DONALD TRUMP 2.0:
MAIN CHALLENGES, STRATEGIC OPTIONS,
AND THE "NEW" GRAND STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

The victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election of November 5, 2024, has reignited academic debate concerning the future grand strategy of the United States. This paper seeks to contribute to that debate by analysing the current global context and evaluating the strategic options at Washington's disposal. Specifically, we address two central research questions: first, what strategic options are available to Donald Trump, and second, which grand strategy will likely be chosen by the 47th president of the United States? We argue that, despite the unconventional nature of Trump's first presidential term, his strategic priorities have remained broadly consistent with those of previous administrations, particularly regarding the preservation of US primacy and the maintenance of a favourable balance of power in key regions—the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. The paper further explores the dominant strategic options available to Trump, including isolationism, offshore balancing, selective engagement, and deep engagement. We predict that Trump is unlikely to significantly alter the grand strategy from his first term, opting instead for selective engagement. Methodologically, the paper employs content analysis, comparative methods, and genealogical analysis to examine Trump's strategic options within a dynamic global context.

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Introduction

When sirens sounded in Kyiv at dawn on February 24, 2022, and bombs began to fall across Ukraine, the last remnants of faith in the world we thought we knew were shattered. That world, which had seemed defined by the hope and optimism that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, now felt distant. The end of the Cold War sparked dreams of a more peaceful, cooperative international order. Yet, recent history has been marked by a series of crises that have repeatedly shaken the foundations of the international order. Adam Tooze (2022), a Columbia University professor, uses the term "polycrisis" to name such an environment. In his view, "With economic and non-economic shocks entangled all the way down, it is little wonder that an unfamiliar term is gaining currency—the polycrisis. A problem becomes a crisis when it challenges our ability to cope and thus threatens our identity. In the polycrisis, the shocks are disparate, but they interact so that the whole is even more overwhelming than the sum of the parts" (Tooze 2022).

Some of the most defining moments of the 21st century include the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008, Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea, the war in Ukraine starting in 2014, and the global upheaval caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. These events challenged the notion that a unipolar world dominated by the United States would prevail. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 stands out as a particularly pivotal moment. It signals the return of great power competition, a shift from the relative stability many hoped would define the post-Cold War era.

The United States has faced several key questions in recent years, one of the most pressing being how to respond to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. After nearly three years of war, it is clear that the Biden administration has made its stance known: While American troops are not directly involved in the conflict, the US has provided extensive economic, military, intelligence, and logistical support to Ukraine. According to Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow (2024), US assistance to Ukraine has exceeded $175 billion, with intelligence support being challenging to quantify but crucial to Ukraine's efforts. Although Ukraine is not part of any formal US security arrangements, the support has been pivotal in Ukraine's survival as an independent state and in restoring Washington's credibility among its allies.

The second important issue was the US presidential election on November 5, 2024. While domestic policy issues have traditionally been the key drivers in elections for nearly half a century, recent polling data (e.g., Brenan 2024, Pew Research Center 2024) and focus group findings (The New York Times 2024) revealed that foreign policy played a decisive role in the choice between Donald

Trump and Kamala Harris. Voters faced a critical decision: whether to reduce America's global engagement or continue the policies of the Biden administration, particularly its handling of the war in Ukraine. According to polling aggregators like RealClearPolitics (2024), only about 40% of Americans approved Biden's approach to the war, while 54% disapproved. These sentiments about US foreign policy significantly impacted the election results, ultimately leading to Donald Trump's victory as the 47th president of the United States.

Trump's election victory raises another critical question: what will be the grand strategy of his new administration? However, before addressing that, it is worth considering whether Trump had a grand strategy during his first term. Scholars have debated this issue (see, for example, Brands 2017/2018, Brands 2018b; Porter 2018; Dombrowski and Reich 2017; Trapara 2017; Simić and Živojinović 2019; Ülgül 2020), with some arguing that his foreign policy was more tactical or characterised by "adhocracy" (Appelbaum 2017), a term Richard Haass used to describe Trump's approach. While this article cannot provide an in-depth analysis of whether Trump indeed had a grand strategy from 2017 to 2021, we will conclude that there was, in fact, a somewhat coherent vision or theory about how America could "produce security for itself" (Posen 2014, 1). Trump believed this could be achieved by focusing solely on national interests rather than global ones, adopting a transactional approach to foreign policy, avoiding American involvement in "endless wars", and maintaining a favourable balance of power in key regions.

In the well-known strategic framework of *ENDS-WAYS-MEANS + CONTEXT*, Trump changed the methods or approaches ("**ways**") to achieve the objectives, but the other two core elements, **ends** and **means**, generally remained the same. The goal of the United States remained consistent from 2017 to 2021, as it was during the Obama administration: preserving US primacy in the global order and maintaining a favourable balance of power in key regions (Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Persian Gulf). Therefore, the strategy followed by Trump was essentially the same as that of Obama and Biden, which Robert J. Art (2004) refers to as selective engagement. Eight years later, Donald Trump faced a crucial decision again: which approach to global politics and which grand strategy should he choose? Given his character and previous experiences as the 45th US president, the answer may not be too difficult to deduce, but this will be explored further in the following chapters.

This paper addresses two important questions. Given the post-Cold War history of the United States grand strategy, particularly from 2017 to 2021, we seek to answer the question of what strategic options Donald Trump has at his disposal. Additionally, we aim to answer the question of which grand strategy the 47th US president will rely on during his second term. We will primarily use content analysis methods, comparative analysis, and genealogical analysis to

answer these questions. The paper will be divided into four sections: the current strategic context, contemporary understandings of the concept of grand strategy, the dominant strategic options available to Trump, and our forecast for the US grand strategy from 2025 to 2029.

The Current Global Strategic Context

Each US president inherits a world shaped by the actions and decisions of their predecessor, which is composed chiefly of known facts and conditions— what we call *known knowns*. However, every administration also faces new challenges and possibilities arising during the president's time in office, which fall into the realm of the unknown. In Strategic Studies, these are categorised into three types: *known knowns*, *known unknowns*, and *unknown unknowns*. Donald Rumsfeld, former US Secretary of Defence under Presidents Gerald Ford and George W. Bush, defined these categories as follows: "*Known knowns* are facts, rules, and laws that we are certain about. *Known unknowns* are gaps in our knowledge that we are aware of, but we know these gaps exist. The most challenging category, however, is *unknown unknowns*—gaps in our knowledge that we don't even know exist" (Rumsfeld 2012, xvi).

