

CHINA'S EMANCIPATORY DIPLOMACY FOR A PEACEFUL, DEMOCRATIC, AND SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL COMMUNITY

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ABSTRACT

This research explores the theoretical formation of the People's Republic of China's diplomacy. Despite efforts to relate its theorisation into communicable terms, the West considers them a thin veneer for the ruling Communist Party's propaganda. China's diplomatic actions are portrayed as manipulations of a power-greedy state for global might, ready to tear apart the existing arrangements and overtake the United States on the apex of world power. Although a "wolf-warrior" stream in diplomatic practice can sometimes run high, studying China's theorisation of diplomacy reveals the ideational normativity of willpower for relationships of mutuality. Xi Jinping's "Thought on Major Country Diplomacy", formatively shaped in 2014, shows that China's diplomacy emancipatory crux is frightening to those alarmed by the country's might. We will test this proposition by conducting a contextual content analysis of relevant sources. The Chinese emancipatory diplomacy conceives the use of the state power for the joint sharing of life, time, and the planet. It is poised to lead to the principled and just consent of all states to achieving an inclusive, equitable, fair, democratic, and peaceful international order of balanced and just autonomous development and global governance through mutually ascertained multilateralism in a human community with a shared future.

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“He who conquers others is strong; He who conquers himself is mighty”,
Lao Tze (老子).

Getting Right the Core of China’s Diplomacy

A scientific inquiry into the People’s Republic of China’s (the PRC, China) diplomacy requires addressing its distinct tenets scrupulously. The unbiased dealing with this country’s official conception of what diplomacy is and why, who should manage, implement, oversee, and conduct it, when, where, and how, and with what outcomes, effects, and impacts, does not imply valuing any as appropriate. Deciding to have an open epistemological stance allows sensible distinction of nuances. Further, an impartial analysis of the Chinese theoretical conceptualisation of diplomacy can lead to research on whether this state’s diplomatic actions sincerely “walk the talk” of theorisation. If we perform the latter task responsibly now, it will enable us to do the former task properly later on. Directed attention to the unfolding of China’s way of theorising diplomacy requires a more extensive and in-depth probe. To grasp its way of diplomacy, the focus needs to be on the uniqueness of the very theorisation process.

The key to solving the puzzle of China’s theorisation of diplomacy is how diplomatic theory-building is performed. The Chinese practice a collective diplomacy theory-building. Although institutionalised, this process is still held out of analytical sight. Since 1971, the *ad hoc* Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs (外事工作会议) has been organised by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The second one was held in 1991, and the third in 2006. This analysis of the collective theorisation of diplomacy is focused on how it was done at the Fourth Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held in Beijing on November 28 and 29, 2014.³ Delving into the emancipatory design of China’s diplomacy includes meticulous care for contextual and theoretical inweaving of the unique state identity with changes in long-term planning, strategic orientation, and day-to-day diplomatic work. The complete analytical apparatus of the text analysis of the foundational theorisation of emancipatory diplomacy can be found in the Annex.⁴

³ The Fifth Conference, the next significant event in the evolution of Chinese diplomatic theory and strategies, was organised on June 22 and 23, 2018 (Xinhua 2018). The most recent, the Sixth Conference, held on December 27 and 28, 2023 (SCPRC 2023), further solidified the regularity and increased involvement of political and social actors, including specific local communities and the business sector in this collective diplomatic theory and strategy-building process.

⁴ The entire protocol for quantitative and qualitative content text analysis of the officially published reports is attached in the Annex to this article.

Of primary importance is the theoretical prism of the Communist Party of China. It is put together from Deng Xiaoping's theory (邓小平理论)⁵, the in-depth principled guiding theory of the "three represents" (三个代表)⁶, and the Scientific Outlook on Development (科学发展观)⁷. This theoretical prism is used to get an overview of systemic conditions appropriate to China's strategic opportunity for thriving while pursuing its goals through diplomacy. The aim is to gradually transcend the limitations of the infeasible international system. It became burdened with crises and overloaded with indeterminacy. The Party leadership felt obliged to prove able to keep the strategic opportunity for the country's secured peace and development safe by adjusting the course in global affairs. Preservation of the undisturbed systemic environment for peaceful development was then, as it is now, the must. Henceforth, after the 2008 world's tumult and the generational change at the Communist Party's helm in 2012,⁸ the circumstances were ripe for the theoretical refreshing of Chinese diplomacy and its operations.

More clearly than ever, China's diplomacy emancipatory crux and style were thoroughly configured "from head to toe" at the 18th CPC Congress. In his Report⁹ to this congress, then-General Secretary Hu Jintao elaborated on the

⁵ Deng Xiaoping, a key figure in the development of the socialist system, drew on Vladimir Ilich Lenin's New Economic Policy theory to design a policy of economic reform. This policy, tailored to the system's own characteristics and needs, demonstrated the system's capacity for self-improvement.

⁶ Jiang Zemin introduced the Three Represents Theory. This theorisation of socio-political relations between the party and the people stipulates that the party must always represent and promote "the advanced productive forces, the orientation of the development of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people in China" (Zemin 2001).

⁷ Hu Jintao (Hu 2007, 8) presented the Outlook as the socio-political theory on China's future development at the 17th Congress of the CPC, underscoring how it "takes development as its essence, putting people first as its core, comprehensive, balanced, and sustainable development as its basic requirement, and overall consideration as its fundamental approach."

⁸ At the 18th Congress of the CPC, Hu Jintao concluded his term as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi Jinping took this post on November 15, 2012, through party selection and the election process. He was the first CPC member born after the new communist China was established to hold this position.

⁹ This report was, as habituated, a quite long document. It contained the following 12 chapters: "I. Our Work in the Past Five Years and the Basic Experience We Have Gained in the Past Ten Years; II. Achieving New Victory for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics; III. The Goal of Completing the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Deepening Reform and Opening Up in an All-Around Way; IV. Accelerating the Improvement of the Socialist Market Economy and the Change of the Growth Model; V. Keeping to the Socialist Path of Making Political Advance with Chinese Characteristics and Promoting Reform of the Political Structure; VI. Developing a Strong Socialist Culture in China; VII. Strengthening Social

necessity and direction of emancipation in global terms. He stated that China has been following the right path and must stay the course since:

“Mankind has only one earth to live on, and countries have only one world to share. History teaches us that the law of the jungle will not lead to the coexistence of human society and that the arbitrary use of force cannot make the world a better place. To pursue peace, development and cooperation and oppose war, eliminate poverty and avoid confrontation in order to build a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity – this is what the people of all countries long for” (Hu 2012).

From the 18th CPC Congress onwards, the rhythm of reviving the theoretical outlook of international relations has fastened. Therefore, the utmost sensitivity is in high order in foregrounding the endogenous conditions and exogenous influences from which the Chinese contemporary diplomatic agency is theoretically sculptured. In that regard, there is a dual puzzle. Concomitantly, China’s theorisation of diplomacy has been undermined, while claims abound that it is overtaking the world’s ordering.

