargement of the Self of Late Modernity; they are also a reflexive rejection of society as consumerist, but they neither completely reject it nor fully affirm it, but adjust its key elements to each other; represent mystified consumption (Dawson, 2009).

Many other authors and interpretations pay attention to the role of the new religions in emphasizing individuality, and its sacralization at the expense of the desacralization of social ties, qualifying society as a "merchant without a soul."

But there are also opposing views: that the religious sphere is regulated by the same principles as economic relations - such as the principle of optimal satisfaction of each participant in the market game, characteristic of modern society. According to the report presentation at the 30th conference of the ISSR of the Canadian researcher Raymond Lemieux, this principle is also characteristic of the goods of salvation, of the religious sphere - where the processes such as deinstitutionalization, bacchanalia of supply, individualism are also characteristic of this sphere (Lemieux, 2009). The processes of individualization of faith, the so-called "I believe in my own way", are also named by some authors using economic categories - such as "individual investment" in the religious market.

According to the report of the Finnish researcher Tuomas Martikainen, since the 1970s in Western societies, neoliberalism has been involving market-type

relationships, strengthening control mechanisms over various spheres of society, focusing on social cohesion, civil society and social capital in order to ensure a predictable workforce; a new type of consumer collective identities is created. In relation to the religious sphere, this is manifested in its subordination to market mechanisms: for example, the Lutheran Church uses the services of professional marketing to create new religious needs (Martikainen, 2009). On the other hand, some of the new religions, such as the Neo-Pentecost churches, give a new meaning to money, to consumption and prosperity in their ideological layer, turning them into a sacred value, postulating the necessity of divine intervention to achieve personal prosperity, and preaching the ethos of stubborn work and prosperity as a fight against “evil forces” (Barrera, 2009).

At the same time, the opposite approach is also applied: concepts and characteristics from the religious sphere refer to the most openly, literally understood sphere of consumption (restaurants, eating): gourmet restaurants as a sacralization of taste; from the profane table to the culinary temple; a gastronomic revelation; the restaurant as a sanctuary, etc. under. As the French researcher Nadège Mézié notes in her presentation, a bridge has been thrown between neoliberal economics, politics and religion; a range of values and ideologies circulate from economics to religion (Mézié, 2009).

In this context, interesting analyzes were offered about the relationship between the “economic miracle” in Ireland and its influence on the religious sphere. According to the report of German researcher Jochen Hirschle, the “economic miracle” in Ireland catapulted the country from the pre-modern to the post-modern era. With the doubling of the gross domestic product intensity, the prevalence of religious practices decreased from 80% to 60%. The results of the analysis of socio-economic data for the period 1988-2005 show that economic growth does not necessarily mean modernization, but it certainly means secularization. Increased purchasing power creates opportunities for expanded consumption in the broadest sense of the word, including alternative concepts of life that erode traditional community ties and their corresponding religions (Hirschle, 2009). Researcher Isabelle Matte has supported this vision by arguing that modern Ireland represents an example of the transformation of a traditionally Catholic society into one in which the market is the main subject. She defined the study of the transition from the traditional social world to the consumptive society (1994-2004) as an exciting anthropological undertaking that discovered a strong mutation in the religious sphere as a result of the cultural shock of the transformation of the market into a transcendent referent (Matte, 2009).

A similar process of subjugation or mixing of religious tradition with new, modern motivations and practices was also debated in relation to pilgrimage. Special attention was paid to the phenomenon of “pilgrims” and traveling pilgrims. Walking is taken as a performance, as an achieved utopia, a mythogeography;

as a public display of one's better self, as an escape and refuge from the pressure and consumerist nature of society. It reveals holistic and therapeutic impulses related to modern medicine, psychology and the role of the sacred according to Alana Harris, Oxford (Harris, 2009).

The rediscovery of pilgrimage since the 1980s raises many questions related to the paradox that this trend is realized in the bowels of the secularization processes in Europe and the world, in the conditions of a declining growth of traditional religiosity in Europe. According to the Spaniard Nieves Herrero, this trend is not the result of a revival of religion, but rather of the application of secular values such as tourism, a syncretic spirituality in relation to the rediscovered tradition. The road to Santiago de Compostela epitomizes postmodern mobility: ritual travel, expressive and communicative mobility, finding community in a society of anomie (Herrero, 2009).