The United States of America is still the only country with a global strategic presence and global power projection capabilities. During the Biden administration, the United States was in line with what he proclaimed at the beginning of his mandate as the "America is back" approach (The White House 2021). That means the US will maintain the international liberal order and actively participate in international relations. One way or another, the United States is involved in all pressing problems and present at all hot spots in the world. Global challenges will undoubtedly confront Donald Trump's second administration, favouring the "America First" approach. While Trump's "America First" policy emphasises prioritising domestic interests, it is important to recognise that even from a national interest standpoint, "America First" should not mean "America Ignores".

As Fareed Zakaria notes, "Any attempt at a grand strategy for today must also begin with an accurate appraisal of the world" (Zakaria 2008a). In this spirit, we will briefly outline the key characteristics of the current strategic context. To do so, we will draw on Joseph Nye's framework for analysing the international system (Nye and Welch 2017, 50). First, we will examine the structure of this context, followed by an exploration of its process. Nye sees structure as "the configuration of units within a system. Structures characterise how units relate. Realists consider the distribution of power the most important structural feature of the international system; constructivists emphasise its social dimensions (e.g., norms, rules, and identity relationships)" (Nye and Welch 2017, 398).

The concept of *process* is significantly more complex, and Nye defines it as "the patterns and types of interactions between the units of the system" (Naj 2006, 62). According to Nye, "the distinction between structure and process at any given time can be illustrated by the metaphor of a poker game. The *structure* of a poker game is in the distribution of power, that is, how many chips the players have and how many high cards they are dealt. The *process* is how the game is played and the types of interactions among the players. (How are the rules created and understood? Are the players good bluffers? Do they obey the rules? If players cheat, are they likely to get caught?)" (Nye and Welch 2017, 50).

When discussing structure, one of the most important aspects is power distribution in today's world. Power polarity is a central topic in international relations, referring to "the number of especially capable powers at the top of the international system" (Wohlforth 2022, 415). So, there may be different configurations of power: "A multipolar system is one in which there are three or more roughly evenly matched poles at the top of the state system; in bipolarity, there are only two; and in unipolarity, only one state meets the basic criteria of polar status" (Wohlforth 2022, 415). Some scholars, like Richard Haass, Ian Bremmer, and Randal Schweller, argue about a non-polar or G-Zero World (Haass 2008; Bremmer 2012; Schweller 2021).

The issue with today's world is that power distribution is not as clear-cut as it once was. Instead, we are experiencing a pluralistic distribution of power in international relations, with strong proponents of different power structures: multipolarity (Mearsheimer 2017), bipolarity (Lind 2024), and unipolarity (Brooks and Wohlforth 1999; 2016), even in its "partially unipolar" form (Brooks and Wohlforth 2023). In our view, we have some mixed situations in which the world is much more multipolar in the process but still not multipolar in the structure (Simić and Živojinović 2022).

Regarding the current global strategic context process, several key characteristics will matter in the second Trump administration. Since "processes of interaction include such things as diplomacy, negotiation, trade, and war" (Nye and Welch 2017, 398), we will follow that pattern.

Negotiation and **diplomacy** are crucial elements in any strategic context and within the international system as a whole. They are not merely foreign policy tools available to states, which is the ordinary way we view them (Dimitrijević and Stojanović 1996; Vukadinović 2005). Rather, diplomacy serves as a mechanism for maintaining the international system itself. White (2001, 388) explains, "Diplomacy in world politics refers to a communication process between international actors that seeks, through negotiation, to resolve conflicts short of war". What we are currently witnessing, however, is a lack of communication—or, at the very least, an insufficient level of communication—between the

prominent global actors. This includes the absence of even "Cold War-style" back channels, once vital for maintaining dialogue and managing tensions.

Vladimir Putin became increasingly isolated from the West during the Biden administration, particularly after the invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the level of cooperation between China and the United States, the two most powerful countries in the world, has not reached an adequate level. That is evident from statistics provided by Yan Xuetong (2024), one of China's leading IR scholars. According to Yan, "Under the Obama administration, there were more than 90 official channels for dialogue between the two governments. By the end of Trump's first term, there were none. Trump will likely suspend the nearly 20 channels with China that the Biden administration has established and may replace them with new channels directly under his oversight, rather than through high-ranking bureaucrats" (Xuetong 2024).

Regarding **trade** and economics, there is a growing debate about the "end of globalisation", or at least the decline of its hyperphase (Patel, Sandefur, and Subramanian 2024). They argue that "globalisation occurs when international flows of goods, services, capital, technology, and ideas increase rapidly". Hyperglobalisation, they explain, is essentially globalisation on steroids. From the late 1980s, three key factors drove the exponential rise in these flows: a sharp decline in the cost of transporting goods and communicating across borders, political leaders' adoption of globalisation-friendly policies, and, perhaps most fundamentally, the end of the Cold War (Patel, Sandefur, and Subramanian 2024). What complicates things right now is the crisis or neglect of factors two and three. Namely, regarding "globalisation-friendly policies", the international economic context is much more protectionist and regional than global, especially in the United States.

Geoffrey Gertz (2024), former Director for International Economics at the National Security Council under the Biden administration, believes we are witnessing the end of the administration's "small yard with a high fence" policy. According to that policy, "sensitive technologies should be kept within a yard, protected by a high fence of trade and investment controls. But the yard should be small, limited to a narrow set of advanced technologies with military applications, while broader commercial trade and investment with China would continue" (Gertz 2024). Under this approach, competition and cooperation coexisted. However, this middle-ground strategy is now reaching its end because Trump 2.0 will probably renew trade wars not just against China but against some allied countries as well. Furthermore, the third factor—the end of the Cold War—has given way to more "hot wars". The number of such conflicts is increasing daily. According to the NGO Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), "Political violence increased by 25% globally in 2024 compared to

2023, with one in eight people exposed to conflict and 223,000 people killed" (Euronews 2025).

