

CONTEMPORARY RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) WITH SERBIA

Darko TRIFUNOVIĆ*

Abstract: In this paper, the author deals with the analysis of the relations of two significant international organizations – the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – with the Republic of Serbia. Since Serbia is a country on the way to joining the EU and is surrounded by NATO member states, the analysis of relations in real geopolitical circumstances is particularly interesting for scientific research. In this sense, official indicators point to a raised threshold of cooperation between these actors, but also to a certain imbalance that exists in mutual relations, which is determined by internal political and foreign political determinants. Within the political determinants, they determine the imbalance between the officially proclaimed policy and public opinion. On the other hand, foreign policy determinants are determined by geopolitical trends in Europe and the world. In this regard, the expectation of the EU and NATO in relation to the crisis in Ukraine was expressed that Serbia would join the economic sanctions against Russia, which is blamed for the aggression. The direction of further development of mutual relations is therefore directly conditioned by the commitment to fulfill this requirement, which is one of the key ones in the current constellation of relations with the EU and NATO. Because this is in direct opposition to Serbia's neutrality, good relations with these two international organizations may face many difficulties. All the more so if one takes into account that the new geopolitical division in the world has led to new "iron curtains" that seriously disrupt world peace and security. Time will tell whether Serbia will agree to the introduction of restrictive measures towards Russia or will remain consistent in its

* Director of the Institute for National and International Security; Senior Research Fellow, Faculty of Security Studies, Belgrade. E-mail: galileja@yahoo.com

foreign policy neutrality. In the author's opinion, in the existing international circumstances, Serbia should be guided exclusively by its own national interests, remaining on the sidelines in conflicts between the great powers.

Keywords: Serbia, EU, NATO, geopolitics, great powers.

INTRODUCTION

Relations between the EU and Serbia

Serbia officially applied for membership in the European Union on December 22, 2009. In the same year, Serbia received free travel opportunities from EU visas, so that Serbian citizens can travel to the EU member states without visas or restrictions, except for the length of stay, which is limited to 90 days. Since June 2013, the EU has decided to open accession negotiations with Serbia. In other words, Serbia has begun to open and close chapters aimed at harmonization at various levels in the process of Serbia's accession to the EU. So far, a total of twenty-two chapters have been opened (Chapter 5 – Public Procurement; Chapter 6 – Company Law; Chapter 7 – Intellectual Property; Chapter 13 – Fisheries; Chapter 14 – Transport Policy; Chapter 15 – Energy; Chapter 17 – Economic and Monetary Policy; Chapter 18 – Statistics; Chapter 20 – Entrepreneurship and Industrial Policy; Chapter 21 – Trans-European Network; Chapter 23 – Justice and Fundamental Rights; Chapter 24 – Justice, Freedom, and Security; Chapter 25 – Science and Research; Chapter 26 – Education and Culture; Chapter 27 – Environment and Climate Change; Chapter 29 – Customs Union; Chapter 30 – Foreign Economic Relations; Chapter 32 – Financial Supervision; Chapter 33 – Financial and Budgetary Provisions; and Chapter 35 – Other), and Chapter 25 (Science and Research) and Chapter 26 (Education and Culture) are temporarily closed. Criteria for opening have been given for seven chapters and action plans are being drafted: Chapter 1 (Free movement of goods), Chapter 3 (Right of establishment and freedom to provide services), Chapter 8 (Competition policy), Chapter 11 (Agriculture and rural development), Chapter 16 (Taxation), Chapter 19 (Social Policy and Employment) and Chapter 22 (Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments). There are no criteria for opening for four chapters, and negotiating positions are being developed for Chapter 2 (Freedom of movement of workers), Chapter 4 (Freedom of

movement of capital), Chapter 9 (Financial services), and Chapter 28 (Health protection and consumer rights) (Proces pregovora o pristupanju Srbije Evropskoj uniji, 2022).