Since China lavishes on diplomacy, although many researchers suspect it is backed by diverse means of coercion, it follows that the Chinese diplomatic actions, despite lacking theoretical grounding, are succeeding in altering world order. Elizabeth Economy (2024) is among analysts who assume the Chinese are engaged in establishing an “alternative order”. Her thesis is that this gives the United States (US) a learning opportunity to counter the alternative construction of order while avoiding unnecessary confrontation. She pictured (Economy 2024, 8) it as indisputable that Xi Jinping wants to change the entire global system, break apart Washington’s relationships, and remove what he considers to be “Western” principles from international organisations. He aims to overthrow Washington’s dominance over important technologies and dethrone the US dollar. Chinese ideas about shared security and economic development, as well as principles of state-determined political rights and technology, will all serve as the foundation for global institutions and norms in a new multipolar system. China will not have to struggle to take the lead, as its economic prosperity, ideals of state-determined political rights, and technology

Development by Improving the People’s Wellbeing and Making Innovations in Management; VIII. Making Great Efforts to Promote Ecological Progress; IX. Accelerating the Modernisation of National Defence and the Armed Forces; X. Enriching the Practice of “One Country, Two Systems” and Advancing China’s Reunification; XI. Continuing to Promote the Noble Cause of Peace and Development of Mankind; XII. Making Party Building More Scientific in All Respects” (Hu 2012).

will contribute to its primacy. It assumes the leadership in global relations and is undoubtedly central (Economy 2024, 8).

We are partly in agreement with the above assumption. Yes, China has developed an autonomous conceptualisation of how international relations can unfold differently, how the international system can be different, and how global governance regulation can accordingly be changed. Yet, from here on, our argument differs. We propose that all these aspects of the ideated altering stem from the Chinese conceptualisation of diplomacy. Straightforwardly, in a unique constellation of unprecedented conditions for profound change, their quest for a reformed global order is built upon diplomacy. Diplomacy is posited as the virtuous apparatus for freeing the state from multiple fears, allowing it to govern jointly and justly, as equal with all other states, a sustainable and resilient world for the current and next generations. It normatively roots transcending anarchy, the consequent security dilemma rationalisation of inescapably self-driven interstates' competitiveness, and international relations as the struggle for power regulated by the capacity of the preeminent state or group of them to keep others in check. We consider this modality of the Chinese thought on diplomacy as a conception of an emancipatory mode.

Emancipation is a signature trait of their thinking and acting for altering the global order and not merely a metaphor. Findings of one comparative study of multilateral diplomacy (2022) in the shifting relations between the United States, the European Union (EU, Union), and China suggested a trend of multilateralism's change only metaphorically categorised as emancipation:

“One could claim that the current transformations of multilateralism resemble a process of emancipation. It can be seen as an emancipation from the US as sole hegemon and more broadly an emancipation from Western domination in many multilateral institutions. In addition to this, it may even be an emancipation from the state-centric origins of multilateralism. But whether or not the metaphor of emancipation does justice to the process of change that multilateralism is currently undergoing: while we can identify current trends... not only further research will be needed but also patience” (Wu, Gaenssmantel, and Giumelli 2022, 273).

In Xi Jinping's *Thought on Major Country Diplomacy* as the theoretical conceptualisation of China's diplomacy, the emancipatory potential of state-centric diplomacy is set unambiguously. It accorded to diplomacy the liberation of the state from the fear and dangers of both anarchy and domination and hegemony, either institutionalised or informal. The certainty that ongoing unprecedented change allows China to diplomatically nudge other states to liberate themselves through diplomacy from the fears of a hegemon and the need for hegemony is puzzling. It might even seem too bold. Its implication is

not only the emancipation of states from fierce competition and the vagaries of power politics, but almost a negation of the well-known Tilly's (1975, 42) statement, "War made the state, and state made war". For some, it might look overly idealistic. For others, it can be solely a part of the Communist Party of China's (CPC) "mirage industry".

Why do the Chinese purport that the change in the international system does not necessitate the waging of war, but the order-making unfolds through the diplomatic activities of states? In their vision of order, the very cause of friction and confrontations among states is their uneven and unequal development, expressed in the balance of power, interests, and threats. If states deploy diplomacy towards the attainment of balanced, just, and autonomous development through the assistance of developed states to the less developed ones to boost their prosperity according to their own needs, the root causes of war will be eliminated. Then, the decline of the international order of US hegemony can be peacefully overcome by diplomatic actions orientated towards establishing an international order of balanced, just, and autonomous development for all. Hence, neither the hegemon nor the balance of power is needed. The democratically revived United Nations will be the main institution of this mutually ascertained multilateral order instead of mutually assured destruction. Consequently, global governance regulation founded upon the norms of international law, which are applied diligently, will guarantee the rule of law and interstate democracy in decision-making. Pluralism and diversity being fully recognised and respected will be the sources of thriving states and all peoples jointly caring for their well-being and the planet's wellness in sharing the future as a human community.

The above summary of China's thinking of the international and global system's transformation centred on diplomacy brings to the analytical focus its emancipatory mode and how it was theoretically developed. Not enough attention was paid to studying the process of Xi Jinping's *"Thought on Major Country Diplomacy"* evolving and what makes the Chinese diplomacy mode emancipatory. The ruling canon of diplomatic theory, prevalently Western in construction and outlook, cannot be mechanically applied to understanding the Chinese theoretical stance on diplomacy. Scientific dialogue on these two strands of thinking about diplomacy is still missing. That matter is waiting for researchers to take the helm. The prerequisite for such an endeavour is to start it free from biased assumptions. Therefore, delving into Xi Jinping's *"Thought on Major Country Diplomacy,"* supposing that it conceptualises a type of emancipatory diplomacy, must begin from when it was expounded and debated. It was at the Fourth Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs (外事工作会议) held in 2014.

To proceed thoroughly, the methods and research materials will first be presented. A critical review of the literature on China's diplomacy and the classical understanding of European state diplomacy unalloyed with the theoretical additions of International Relations over time is the central aspect of this part. The elements of the classical knowledge of state-centric diplomacy will be applied in developing key analytical categories for the textual analysis, pre-tested on the actual Chinese diplomatic actions. The results of contextual qualitative textual analysis of the theoretically emancipatory layout of Xi Jinping's *"Thought on Major Country Diplomacy,"* elaborated in 2014, will be explained in the next part. The discussion will review the main theorisation tenets solidified before the Sixth Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held at the end of December 2023. At this two-day meeting, the theoretical progress was discussed to conform diplomacy to new demands posed by percolating tensions in global relations. The conclusion will succinctly answer the research questions in what respect China's theoretical conception of diplomacy is emancipatory to enable further research on whether its diplomatic actions confirm that it is practised.