That brings us to the third key characteristic of the current international context: the question of **war**. Donald Trump's first presidency was marked by his "No new wars" approach, a policy in which he took great pride. However, in the second term, he will face the challenge of managing two major ongoing conflicts—one in Ukraine and another in the Middle East—while the crisis over Taiwan in East Asia looms large. Historian Niall Ferguson warns that "the rhetoric of populism and nationalism has a historical tendency to spill over into violence—not just riots, but sometimes civil war and even full-blown war between states" (Ferguson 2025). What makes this particularly dangerous is the fact that "violence is most likely to occur when economic volatility strikes and where empires are in decline, leaving multi-ethnic societies without robust political institutions" (Ferguson 2025). Adding to this volatile mix are "three epochal challenges right now: runaway artificial intelligence, climate change, and spreading disorder from collapsing states" (Friedman 2024). Given these factors, the possibility of global conflict is higher than at any point since the fall of the Berlin Wall more than 35 years ago.

Different Meanings of the Term Grand Strategy in International Relations

"Grand strategy" is a widely used term in international relations, yet it often lacks precision. Lawrence Freedman, the "patriarch" of Strategic Studies, is entirely correct when he notes that "the literature on grand strategy is now vast, and new contributions come rapidly, often in the form of proposals for the sort of grand strategy a country—usually the United States—should adopt. At the same time, the concept appears to lack firm theoretical foundations" (Freedman 2021, 25) and, in some respects, is losing its focus (Freedman 2021, 26). Similarly, Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs, the editors of the Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy, begin their book by stating that "grand strategy is arguably the highest form of statecraft" (Balzacq and Krebs 2021, 1). Yet, they conclude by acknowledging that in "a fractured world—where structures of authority have broken down, politics has become polarised and tribal, and populist authoritarians find fertile ground—the end of the obsession with grand strategy could be its silver lining" (Krebs 2021, 685-686).

Some even argue that we are witnessing "the end of Grand strategy" (Drezner, Krebs, and Schweller 2020). According to them, since we live in an uncertain and ever-changing environment, "Grand strategy is not well suited to an entropic world. Grand strategic thinking is linear. The most direct path between two points is not a straight line in today's world of interaction and

complexity. A disordered, cluttered, and fluid realm is precisely one that does not recognise grand strategy's supposed virtue: a practical, durable, and consistent plan for the long term. To operate successfully in such an environment, actors must constantly change their strategies" (Drezner, Krebs, and Schweller 2020, 112).

What is certain is that the term "grand strategy" entered the field of Strategic Studies in the early 20th century. Precisely, between 1906, when British strategist Julian Corbett used the term "major" or "grand" oppositely to the term "minor", and the First World War, which was a "game changer" and real watershed in the field of Strategic Studies and international relations in general. (Freedman 2021, 25-26). In their writings, J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart expanded the concept of strategy beyond military tools to consider what was necessary for a nation to succeed in modern warfare (Freedman 2021, 30-31). After flourishing during the Cold War as a key concept in strategic studies, the term "grand strategy" became a real "buzzword" after the end of the Cold War. According to Freedman, this shift occurred because "just as the post-First World War embrace of grand strategy reflected dissatisfaction with an overly narrow view of what strategy entailed, the post-Cold War embrace reflected a more ambitious agenda for international security. This agenda required addressing a broader range of nonmilitary factors in order to marginalise war as an instrument of statecraft" (Freedman 2021, 34).

For the purposes of this article, it is important to establish an operational definition of grand strategy. In 1991, Yale historian Paul Kennedy offered what is likely the most comprehensive definition of grand strategy up to that point. In a book that he edited, Kennedy stated, "The crux of the grand strategy lies therefore in *policy*, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (wartime *and* peacetime) best interests" (Kennedy 1991, 5). Since the real world is full of "frictions", in a Clausewitzian sense of the word, every strategy has its limits. It is more art than, as he said, "mathematical science" (Kennedy 1991, 5). Another prominent understanding of grand strategy, particularly after the Cold War, comes from John Lewis Gaddis. In numerous lectures, articles, and books, Gaddis has argued that strategy—and grand strategy, in particular—is always about the relationship between ends and means. Specifically, in his lecture from 2009 he said, "Grand strategy is the calculated relationship of means to large ends. It is about how one uses whatever one has to get to wherever it is one wants to go" (cited in Friedman Lissner 2018, 62).

Despite these contributions, there is considerable methodological, ontological, and epistemological confusion regarding the term "grand strategy". Two essential articles, one by Nina Silove (2018) and the other by Rebecca

Friedman Lissner (2018), provide an excellent review of the ongoing debates and challenges within the field of grand strategy.

Silove recognises that "the problem with the concept of grand strategy is that it has evolved to have three distinct meanings. First, scholars use grand strategy to refer to a deliberate, detailed plan devised by individuals. Second, they employ it to refer to an organising principle that individuals consciously hold and use to guide their decisions. Third, scholars use the term to refer to a pattern in state behaviour. As shorthands, the three uses may be thought of, respectively, as "grand plans", "grand principles", and "grand behaviour" (Silove 2018, 29). In the context of the United States, grand strategy as "grand plans" can be seen in documents like "the Harry Truman administration's NSC-68 document" (Silove 2018, 37). Grand strategy as "grand principles" is exemplified by the strategy of containment employed by the US against the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Silove 2018, 40). Lastly, grand strategy as "grand behaviour" could refer to the strategy of "global hegemony", often associated with what is commonly termed "liberal hegemony", a strategy the United States pursued after the Cold War (Mearsheimer 2018, 1-12; Mearsheimer 2019, 26).

For the purposes of our article and research question, we are more inclined to adopt the model proposed by Rebecca Friedman Lissner (2018, 50). She distinguishes "between three component research agendas within the grand strategy literature: those that treat grand strategy as a variable, process, and blueprint". The "grand strategy as variable" agenda provides a prism through which academics may study the origins of state behaviour, with particular attention to the perennial question of how agency and structure interact to produce grand strategic outcomes. The "grand strategy as process" agenda foregrounds the importance of grand strategising, whether as a governmental strategic planning process or a more generic mode of decision-making. Finally, the "grand strategy as blueprint" agenda proffers broad visions in hopes of influencing future governmental behaviour (Friedman Lissner 2018, 53). In practical terms, this means that "grand strategy as a variable" primarily describes state behaviour, while "grand strategy as a process" is both descriptive and prescriptive. On the other hand, "grand strategy as blueprint…outlines prescriptive broad visions for grand strategy, particularly in the United States" (Friedman Lissner 2018, 57).