Besides these analyzing and romanticizing approaches to the pilgrimage, there have also been critical approaches that find in it an instrumental attitude towards the sacred, motivated by depressions, health problems, social isolation: waiting for a miracle that God would see the victims and grant beneficence.

In the various interactions between these modern phenomena and religion, the latter seems to be reactive rather than proactive. The "market" type of concepts with which sociology, and in particular the sociology of religion, reflects these processes is also an argument in favor of this thesis.

Religion, Ecology, Pandemic

The relationship of religion to the ecological crisis is discussed in depth by the Bulgarian scholar of religions with a special interest in Eastern philosophy and religion Dr. Antoaneta Nikolova. The author traces various contemporary points of view - of philosophers, theologians, religious figures - about the attitude of religion, and especially Christianity, to the ecological crisis. According to many of them, since the model of industrialization, activism, and domination over nature is set by Western civilization, the philosophical and religious values that are at its foundation are responsible for this crisis (Nikolova 2019). Central to these authors' criticism of Christianity is its attitude to nature, which makes it irrelevant to the emergence and formation of a new ecological consciousness. In more detail, the author dwells on the position of the historian Lynn White, who discusses this issue: "He sees the roots of the ecological crisis in the relation to nature based on the Christian worldview. The main vices of this attitude, according to him, are the established dualism of man and nature and the claim that man is authorized by God to exploit nature for his own purposes as it is indicated in Genesis 1:28. His assessment of Christianity is clear: "the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen" (Nikolova, 2019:182).

Further, the author traces different interpretations of the attitude towards nature in Christianity - both traditional and innovative, which also show the presence of potential in the Holy Books for assistance in solving the ecological crisis. In all cases, the authors speak of the need for new interpretations and theologies to make this possibility a reality. (Nikolova, 2019: 183-185).

In a similar direction are the reflections of a number of famous modern philosophers and sociologists, placed in the context of the pandemic. They seek the roots of these crises in the philosophical anthropocentrism characteristic of Western civilization. The famous sociologist Hartmut Rosa draws attention to the harmful and fruitless efforts of man to dominate nature: "We are trying to make this world completely controllable, predictable, accessible. In a strange way, our enormous inability to achieve it has returned today" (Rosa, 2020: 24). P. Sloterdijk also sees the trouble for nature and man in the latter's sense of infallibility, in his inability to foresee the far-reaching consequences of his actions. In an interview with the Deutsche Welle, he shared: "We are deeply convinced that everything we do can and should be forgiven. In an ecological sense, we are living in a period of lost innocence." (Sloterdijk, 2020).

Confirming the idea of a critical attitude towards the overconfidence of man, the authoritative sociologist Edgar Morin accepts that the values and axioms caused by the pandemic should be revised, reformulated depending on the lessons learned: "Humanism adopted two antinomian faces in Europe. The first is that of the quasi-deification of man, destined to master nature. The other humanism was formulated by Montaigne: "I recognize in every man my countryman." (Morin, 2020: 27). The absolutization of individuality does not work in this situation, a person is a unity of the individual, biological and social, the author continues, a line of reasoning that we see also available in other analysts of the situation in a philosophical plan. Moreover, man himself is ascribed the parasitic status of a virus that destroys the natural conditions for its existence, driven by a drive for economic growth, over-consumption and over-profit: "Is not the human spirit a kind of virus that parasitizes the living species, putting it in the service of its own reproduction, and even threatens to destroy it?" (Žižek, 2020: 23).