In October 2020, the EU Commission proposed an Economic & Investment Plan to support and bring the Western Balkans closer to the EU. Serbia accepted the revised enlargement methodology and the first political inter-governmental conference was held in June 2021. This revised methodology focuses on the following aspects:

- A stronger focus on the fundamental reform;
- A stronger political steer;
- An increased dynamism and,
- The predictability of the process.

The overall pace of negotiations will depend, in particular, on the pace of the rule of law reforms and the normalization of Serbia's relations with Kosovo (European Commission, 2021, October 19).¹ It is important to point out the fact that five EU states did not recognize the self-proclaimed state of Kosovo and Metohija (Riegl & Doboš, 2017, p. 207). Also, there is an example in the EU that a state can become a member of the EU even though parts of its territory are disputed. This is the case with Cyprus (Janigian, 2018). It is interesting to note that the Vatican state did not recognize the self-proclaimed Kosovo and Metohija, especially given its importance and influence in the geopolitics of the world. (Ker-Lindsay, 2012, p. 81).

The relationship between Serbia and the EU will be best illustrated by the following indicators listed in Table 1.

¹ This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSC Res. 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

Table 1 – Main trade partners of Serbia in 2021



The analysis of Panel 1 clearly shows that the EU is Serbia’s most important foreign trade partner. From 2009, when that trade amounted to 3.2 billion, in 2021 it reached 14 billion. This fact indicates that the export of the Serbian economy to the EU is increasing, but this is not the case with China and Russia. As can be concluded, there is an obvious imbalance, especially with China. Analyzing Table 1, it is concluded that Serbia’s exports to China are 0.82 billion, and imports from China are 3.65 billion. Also, there is an obvious imbalance with Russia. Imports from Russia are 1.53 billion, and exports are 0.84 billion. The National Bank of Serbia has published the balance sheet of FDI in Serbia. According to the attached data for 2021, the People’s Republic of China did not have FDI in Serbia. Russia had 6.3 billion while the EU convincingly had the highest FDI of 116.4 billion (Narodna banka Srbije, 2022).

Table 2 – IPA direct investments and projects in Serbia 2014-2020

ANNEX 1: INDICATIVE ALLOCATIONS (million EUR)⁴ - per policy areas and sectors

Serbia	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018-2020	Total 2014-2020	Of which climate change relevant (%) (**)
a. Reforms in preparation for Union membership	95.1	61.4	77.9	78.4	230.2	543.0	
Democracy and governance	177.8				100.2	278.0	
Rule of law and fundamental rights	135.0				130.0	265.0	
b. Socio-economic and Regional development	85.0 ⁵	75.0	85.0	80.0	240.0	565.0	
Environment and climate change	85.0				75.0	160.0	80%
Transport	90.0				85.0	175.0	
Energy	80.0				45.0	125	40%
Competitiveness and innovation	70.0				35.0	105.0	
c. Employment, social policies, education, promotion of gender equality, and human resources development	15.0	40.0	20.0	27.0	88.0	190.0	
Education, employment and social policies	102.0				88.0	190.0	
d. Agriculture and rural development	0	25.0	25.0	30.0	130.0	210.0	40%
Agriculture and rural development	80.0				130.0	210.0	
TOTAL	195.1	201.4	207.9	215.4	688.2	1508.0	

From the attached Table 2, it follows that the EU, only through IPA funds from 2014 to 2020, directly financed 1,508,000,000 euros: 543 million euros in reforms to prepare for Serbia’s membership in the EU; 565 million euros for socio-economic development; 190 million euros for employment, social policy and education, promotion of gender issues and for the development of human resources; and finally, 210 million euros for agriculture and rural development (Instruments for Pre-Accession Assistance IPA, 2014). When we consider all aspects of the geopolitical position of the Republic of Serbia and the three main segments of geopolitics, such as politics, economy, and security, it can be concluded that Serbia is inextricably linked with the EU. Although Serbia has declared military neutrality, it is not a politically neutral state. Serbia is a candidate country for EU membership. It has thus committed itself to fulfill certain conditions for membership as well as aligning its national policies and legislation with the EU. Some of the most important and recent news that is of strategic importance for the EU and Serbia is the EU decision to adopt a special strategy in the field of security and defense called Strategic Compass.