Given the ongoing debate in the United States after the end of the Cold War about how to manage American power, an issue that began with the famous "Defence Planning Guidance" of the George H.W. Bush administration in the winter of 1992 (Brands 2018a), it is crucial to understand how the Trump administration will approach this issue.

The Grand Strategy of the 47th US President:
What Are the Strategic Options?

Like previous US presidents from Harry Truman to Joseph Biden, Trump faces several global strategic options, each slightly or fundamentally different, offering a distinct vision for America's role in global affairs. The list of potential US grand strategies is vast and includes isolationism (see, e.g., Kirkpatrick 1990; Bremmer 2015), offshore balancing (see, e.g., Layne 1997; 2002; 2006; 2009; Mearsheimer and Walt 2016), restraint (Posen 2014; Priebe et al. 2024), retrenchment (see, e.g., Popescu 2014; Dueck 2015), selective engagement (Art 2004), cooperative security (see, e.g., Art 2004; Payne 2012), deep engagement (see, e.g., Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 2013), primacy (see, e.g., Monten 2007; Wertheim 2020), and dominion (Art 2004).

The strategies mentioned above are not entirely mutually exclusive and share many points of overlap. This has led Priebe et al. (2024, 137) to categorise all possible strategies after the Iraq War (2003) into two broad camps: restraint and deep engagement. However, this article will analyse four potential US grand strategies: modern isolationism or neo-isolationism, offshore balancing, selective engagement, and deep engagement. These strategies represent the most sharply defined proposals for US grand strategy and have strong historical roots in American foreign policy. For this reason, we believe that focusing on these four strategies is justified.

Modern Isolationism as a US Grand Strategy

The isolationist impulse has always been present in American society. Before World War I, whether the United States should engage more significantly in global affairs was not even up for debate. The US followed the wishes of its Founding Fathers, best encapsulated by the 6th president, John Quincy Adams, who expressed that America should not "stand under other flags" and should not go abroad "in search of monsters to destroy" (UVA Miller Center n.d.). Of course, alongside its historical legacy, the lack of power motivated the United States to pursue a cautious foreign policy, often labelled as isolationism.

During the Great War, President Woodrow Wilson faced the challenge of sending the US Army across the ocean, preventing German dominance in Europe, and creating a world safe for democracy. After Europe's freedom was defended, contrary to Wilson's wishes, isolationist sentiments in Congress prevailed, and the US once again withdrew from global politics. However, even then, isolationism did not mean a complete retreat into a "Fortress America". American exports doubled during World War I and continued to grow in the post-war years. The US organised the Washington Naval Conference (1921-

1922) and participated in the London Naval Conference (1930). It co-sponsored the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which renounced war as a political tool. Additionally, a contingent of 1,000 American soldiers was stationed in the Chinese city of Tianjin from 1912 to 1938. The US was directly involved in the Russian Civil War (1917-1923), and Washington controlled a significant number of territories outside the Western Hemisphere.

Opposition to US global engagement did not disappear before and even during World War II. In September 1940, a broad coalition of Democrats and Republicans, communists and anti-communists, retirees and students, and industrialists and farmers formed the America First Committee. The primary goal of this group was to prevent Washington from entering World War II. The committee believed that the US was blessed by its geography and that the Monroe Doctrine defined the limits of necessary engagement. One of the committee's most influential members, Charles Lindbergh, articulated two dimensions of the isolationist strategy: "An independent American destiny means, on the one hand, that our soldiers will not have to fight everybody in the world who prefers some other system of life to ours. On the other hand, it means that we will fight anybody and everybody who attempts to interfere with our hemisphere" (Longley 2022). However, after the attack on Pearl Harbour, President Franklin D. Roosevelt convinced the American public and political decision-makers that leaving isolation was both a realistic and justifiable course of action.

During World War II, the United States ventured across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and there was no turning back. The prophetic words of the renowned strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) came true: "When the opportunities for gain abroad are understood, the course of American enterprise will cleave a channel by which to reach them". The US abandoned isolationism in style, leveraging both hard and soft power to shape international institutions and the global order to its advantage. However, even though isolationist sentiment was largely overshadowed by the Soviet threat after World War II, it never entirely disappeared. In fact, in 1972, George McGovern secured the Democratic Party's presidential nomination with the slogan *Come home, America!* This message not only addressed domestic issues such as racism and economic hardship but also called for an urgent withdrawal from Indochina and a reduction in military spending.

The Cold War ended, and with the dissolution of the Soviet threat, the isolationist impulse in the United States resurfaced. The argument made by Jeane J. Kirkpatrick (1990, 40) was that America should return to being a "normal country in a normal time". She argued it was time to "give up the dubious benefits of superpower status and become again an unusually successful, open American republic" (Kirkpatrick 1990, 44). In other words, the US should relieve itself of the burdens of global leadership and focus on

addressing its domestic challenges. Isolationism as a potential grand strategy for the US is not without logic or support, even if presented in a more modern form. Even critics of isolationism have acknowledged its appeal. For example, Krauthammer (1990, 27-28) considers it a popular and natural call, noting that such a conclusion is not only based on geography but also on history: "America was founded on the idea of cleansing itself of the intrigues and irrationalities, the dynastic squabbles and religious wars, of the Old World".

Although isolationism, or modern isolationism as a grand strategy, does not have significant support among decision-makers, its role in the debate over potential US strategies has not disappeared. In fact, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the renowned magazine Foreign Affairs published its March-April 2020 issue with the headline "Come Home, America?" The message was the same as that of McGovern almost half a century earlier, with the only difference being, though not insignificant, the question mark at the end. Contemporary isolationism is significantly different from the 18th-century version, and today's arguments for isolationism as a US grand strategy would likely sound blasphemous to the Founding Fathers. One of the key proponents of modern isolationism is Ian Bremmer, president of a firm that advises global leaders and companies. In his book, Bremmer (2015) outlines three strategic options available to Washington: Indispensable, Money-ball, and Independent America.