Research Methods

The Chinese visibly started to assert the right to legitimate its diplomatic authoritative might in 2014. This has been received by the United States and the Western part of the world as almost bordering on the intention of stripping the US of its global hegemony. In recent years, the growing weariness with the strain of the "wolf-warrior" diplomatic boldness of some Chinese diplomats and state officials has been adding fuel to the fire. Even invocations of the looming nightmare of the Hobbesian state of global affairs were not rare. Alleged China's drive for world preeminence has caused it. Here, obviously, a realist understanding of the international overpoweringly intervenes. It assumes China has overgrown its allotted place in the International Liberal Order. Hence, the chosen way to free itself from the restraints will be to challenge and subvert the power of the US as the hegemon. According to the always mighty realist dictum, also lingering on the margins of liberal internationalism, "the freedom of choice in any one state is limited by the actions of all others" (Waltz 1959, 204). Upon his command to the thinking process, it is pondered that Chinese free choice could not be anything other than actions for tearing apart the existing order-established rules limiting their freedom of choice by other states' actions.

Therefore, China's conduct on the international analytical radar has been in the spectre of a "revisionist" to a "revolutionary" rather than a "reformist" state (e.g., Chan et al. 2021; Chu 2020; Huiyun 2009; Mitter 2022; Shambaugh 2001). Inclination to Schweller's (1994; 2015) view of states' dissatisfaction with

an international order when it constrains their rising power has suggested a “tragic world” (Schmidt 2013). Mearsheimer’s (2001) “tragic realism” condemns the great powers to the tragedy of their “power politics”. But what if the rising state achieves power status determined to avoid the pitfalls of great power politics yet deems the existing order unsatisfactory to itself and the majority of states? One possibility rarely accounted for and investigated is the freedom of choosing diplomacy to address the shortcomings of order and use diplomatic means to transcend them peacefully.

Why did China conceive such an avoidance of the “Thucydides Trap” (Allison 2017)? In what ways does China use diplomacy to avoid falling into the “Kindleberger Trap” (Nye 2017)? China’s riddle becomes even more intriguing since it has continued to provide global public goods instead of a free ride. Nothing is inevitably dramatic or tragic, even in the rising turmoil. Diplomacy’s inventiveness to restrain power is enormous. Even when the crumbling of order starts because the hegemon begins to behave like any other state, it does not equal the “iron law,” as the “power transition theory” sets out. Neither China’s free choice of diplomacy is inevitable. Nevertheless, one could think that its “territorial incompleteness” enforces strategic restraint to using force and opting for ample diplomatic tools. On the other hand, China’s choice of diplomacy can be attributed to unique Asian or domestic wisdom translated into a theory. But these are all wagers. Whether or not the theoretical understanding of Chinese diplomacy is mirrored in real-world behaviour is only a matter of conjecture and belief if the scientific impartial evaluation is missing.

The theoretical grounding methods for this research are historical-comparative and model methods. The model method is used to derive analytical categories from the classical theorisation of diplomacy in diplomatic theory. In the empirical part, the case study method (Gomm, Hammersley, and Foster 2000) will be applied for generalisation from a single case study of the theoretical foundation of Chinese diplomacy in 2014 and the relevant subsequent precisions. The qualitative technique of content analysis (Kuckartz and Rädiker 2023) will be applied to extracts from the relevant official Chinese textual documents on how Xi Jinping’s “*Thought on Major Country Diplomacy*” was theoretically grounded in this very constitutive moment of conceiving diplomacy as emancipatory. The theoretical outline of emancipatory diplomacy will then be processed to see if the main elements hold after the constitutive theoretical enterprise. The representative selection of China’s core bilateral, regional, multilateral, and interregional diplomatic actions during 2023 was used to pre-test empirically the analytical categories of diplomacy theorisation. From the findings, it will be possible to infer whether the gathered evidence corroborated our leading hypothesis that the Chinese theoretically developed the mode of emancipatory state diplomacy. We will use three specific

collections of materials in the research. The first consists of scientific monographs on China's diplomacy. The second set contains theoretical works on diplomacy. The third set of materials is primary Chinese sources related to the theorisation and the practice of their diplomacy.

Chinese diplomacy has gotten into the focus of analysts' attention since the change of cadres at the Communist Party of China's helm in 2012 and later in 2013 at the ruling position of the state (e.g., Ali 2023; Cheng 2020; Freeman 2020; Iida 2020; Jia 2021; Jiechi 2013; Jianfei 2017; Jiemin 2016; Kurlantzick 2008; Liu and Liu 2023; Shixue 2024; Sun 2021; Wang 2019; Wang 2022; Xiao and Men 2021; Yi 2013; Yi 2016; Yuan 2023; Zeguang 2018; Zhang 2018; Zhang 2021; Zhang and Hong 2023; Zhong 2019; Zhu 2016). Some authors researched China's bilateral diplomacy in detail (e.g., Akdağ 2024; Jiechi 2014; Loh 2024; Zhang 2022; Zhang and Yang 2023), as well as the bimultilateral form (e.g., Mu and Menglong 2023; Yang 2023). Others devoted their investigation to China's multilateral diplomacy in a similar period (e.g., Jiechi 2011; Liu 2021; Miaofa 2010; Ruipeng 2020; Shamim, Nasim, and Shah 2023; Wuthnow, Li, and Qi 2012; Zhirui and Lin 2023; Zhimin 2012). China's substate diplomacy was also studied (e.g., Wei 2021). Reading thoroughly through those works, we have found many relevant points to solve the riddle we are dealing with. Yet, interconnecting these threads into a coherent understanding has China brought out the theorisation of diplomacy in its new mode, which is what it has been lacking.

The two most common directions in the diplomatic theory and the study of the diplomatic practice are fixed to its Western modernity form. Diplomacy is a European invention that became global through the expansion of Europe and, later, the US. One conceives diplomacy metaphorically as international relations' "engine room" (Cohen 1998). This almost mechanistic industrial metaphor was partially relaxed by another direction introduced by Bull (Bull 2002). He conceptualised diplomacy as "a custodian of the idea of *international society*, with a stake in preserving and strengthening it" (Bull 2002, 176). Again, the metaphor was used to explain diplomacy. This time, it was one with Biblical origins and religious overtones. It secularises the European theological position of God's given custodianship to humans for the care of its creation, thus socialising them while preserving Eurocentric god/human duality. Both directions universalised the history of European diplomacy as the theory of diplomacy quelling histories of relations of sharing life, time, and the Earth within other civilisations. Myriads of entanglements made international relations and international societies of states more diverse in the past than both of these metaphors for defining diplomacy capture. Nevertheless, they tend to set Europe's history of diplomacy as a universal one. Some of these entanglements led to oppositional paths even in the European history of diplomacy as they do currently. To understand the Chinese conceptualisation of diplomacy in the second decade of the 21st century, both

directions of unilinear and historically incorrect unification of diplomacy meaning are unsatisfactory.