The Strategic Compass strategy provides the European Union with an ambitious action plan to strengthen the EU’s security and defense policy by 2030. A challenging security environment requires a significant

step forward and increased capacity and willingness to act, strengthen resilience, and invest more in the defense capabilities of the EU. The goal of the Strategic Compass is to make the EU stronger, more applicable, and capable of security. The EU should be able to protect its citizens and contribute to international peace and security. This is even more important at a time when war has returned to Europe after the unjustified and unprovoked aggression of Russia against Ukraine, as well as great geopolitical shifts. The Strategic Compass strategy will improve the EU's strategic autonomy and its ability to work with partners to protect its values and interests. A stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defense will positively contribute to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defense for its members. It will also intensify support for a rule-based global order at the heart of the United Nations (Strateški kompas za bolju bezbednost i odbranu EU u narednoj deceniji, EU u Srbiji, 2022). The Strategic Compass strategy provides certain guidelines that are without a doubt very useful for Serbia. Particular attention should be paid to how the EU plans to use the Strategic Compass strategy to address the threats, risks, and challenges to the security of the EU and its members. In all segments of the listed threats and answers, Serbia has no institutional answer or announcement that something will be done on these issues. Serbia's main problem is the absence of key security and defense institutions in recognizing threats and risks. This is already a consequence of the long-term disruption of the education system in these areas of security and defense. To strengthen its ability to anticipate, deter, and respond to current and fast-emerging threats and challenges and safeguard the EU's security interests, the EU will boost its intelligence analysis capacities, develop a Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams, bringing together different instruments to detect and respond to a broad range of hybrid threats, further develop the Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox and set up an EU Cyber Defense Policy to be better prepared for and respond to cyber-attacks, develop a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox, develop an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defense and strengthen the EU's role as a maritime security actor (*Ibidem*).

In this part of the paper, only some current aspects of EU-Serbia relations are discussed. The EU is mentioned in all important documents of the Serbian government as the most important partner in all aspects, and the same important documents emphasize that Serbia's desire and ambition is to become a full member of the EU. In addition to the relations between the EU and Serbia, this article will also deal with the relations

between Serbia and the NATO alliance. Serbia is located next to Bosnia and Herzegovina as an island surrounded by the EU and NATO, so the relationship with these two organizations is extremely important for Serbia. It should be noted that although Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a member of NATO, NATO is in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, NATO forces are located on the Serbian territory in Kosovo and Metohija.

RELATIONS BETWEEN NATO AND SERBIA

Unlike all other Balkan states, Serbia's state policy is to join the EU but not the NATO alliance. One of the main reasons for this is NATO's aggression against the FRY in 1999, as well as the role that this military alliance played in the self-proclaimed Serbian territory of Kosovo and Metohija (Trifunović, 2018, pp. 53, etc.). Significant cooperation between Serbia and NATO began in 2006 when Serbia joined the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a multilateral forum for dialogue that brings together all allies and partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. Cooperation with NATO has expanded even more since 2015 through the IPAP-Individual Partnership Action Plan. Currently, Serbia has gone a step further by shaping a model of cooperation with NATO through the Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP). In the implementation of the program of cooperation with NATO, the Government of Serbia opened the 2006 NATO Military Liaison Office in Belgrade, with its headquarters in the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Serbia. In cooperation with NATO, Serbia has enabled the rapid development and modernization of both the combat and other potentials of the Serbian Army.

Serbia's cooperation with NATO is mutually beneficial and includes:

- Serbia joined the Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 2007 to develop the capacity of its forces to participate in UN-mandated multinational operations and EU crisis management operations. PARP also serves as a planning tool to guide and measure progress in defense and military transformation efforts.
- Since 2012, Serbia has been actively engaged in Building Integrity (BI) to strengthen integrity, transparency, and accountability and reduce the risk of corruption in its defense and related security sector. The ministry of defense also offers its experience to other countries engaged in the NATO BI Self-Assessment and Peer Review Process

and was actively engaged in the development of the NATO BI Reference Curriculum published in 2016.