Among the three options, Bremmer (2015) chooses "Independent America", which represents a modern isolationist approach. He summarises his arguments as follows: not all global problems are America's problems, and the US cannot be the world's policeman; America's appetite for conflict has only grown since the Cold War, while faith in the US Constitution and its founding principles has declined; superhero-style foreign policy poisons American democracy; unfavourable trade agreements, such as NAFTA, have negatively impacted the US economy; it was not power that made America exceptional, but freedom; and military spending has become overly burdensome, among other points.

In short, modern isolationism does not mean complete disengagement from all affairs across the Atlantic and Pacific. Still, it calls for a drastic reduction in America's global footprint and a refocusing on domestic issues. Modern or neo-isolationism would answer the question "Come home, America?" affirmatively, but it would not foresee a complete and quick withdrawal, as such a move is unrealistic. The world today is very different from the 19th century, and technology and the current level of interdependence make disengagement from world affairs almost impossible.

A grand strategy of isolationism would have several key characteristics: unilateralism, specifically the application of a non-interventionist doctrine and unilateral distancing from issues beyond the Western Hemisphere; a focus on

domestic challenges such as the economy, education, infrastructure, healthcare, immigration, and so on; a reduction in military spending and the withdrawal of US forces from bases around the world; and the retention of complete freedom of action, without the constraints of alliances like NATO or international institutions such as the United Nations. However, it is essential to note that isolationism is a strategy whose swift implementation would not be feasible. Given Washington's existing security, economic, and political networks, transitioning to isolationism would take years, if not decades.

Offshore Balancing as a US Grand Strategy

Immediately after the end of the Cold War, a dilemma arose regarding the new grand strategy for the United States, the world's sole superpower. Proposed strategies ranged from a return to neo-isolationism to global dominance or primacy (see, e.g., Posen and Ross 1996). Often oblivious to these differences, many failed to recognise that various viable options existed between these two extremes. One option frequently misunderstood as neo-isolationism is "offshore balancing". This concept was introduced by Christopher Layne (1997), although scholars such as John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2016) argue that it was, in fact, a strategy the US had practiced throughout much of the 20th century, even if the term itself emerged only in 1997. In essence, the core principles of offshore balancing align closely with US foreign policy throughout much of the past century, where Washington engaged in global affairs only as much as necessary to eliminate the most significant threats to American security while maintaining its primacy.

The modern understanding of the offshore balancing strategy primarily stems from the writings of neorealists. Layne (1997; 2002; 2006; 2009), Mearsheimer and Walt (2016) conceptualised the strategy based on the historical experience of the United States and, as they argue, the disastrous outcomes of Washington's strategy of liberal hegemony or deep engagement after the Cold War. Neorealists do not share identical views on the origins of the need for this strategy or how it should be implemented. Still, their positions are similar enough to suggest a core framework for a grand strategy. When analysing the works of key authors (Layne 1997; 2002; 2006; 2009; Walt 2005; 2006; 2018; Mearsheimer 2014a; Mearsheimer and Walt 2016), one arrives at the common denominator in answering the question of why offshore balancing is the most suitable strategy for the United States: "1) Unipolarity is unstable; 2) Countries like the US or the UK are blessed by geography; 3) If you don't know what's good, go back to the realist core; 4) Balance of power > hegemony; 5) Deep engagement reduces, not increases, security; 6) Ideological crusades are not in the US national interest; 7) The rise of the rest (Zakaria 2008b); 8)

Washington should not *a priori* renounce unilateralism; 9) Offshore balancing is not isolationism; 10) Power is inexhaustible; 11) US hegemony is a double-edged sword (Layne 2002, 233); 12) Not all world regions are equally important; and 13) America first!" (Nedeljković 2024).

The last two postulates form the foundation of the goal that the grand strategy of offshore balancing aims to achieve. The primary US strategic imperative is "to keep the United States as powerful as possible, ideally, the dominant state on the planet" (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016, 72), i.e., to "concentrate on what really matters: preserving US dominance in the Western Hemisphere and countering potential hegemons in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf" (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016, p. 71).

According to the advice of proponents of offshore balancing, the United States could achieve this through the following measures: first, by drastically reducing its presence in Europe and the Persian Gulf, while maintaining a military presence in East Asia due to the Chinese threat; second, by maintaining a favourable balance of power and preventing the emergence of a new hegemon in key regions; third, by relying on allies in crucial regions and intervening only when there is a threat to the existing balance of power; fourth, by continuing to strengthen and develop military capabilities to maintain the ability to project power, with the backbone being "robust nuclear deterrence, air power, and—most importantly—overwhelming naval power" (Layne 1997, 113); fifth, the spread of democracy, the promotion of open markets, and the protection of human rights worldwide would no longer be part of US foreign policy priorities (Nedeljković 2024); and sixth, the United States should remain a member and leader of post-WWII initiatives it created, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, and the International Monetary Fund.

It should be noted that the proposed strategy is not isolationist, as it advocates for continued US involvement in multilateral organisations and initiatives, as well as a military presence in specific regions and unilateral action when it serves US national interests. On the other hand, it calls for a reduction in American military presence and the US role in making "the world safe for democracy" (Ikenberry 2020). Like selective engagement, offshore balancing fills the space between the extremes of isolationism and deep engagement. The only significant difference from selective engagement is the perception of necessary security commitment.

Selective Engagement as a US Grand Strategy

Selective engagement stands halfway between isolationism and deep engagement or domination, specifically "between an overly restrictive and an

overly expansive definition of America's interests" (Art 2004, 121). What distinguishes it from isolationism is that it involves defending national interests abroad, while from deep engagement, it recognises that not all important interests can be fully realised. In contrast to offshore balancing, proponents of selective engagement argue that US interests in key global regions are not solely about preventing the emergence of a new hegemon but also about maintaining peace. Robert J. Art (2004, 121), one of the strongest advocates of selective engagement, believes that America should draw on lessons from isolationism and the Cold War to adopt a balanced strategy that lies between the two problematic solutions of isolationism and deep engagement.