But the more important thing in this case is something else: some of the main concepts in the "pandemic" discourse - person, disease, death - have long established their secular meaning. As Jean-Luc Nancy writes "In the past, the pandemic was considered a divine punishment, since the disease was perceived as external to the social body. Today, most diseases are endogenous, caused by our living conditions. What was once divine has now become human, too human, as Nietzsche says." (Nancy, 2020: 21). In the same sense, in his essay "The Return of Death" Ivailo Dichev explains the fear and panic of the pandemic and that death has already lost its religious and political meaning for man; worldview

and socially unsupported, it remained “available” only to the individual, to his personal intellectual and emotional powers (Dichev, 2020).

According to most of the commented opinions, this individual has long since lost his “God-pleasing” features: ruthless activism and selfishness, consumerism, a sense of permissiveness and unlimited power over nature characterize his “ethos”. But the aspiration of most of the opinions discussed here is not in the direction of God-building and God-seeking, but in the direction of the need for rethinking and reasonably determined change in this his/our unethical “ethos”. The hierarchy of responsibilities was also recalled, sometimes blurred in the metaphysical (and theological) discourse about the “culpable” man in general: the ideology and practice of unceasing economic growth and consumerism, producing profits and power for some, poverty and marginalization for others.

But we started this discussion in order to comment on Agamben’s thought that “the plague was already here” (Agamben 2020). In Albert Camus’ famous novel, the plague taken as a social metaphor not only by the preacher Paneloux, but also by another character – the Saint (Jean Tarrou), who tries to become a saint without God. And while the preacher arrogantly accuses people of the evil in them and sees the disease as a punishment meted by God, the Saint feels personally engaged in and responsible for the unjust world full of death and suffering. “Yes, I have continued to feel ashamed, and I learned that we are all in the plague, and I have lost my peace of mind. I am still looking for it today, trying to understand all of them and not to be the mortal enemy of anybody. All I know is that one must do one’s best not to be a plague victim and this is the only thing that can give us hope of peace or, failing that, a good death.” (Camus, 1966).

Between these strategies – accusation or salvation of all humankind, which carries the contagion as human essence eternally in the souls of individuals or in society – Camus’ sympathy seems to be for the stance of the Healer (Doctor Rieux). The latter looks upon the disease not as a metaphor but in terms of pain suffered by people. He does not seek the causes, does not divide people into victims and executioners, does not rely on God, but understands the suffering of people, feels it deep in his heart, especially the intolerable suffering of children. His cause lies in sharing and possibly healing this suffering, and perhaps that is why he is one of the few highlighted characters among the suffering mass of people who is not struck down by the disease.

Attempts have been made in our country to philosophize along this existentialist line. They may seem belated in view of the passing of this current of thought in the West, but today’s situation is giving them a new impetus. Our young colleague Nikolay Turlakov makes an interesting attempt to construct a metaphysics of the universally human based on a literary classic. Thinking on the short stories of the Bulgarian writer Yordan Yovkov, Turlakov draws, so to

speak, a metaphysics of human suffering and loneliness, of rejection within even mass human formations. This situation is interpreted philosophically as a fundamental dimension of human existence, as an existential destiny (or as a “basic law” of humankind, as Dostoyevsky calls it in *The Idiot*). The escape from this “absurd” philosophical and human situation offered by the author is what he calls “hope-without-God”. It is in the hands of people, not of God, to offer other people compassion, support and hope. This specific “anthropology from a Romantic perspective” flows into the philosophical traditions that refer to I-Thou relations such as love, care, compassion; these are ideas we find in authors like Buber and Levinas, and before them, in Ludwig Feuerbach (Bogomilova, 2021).

Even the danger of contagion cannot subdue this yearning for closeness, as Camus testifies: “Does one not observe how each person is afraid of touching others but hungers after human warmth and how this hunger drives people towards each other, so that they may embrace, merge their bodies together?” Because “a world without love is a dead world, and there always comes a time when man is sated with prisons, with work, with courage, and looks only for a beloved face and a heart enchanted by gentleness” (Camus 1966).

But these reflections, as well as the concepts they are centered on – compassion, closeness – can also be placed in the broad framework of the main dimension of religion, that is, morality, defined by the philosopher Immanuel Kant.