- Since 2014, Serbia has been engaged in the Defense Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), which supports Serbia's efforts to develop a comprehensive and modern defense education system. Thanks to DEEP, Serbia is now a net security provider in the field of education and training and is supporting other DEEP programs such as the one with Armenia.
- Also, since 2014, under the Partnership Interoperability Initiative, Serbia has participated in the Interoperability Platform, which brings allies together with 24 selected partners.
- Serbia is offering expertise and training to allies and partners at the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Training Centre in Kruševac, which was recognized as a Partnership Training and Education Centre in 2013.
- In December 2017, in coordination with several NATO allies, Serbia conducted a course to train Iraqi military and civilian medical personnel as part of the NATO Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative.
- The allies have supported a number of NATO Trust Fund projects in Serbia. This includes a project to destroy 28,000 surplus small arms and light weapons, which was completed in 2003, and another for the safe destruction of 1.4 million landmines and ammunition, which was completed in 2007. A third project for the destruction of approximately 8,000 tons of surplus ammunition and explosives is underway. Another five-year project, completed in 2011 and implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), helped almost 6,000 discharged defense personnel in Serbia start small businesses. In the framework of the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Program, leading areas for cooperation with Serbia include counter-terrorism, energy security, advanced technology, border security, mine and unexploded ordnance clearance, and human and social aspects of security. Among these, noteworthy is Serbia's participation in the DEXTER program, which is developing an integrated system to detect explosives and firearms in public spaces. Furthermore, scientists from Serbia are working on a wearable smart patch that will collect and analyze medical information in real-time to assist personnel responding to mass casualty incidents. Serbia engages with NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre

(EADRCC) to develop its national civil preparedness and disaster management capabilities, and to improve interoperability in international disaster response operations. In December 2015, Serbia requested international assistance through the EADRCC in the context of an influx of refugees. Six allied nations provided support. Serbia hosted the SRBIJA 2018 consequence management field exercise, which brought together approximately 2,000 participants from 40 countries to practice international cooperation in an earthquake scenario. As a participating country, Serbia also took part in five other EADRCC exercises.

- In 2017, Serbia launched its second National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security for the period 2017-2020. Serbia is associated with the NATO/EAPC Policy and Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, which was endorsed at the NATO Brussels Summit in 2018. Moreover, together with the United States, Serbia led a series of NATO-funded expert workshops to develop a scorecard, or set of indicators, to help assess how NATO and partner countries are mainstreaming gender in military operations.
- Serbia and NATO aim to improve public information on NATO-Serbia cooperation. The NATO Military Liaison Office in Belgrade plays an important role in this process.
- Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, NATO and Serbia have worked in close coordination. NATO has supported Serbia along various avenues and donations have been made by various allies (Relations between NATO and Serbia, 2022).

SYNTHETIC ANALYSIS OF MUTUAL RELATIONS

From all the above-mentioned, it should be added that many other fields are not covered by this paper, which testifies to the successful relations of Serbia with the EU and NATO. It is also necessary to perform an analysis of errors and mistakes in mutual relationships. Namely, despite the facts of good and quality cooperation, the public opinion of Serbia is extremely negative, especially towards the NATO Alliance, but with a big surprise towards the EU as well, significantly after Russian aggression on Ukraine. Indicators that lead to a negative or changing attitude of Serbian citizens towards these two international organizations need to be included in the quality analysis. Very often, despite the proclaimed policy of the Serbian government towards the EU, Serbian

officials make statements that are directed against the EU (Daily newspaper Blic, April 22). Other state institutions allow the arrival and stay of foreign experts who have declared themselves openly against the EU. Examples are numerous.² For this article, let's list the following indicators:

- NATO bombing of the FRY in 1999,
- The extremely hostile propaganda of foreign media from that time towards Serbia and Serbs living in the region, which continues in segments up to this day,
- The work of the ICTY, which largely judged and sentenced Serbs,
- Hundreds of thousands of Serb refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo and Metohija,
- The high level of political mafia and its action aimed at destroying Serbia's economy,
- Paralyzed state institutions,
- Russia — a country that took advantage of the described situation and developed an intelligence network in Serbia with undisguised operations,
- Completely paralyzed public information system,
- Hybrid threats and operations against Serbia,
- Other activities aimed at causing divisions in society and destroying the economic, political, and security functions of the state.

Also, one of the key components that must be specifically analyzed is the role of the media in creating the overall picture and accepting the general values of society. Although the public has the impression that Serbia is cooperating more with Russia than with NATO, data show that since joining the Partnership for Peace program in 2006, Serbia has participated in about 150 exercises together with NATO, and with Russia, 12 military exercises have been organized in the last five years. Despite the numerical indicators, the public is imagining that NATO is putting pressure on Serbia, which is not true in practice. NATO is a military alliance based on voluntary membership, and any country that wants to become a member must first

² Thus, among others, it was possible for Prof. Dr. Elena Ponomareva Georgievna, a Russian professor, not only to give lectures at the University of Belgrade but also to be in the commission for the defense of theses. This Russian professor is known to the general public for her anti-EU statements, calling the EU a Nazi creation.

apply and meet the conditions for a long period to be admitted to membership. Due to the media influence, the situation in Serbia has completely reversed, and even some high-ranking state officials declare that Serbia will not join NATO in a situation where Serbia does not have an official invitation to join this alliance. There are problems in these relations caused by internal circumstances but also by the actions of other international geopolitical forces that have an interest in making Serbia the center of their activities, which may not be good or desirable for Serbia either. If the analysis includes all the main states and powers that can influence Serbia on the international and domestic levels, a projection of the “power vector” or line of interest can be determined. The US, UK, EU, NATO, Germany, Russia, and China have been identified as major forces of interest. The analysis of the United States’ policy towards Serbia clearly shows the intention that the US wants to see Serbia integrated into Euro-Atlantic integration. The presented graphs of cooperation between Serbia and the EU show the economic, political, and military justification for which Serbia has a state policy of joining the EU and also a certain type of partnership with NATO. On the other hand, Russia takes advantage of the situation in the media, energy sector, political environment, and attitudes of political parties in Serbia. Russia does not want to give up Serbia because it has had an influence on Serbia for centuries (Trifunović & Đurović, 2021). In a relatively short time, Russia has taken over not only Serbia’s public opinion but also the key energy sector. Serbia has become a Russian energy hub in Europe (Thompson, Nordic, 2012). Russia constructed in Serbia the “Serbian-Russian Humanitarian Center-SRHC” in the southern Serbian city of Nis. This center has repeatedly been the focus of criticism that it is not a humanitarian center at all but a center for the training and logistics of paramilitary forces (Perry, 2019, p. 130). Although once far from the public eye, Serbian-Russian relations at home are burdened by the fact that the Serbian Police dismantled the criminal-terrorist camp on Mount Zlatibor, organized by the Russian mercenary organizations ENOT and Wagner (Dnevne novine Blic, 2022, April 27). The camp was intended for the training of Serbian children. Serbian security services documented a strong Russian intelligence network in Serbia, after which Serbia expelled Russian Lieutenant Colonel Kleban and the Serbian president himself announced in a speech to the Serbian parliament that he had information about several other Russian service agents in Serbia (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2022). Serbian security services have recorded and documented the activities of Russian operatives Shismakov and Popov, accused in Montenegro of attempting a coup and assassinating the country’s president (EU-OCS,