Art (2004, 122) outlines six defining characteristics of the grand strategy of selective engagement. First, it is a hybrid strategy that "borrows the good features from its competitors and seeks to avoid their pitfalls and excesses". For instance, it adopts isolationism's reluctance towards war. On the other hand, like deep engagement, it leverages the benefits of military power but without imposing its will on others. Its greatest strength lies in its diversification, which makes it "more resilient, more adaptable, and more effective than the alternatives" (Art 2004, 122). Second, it identifies fundamental goals that best serve the United States in the current era (Art 2004, 121). In other words, it blends core realist objectives, such as security, with liberal values, such as human rights and free trade. Third, it directs US attention to key regions. Like offshore balancing, selective engagement prioritises Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East Asia. These regions are vital for economic reasons, for US security commitments through NATO and other partnerships, and because they harbour the potential for the rise of a new hegemon.

Fourth, Art (2004, 136) argues that selective engagement is a forward defence strategy. Specifically, this strategy encourages the US to maintain its commitments within organisations such as the Organisation of American States and NATO and through bilateral arrangements with countries like Japan, South Korea, and other essential states. The advantage of this approach lies in several key points: "It deters adverse military actions; it reassures key regional actors and thereby buffers regions from destabilising influences; it enhances regional security cooperation and management; and it facilitates waging war should that become necessary" (Art 2004, 139). Fifth, this strategy includes a set of reasonable rules for using force, such as the principle that war should only be waged for vital interests rather than for every significant issue. It also sets criteria for possible exceptions (Art 2004, 146). Finally, proponents of selective engagement argue that American leadership is essential. They claim that US leadership is the key to preserving primacy while defending vital national interests.

Deep Engagement as a US Grand Strategy

The grand strategy advocated by proponents of unipolar stability theory, who are closer to realism, such as Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, as well as by liberals like John Ikenberry, is deep engagement. This strategy is similar to selective engagement, but unlike the latter, it aims to reshape the world in America's image. Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth (2013) argue that all US administrations since World War II have pursued this strategy to maintain security and prosperity. Key strategic instruments included expanding the liberal economic order and fostering allied relationships with key states in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. A good illustration of this strategy is a statement made by US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, during the debate on intervention in Bosnia, when she told Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" (Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 2013, 137).

Deep engagement requires both leadership and the global footprint of the United States, as well as involvement, even when Washington's direct interests are not at risk. This strategy often conveys, sometimes implicitly and at other times explicitly, the idea that the United States should aim to transform the world. Washington should inspire the world to pursue the preservation of peace, democracy, and open markets. In the vision of deep engagement, America is not only exceptional but also an irreplaceable force whose involvement is essential to making the world less threatening to the United States. In fact, this represents a grand strategy that proponents argue America has followed since 1945, when the Cold War ended. Scholars like Joseph S. Nye (1995) believed that America must remain deeply engaged in global affairs. The core idea behind forward presence worldwide is to ensure stability, reduce the need for excessive armament, and deter the rise of a new hegemon (Nye 1995, 91).

Since deep engagement has undoubtedly been the most prominent strategy in US foreign policy since World War II, it has also been the subject of the most criticism. It is often referred to as *global domination* (Mearsheimer 2014b), *primacy* (Mandelbaum 2005), *liberal hegemony* (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016), or *preponderance* (Layne 1997). Although there are specific differences between the above concepts, they also share enough similarities. One of these is that the United States must confront and respond to any threat as soon as it arises. Critics primarily argue that it is too costly and risky, prompts balancing coalitions, and ultimately leads to the erosion of the United States' status as the most powerful global force. For example, Mearsheimer (2014b, 9) somewhat mockingly concludes that the American political elite operates on "the assumption that every nook and cranny of the globe is of great strategic significance and that there are threats to US interests everywhere". On the other

hand, proponents of deep engagement (Brooks, Ikenberry, Wohlforth 2013) respond by arguing that the costs of the US strategy outweigh the benefits, that military dominance fosters economic supremacy, that there are no balancing coalitions on the horizon, and, ultimately, that deep engagement is the "devil we know", while all alternative strategies are risky ventures.

Every strategy, including grand strategies, must follow the famous formula: *Ends–Ways–Means + Context*. While the grand strategies we have analysed differ in terms of the resources the United States possesses, the ways and the instruments used to achieve their objectives, and even in their analysis of the current strategic context, the goal is the same across all of them: to maintain the US in its current position within the global order. In other words, to remain the only superpower in the international order and the sole regional hegemon.

Trump's "New" Grand Strategy

When Donald Trump "takes the keys" to the White House on January 20, 2025, the eyes of the entire world will be focused on Washington. Several reasons point to this conclusion. First, the United States remains the world's only superpower and the most influential country in the international order. Second, fires are raging around the globe, from Ukraine to Gaza, and putting them out will be impossible without Washington's involvement. Finally, while some world leaders celebrated Trump's victory, others expressed anxiety and uncertainty after the results were announced. Yet, everyone is still asking whether he will fulfil his campaign promises and what his foreign policy will look like in a second administration. Will he follow the "Project 2025" guidelines from the influential conservative think tank Heritage (Dombrowski 2024)?

Predicting the secrets of the future is one of the most challenging tasks in international relations. The "flocks of black swans" (Taleb 2010) that the world has faced in recent years confirm that it is nearly impossible to predict all the events and changes in the international order. Nevertheless, the absence of reliable forecasting raises questions about the purpose of science itself. Therefore, in this paper, we will dare to attempt to forecast Donald Trump's grand strategy. We start with the premise that "forecasting is a problem of reasoning, of reducing uncertainty, and of bounded and disciplined speculation" (Choucri 1974, 63), and we will try to position our argument concerning existing alternatives.

We argue that during his second term, Donald Trump will rely on a grand strategy of selective engagement rather than neo-isolationism, offshore balancing, or deep engagement. Of course, this assumes no global chaos would threaten the survival of the United States or the international order itself. In conditions of standard and expected turbulence, we contend that Trump will

choose selective engagement for three reasons: first, based on the approach he took during his first term; second, in light of the positions he has expressed during his 2024 presidential campaign; and third, through a cost-benefit analysis.

Donald Trump 2.0: 45 = 47?

Since entering the race for the Republican nomination in 2015, Donald Trump has been labelled as unpredictable (see, e.g., Bentley and Lerner 2023; Fuchs 2017). While it is undeniable that his behaviour has often been "erratic, combative, self-indulgent, and decidedly unpresidential" (Walt 2018, 132), Trump is not as unpredictable as he is frequently portrayed. Many of his ideas may be outside the traditional political mainstream and unfamiliar in the context of the modern US presidency, but the 45th US president has consistently adhered to them. As Elizabeth N. Saunders (2024) points out, "Trump's core beliefs have been remarkably consistent". For example, since the 1980s, he has advocated for a tougher stance towards allies, a smaller government, stronger borders, and a robust military. From 2017 to 2021, he persistently prioritised bilateralism over multilateralism and personal relationships with leaders instead of institutional approaches.

Additionally, the US's vital national interests have not changed compared to those of the Obama administration. Trump believed that maintaining US primacy in global affairs was essential to sustain a favourable balance of power in key regions and counterbalance potential competitors. As Stephen Wertheim (2020, 20) argues, "US President Donald Trump often portrays himself as breaking with the basic pattern of recent American foreign policy. Many of his detractors also see him that way. In truth, Trump has carried forward and even intensified the post-Cold War agenda of his predecessors: spare no expense for military hegemony, and find little to spare for the earth's climate or the well-being of anyone who is not wealthy".

During Trump's first term, the institutions of the liberal international order did not collapse. NATO expanded to include two Western Balkan countries, and all US Cold War or post-Cold War alliances endured. Like Obama, he prioritised peace, rejected US interventionism, and adopted a more "Pacific" than "Atlantic" approach to foreign policy. Additionally, authors like Richard Fontaine (2025) argue that there is a striking similarity between Donald Trump's first term and Joe Biden's term. On the other hand, multilateral institutions, the spread of democracy, and free markets were not high on Trump's agenda. Additionally, Trump's diplomatic style as the 45th president was unconventional. For instance, negotiations with authoritarian regimes like Kim Jong Un's in North Korea or announcing foreign policy moves via Twitter were unimaginable before January 20, 2017.

Nevertheless, key strategic priorities from 2017 to 2021 remained unchanged compared to the Obama administration. Viewed through the lens of strategic formulation, the ends and means largely remained intact, with the most significant changes occurring in the ways—that is, the methods used to achieve these goals. Additionally, Trump is not someone who pays much attention to the strategic environment. If that were the case, he would not be taking threatening actions against allies in key regions during a time of renewed great power competition. Instead, he would be doing everything possible to contain those threats. All of this suggests that, during his first term, Trump employed a grand strategy of selective engagement.

Trump: Political Campaign = Political Reality?

It is common for politicians to make significant deviations from the promises they make during their campaigns. However, we argue that this was not the case with Donald Trump. First, during his first term, he fulfiled or made significant efforts to fulfil his key foreign policy promises. He withdrew the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement and the Iran Nuclear Deal, pursued a maximum pressure policy on Iran, insisted that NATO members increase their defence spending, negotiated a new free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico (USMCA), criticised China for "economic aggression" and unfair trade practices, and worked on strengthening the military, among other actions. In other words, he tried to apply a transactional, business-like approach to global politics, cornering main competitors and pressuring allies "to shoulder a fair share of the burden of responsibility to protect against common threats" (NSS 2017).

Second, although Trump has been active in politics since 2015, he remains an unorthodox politician and an authentic person. His impulsive and sometimes childish nature prevented him from making decisions based solely on political calculation or public opinion. In fact, he often caused headaches for Republicans with his statements or politically damaging choices. This trait will likely become even more pronounced during his new term, as, according to the 22nd Amendment to the US Constitution, his second presidency will be his last. Although he has never been overly concerned with reelection, from 2025 to 2029, we will see every aspect of Trump's character. In other words, in his second term, "he will be his uninhibited self, free to pursue policies he has always favoured" (Saunders 2024). Therefore, all of his campaign statements about tariffs, trade wars, Israel, China, international agreements, and institutions should be taken with complete seriousness.

Finally, according to research by Elizabeth N. Saunders (2017; 2024), "the beliefs that presidents hold when they arrive in office are 'sticky'—in other

words, presidents don't change their core views much over time". Although the findings of this research may not be universally applicable, they certainly hold for Donald Trump. His policies during his first term were not only consistent with the views he expressed during the 2015-2016 campaign but also with the political beliefs he voiced back in the 1980s. Even then, Trump argued that allies were "taking advantage" of the United States, that many countries engaged in unfair trade practices, and that he would always impose tariffs on every Mercedes and every Japanese product entering the US market (Playboy Interview 1990). Given that he applied these longstanding beliefs in the presidential office from 2017 to 2021, we see no compelling reason why he would not continue to do so from January 20, 2025, onwards.

Trump = Cost-benefit Analysis?

Among scholars and political analysts, it is widely believed that Trump seeks to apply business logic to foreign policy. The core principle of his approach to other countries is calculated *zero-sum* transactionalism, which reduces the importance of ideological or value-based alignment in international relations. In other words, if the US is giving more than it is receiving in its relationship with a particular country, or if Trump perceives this to be the case, there is no doubt that the new US president will seek to redefine the bilateral relationship in order to balance the cost-benefit analysis. The same applies to grand strategy. During his first term, whether consciously or not, Trump chose selective engagement as his grand strategy. Although he sought to distance himself from previous administrations, especially Obama's, he did not succeed in doing so because selective engagement remains, at this point, the best option in a cost-benefit analysis.

Proponents of grand strategies focused on retrenchment or restraint, such as neo-isolationism and offshore balancing, argue that these strategies offer the greatest benefits at the lowest cost (see, e.g., Bremmer 2015; Layne 1997; 2002; 2006; 2009; Walt 2006; Mearsheimer and Walt 2016). However, it seems that the cost of these strategies in the current strategic context is too high. A US withdrawal from key regions would alarm allies, who would inevitably seek alternatives, ranging from building independent strategies to aligning with US competitors like China, Russia, and Iran. Moreover, there is little doubt that competitors would exploit Washington's retreat to fill the vacuum. On the other hand, the United States already attempted to apply a deep engagement strategy during the 21st century, particularly under the George W. Bush administration, which viewed America as an irreplaceable force, where every global threat was seen as an essential threat to US security, and every US interest abroad was considered vital. Today, the strategic context for implementing such a strategy

is even less favourable than at the beginning of the century, and the costs of deep engagement would be almost incalculable.