Religion in the Conflict Fields of Late Modernity

I place this context of “conflict” in the relationship of religion to crises in the last place, although in analyzes of such topics it is more often put first. I am convinced that, both in the past and today, the main cause of conflicts and wars is the struggle for resources - for land, for access to water, for energy resources (Bogomilova, 2019). Despite the fact that usually this “shameful” motive is covered up with “glorious” and “patriotic” ideologies - liberation, democracy, protection of minorities, fight against dictators, etc. Although religion is usually not a leading factor in these conflict situations, it is often drawn in favor of one or each of the parties in the conflict field, regardless of its ethical standards related to humility, love of neighbor, non-resistance, appreciation of poverty, weakness, etc. As Paul Tillich put it, the religion gives absolute definitions and dimensions. This provides each community with the possibility to sacralize its being as an absolute, exclusive, incompatible (in terms of territory, politics, gender, economics, etc.) with respect to another community.

Indeed, Judit Liwerant summarizes, ethnic identities have been activated by association with religious mythologies and symbols: the revival of Islam in Bosnia, of Islam and Hinduism in the Indian subcontinent, of nationalist Orthodoxy in Russia, of new Islamic movements among Islamic communities in the West –

in a situation of a “foreign environment”. At the same time, not only in the East, or among “foreign surroundings”, but also in the West - in Ireland, America, Mexico, there have been revivals of Protestantism, Catholicism and Judaism as forms of ethnic self-affirmation, although not as strongly as Islam and Hinduism. Based on these analyses, the author makes the strong conclusion that a kind of “new racism” is emerging on a global scale (Liwerant, 2002: 256).

The Italian political scientist Maria Lanzillo writes about the return of fear in the global age as “a constitutive factor in our understanding of social relations, of the world around us and of the future...” (Lanzillo 2009: 102). Its source, according to her, is diversity, otherness, duality in its various forms: “natural diversity, the poor, women, the proletariat, dangerous classes, people of color, vagrants, immigrants, criminal states, etc.” (Lanzillo, 2009: 102).

Researchers pay attention to the development of these processes in different European countries. In the 1960s there was a strong wave of secularization in Germany, as in other European countries, notes Th. Knauth. This trend was accompanied by a growing spirit of solidarity with the Third World, with the appearance of a new generation of politicians, and with the growth of liberal ideology, critique of tradition, and rationalism (Knauth, 2007: 247).

After the end of the Franco dictatorship in 1975, which actively exploited the idea of a national Catholicism, secularization and religious pluralism gradually won ground in Spain: according to G. Dietz, these trends came with the Muslim immigrants, with the expansion of Pentecostal churches, and the multiplication of Protestant churches. But after September 11, and the terrorist attack of March 11, Islamophobia and Arabophobia have grown here (Dietz, 2007: 103). Until recently Spanish society perceived itself as being homogeneously Catholic, and the state and the Catholic Church worked together to maintain this status quo. The completion of the Reconquista was in fact the completion of the formation of a monolithic nation as regards territory, language, religion, ideology. At present, the cultural situation is such that ethnic minorities are faced with the perspective either of integration and Spanicization, or isolation and marginalization: society sets a cultural-ethnic dividing line between the “authentically Spanish” (meaning Catholic-Castilian) and the “inauthentic”, including other ethnic groups. Racial phenotype criteria are being introduced, as Dietz points out. He finds that this is due to a deeply ingrained and historically transmitted stigmatization of the “other” (Dietz 2007: 116).

On the scale of ethnic groups in Spain, the lowest position among “inferior” groups is occupied by the Roma, people of Arabic origin, and Muslims in general. After September 11, this trend has gained in force: Islamophobia is growing stronger in the media, and hostility towards immigrants in general is increasing. The Catholic Church is not taking a clear and strong stand on these discriminatory trends, and in some cases is even supporting them, G. Dietz finds.

