

FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO THE AFRICAN UNION (AU) – THE DYNAMICS OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF A REGIONAL INTEGRATION

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Abstract: Formed through Pan-Africanism, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was the first continental and regional bloc in Africa with the aim of liberating African countries from the shackles of colonialism. However, the OAU experienced numerous challenges on the African continent that came with its transformation into the African Union (AU) in the early 2000s. This dynamic transformation has essentially been greeted with euphoria and uncertain forecasts. The subject chapter examines whether the transition from the OAU to the AU represented a fundamental change or not. The analysis showed that this transformation represented an expansion of the scope of African regional integration. The OAU has been successful in synergizing efforts to help African countries secure independence (e.g., Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, etc.). Also, the OAU was central to the struggle against apartheid in South Africa and served as a forum that brought together African states in the United Nations to promote African interests and goals. To some extent, the OAU has succeeded in institutionalizing the pattern of behavior of African states in the event of the outbreak of mutual conflicts. On the other hand, the OAU has failed in the realization of the goals of African unity and maintenance of peace, as well as the socio-economic goals contained in Article II of its Charter. As for the AU, this organization has contributed to the stabilization and maintenance of peace and security. It has influenced the good

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governance of Africa, which has greatly improved the position of African states in the international arena. However, dependence on donors has weakened the mandate of the AU. The transformation from the OAU to the AU represented, theoretically speaking, a dynamic change that essentially meant the revivification or revitalization of this international organization in complex African circumstances. From the analysis, it can be concluded that there is a need for greater commitment from the leaders of the AU member states to strengthen mutual trust and build strategic relations.

Keywords: Pan-Africanism, OAU, AU, transformation, regional integration, Intergovernmentalism, Neo-functionalism, Supranationalism.

INTRODUCTION

As Kimenyi (2015) recounted, the need to unite Africans and people of African descent under a unified body has been an imperative for Africans for many years. Consequently, the establishment of the OAU in 1963 represents one of the most significant developments in the effort to unite the continent. The OAU was the first contemporary African continental organization formed through Pan-Africanism with the aim of pursuing political independence for Africans (Dauda, Ahmad, & Keling, 2021). As Padmore (1972) opined, Pan-Africanism is conceived as a worldwide intellectual movement which aims at securing national self-determination, embodied by strengthening the solidarity between all peoples of African descent. Thus, Pan-Africanism strongly emphasized solidarity that intrinsically underpinned the spirit of championing political, social, and economic growth of Africans – thus forces aimed at unchaining people of African descent from the shackles of destructive colonial and contemporary Western imperialism. It is an established fact that colonialism in Africa led to the destabilization of indigenous communities, the oppression of indigenous cultures, etc., which ultimately served as a boulevard to disunity among Africans. With time, notable Pan-Africanists such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Jomo Kenyatta, etc., were fully convinced that both colonialism and its related practices were largely responsible for the widespread and pervasive practice of racism in Africa and had subsequently eroded both African culture and local customs and values (Chirisa et al., 2014). This eventually led to the series of agitations for self-independence which intensified after the Second World War (Mark, 1979). In the hope of accelerating the decolonization process, the Pan-Africanists held a series of meetings and discussed a number of issues. In

April 1958, for example, leaders and delegations from newly independent African states met in Accra (Ghana). Johnson (1962) reiterates that among the key issues discussed were the formulation of suitable mechanisms aimed at creating mutual understanding among African States; strategies for safeguarding the sovereignty and independence of participating States; strategies for assisting the then dependent African territories towards self-determination, etc. Consequently, most of the resolutions at this Conference were later incorporated into the Charter of the OAU in 1963 (Saho, 2012). This was despite ideological differences about the nature of African unity that could be adopted – whether a federation or separate states pursuing similar but differentiated policies under a common umbrella (Dauda et al., 2021). Such division, according to Duodu (2013), was visibly displayed in the existence of three different ideological blocs that dominated the African geopolitical scene at the time – the Brazzaville, Monrovia, and Casablanca blocs.