Neither is it helpful to think of diplomacy as “divorced” from the state. The usual state-centric understanding is reductionist. Diplomacy is seen as an instrument of statecraft (Freemen 2023, 41) or as one of the state’s tools for implementing foreign policy. On the opposite side, unspecific thinking of diplomacy is going on. It is conceived as “the mediation of estrangement” (Der Derian 1987, 42). Attempts to specify mediation as an “essence” of diplomacy lead to either keeping separateness (Sharp 2009) or trying to overcome it by inserting the dose of humanism by pinning it back to individual introspection as:

“Homo-diplomacy”—that is negotiating identity borders, one’s own interests, and needs—not just strategic “hetero-diplomacy,” that is concerned with persuading or controlling others by way of implementing given policy” (Constantinou 2013, 144).

The unspecified “dealing with difference” (Adler-Nissen 2015, 22) stays affiliated with diplomacy in International Relations as a discipline that took diplomacy under its wing of understanding and explaining.

To get to the definition of diplomacy that accommodates non-linearity and plurality of lived experiences, it is necessary to go back almost a hundred years to the diplomatic theory. In that regard, Ernest Satow’s (1922) effort to isolate its modern meaning is indispensable. He defined diplomacy as “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes also to their relations with vassal states” (Satow 1922, 1). His explanatory fix of diplomacy to the knowledge and the unique manner of official interstates’ relations making them the prerogative and responsibility of their governments is unambiguous: After the overview of diverse understandings of diplomacy over the period since the coining of the word in English and its meanings by Edmund Burke in 1796, Satow concluded:

“When we speak of the ‘diplomacy’ of a country as skilful or blundering, we do not mean the management of its international affairs by its agents residing abroad, but their direction by the statesman at the head of the department. Many writers and speakers are deposed to put the blame for a weak or unintelligent diplomacy on the agent, but this mistake arises from their ignorance of the organisation of public business. The real responsibility necessarily rests with the government concerned” (Satow 1922, 4-5).

Therefore, the categories for empirical analysis of diplomacy’s theoretical conceptualisation must start from the conceiving of diplomacy’s relatedness to the state. Next are the organisation of state governance and the purposes of state-led diplomacy. The following taxon is the set of diplomacy goals (strategic, specific, state-individual, and directive to practising diplomacy). The categories of concrete diplomatic conduct (innovations in diplomacy and organisation of

diplomatic work), types of diplomatic actions (bilateral, multilateral, bimultilateral, regional, and interregional), and values pertinent to diplomacy will lead to the comprehensive categorisation of diplomatic approaches enveloped within the theoretical conceptualisation.

Results

In 2013, Xi Jinping, the newly elected President of the PRC, spread further the concept of “a community of common destiny”¹⁰ for a global systemic change. In the same year, he also launched the vision to renew the multiplication of transnational cooperation along the ancient “Silk Road”. The initiative was initially dubbed the “One Belt One Road” (OBOR), to be renamed the Belt and Road Initiative. It involves cooperating in diverse sectors and geographies and getting a thin multilateral institutionalisation through the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation¹¹. The early dynamic generator

¹⁰ In his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO) in March 2013, Xi Jinping presented a unique perspective on international relations. He described the world as a common home of all humanity, emphasising the unprecedented interconnectedness and interdependence among countries. This view, which he elaborated on in a manner reminiscent of Western hermeneutics, was also deeply rooted in Chinese wisdom, evidently in the statement: “In this world, the level of interconnectedness and interdependence among countries is unprecedentedly raised. Human beings are living in common global village, in one time and space in which history and present are meeting. Thus, it is more and more becoming the community of common destiny with me in you and you inside me” (Xi 2013a). This innovative approach to understanding international relations will have this emancipatory idea of mutuality as pervasive human intra-connectedness as the fil rouge.

¹¹ Three high-level meetings of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, or the Belt and Road Forum for short and with the acronym BRF, have been held thus far. The first high-level meeting of this forum was convened in 2017 in Beijing to stir close collaboration and joined-in coordination of the practical deliverability of multidimensional interconnectivity projects in various sectors networking Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America. The second high-level meeting of the Forum platform was held in Beijing in 2019, resulting, among other outcomes, in instituting the BRI International Green Development Coalition on the initiative of China's Ministry of Ecology and Environment. At the third high-level meeting organised in 2023 in Beijing, the platform branched thematically to coordinate “Trade Connectivity, Maritime Cooperation, Clean Silk Road, Think Tank Exchanges, People-to-People Bonds, and Subnational Cooperation” (BRF III 2023, point 2). Ahead of this meeting, a CEO conference was also held. Further, it is concluded that strengthened international Belt and Road cooperation requires additional institutionalisation. China has committed to “work with Belt and Road partner countries to strengthen the building of multilateral cooperation platforms covering energy, taxation, finance, green development, disaster risk reduction, anti-corruption, think tanks collaboration, media, culture, and other fields. China will continue to host the BRF and establish a secretariat for the Forum” (BRF III 2023, point 7(8)).

of the foreign investments later served as the model for infrastructural grounding of the desired change with global scope (Xi 2013a). In a speech delivered at the Nazarbayev University in Astana, Xi gave the following outline and rationale for the new initiative with its historical roots in the ancient Silk Road's connectivity throughout Eurasia to Africa. The OBOR is conceived:

“To forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development space in the Eurasian region, we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an ‘economic belt along the Silk Road’. This will be a great undertaking benefitting the people of all countries along the route. To turn this into a reality, we may start with work in individual areas and link them up over time to cover the whole region” (Xi 2013b).

The innovation process of diplomacy theorisation at the Fourth Conference in 2014 was the culmination point in ideational and, therefore, normative transforming of the Chinese worldview in the second decade of the 21st century. The CPC's central leadership convened this most representative gathering of the Chinese ruling echelon, devoted entirely to the theoretical uplifting of diplomacy and revamping its spirit demanded by “the underlying trend of the times” (Xinhua 2014). Li Keqiang¹² presided over the two-day deliberation. Attendees, among other party and state notables, were Zhang Dejiang¹³, Yu Zhengsheng¹⁴, Liu Yunshan¹⁵, Wang Qishan¹⁶, and Zhang Gaoli¹⁷. Xi Jinping delivered a key address outlining the foremost elements of his thoughts on Major Country Diplomacy. He summed up the first achievements, as habituated in this type of collective theory-building enterprise. Xi emphasised the successes of Chinese diplomatic engagement with the world and in relating to the world after the 18th National Congress of the CPC. His main argument was built around continuity and consistency. He praised the Chinese foreign affairs community for its diplomatic success. Its members posted abroad were primarily credited

¹² At that time, the member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Premier of the State Council.

¹³ Then, the member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

¹⁴ At the time, he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

¹⁵ Then, the member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee.