Presenting the picture of the Muslim presence in contemporary Europe, Dan-Pol Jozsa comments that this intensifying immigrant presence leads to the strengthening of xenophobic and anti-Muslim sentiments, to the denial of Islam, to the reduction of European identity only to Christianity, etc. (Jozsa, 2007: 67-70). Regardless of objective research analyses, these xenophobic and even racist sentiments, Jozsa found, are growing, and in a number of countries, in the media and public consciousness, Islam is judged as aggressive, dangerous, fanatical: in Germany, France, Russia, Spain and England respectively by 78%, 50%, 72%, 83%, 48% of the population; and as violent respectively by 52%, 41% 59%, 60%, 32% of the population. As reasons for this unfavorable attitude, in addition to increased immigration, historical stratifications, the elitism of the European community consciousness, peculiarities of Christian theology, certain moments in the teachings and practices of Islam, etc. are also highlighted. The terrorist acts in 2004 in Madrid and in 2005 in London have also contributed to the development of this trend (Jozsa, 2007: 68).

On the Trail of a “Hot” Topic

The strong tendencies towards conflict and opposition between adherents of Orthodoxy and Islam in the former Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the period 2000-2007 was also accompanied by the linking of ethnicity and religion and an increase in religiosity in the categories of affiliation, and not so much in personal religiosity. According to researchers of the situation (which we had an opportunity to discuss at a round table in Yalta in November 2007 within the framework of a mission of the UN development program), during this period, one third of the religious communities in Crimea had been on an ethno-confessional basis, while the “Slavic ethnos” and the “Crimean Tatar ethnic group”, had been accepted as the basis of the confessional conflict Orthodoxy – Islam in Crimea in the same period (Khan, 2007).

The process of Islamic revival in Crimea began with the mass return of Crimean Tatars to their native lands in the 1980s, after their deportation in the 1940s by the Stalinist regime. Gradually, the role of Islam as a factor of ethnic mobilization became visible and strengthened. In the first stage after the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars, the attitude towards them was tolerant, since this period generally coincided with the period of already state-sponsored religious tolerance. In the period 1993-1995, according to the analysis presented there (Khan, 2007), a certain accumulation of conflict tendencies was observed, since the number of registered Islamic communities in Crimea during this period exceeded by about 3 times the number of the registered Orthodox communities.

The following period, until the end of the 1990s, was characterized by an intensifying politicization of Islam and its association with the Tatar ethnic group.

A new stage began in 2000, when there was a strengthening of mutual distances with the supporters of Orthodoxy, and this happened mainly in the conflictogenic disposition - pro-Russian Orthodoxy and Crimean Tatar Islam, tied to Ukrainian independence. The celebration of 2000 years of Christianity in the year 2000 became a kind of time division between tolerance and conflict in interreligious relations (Khan, 2007).

The lavish celebrations in connection with the anniversary, the claims of the Orthodox Church and community that Crimea is a primordial Christian territory, the placing of dozens of crosses on the territory of Crimea in this period was perceived by the Crimean Tatars as a challenge, and the response, which triggered a strong conflict period, was the mass tearing down of the crosses, the so-called "krestopoval". At the same time, the ruling political elites used the incidents to strengthen ethno-confessional identity. The equality of individual denominations provided for in the law on religion had no real coverage in practice, i.e. compliance with the democratic principles of legislation remained formal if there was no appropriate social atmosphere of tolerance and dialogicity to embody them in life (Khan, 2007).

Evidence of the activation of religious identification and the growing importance of religion on the public scene is the fact that in 2007 there were already 1,319 registered religious organizations in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, representatives of 48 religious denominations and movements, that is, 35 times more than in 1989, when there had been 37 of them. If at the beginning of the repatriation process of the Crimean Tatars, the basis of their ethnic identity was socio-cultural, by the first decade of the new century, Islam, although not canonical Islam, became the main factor for ethno-social consolidation of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group. Gradually, radicalized religious groups and movements emerged, the number of which increased manifold since the beginning of the period (Khan, 2007).

Conclusion

In a result of the above analysis we can confirm our hypothesis that the majority of societies and peoples of Late Modernity, and especially its political and economic elites, do not accept the ethical messages and the values of religion as respectable forms of regulation of spiritual and practical attitudes. Religion and Church should more effectively and publicly, and in an innovative way, support their moral standards in order to turn them into widely accepted values and regulative instruments.

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