The OAU was expected to be the platform through which the agenda for forging unity and solidarity among African states was to be attained. It was also expected to promote cooperation and economic development among the member states through the expansion of inter-country trade, encourage the peaceful settlement of disputes, enhance the quality of life, and promote democratic governance. Above all, the OAU fought to eliminate the vestiges of colonialism from the African continent as a primary objective (Kimenyi, 2015). Most of the OAU member states were non-aligned, thus determined to not take sides with either the West or East (Botchway & Amoako-Gyampah, 2021). Efforts to appraise the OAU require juxtaposing the objectives of the Union with its accomplishments. According to Article II of the OAU Charter, the purposes and objectives of the organization include the promotion of unity and solidarity of the African states; the coordination and intensification of cooperation and efforts aimed at achieving a better life for Africans; defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of African states; eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa; and the promotion of international cooperation, with due regard to the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On the basis of these purposes, the member states agreed to coordinate and harmonize their general policies. In order to achieve the stated objectives, Article III of the OAU Charter explicitly spells out seven principles that could guide members. These include the sovereign equality of all member states; non-interference in the internal affairs of states; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state and its inalienable right to independent existence; peaceful settlement of disputes

by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; unreserved condemnation of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring states or any other state; absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent; affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs. Despite the nobility of these principles, there are lingering questions about the propriety of some of them, particularly the idea of non-interference in the internal affairs of the member states. Structurally, the OAU started with four principal institutions: the Assembly of Heads of States and Government; the Council of Ministers; the General Secretariat; and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. With time, three other institutions were created. The first one was the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (1987), which was established within the framework of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1982). The second one was the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (1993). The purpose of this structure was to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts in Africa by anticipating and preventing potential conflict situations from fledging into full-blown conflicts; undertaking, in the event of full-blown conflicts, peacemaking and peace-building efforts, and also extending peacemaking and peace-building activities in post-conflict situations (Fon, 2018). The third institution was the African Court on Human and People's Rights (the Court), established in 1998 (under the OAU) but entered into force in 2004 (under the AU).

SUCCESSSES OF THE OAU

With time, as the OAU evolved, its attention equally evolved, though the primary objectives remained seemingly unchanged. According to Fon (2018), the organization's primary objective of synergizing efforts to assist African states' quest for independence and the fight against Apartheid in South Africa remained unchanged. Consequently, the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of African Countries was established to ensure the harmonization of diplomatic support and also convey financial, logistical, and military assistance to liberation movements across the continent (Moshi, 2013). Efforts along these lines were successful as countries such as Guinea Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, etc., secured their independence and Mandela became president of South Africa, signaling the end of the apartheid regime (Fon, 2018). Further, the OAU was largely successful in the resolution of boundary conflicts. Thus, the organization used various channels to secure the territorial integrity of its member states,

such as Nigeria in 1970 during the Biafran civil war and border-related conflict between Morocco and Algeria, etc. (Fon, 2018; Moshi, 2013; Wild, 1966). Thus, despite the several challenges that existed, the OAU to some extent succeeded in institutionalizing a pattern of behavior for African states in conflicts based on the broad principles of the Charter .

With the support of the UN Economic Commission on Africa, the OAU adopted the Lagos Action Plan in 1980. This plan recommended the division of the continent into Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This was to ensure the promotion of continental industrialization and integration. Consequently, three RECs were created, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1978, 1983, and 1994, respectively (DeMelo & Tsikata, 2015). The OAU also made substantial progress in the area of human rights as it adopted the African Charter of Human and People's Rights in 1981 and established the African Commission on Human and People's Rights in 1986. In 1998, the African Court on Human and People's Rights was established to protect the rights espoused by the Charter and to create a wider legal instrument targeting the violation of human rights at the time.

FAILURES OF THE OAU

Despite the above-mentioned successes, the OAU also failed to achieve certain objectives due to the several challenges it faced. For instance, the organization was unable to promote and attain most of the socio-economic goals and objectives stipulated in Article II of its Charter (Young, 2016; Makinda et al., 2016; Obeng-Odoom, 2013; Williams, 2007). According to Dauda et al. (2021), the failure of the OAU eventually led to the canvassing for its metamorphosis into the AU. Indeed, as several studies have shown, at independence, most African leaders were in no position to undertake serious development initiatives as they were absorbed in the "struggle for survival and the need to cope with the many problems threatening their countries and their power" (Olympio, 2004). It was then left to the OAU to show the way. The organization, unfortunately, failed in this regard as it was unable to undertake or accomplish many of the set objectives or important tasks. Specifically, the OAU failed to promote and institutionalize democratic governance on the continent. This is underscored by the fact that at a point in time (between the late 1950s and the mid-1990s), virtually all African states were controlled by either military dictators or single-party

regimes that were generally kleptocratic, prebendal, corrupt, and unaccountable to the people (Botchway, 2018). It is not surprising, then, that the organization came to be regarded as a “club of dictators” by some, and thus lacked the moral standing to serve as an effective voice for Africa (Olympio, 2004). Sadly, despite much talk about “African Unity,” most national leaders firmly defended the colonial borders bestowed upon them, believing that “all hell might break loose if these borders were dissolved” (Olympio, 2004). In addition, the organization’s Charter that stipulates non-interference (despite good intentions) unfortunately limited its ability to intervene when atrocities were committed against innocent civilians and minority groups. Thus, huge questions remained as far as human rights were concerned. Consequently, the OAU largely failed to curb the activities of dictators such as Idi Amin (Uganda), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire), Sargent Samuel Doe (Liberia), the Rwandan genocide, etc. (Kimenyi, 2015). Thus, hiding behind the principles of “non-interference” and “non-alignment” did more harm than good to the member states and prevented the OAU from playing an objective role in internal conflicts, with the institution frequently appearing as a shield to the ruling party rather than balancing international obligations with domestic responsibility – the member states failed to be good neighbors under the guise of non-interference (Botchway & Hlover, 2022; Botchway, 2019; 2018a). More cogently, contrary to the provisions of Article 2 (1) (a) and (b) of the Charter that focus on unity and solidarity of African states, and the coordination and intensification of collaboration and “efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa”, available evidence suggests that the organization achieved little in this regard. Thus, as indicated earlier, being preoccupied with their “newly won freedom and sovereignty”, most African leaders distrusted and feared each other, and consequently could not work together to lay solid foundations for national, sub-regional, and continental unity (Olympio, 2004). In consonance with this assertion, Dauda et al. (2021) confirm that the issue of lack of unity greatly contributed to pushing for the transformation of the OAU into the AU. More so, the OAU failed to unite African countries. Thus, the issue of disunity in Africa that existed prior to the establishment of the OAU did not vanish simply because of the organization’s establishment (Ekwealor & Okeke-Uzodike, 2016; Guzansky, 2015). Even meetings that were organized in the anticipation of forming the OAU were characterized by disunity due to the existence of the three major political blocs – the Casablanca, Monrovia, and Brazzaville blocs. Thus, the early 1950s and 60s witnessed rivalries and conflicts between and among the dominant political blocs in the continent,

and this did not cease as they had ideological differences on how to achieve the objectives of the OAU (Dauda et al., 2021).

Actually, the OAU was gradually losing its credibility as far as the uniting African states were concerned. For instance, it failed to curb the Congo crisis due to a loss of credibility and also failed to forge African unity, which thwarted security and stability in Africa. Consequently, as argued by Packer and Rukare (2002, p. 367): "By the time of its thirtieth anniversary, most analysts of the OAU concluded that the organization could not meet future demands without serious reforms and re-organization (...)". Analysts also generally agreed on the structural/functional weaknesses of the OAU and its charter, particularly with regard to the Secretariat and Secretary-General. Though the Charter of the OAU stipulates that its aims are to be achieved through the workings of the various units – the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, etc., – the question still remains as to "who is to do what, when and how". There was therefore a growing feeling that the structure and procedures of the OAU did not adequately respond to the exigencies of the time, and thus the Charter had to be reformed to reflect contemporary situations (Olympio, 2004; Tiekou, 2004).

FROM THE OAU TO THE AU: TRANSFORMATIONAL UNDERPINNINGS

So far, the above information indicates that the dreams of the founding fathers of the OAU have, to a large extent, not been met. Thus, far from the OAU becoming an instrument for the continental union that would lead to a degree of economic and political unity that would ensure prosperity, it became an object of ridicule. As a result, African leaders resolved in the year 2000 to systematically transform the OAU into the AU. Consequently, on July 9, 2002, the CAAU came into force, and the AU was officially inaugurated in Durban, South Africa (Olympio, 2004). In other words, the formal establishment of the AU in 2002 was based on three interrelated initiatives: the Sirte Extraordinary Session, which established the AU; the Lomé Summit (Constitutive Act of the Union); and the Lusaka Summit that "designed the blueprint for implementing the Union". The formation of the AU is also linked to the concrete expression of Pan-Africanism, though it exhibits a new form of Pan-Africanism, regarded as the third phase of the movement – new Pan-Africanism (Mathews, 2018; Landsberg, 2012), and the renaissance coalition, with distinctive features. Quite different from the first

wave of Pan-Africanism, the AU is cosmopolitan in orientation; it seemingly discontinued the victimhood mindset and the culture of Africa blaming others for its ills, which embodied the actions and ideas of pioneered Pan-Africanists; in comparison to the second phase, which respected decolonization and the creation of the modern African state system, the new Pan-Africanism, according to Tiekou (2019), is human-centered. The AU has been characterized as a tripartite organization, incorporating governments, international bureaucrats, and outsiders (Tiekou, 2019). This means there are groups of actors and institutions that are not formal members of the AU *per se*, but whose actions and inactions shape the organization's practices, directions, priorities, and policies (Tiekou, 2017). As indicated earlier, the transformation of the OAU to the AU was targeted at correcting some of the existing disparities and difficulties that impeded the former from achieving its objectives effectively (Dauda et al., 2021). This transformation is intrinsically engulfed by ongoing speculation. It is therefore in order to examine the extent to which the AU corrected these impediments. According to Article 3 of the CAAU, the Union should: "(a) achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa; defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states; accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; (b) promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; (c) encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (d) promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and good governance; (e) promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments; (f) establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations; (g) promote sustainable development at the economic, social, and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies; (h) promote corporation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples; (i) coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union; (j) advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, particularly in science and technology; and (k) work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent".

A critical review of the objectives of the AU reveals an extension of the purpose of the AU. In the event of achieving these objectives, the member states of the AU are to adhere to a number of principles as postulated in Article 4 of the CAAU, including, among other things, sovereign equality of the member states and participation of the African people. Given these eleven objectives of the AU, accompanied by sixteen principles, and the established institutions such as the Assembly of the Union; the Executive Council; the Pan-African Parliament; the Court of Justice; the Commission; the Permanent Representatives Committee; the Specialized Technical Committees; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and the Financial Institutions, it is pertinent to discuss the extent to which the AU has achieved the stated objectives or otherwise as a continental Union spearheading regional integration.

SUCCESSSES OF THE AU

With the hope of maintaining peace and security in Africa, the AU has established a number of conflict management instruments, for instance, the African Peace and Security Architecture (Joshua & Olanrewaju, 2017; Bakare, 2014). Consequently, unlike the OAU, Article 4(h) provided the opportunity for the AU to intervene under the principle of Responsibility to Protect. Subsequently, the AU, in conjunction with the Peace and Security Council, has deployed AU missions to some conflict zones: Burundi, Comoros, DR. Congo, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Somalia, etc. Further, the AU has been instrumental in conflict prevention and peaceful settlement of violence (Mathews, 2018; Joshua & Olanrewaju, 2017). These efforts have usually been deployed alongside sanctions regimes, especially when mediation and peaceful negotiations fail (Williams, 2009). Additionally, until quite recently, the AU has been able to ensure that military coups are effectively reverted to democratic rule (Joshua & Olanrewaju, 2017). Thus, countries that experienced coups, such as Guinea and Mauritania, Madagascar, and Burkina Faso in 2008, 2009, and 2015, respectively, were suspended from the AU and given about 6 months to conform to their respective constitutions. Failure to comply with these directives was to be followed by the deployment of the PSC's coercive means and sanction regimes. Also, the AU has enhanced the agency of African states and governments in the international system since it serves as a forum for African governments to coordinate their policies and decisions on key international issues. Thus, it has empowered African governments to take more assertive positions on international issues. It has also aided African states in presenting a common front at international

organizations such as the UN, particularly in terms of coordinating collective action and harmonizing positions on any given subject of interest (Tieku, 2019). Moreover, the AU has been successful in formulating relevant international laws and practices that shape national legislation and policies. These regulations and practices usually cover a wide spectrum of issues, including the control of epidemics, disaster and environmental management, food security, international crime and terrorism, trade negotiations, refugees and internally displaced persons, migration, etc. (AU, 2005).

CHALLENGES/FAILURE OF THE AU

Among the challenges that hampered the AU's ability to carry out its mandate was the issue of financial constraints, which had significant unintended consequences. Thus, over-dependency on donors usually weakens ownership, which in turn has serious implications for achieving strategic goals and possible drift. The AU has unreliable and unpredictable funding, which makes the sustainability of well-intended policies problematic (AU, 2017). Furthermore, Joshua and Olanrewaju (2017) contend that the AU's actions at times appear to contradict the essence of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which allows for armed intervention when necessary. This leads to situations where crises degenerate into uncontrollable situations, which lead to crimes against humanity. Thus, there seems to be difficulty establishing the relevant synergy between state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. Again, evidence exists to suggest that the track record of the member states' implementation of AU decisions is poor (Tieku, 2019). Empirical data reveal that in the period from 2001 to 2018, only 15% of the total number of decisions made by the AU were fully implemented by the member states (Assogbavi, 2018). Arguably, the AU members often fail to integrate progressive ideas into national legislation and are reluctant to ratify AU decisions. Yet there is doubt regarding the ability of the AU to implement its decisions if it cannot motivate its members to implement them. Finally, though the idea of opening up the continental decision-making process to many Africans was a chief consideration for transforming the OAU into the AU (Makinda & Okumu, 2007), evidence suggests that the Union has failed in this regard, as coalescing the voice of non-elite Africans in terms of the AU's programs, decisions, and policies is conspicuously missing from the scene.

THEORETICAL LENS FOR UNDERSTANDING

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE OAU TO THE AU

Theoretically, it is not far from the truth to assert that functionalism and neo-functionalism generally underpin the gradual evolution of the OAU to the AU. For the functionalist, in any given system, all the component parts within the system are interconnected and work together in a complex web of interrelations. Functionalism thus emphasizes the common interests of both states and non-state actors in the integration process. This implies that a change in dynamic resultantly alters the whole system, even though with time the system will evolve to accommodate the said change (Brennan & Murray, 2015). The problem, however, with functionalism is the issue of oversimplification of the complex issues of international relations. It is this shortfall and related issues that lead to the need to adopt a new form of functionalism – neo-functionalism. For the neo-functionalism, the idea of integration is an inevitable one, something that must happen in one way or the other. Thus, it is incumbent on all actors within the international system to prepare to accept the outcome of global integration if they fail to plan for it. As a result, for the neo-functionalism, nationalism and the decline of state-centric ideals indicate the need for integration, which would eventually serve as a channel for aggregating and pursuing interests (Lombaerde, Estevadeordal, & Suominen, 2008). In view of this, despite the fact that other theories, concepts, and principles such as supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, realism, etc., could be deployed to explain the move from the OAU to the AU, this paper sides with the ideals of the neo-functionalism in exploring the need or otherwise for the metamorphoses of the OAU to the AU. It is the view of the paper that regional integration must not just be seen as a process of removing barriers to free trade and enhancing the free movement of people across territorial borders, with the goal of reducing tensions that usually lead to international conflicts, but as an avenue for promoting mutual growth and development in every facet of life.

UNDERSTANDING THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE AU

Historically, with regards to the AU, there was the re-emergence of the divide between “absolute and minimal integrationists” that preceded the establishment of the OAU (Maluwa, 2004). The “absolute integrationists”, led by the late Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya, advocated for the creation of a federalist AU with extensive executive, legislative and judicial powers, whereas the “minimal integrationists”, led by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa

and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, pushed for an intergovernmental approach that would incrementally evolve into a supranational entity (Maluwa, 2004). According to Rosamond (2000, p. 204), supranationalism denotes “the development of authoritative institutions and a network of policy-making activity above the nation-state”. Three elements of supranationalism have been identified by Pescatore (1974), namely, the recognition of common values and interests; the creation of an effective power; and the autonomy of these powers. In a similar acknowledgement, Weiler (1981) distinguished between normative and decisional supranationalism by arguing that the latter’s central line of enquiry is the extent to which the laws of regional institutions supersede, and in some cases nullify, competing laws in the member states, whereas the former basically captures the procedural mechanism for arriving at decisions, particularly through a majority voting system rather than the rule of consensus. Although the transfer of sovereignty to the AU has been less than satisfactory, a careful reading of the AU Constitutive Act (AU, 2005), suggests that the architects of the organization intended to create a supranational entity. As can be gleaned from the preamble of the CAAU, the intention to confer supranational powers on the institutions of the AU reads: “We, heads of States and Government of the member states...are determined to take all necessary measures to strengthen our common institutions and provide them with the necessary powers and resources to enable them to discharge their respective mandates effectively”. Controvertibly, there still remains the lingering question of classifying the AU as a supranational organization or not. It is important to note that the supranationality of a given international organization is usually underpinned by the existence of normative as well as decisional supranationalism within the established structure of the organization. Consequently, the lack of the former within the institutional structure of the AU means the lack of supranational authority as compared to entities such as the UN or the EU (Oloruntoba & Falola, 2018; Kwarteng & Botchway, 2018; Weiler, 1981). In fact, while the OAU may differ from the AU in terms of form, the theoretical exposition reveals that very little has changed in terms of substance. Thus, as argued elsewhere, supranationalism within the AU is either too weak or non-existent (Fagbayibo, 2013).

CONCLUSIONS

The OAU’s limited successes, which epitomized its transformation into the AU, can be associated with a variety of factors coalescing under political,

economic, social, cultural, historical, and globalization, among others. The question still remains as to whether the mutation of the OAU to the AU has been the answer to the problems of its numerous problems. Some believe that the transformation process has provided greater benefits to the African continent. Some also believe that it might sound incorrect to describe the transformation as a failure as it is too early to judge (Dauda et al., 2021; Tieku, 2004). However, some agree that the transmutation from the OAU to the AU marked a critical phase in the linear trajectory of achieving collective security on the African Continent through several challenges that still remain (Fagbayibo, 2021; Joshua & Olanrewaju, 2017). Overall, suffice to note that at the time of the formation of the OAU, most African states were under colonial bondage and that the OAU drew its objectives from decolonized African states to confer African unity. In the meantime, considering the proclaimed goals, the AU was focused on regional integration. Based on the stated statement, we can safely conclude that the transformation from the OAU to the AU, theoretically speaking, was a change made for the revival of Africa, and that it was based on the expansion of the scope of the OAU. But practically, this change was not carried out to the end. Achieving this goal requires the AU to have mature African leadership. Thus, there is a need for the member states and the Union to strike the right balance between their domestic goals and their responsibility towards the Union. The implication is that letting go of national sovereignty for the common good of the continent may at times be the most viable option. Furthermore, realizing the AU's vision of supranationality requires the subscription of African leaders to shared norms such as accountability, democratic governance, and adherence to the principles of transparency, human rights, etc. Further, there is a need to promote coordination and cooperation among the various regional and sub-regional groupings in Africa. In addition, NGOs, CSOs, and all other relevant stakeholders must be involved in the integration process. Thus, building mutual trust, strategic cooperation, and collaboration is highly recommended. Finally, there must be an effective and equal application of the rules and regulations, sanctions, benefits, reprimands, etc. This will ensure fairness, equity, and firmness, which would in turn engender confidence and tranquility within the Union.

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