¹⁶ At the time, he was a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection of the CPC Central Committee.

¹⁷ He was then a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Vice Premier of the State Council.

for the positive results. Building upon these diplomatic accomplishments, the second part of his address brought a significant remake of diplomacy. It upgraded the theoretical facets of China's emancipatory diplomacy mode.

It transpires that Xi understood diplomatic theory-building as a scientifically reflexive knowing that must be firmly aligned with the "trend of the times" (Xinhua 2014) for the seminal endeavour of relationships-making, using the state power for shaping jointly with others the just sharing of life, time, and the Earth (Stefanović-Štambuk and Joksimović 2023). Strivings towards achieving universal relations of mutuality were set forth. China's diplomacy's emancipatory thrust in bringing closer the sovereign independent states through methodically woven liberating relationships from hegemonic forces expressed the willpower for relationships of the socialist state. In a diversified global setting of rapidly changing international and global systems' relations, mired in uncertainties, diplomacy has been given a significant quadruple purpose.

First, in the turbulent external environment, Chinese diplomacy's social purpose must be the realisation of the "Chinese dream" (中国梦). Xi emphasised the following:

"Keeping in mind new tasks that should be carried out under new conditions, we have worked hard to creatively pursue China's diplomacy in both theory and practice, highlight the global significance of the Chinese dream and enrich the strategic thinking of peaceful development" (Xinhua 2014).

The "Chinese dream" is the national interest purposefully concretised to be attained by the time of the "Two Centenary" in 2049. A reformed China's diplomacy must contribute to the materialisation of "the great renewal of the Chinese nation" (Xinhua 2014) in honour of the centennials of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China. The great renewal was defined as the achievement of two sets of goals. One set relates to "doubling the 2010 GDP and per capita income of urban and rural residents and finishing the building of a society of initial prosperity in all respects" (Xinhua 2014). Another set of goals was to make China "into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious" by that time (Xinhua 2014).

We discovered that the second purpose of Chinese diplomacy is the holistic human one. It is to yield China's prosperity to the whole of humanity by embedding systematically through new types of win-win cooperative international relationships its growing welfare into the growth of other states and their nations' welfare. All the directions in which such purposed diplomacy of building a new type of international relations creates them, as distinct special types having the holistic human purpose of betterment of all, are marked by the fact of supporting and imbuing mutuality through the winning cooperation

(“win-win cooperation”). This is the most contentious point from almost all perspectives of modern Western thought of the international order. From their standpoints on human nature and human associative relationships, it is impossible for one to have “a cake”, eat it, share it with others, and make it that way larger for all.

Therefore, confrontations with this Chinese worldview from every Western theoretical wing are focused on rebuking this stance on cooperation as mere empty propaganda unreasonable and easily deniable by the simple laws of physics. Yet, what is clearly sensed and reasoned is that China is laying the groundwork for supplanting the West’s “*homo economicus*” determinism and pursuit of selfish individual “life plans” in a constant struggle for relative gains. The new model of balanced and just development purported by China is a linchpin for the new international system free from power politics, the balance of power, and hegemony. Its offer is essentially the same as what sustainable development conceives. This goal of diplomacy at the international system level provides a concrete means of realising the shared worldwide concept of sustainable development. It was reached at last in 1992 following intense negotiation. The goal stems from the recognition that sustainability serves as a conceptual road map for understanding how the problems and obstacles facing humanity today result from the world’s erroneous arrangement brought about by technology and war in relations-making. This unsustainable existing meshwork must be transcended. That imperative necessitates change towards sustainable development, prefiguring “*homo harmonious*” envisaged by the old Chinese wisdom inherited from the range of their ancient thinkers, not only or solely Confucius.

Henceforth, creating a new type of international relations, in addition to supportive mutually win-win cooperation, includes putting forward and following “a policy of upholding justice and pursuing shared interests” (Xinhua 2014), championing “a new vision featuring common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security” (Xinhua 2014).

Awareness of China’s success in making itself a powerful state by freeing close to 800 million inhabitants from poverty (World Bank 2022) is almost palpable. The Bank’s (2022) data from tracking global extreme poverty, defined by the International Poverty Line as living daily with incomes below \$1.90, shows China’s contribution to “close to three-quarters of the global reduction in the number of people living in extreme poverty. At China’s current national poverty line, the number of poor fell by 770 million over the same period”. Poverty was inflicted by colonialism and ill governance. Yet, this recent transformation from “rags to riches” was not distorted into greed for strength but prod the emancipation to might. Lao Tze held this as the wisdom of ruling the state, and the CPC accepted it as its creed. Internationally, China overcame

its dependency and imperialist subjugation to become a responsible participant with a high stake in the ordered world. It did not translate its newly gained strengths into a towering power figure. Self-legitimation is intentionally formed with the might to be a “major country” rightfully and not a “big power” or “superpower”, since it leads diplomacy appropriately to the multiplicity of its culturally pervaded identity over millennia of civilised life. From there stems the holistic humanity’s purpose of co-existence in peace on the shared planet as the precondition for having a future not just for the sake of survival but for thriving life in well-being. Thriving today enables the next generations to lead good lives unconstrained by erroneous conceptions of life expounded by the living generations.

The third purpose of emancipatory diplomacy is to build a global community with a shared future. A major country’s new model of relations must first and foremost be shown in creating and maintaining friendly, sincere, inclusive, and mutually beneficial relations with neighbours (Xinhua 2014). China’s bilateral diplomacy, in general, has to be orientated to making diverse partnership relations short of alliances, neither defensive nor offensive. Relations without blocks or security alignments must be sought everywhere, particularly in Africa, where they must feature “sincerity, delivering outcomes, affinity and good faith” (Xinhua 2014). All these ties, be they bilateral, multilateral, regional, or interregional, are weaving a human community with a shared future governing jointly and respectfully peaceful and just sharing of life, time, and the Earth.

The fourth purpose of China’s diplomacy, which will become more salient in years to come, is a universal purpose: to help restore harmony between humanity and nature. This constitutive relationality is the most distinctive standpoint in ancient Chinese philosophical thought. Human misguided actions must not disturb the joint pulsation of Heaven and Earth. Mindfulness and care for an undisturbed energy flow must underpin the human reverence for nature. Such a relationship with nature is what we refer to as sustainability today. Ancient Chinese thinkers perceived this ability as a profound and noble-centred understanding of the universe’s interconnectedness in human thoughts and actions. Today, China reaffirms this same conception, insisting that:

“We should make our world clean and beautiful by pursuing green and low-carbon development. It means bidding farewell to the destructive exploitation of resources and preserving and enjoying the lush mountains and lucid waters. Humanity coexists with nature. Any harm we inflict on nature will eventually come back to haunt us. We often take natural resources such as air, water, soil and blue sky for granted. But we could not survive without them (SCIOPRC 2023).