2022). The situation is similar in the political sense, given the growing right-wing forces that, in conjunction with Serb leftists who are traditionally pro-Russian, are turning the Serbian political scene towards Russia. Russia is doing everything possible to prevent Balkan countries such as North Macedonia and Montenegro from integrating into NATO, and even if they become members, the intention is to keep this part of the world in constant instability and under Russian control with pro-Russian forces. Russia has used both soft and hard power to prevent Montenegro from joining NATO. Montenegro accused Russia of being directly involved, by using the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian people in Montenegro, in the 2016 election events and that Russia, with its network and agents, tried to assassinate the Montenegrin president (Vučković, 2021). The particularly aggravating picture and the situation in which Serbia finds itself are foreshadowed by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Even though Serbia is a candidate country for EU membership, Serbia did not follow EU foreign policy, as all EU countries imposed sanctions on Russia, and the EU went one step further. The Council of Europe suspended Russia's right to representation in this EU body (Council of EU, 2022). Given Serbia's energy dependence on Russia, as well as the overall picture created by the fact that Serbia is the only country in Europe to hand over its oil industry to another state, the emerging geopolitical situation complicates Serbia's position at many points. Serbia's key foreign trade and political partner is the EU. The EU has changed its attitude towards Russia and imposed sanctions with unpredictable consequences. Serbia is required to adjust and harmonize its foreign policy position with the EU, which means that Serbia is required to impose sanctions on Russia in a situation where Russia owns the Serbian oil industry. The whole difficulty of the new situation reflects the fact that if Serbia imposes sanctions on Russia, it means that Serbia would impose sanctions on its energy system. If Serbia does not impose sanctions on Russia, the EU can not only stop the flow of energy but also stop cooperation with Serbia, interrupt Serbia's European path and integration, impose sanctions, restrict the movement of people and goods, stop all financial assistance and cooperation, and demand from Serbia to return all the finance that Serbia withdrew from the EU pre-accession funds.

CONCLUSIONS

According to the presented facts, Serbia's main partner is the EU in the economic, political, and security fields. Cooperation with NATO has also been improved, and the facts point to significantly greater activity

between Serbia and NATO than with other states, including Russia and China. Serbia is surrounded by the EU member states or those states that are on the path to membership in this organization. Also, Serbia is surrounded by NATO member states. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a high degree of cooperation with this military alliance, and NATO forces are stationed on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia also has NATO forces stationed in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija. The geopolitical picture of the world has changed overnight after Russian aggression on Ukraine. A kind of “steel curtain” has risen between Russia and Europe, especially the EU. Serbia remained far behind that curtain. Serbia’s decisions must be guided exclusively by Serbian interests, having in mind all possible consequences. Serbia was already facing difficult decisions concerning resolving the issue of Kosovo and Metohija, EU integration, and cooperation with the NATO alliance, but also decisions related to cooperation and relations with Russia and China. It will take a lot of political skill and wisdom to preserve vital Serbian interests, especially in the times to come. Perhaps one of the solutions for Serbia is to rely as much as possible on the strongest Serbian potential, and that is Serbian science and the concept of science diplomacy.

REFERENCES

- Council of EU. (2022). *Council of Europe suspends Russia’s rights of representation*. Retrieved from: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-/council-of-europe-suspends-russia-s-rights-of-representation>. Accessed 27.04.2022. Daily news paper Blic. (2022, April, 22). Minister without portfolio Nenad Popovic, in charge of innovation in the government, tried to innovate Serbia’s foreign policy over the weekend, saying that “European integration is no more” and that “the Brussels agreement is dead” and that “Serbian political ship should be turned slowly and wise in the other direction”. Retrieved from: <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/koliko-nas-kostaju-proruski-stavovi-neposlusnog-ministra-ako-je-popovic-protiv-eu/v0rcvlx>. Accessed 22.04.2022.
- Dnevne novine Blic. (2022, April, 27). *Opasne veze – Da li trag ruskih plaćenika koji su obučavali decu na Zlatiboru vodi ka još zlokobnijoj organizaciji?* Retrieved from: <https://www.blic.rs/vesti/drustvo/opasne-veze-da-li-trag-ruskih-placenika-koji-su-obucavali-decu-na-zlatiboru-vodi-ka/wk39cew>, Accessed 27.04.2022