We believe selective engagement will remain the United States' grand strategy from 2025 to 2029, among other reasons, because it offers the best cost-benefit results. By adopting this strategy, the US would remain the world's most powerful country and a regional hegemon. It would maintain a favourable balance of power in key regions—the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. At the same time, interventionism would be limited to cases where vital US interests or principles are threatened, as was the case during Trump's first term with ISIS and the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria. Selective engagement, which includes the principle of forward posture (Art 2004), would allow Trump to respond when necessary to protect American assets or allies in key regions. In other words, it would combine the principles of transactionalism and non-interventionism with a focus on US security.

Conclusion

The world that will greet Donald Trump is somewhat similar to the one that Joe Biden inherited on January 20, 2021. At that time, the United States had already entered an era of geopolitical competition with key challengers, China and Russia, and both administrations have sought to sharpen the US "competitive edge for the future" (see, e.g., NSS 2017; NSS 2022). The unipolar world and the liberal international order were called into question in 2017 and 2021. Although Trump's sharp rhetoric undermined the confidence of allies in the US, all bilateral and multilateral security arrangements persisted and continue to exist today. Additionally, domestic divisions did not disappear during the Biden administration, and the term "Divided States of America" remains relevant—perhaps even more so today than four or eight years ago.

On the other hand, today's world is somewhat different from what it was four years ago. Wars not seen in a long time are now raging in Ukraine and the Middle East. No matter how much Biden wishes to distance himself from the era of "endless wars" during George W. Bush's presidency, the US's indirect involvement in current conflicts is significant. Furthermore, the security threats the United States faces have increased substantially, including the risk of nuclear conflict. The Commission on the National Defence Strategy (Harman et al. 2024, v) concluded, "The threats the United States faces are the most serious and challenging the nation has encountered since 1945". Additionally, the Commission found that "in many ways, China is outpacing the United States and has largely negated the US military advantage in the Western Pacific through two decades of focused military investment" (Harman et al. 2024, v).

In other words, the rise of other powers and the post-American world that Zakaria (2008) wrote about nearly 17 years ago is now fully visible.

This paper's final lines are written in early January 2025, while Trump is still the president-elect and has not yet taken the helm of the USS America. However, signs of his future policies are already beginning to emerge. If our predictions prove accurate and Trump chooses a grand strategy of selective engagement again, China will be at the centre of Washington's focus. In the current global context, only Beijing can be a genuine challenger to the US, threatening its global primacy and disrupting the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. In other words, China can potentially negatively impact key elements of the US grand strategy. Other actors either lack the desire—like European allies—or the capability—like Russia and Iran—to effectively oppose Washington globally.

If Trump firmly adheres to the priorities of selective engagement, the next four years will see intense economic, military, diplomatic, technological, and institutional competition between Washington and Beijing. Although China was already a focus for Trump from 2017 to 2021, his attention will now be even more pronounced. The appointments of figures like Marco Rubio, Pete Hegseth, John Ratcliffe, Michael Waltz, and others (except for Waltz, all are awaiting Senate confirmation) send a clear message that the Trump administration will adopt a hawkish stance towards China. In the evolving asymmetrical multipolarity, or bi-multipolarity, where the United States and China emerge as the two dominant poles, it is evident that any instability between them will have ripple effects on the rest of the world.

Trump's second term will serve as a kind of laboratory for testing theories of international relations. The structure of the international system suggests that the world in the near future is unlikely to become a better place, and Trump's character leaves little room for optimism. From a liberal perspective, never before have two dominant centres of power been as interdependent as the United States and China are today, which might reduce the likelihood of conflict. Some constructivists argue that "a hybrid grand strategy of cooperative security and selective engagement presents a path for a peaceful rise of China without compromising America's core interests in Asia, US regional hegemony, or the United States' status as a superpower" (Jamison 2021). Regardless, it is unlikely that Trump's term will provide a final answer on the nature of Sino-American relations, but it will certainly help set the course.

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DONALD TRAMP 2.0: KLJUČNI IZAZOVI, STRATEŠKE OPCIJE I „NOVA" VELIKA STRATEGIJA SJEDINJENIH AMERIČKIH DRŽAVA

Apstrakt: Pobeda Donalda Trampa na predsedničkim izborima u SAD 5. novembra 2024. godine, rasplamsala je akademsku debatu o budućoj Velikoj strategiji Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Cilj ovog rada je da doprinese debati kroz analizu trenutnog globalnog konteksta i strateških opcija Vašingtona. Nastojaćemo da odgovorimo na dva istraživačka pitanja: prvo, koje su strateške opcije na raspolaganju Donaldu Trampu i drugo, koju će Veliku strategiju odabrati 47. američki predsednik. U radu tvrdimo da su, uprkos tome što je Trampov prvi mandat bio obeležen neuobičajenim pristupom, njegovi strateški prioriteti ostali prilično konzistentni prioritetima prethodnih administracija, posebno u pogledu očuvanja primata SAD i održavanja povoljne ravnoteže snaga u ključnim regionima – Indo-Pacifiku, Evropi i Persijskom zalivu. Dalje istražujemo dominantne strateške opcije koje su na raspolaganju Donaldu Trampu, a pre svega izolacionizam, uravnotežavanje s obale, selektivno angažovanje i duboko angažovanje, i iznosimo predviđanje da Tramp neće menjati veliku strategiju iz prvog mandata – selektivno angažovanje. U radu koristimo metod analize sadržaja, uporedni metod i geneološku analizu kako bismo adresirali Trampove strateške opcije u živopisnom globalnom kontekstu.

Ključne reči: Donald Tramp; Sjedinjene Američke Države; velika strategija, selektivno angažovanje; izolacionizam; uravnotežavanje s obale; duboko angažovanje.