The four-pronged approach to practising emancipatory diplomacy was envisioned. Its theorisation will stay open for enrichment and further development, while diplomacy will be conducted boldly with “a salient Chinese

feature and a Chinese vision” (Xinhua 2014). It will “uphold the CPC’s leadership and socialism with distinctive Chinese features” (Xinhua 2014), which is firmly tied to China’s “development path, social system, cultural tradition, and values” (Xinhua 2014). New self-confidence and determination are glaring and a precursor of later comments on Xi’s new “24-characters” daring doctrine and assertive “wolf warrior” diplomacy.

Discussion

There is a penchant for devaluation not only of the relevance but also of the prudence of “Marxist-Leninist Thought with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. Even its close entwinement with system thinking inwoven with the ancient philosophical traditions is either outright dismissed or only Confucianism inheritance is singled out, diluting influences of other philosophers. Any coherent theoretical thought on diplomacy, even after the formalisation of Xi Jinping’s “*Thought on Major Country Diplomacy*” (大国外交理论), has been undervalued. Allegedly, China conducts diplomacy without any meta-theory guardrails. Additionally, there has been an overexploitation of the claim that no prior comprehensive theoretical overlay existed. China’s diplomacy is seen to be led by pragmatic handling of learning on the spot. Diplomacy conducted as circumstances command was considered the source of ex-post systematisation as playing the role of theory-building. From time to time, the CPC translated the gained practical experiences as knowledge accrued into summaries of practice for further “diplomatic work”.

Consequently, the unique theorisation of peaceful coexistence diplomacy (和平共处外交), peaceful development diplomacy (和平发展外交), harmonious world diplomacy (和谐世界外交), win-win cooperation diplomacy (共赢外交), and most recently emancipatory diplomacy of building a global community of a shared future (命运共同体外交) remains yet underexplored.

Although diplomacy’s relatedness to the state was not directly mentioned in the first conceptualisation in 2014, all other references indicated what Xi Jinping spelt out in 2019. He defined diplomacy as the “concentrated embodiment of the will of the state” (Xi 2019, 550) in world-making. As for the organisation of the state and its conduct of diplomacy, he stressed that “diplomatic powers must be held by the Party Central Committee” (Xi 2019, 550). The struggles to liberate Chinese people from the suffering, misery, and humiliation brought upon them by foreign oppression and monarchic internal mismanagement were entwined with the rise of the Communist Party of China. It is not a small matter that China’s emancipation from the yoke of colonialist and imperialist states of the then-nascent West, which started near the end of the 19th century, had ingrained today’s power of the CPC. In the decisive battle

for independence and unification, the CPC prevailed. A pride of China's populace in a long and formidable continuous civilisation, again flourishing in the gained freedom from oppression in 1949, was offended and hurt in the same year. Then, the decision was made to segregate this state from the Liberal International Order's main multilateral institution, the United Nations (UN). The new communist government's right to represent the Chinese state in the UN was withdrawn. This move, spearheaded by the United States, enraged by China's loss to communism, left a deep fault line in the construction of this country's diplomacy.

"Leaning to one side", to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was not just an ordinary ideological choice of relationships. It was also the extorted action of coercion by exclusion from the international society of states and the international community. Disdain for oppressiveness, colonialism, imperialism, domination, power politics, and hegemonism in international relations has been firmly engrained from these new encounters of subjugation by the most powerful state at that time, i.e., the US and its allies. This injustice has been remembered not only within the CPC's ranks and files. It is also carved in the hearts and minds of people from all walks of life. The contempt and mistreatment of the Chinese state because of the free choice of the social, political, and economic system and the form of domestic governance that was found to be appropriate and good, could hardly be separated from the feelings that rejection from the states' system in 1949 stemmed from the US and the West European countries' disrespect for the different, diverse, and distinct civilisation, culture, and even race.

Already in 1953, Zhou Enlai, at that time China's foreign affairs minister, started to introduce in diplomatic intercourse with the newly independent India's government the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (和平共处五项原则). They were envisaged as guidance for the new type of international relations, first and foremost between decolonised states. In 1954, China and India jointly affirmed these principles as the basis for their relations. Officially, the Principles formed the irrefutable foundation of China's external relationships' praxis and theoretical work. They were constitutionally enshrined as a set of open and inclusive international law principles:

"...China pursues an independent foreign policy, observes the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence..." (PRC Constitution 2019, Preamble).

Faced with the US-orchestrated exclusion from international affairs, the leadership of China's ruling Communist Party ventured into a mode of "revolutionising diplomacy". It experimented with the Marxist-Leninists' permanent internationalised struggle to extricate the state from imposed

subjugation. Until the normalisation of relations with the US in 1971, “anti-diplomacy” (Der Derian 1993, 29) was almost made the Chinese communists’ own brand. The social purpose of diplomacy, be it “revolutionising”, particularly in the 1960s, or “normal” ever since partaking in the US “triangular diplomacy” (Hanhimaki 2003), the assumption of the rightful representation in the UN and gaining back the legitimate standing in the international system, was own emancipation and the world’s emancipation from underdevelopment and power politics. Since the country’s “opening up”, it has never been severed from its forwarded positively holistic humanity’s purpose.

Using its own theoretical prism, the leadership of the Communist Party of China has come up with an answer to the most challenging questions of the suddenly uncertain times in the first decade of the 21st century. The main problem occurred with the 2008 global financial crisis and the extremely slow recovery of the US and the EU’s economies. The chosen austerity policies have deepened societal distress in these polities. Hence, the main questions were whether such a shift holds the strategic opportunity for China and whether its early emancipatory diplomacy is sustainable and sufficient in that regard. This concern was considered for China’s sake and the planetary good. Transcending peacefully to a new era of interhuman relationships and humanity relating to nature was considered a prerequisite for the continuation of the Chinese state and society on the path towards attaining their strivings for a better-ordered world and joint, peaceful, and just global governance. Transboundary crises accumulating in fast succession bothered ruling China’s circles the most. Therefore, they got emboldened by coming out relatively unhurt from these crises.

Without significant losses in their own system’s stability and prepared for the foreseen sharpening of international contradictions, they have come to see that they must double down on diplomacy to preserve the strategic opportunity. This stepping up was not taken upon as any “idealistic” mission to save the world by its own writ or newly gained might. Finally, the last shred of expectations that the administration of the 44th President of the United States, Barak Obama, was planning to upgrade relations with China commensurable with its new relative significance was fast lost in 2009. The joint management of the global economic crisis through the summit mechanism of the Group of 20, where China and America would supposedly act in concert as almost the G2, dissipated as a possibility at Obama’s first press conference in 2009.

China’s emancipatory diplomacy design is fully articulated in an explanation of its roots sustained by wisdom of mutuality throughout the relatedness of many-faceted relations spanning diverse nations, cultures, and ages of their existence given in the White Paper “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions” (SCIOPRC 2023):

"All civilizations around the world have manifestations of the concept of a global community of shared future. Ancient Greek philosophers conducted primary research on this concept based on city-states, believing that humanity as one community should act in concert to pursue common interests and thus must live in harmony. Ancient Indian literature records the motto "Under Heaven—one family". The African philosophy of Ubuntu holds that "I am because we are," emphasizing interdependence of humanity. The concept of a global community of shared future reflects the common interests of all civilizations – peace, development, unity, coexistence, and win-win cooperation. A Russian proverb holds, "Together we can weather the storm". The Swiss-German writer Hermann Hesse proposed, "Serve not war and destruction, but peace and reconciliation." A German proverb reads, "An individual's effort is addition; a team's effort is multiplication." An African proverb states, "One single pillar is not sufficient to build a house". An Arabian proverb asserts, "If you want to walk fast, walk alone; if you want to walk far, walk together". Mexican poet Alfonso Reyes wrote, "The only way to be profitably national is to be generously universal". An Indonesian proverb says, "Sugarcane and lemongrass grow in dense clumps." A Mongolian proverb concludes, "Neighbors are connected at heart and share a common destiny". All the above narratives manifest the profound cultural and intellectual essence of the world" (SCIOPRC 2023).

Also, the fourth purpose of emancipatory diplomacy of China, which might be styled as geadiplomacy or telluric diplomatic purpose, is one of the main theorisation tenets approved by the worsening of the "triple planetary crisis" (UNFCCC 2022). It is elaborated in more detail in 2023:

"Industrialisation has created a level of material wealth never seen before, but it has also inflicted irreparable damage on the environment. We must not exhaust all the resources passed on to us by previous generations and leave nothing to our children, or pursue development in a destructive way. Lush mountains and lucid waters are invaluable assets. We must follow the philosophy of harmony between humanity and nature and observance of the laws of nature and pursue a path of sustainable development so that everyone is able to enjoy a starry sky, lush mountains and fragrant flowers" (SCIOPRC 2023).

Conclusion

Although China does not label its diplomacy emancipatory in all but the "name," it is thus. Starting from this main assumption, the inquiry into enigmatic China's theorisation of diplomacy led to findings speaking clearly of its prowess to harness the power of diplomacy. It is understandable that the Western states are finding themselves challenged by the state and society that they have been looking down upon from their self-styled summit of invented modern times for

mighty affluence and sturdy influence belonging exclusively to them. China is the most puzzling among alleged challengers to the imposed Liberal International Order with its vision of betterment for all the planet's peoples, the planet, and the commonized future for the generations to come.

We assumed that the Chinese theory of emancipatory diplomacy had developed gradually through the collective process of the ad hoc convened Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. The emancipatory diplomacy mode branched out from historical grievances of harm done to China in the 19th century up to the beginning of the 1970s. Diplomacy is conceived as a state-centric power based on scientifically reflexive knowledge for jointly sharing life, time, and the Earth in an inclusive, participatory, democratic, and peaceful way of the world free from empire, dominance, political integration on exclusionary Western terms, its hegemony, and the hegemon power of the US. It is a full-fledged theorisation of a new type of international relations of China with the world and the world with China. Its state organisation requires the central leadership of the Communist Party of China. Apart from the conduct of party diplomacy, it holds the reins of diplomatic powers of state diplomacy:

“As diplomacy is concentrated embodiment of the will of the state, diplomatic powers must be held by the Party Central Committee. We must strengthen our consciousness of the need to maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, follow the leadership core, and keep in alignment. We must work harder to uphold authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Central Committee, closely follow the Central Committee in terms of our thinking, political orientation, and actions, and ensure the strict enforcement of orders and prohibitions and the coordination of relevant parties” (Xi 2019, 553).

Threaded through the strivings for making “autonomous development” for itself and all others regularised to systemically better everyone and everything with inter-human mutuality and humanity’s harmony with nature made the humanistic emancipatory purposes of China’s diplomacy whole. Since 2014, theoretically, all layers and aspects of diplomacy have been rounded plenilaterally. It means that all activities have been pervasively interwoven in a multi-directional, multilateral, multi-stakeholder, multi-level, many-layered, and multifaceted manner that must free the international system from power politics and balance-of-power strategies. This emancipatory design first determined the putting of self-restraints on China’s own diplomatic agency to prevent it from degenerating into strategising for the balance of power. Relation-making of mutuality is devised to guard China against straying towards converting its power into the might constitutive of hegemony.

The Belt and Road cooperative projects, the Global Development Initiative (Xi 2021), the Global Security Initiative (Xi 2022), and the Global Civilisational Initiative (Xi 2023a) operationalise responsible and accountable self-restraints

to China's power not to degenerate into strength but constitute its might with the vision of a human community with a shared future. At the same time, all these working mechanisms of emancipatory diplomacy are conceived as enablers of liberating the international system, global order, and governance from the need for either the hegemon or world government. Yet neither archic nor anarchic outlook thwarts conceiving the possibility of the international system organised for achieving a balanced and just development through mutually ascertained multilateralism. It has to be synchronised through bilateral, regional, and interregional mechanisms joined in the democratic global governance of sharing peacefully life, time, and Earth.

China tends to harness science and diplomacy in world-making, free from violence against nature and consequently emancipating humans to do even politics consensually rather than coercively and oppressively. The fourfold emancipation from violence, the zero-sum structure of reality, the anarchy of international, and the past and present as reserved for the well-being, growth, and flourishing of only some states, societies, and peoples at the expense of others make China's diplomacy different. In these regards, it differentiates itself from all the Western past and present understandings of diplomacy. Critics will certainly sharpen the pen and words to strike out that China works to peacefully share life, time, and Earth. They will likely state that nothing emancipatory could come out of diplomacy where "diplomatic powers must be held by the Party Central Committee" (Xi 2019, 550).

However, China's diplomacy holds many key answers to questions related to the present and the future of the planet and humanity. Their emancipatory diplomacy has opened the competition for more beneficial cooperation between the West and the long-marginalised Global South countries. It is an intensely disturbing fact for the US and the European Union. While they are in such distress, most governments across the Global South are pretty comfortable with China's new gravitas. From this, more choices are provided to them by the competitive West, trying to outbid the Chinese offers. The Global South in world affairs—all nations whose sweat, blood, and tears the Western great powers took for granted—finds nothing wrong with the Chinese "heavyweight" and readiness to shoulder global responsibilities accordingly. In most of these states and societies, China is regarded as one of them in accomplishing domestic prosperity, leaving no one behind, and reordering the world towards integrity, dignity, worth, wellness, calm, and equity of all those sentient or not, everywhere.

In the New Year's speech, President Xi Jinping (2023b) unequivocally summarised 2023 regarding China's achievements and its reaffirmed commitments. He underlined the central tenets of emancipatory diplomacy, reiterating that China, as a responsible major country, will "work closely with the international community for the common good of humanity, build a

community with a shared future for mankind, and make the world a better place for all.” This reassurance in the continuation of China’s emancipatory diplomacy can liberate states, if from nothing else than from fears of daring to think boldly about the alternative to the present unsustainable world order.

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Annex¹⁸

The protocol for quantitative and qualitative content analysis of Chinese diplomacy-related documents

Purposes of diplomacy

- 1.1. Social: achieving the “Two Centenary” Goals
- 1.2. Human holistic: “International relations underpinned by win-win cooperation”
- 1.3. Global: building a human community with a shared future
- 1.4. Telluric: harmony with nature

Diplomacy goals

Strategic goals

- 2.1.a. “fostering a more enabling international environment for China’s peaceful development”
- 2.1.b. “peace, development, cooperation and win-win”

Specific goals

- 2.2.a. “pursuing China’s overall domestic and international interests and its development”
- 2.2.b. “pursuing security priorities in a balanced way”

Individual goals

- 2.3.a. “focusing on the overriding goal of peaceful development and national renewal”
- 2.3.b. “upholding China’s sovereignty, security and development interests”
- 2.3.c. “maintaining and sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity for China’s development”

Diplomacy directive

- 2.4.a. “building of a new type of international relations”
- 2.4.b. “building a new model of major-country relations”
- 2.4.c. “put forward and practised a neighbourhood policy featuring amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness”

¹⁸ Analysed source and quotes (Xinhua 2014).

- 2.4.d. “sincerity, delivering outcomes, affinity and good faith” in relations with Africa
- 2.4.e. “promoting democracy in international relations”
- 2.4.f. upholding “the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”

Diplomatic innovations and reforms of diplomatic work

- 3.1. “opening new horizon in China’s diplomacy”
- 3.2. enhancing “the central and unified leadership of the Party”
- 3.3. abandoning the concept of peripheral diplomacy (CCGOW 2013)¹⁹
- 3.4. “consistency of China’s foreign policy, strengthened overall planning and taken bold initiatives, thus achieving notable progress”
- 3.5. “advancing China’s diplomacy under new conditions”
- 3.6. reforming and improving “institutions and mechanisms concerning foreign affairs, step up their coordination among different sectors”
 - 3.6.a. “always base ourselves on our own strength in pursuing the development of the country and the nation, and follow our own path unswervingly”
 - 3.6.b. “reform and improve institutions and mechanisms concerning foreign affairs”
 - 3.6.c. “step up.. coordination among different sectors, government bodies and localities:
 - 3.6.d. “increase strategic input”
 - 3.6.e. “ensures well-regulated foreign affairs management”
 - 3.6.f. “strengthen the ranks of official managing foreign affairs”

Types of diplomacy

Bilateral diplomacy

- 4.1.a. well-manged “relations with other major countries”
- 4.1.b. building “a sound and stable framework of major-country relations”

¹⁹ On October 24 and 25, 2013, the Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference was held in Beijing, which is an important conference for the CPC Central Committee to well arrange diplomatic work in the new situation. The conference is mainly to conclude lessons, study and judge the current situation, unify thoughts, exploit the future, determine strategic objectives, basic guidelines and overall layout in the next five to fifteen years and specify the working roadmaps and schemes for solving major peripheral diplomacy problems.

- 4.1.c. expanding “cooperation with other major developing countries”
- 4.1.d. strengthening “unity and cooperation with other developing countries”
- 4.1.e. closely integrating China’s own “development with the common development of other developing countries

Multilateral diplomacy

- 4.2.a. advancing “multilateral diplomacy”
- 4.2.b. working “to reform the international system and global governance”
- 4.2.c. increasing “the representation and say of China and other developing countries”
- 4.2.d. actively advancing “the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”
- 4.2.e. working “hard to expand the converging interests of various parties, and promote win-win cooperation through results-oriented cooperation”

Regional diplomacy

- 4.3.a. autonomous leadership in building regions and institutionalising regional cooperation
- 4.3.b. participating in regional economic integrations and free trade areas
- 4.3.c. autonomous leadership in building regional “communities with a shared future” (“common destiny”)

Interregional diplomacy

- 4.4.a. BRICS partnership
- 4.4.b. BRF Network

Values pursued in the conduct of diplomacy

- 5.a. mutuality
- 5.b. sincerity
- 5.c. amity
- 5.d. inclusivity
- 5.e. equity
- 5.f. justice
- 5.g. fairness
- 5.h. interconnectedness

New diplomatic approach

- 6.a. “on the basis of summing up our past practice and experience, enrich and further develop diplomatic perception”
- 6.b. “conduct diplomacy with a salient Chinese feature and a Chinese vision”
- 6.c. “uphold the CPC’s leadership and socialism with distinctive Chinese features”
- 6.d. “stick to our development path, social system, cultural tradition and values”.

EMANCIPATORSKA DIPLOMATIJA KINE ZA MIRNU, DEMOKRATSKU I ODRŽIVU GLOBALNU ZAJEDNICU

Apstrakt: Ovo istraživanje proučava teorijsko oblikovanje diplomatije Narodne Republike Kine. Iako se ulažu napori da se njena teorija predstavi u pojmovima koji su razumljivi, Zapad ih smatra tankim prekrivačem za propagandu vladajuće Komunističke partije. Diplomatske akcije Kine se prikazuju kao manipulacije države željne moći koja teži globalnoj dominaciji, spremne da razruši postojeće aranžmane i preuzme mesto Sjedinjenih Američkih Država na vrhu svetske moći. Iako “vuk-ratnik” pristup u diplomatskoj praksi ponekad može biti izražen, proučavanje kineske teorije diplomatije otkriva normativnost ideja o volji za uspostavljanje odnosa uzajamnosti. „Misao o diplomatiji velike sile“ Si Đinpinga, formativno oblikovana 2014. godine, pokazuje da je emancipatorska suština kineske diplomatije zastrašujuća za one koje brine moć ove zemlje. Ovu tezu ćemo testirati sprovođenjem kontekstualne analize sadržaja relevantnih izvora. Kineska emancipatorska diplomatija zamišlja upotrebu državne moći za zajedničko deljenje života, vremena i planete. Cilj je da se postigne principijelni i pravedni pristanak svih država za ostvarivanje inkluzivnog, pravičnog, fer, demokratskog i mirnog međunarodnog poretka uravnoteženog i pravednog autonomnog razvoja i globalnog upravljanja kroz međusobno utvrđen multilateralizam u ljudskoj zajednici sa zajedničkom budućnošću.

Ključne reči: Kina; teorija diplomatije; Misao o diplomatiji velike sile Si Đinpinga; Pet principa mirne koegzistencije; Pojas i put; Globalna zajednica zajedničke budućnosti; Liberalni međunarodni poredak.