- European Commission. (2021, October 19). *Commission Staff Working Document Serbia 2021 Report*, SWD (2021) 288 final. Retrieved from: file:///C:/Users/User/Desktop/Serbia-Report-2021.pdf. Accessed 20.04.2022.
- EU-OCS. (2022). Investigative website Bellingcat unmasks Russian officer suspected in Montenegrin coup. Retrieved from: <https://www.eu-ocs.com/investigative-website-bellingcat-unmasks-russian-officer-suspected-in-montenegrin->. Accessed 27.04.2022
- Instruments for Pre-Accession Assistance IPA (2014). Ref. Ares (2014) 2979403. Retrieved from: <http://www.evropa.gov.rs/Documents/Home/DACU/12/74/235/ISP%20Serbia.pdf>. Accessed 24.04.2022
- Janigian, A. (2018). *The Cypriot-Turkish Conflict and Nato-European Union Cooperation – Historical Roots of 1974 Conflict Involving Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, Turkish Refusal to Allow Cyprus NATO Participation*. Virginia, Amazon Digital Services LLC – KDP Print.
- Ker-Lindsay, J. (2012). *The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States*, Oxford, OUP.
- Narodna banka Srbije. (2022). Statistika. Retrieved from: https://www.nbs.rs/sr_RS/drugi-nivo-navigacije/statistika/platni_bilans. Accessed 19.04.2022.
- NATO/Relations with Serbia. (2022). Retrieved from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50100.htm. Accessed 22.04.2022.
- Perry, V. (2019). *Extremism and Violent Extremism in Serbia*, Norderstedt, BoD – Books on Demand.
- Proces pregovora o pristupanju Srbije Evropskoj uniji (2022). BOŠ, Beogradska otvorena škola. Retrieved from: <https://eupregovori.bos.rs/progovori-o-pregovorima/pregovori-srbije-sa-eu>. Accessed 19.04.2022.
- Radio slobodna Evropa. (2022). Špijunska afera: Hoće li Vučić i Putina pitati ‘zašto’. Retrieved from: <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/spijunska-afere-vucic-putin-zasto/30287190.html> Accessed 27. 04. 2022
- Investigative website Bellingcat unmasks Russian officer suspected in Montenegrin coup, EU-OCS, <https://www.eu-ocs.com/investigative-website-bellingcat-unmasks-russian-officer-suspected-in-montenegrin-coup>, pristupljeno 27.04.2022

- Riegl, M., Doboš, B. (2017). *Unrecognized States and Secession in the 21st Century*, Cham, Springer.
- Strateški kompas za bolju bezbednost i odbranu EU u narednoj deceniji. (2022). EU u Srbiji. Retrieved from: <https://europa.rs/strateski-kompas-za-bolju-bezbednost-i-odbranu-eu-u-narednoj-deceniji/>. Accessed 20.04.2022
- Thompson, W., Nordic, C. (2012). *Central and Southeastern Europe 2012, World Today (Stryker)*, Stryker Post, Lanham, MD.
- Trifunović, D., Đurović, B. (2021). *Nacionalna bezbednost Srbije krajem XIX i početkom XX veka*, Beograd, Knjiga komerc.
- Trifunović, D. (2021). *Nacionalna bezbednost, Istorijska analiza rada jugoslovenskih sluzbi bezbednosti, Uprava Kontraobvestajne sluzbe JNA, Desetogodisnji izvestaj-borba protiv neprijatelja 1944-54*, Beograd, Institut za nacionalnu i medjunarodnu bezbednost.
- Trifunović, D. (2018). International security and asymmetric threats, In: S. Stojanović (Ed.), *Asymmetry and Strategy*, Thematic Collection of Articles. Belgrade, University of Defence Strategic Research Institute, National Defence School.
- Vučković, V. (2021). *Europeanizing Montenegro: The European Union, the Rule of Law, and Regional Cooperation*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield.