https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_ioscw.2022.1.ch6

BRETTON WOODS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND COOPERATION WITH SERBIA

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Abstract: Yugoslavia participated in the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944, becoming a founding member of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Throughout the post-war period, the World Bank was the most important foreign creditor of development projects in the country, while the IMF was an important factor in maintaining external liquidity, especially during the 1980s. After settling relations with the IMF at the end of 2000, our country returned to the World Bank in May 2001, inheriting the membership of the SFRY. After the Emergency Post-Conflict Aid in December 2000, Serbia had five stand-by arrangements with the IMF. This was followed by two non-lending cooperation programs: the Policy Coordination Instrument, the last of which began in June 2021 and will continue until the end of 2023. The $ 30 million World Bank donation in 2001 was followed by a three-year $540 million loan to the FRY, primarily to pay off previous debts. At the end of 2021, the WB has 17 active projects in Serbia worth $865 million, while 78 projects worth $4.4 billion have been finalized in the last two decades. With the development of a multi-polar financial order, which implies a reduced role of the West, both globally and in those organizations, a trend of decreasing relative importance of the Bretton Woods institutions for Serbia is expected, especially in the context of increasing reliance on bilateral loans, especially from China.

Keywords: Bretton-Woods Institutions, World Bank, IMF, Serbia, cooperation, international monetary order.

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INTRODUCTION

The Bretton Woods institutions are the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and, in part, the World Trade Organization. Both the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were established in July 1944 at a conference in Bretton Woods (New Hampshire, US), with the participation of 44 countries, to begin operations two years later. The World Bank, or more precisely the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, founded in 1944), broadly includes the following financial institutions: the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Development Association (IDA), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), all known as the World Bank Group (although the term "World Bank" refers primarily to the IBRD and the IDA). The key role of the IMF and the World Bank is to facilitate the functioning of the global financial system, with the two institutions complementing each other. Namely, the World Bank should serve as a financier of development, primarily for developing countries, while the IMF should be preoccupied with urgently needed short-term liquidity supply to countries with balance of payments problems (e.g., financial support to states with current account deficits or exchange rate depreciation).

COOPERATION OF SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA WITH THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF

Post-war Yugoslavia participated in the International Monetary and Financial Conference in July 1944 in Bretton Woods, becoming a founding member of the World Bank and the IMF. Intensified cooperation with the World Bank began when, in order to support the distancing of Yugoslavia from the Soviet Union, the US government encouraged the World Bank to approve a loan to Yugoslavia in the late 1940s. The first WB mission arrived in Belgrade as early as 1949, and President Eugene Black personally negotiated with Broz (Kapoor, 1997, p. 103). Namely, Eugene Black saw in the given situation an opportunity to connect the political interests of the countries of Western Europe in supporting Broz with their economic interests for the continuation of trade relations. The decisions of the World Bank were also influenced by the fact that, at that time, the capital market in New York was not willing to lend to Yugoslavia (Mason & Asher, 1973, p. 112). Namely, the World Bank refused to organize credit mechanisms, asking Yugoslavia to resolve the issue of debts on pre-war bonds, which was done only in 1961/62, when the country began to use larger funds from this institution. Throughout the post-war period, the World Bank was the most important foreign creditor of development projects in the country. In addition, by participating in international tenders for developing countries, Yugoslavia also used the funds of this bank to finance numerous projects. One of the larger loans that the SFRY received from the World Bank, worth 70 million dollars, was intended for the railways in 1964 (New York Times, 1964). In 1983, the SFRY received the first (so-called SAL) loan for structural adjustment (financing development projects in the country). The largest number of loans was used in traffic and agro-complexes, which also received the largest amounts of loans from the World Bank, followed by energy and industry. In the period from 1947 to 1991, Yugoslavia received 90 loans from the World Bank in the amount of about six billion dollars, which was a comparatively large amount and a direct consequence of the American Cold War logic to keep Yugoslavia as far away from the USSR as possible. During the period of socialist Yugoslavia, the IMF was occasionally an important factor in maintaining the country's external liquidity, especially during the 1980s. Namely, as the Yugoslav economy entered a period of continuous crisis since 1981, the country increasingly relied on IMF loans. The need for loans was caused by balance of payments deficits and consequently high external debt, which reached a very high $18.9 billion at the time. In May 1982, the IMF, together with the Paris Club (an organization of major creditor countries which try to find coordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties encountered by debtor countries), approved increased supervision of Yugoslavia. The economic crisis, accompanied by very pronounced inflation, high unemployment, and stagnation of GDP per capita, lasted throughout the ninth decade of the 20th century. The last attempt to significantly improve the economic and political situation was in late 1989, when the Stabilization Program (Economic Reform Program) was adopted, which included, among other things, negotiations with the IMF, the World Bank, and Paris Club on debt restructuring, and a loan to stabilize the economy. Although the program gave certain results, the disintegration of the SFRY led to a complete economic and political collapse and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Bretton Woods institutions.

RENEWAL OF COOPERATION WITH THE IMF

Although it was among the founders of the IMF and the World Bank, the decision of the Board of Executive Directors of the IMF on December 14th, 1992, stated that the SFRY ceased to exist, thus terminating its membership in the IMF, while determining the conditions under which successor countries could inherit SFRY membership in the IMF. Of the assets and liabilities of socialist Yugoslavia in the IMF, the FR Yugoslavia accounted for 36.52%. Following the change of government in October 2000, the IMF's Board of Executive Directors decided on December 20th, 2000 (retroactively on December 14th, 1992) that the FRY had met the conditions for membership in that institution. In July 2006, after the independence of Montenegro, the IMF confirmed the continuity of Serbia and the consequent quota of 467.7 million Special Drawing Rights - SDR (SDR is an IMF unit of account created in the late 1960s). Serbia settled its obligations based on the increase of its quota with the IMF (from 468 to 655 million SDR) on February 10th, 2016, and in this way, the volume of possible financial support within future arrangements with the IMF was proportionally increased. Regular cooperation with the IMF takes place within the annual consultations under Article IV of the IMF Statute, which is a statutory obligation of member countries (based on which the IMF makes an assessment of the economic situation in the country and the adequacy of economic policy measures). Since the end of 2000, cooperation with the IMF has taken place under a number of arrangements, beginning on December 20th, 2000, when the Executive Board of the IMF approved Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance in the amount of 117 million SDR, or about 167 million Euros (25% of Serbia's IMF quota), in support of the program of economic stabilization and reconstruction of institutions and administration of the country (International Monetary Fund, 2020). From these funds, the country repaid "bridge loans" in the amount of 101 million SDRs to eliminate arrears with the IMF. Subsequently, a stand-by credit arrangement of SDR 200 million (€294 million, or 42.76% of the quota) was concluded in June 2001, as financial support for further macroeconomic and structural reforms (International Monetary Fund, 2001). After that, in May 2002, a three-year Extended Arrangement was approved, totaling approximately €909 million (139% of the quota), supporting the FRY's economic program in the period 2002-2005 (International Monetary Fund, 2002). The arrangement enabled the realization of the first phase of debt reduction to the Paris Club in the amount of 51% (i.e., by about $2 billion), and the successful completion of the arrangement meant the remaining 15% write-off of rescheduled debt to the Paris Club (counter-value of about $700 million). As early as January 2009, a Stand-By Arrangement of around €400 million (75% of the quota) was concluded, which Belgrade intends to treat as precautionary (International Monetary Fund, 2009). However, it was increased to €2,942 million in May 2009 — representing 560% of the quota — due to an unexpected deterioration in the external financial environment (International Monetary Fund, 2009). This arrangement was successfully completed in April 2011, and at the end of September of the same year, an eighteen-month stand-by precautionary arrangement was approved, accounting for 1,077 million Euros (200% of the quota) (International Monetary Fund, 2011). The arrangement was concluded in order to preserve macroeconomic and financial stability in the country and improve the investment climate, but the first revision of the arrangement in February 2012 was not completed positively due to deviations from the agreed fiscal program. Consequently, approved funds were not used. Then, in February 2015, a 36-month Stand-By Arrangement was approved in the amount of about 1,168 million Euros in support of the agreed economic program for the period 2015-2017 (International Monetary Fund, 2015). The arrangement was concluded as a precaution, except in the case of balance of payments problems. The available funds were not used, and this arrangement was successfully completed in February 2018, as the implementation of the agreed economic program scored the goals. Namely, Serbia has achieved macroeconomic balance, successfully implemented fiscal consolidation, improved the financial sector, and strengthened competitiveness (International Monetary Fund, 2021). In July 2018, the IMF approved a new Policy Coordination Instrument for the Republic of Serbia (International Monetary Fund, 2018). This IMF program will build on the precautionary Stand-By Arrangement realized in February of the same year. This non-financial advisory arrangement, agreed to support an appropriate economic program for countries with no current or potential balance of payments problems, was approved for a period of 30 months, and the progress of the agreed economic program was monitored through five semi-annual reviews. The goal of the program was to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability and to continue structural and institutional reforms in order to foster rapid and inclusive growth, job creation, and improved living standards. These aims were mostly achieved as stated in January 2021, when the program ended. Then, in June 2021, the IMF concluded the Article IV consultation with Serbia and approved a new 30-month Policy Coordination Instrument (International Monetary Fund, 2021). The main goal of the new program is to support the country's economic recovery from the negative effects of the pandemic. It also aims at maintaining macroeconomic stability and anchoring the medium-term fiscal policy framework. Even if the program does not involve the use of IMF funds, the successful completion of arrangement reviews would signal the country's commitment to structural reforms and solid macroeconomic policies. In March 2022, as part of the second review of the results of the agreed economic program, the IMF mission, as a guest of Serbia, discussed macroeconomic developments and the realization of established quantitative and reform goals of the economic program, whose achievements were positively assessed. The relationship between Serbia and the IMF has gone through various phases in the last twenty years: from the obvious stick and carrot policy, through the long delay in fulfilling the agreement, to the IMF's open praise for government policy and "commitment to economic reforms" after 2013. The IMF had frozen a credit arrangement with Serbia in February 2012, and the 1.1 billion-euro arrangement was delayed because of far greater guarantees for loans to public companies and higher government borrowing than allowed. The IMF also suspended negotiations with the Government of Serbia on a stand-by arrangement concluded in May 2009, when the IMF did not approve the conclusion of the second revision of the arrangement. The 2002 arrangement lasted five years instead of three due to numerous delays. This arrangement was extremely important because the IMF's assessment of the success of the negotiations affected the write-off of the debt to the Paris Club in the amount of 700 million Euros. The fourth, fifth, and sixth revisions of the arrangement were postponed several times because the Serbian government did not implement the planned reforms or passed laws contrary to the agreement with the IMF. Concerning financial obligations to the IMF, on the last day of December 2021 the foreign debt of Serbia was 36,201 million Euros, of which, based on the SDR allocation to the IMF, the debt recorded in the Serbian central bank is 776.4 million Euros, while an additional 480.4 million Euros of debt is recorded in the central government (National Bank of Serbia, 2021).

COOPERATION WITH THE WORLD BANK

After settling relations between the FRY and the IMF, the World Bank Board of Executive Directors in May 2001 determined that the country had met the necessary conditions to inherit the former Socialist Yugoslavia's membership in the WB. Thus, the FRY inherited the SFRY's membership in the WB, which ended in February 1993. An important decision of the World Bank on the same date was to grant the country "special status" so that it could use IDA funds on preferential terms. The World Bank Group approved a $30 million donation to the FRY in 2001 for various programs, followed by a three-year $540 million loan, primarily to pay off previous debts. Since re-establishing relations with the World Bank, it has financed dozens of projects worth over two billion dollars in Serbia, in addition to providing consulting. At the end of 2021, the World Bank had 17 active projects in Serbia worth 865 million dollars, while 78 projects worth 4.4 billion dollars were finalized in the last two decades. On the last day of 2021, the debt to the World Bank, more precisely to the IBRD, amounted to 2.239 million Euros and to the IDA, 107 million Euros (National Bank of Serbia, 2021). The framework for cooperation between Serbia and the World Bank, which was valid in the period 2016-2020, provided for 13 loans worth a total of $1.6 billion, and most of them related to loans for the implementation of development policies (among other things, there were projects aimed at improving the real estate cadastre, improving e-government, facilitating regional trade and transport relief, modernizing the tax administration, and encouraging the growth of entrepreneurship).

Currently, the World Bank has 12 active projects in Serbia, while the value of loans at the end of 2021 amounted to 819 million dollars. The World Bank Group is engaged in the new Country Partnership Framework for 2022-2026, with the comprehensive goals of supporting Serbia in achieving a strong recovery from the impact of COVID-19 and encouraging faster, greener, and more inclusive growth. The World Bank Group's active portfolio reflects these priorities through 12 projects in the areas of transport (roads and railways), real estate and business environment management, competitive agriculture, health, financial sector reform, public sector efficiency and modernization, green recovery, energy efficiency, and early childhood education, as well as two regional projects aimed at facilitating trade and transport in the Western Balkans and connecting the Drina and Sava river corridors (World Bank, 2022). One of the last loans of the World Bank to Serbia was approved in March 2022 in the amount of 50 million dollars for the Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency Project for Citizens. Also in March 2022, a World Bank loan worth 100 million dollars was approved for local governments in Serbia, which should support the management of sustainable infrastructure, encourage equal growth and enable the green transition. The loan is part of the $300 million in financial support for the Local Infrastructure and Institutions Development Project, which was prepared in cooperation with the French Development Agency. In general, World Bank loans intended for Serbia are mostly directed towards infrastructure projects, which have very low rates of return (this means that the invested capital "returns" very slowly). The World Bank's interest rates are relatively favorable compared to commercial However, the problem is the complex tender procedures, which practically exclude domestic companies from the competition, because the requirements such as the amount of the company's capital are such that most companies operating in Serbia cannot meet them. On the other hand, companies from the West easily meet the given criteria (in order to decrease costs, they hire Serbian companies as subcontractors). When comparing World Bank loans with infrastructure loans obtained from China (and Azerbaijan) in recent years, the conditions are very similar when it comes to loan costs and regarding the percentage of engagement of domestic companies. Namely, while the World Bank does not formally determine who will be the contractor, in the end, it will almost always be a company from the West. On the other side, China wants its corporations to be the bearers of the project, and Serbian companies to participate up to 50%. It seems certain that with the development of a multipolar financial order involving a reduced role of the West, both globally and in Bretton Woods institutions, we can expect a trend of the declining relative importance of these institutions for Serbia, especially in the context of increasing reliance on bilateral loans, especially from China (which with its "Silk Road" threatens to "squeeze" international and other bilateral creditors from the world market) (Nikolić, 2021).

THE NEED FOR A NEW BRETTON WOODS

The so-called Bretton Woods institutions reflect the US-dominated world economic order. Despite the softening of the so-called Washington Consensus and the fact that the IMF and World Bank are now much more influential in developing economies (e.g., almost half of IMF staff are from those states), these institutions are still mostly (justifiably) perceived as an extension of US economic and geopolitical influence, which has been analyzed by a number of authors (Foot, MacFarlane & Mastanduno, 2003; Ngaire-Woods, 2003; Gwin, 1997, p. 196; Weisbrot, 2014; Beattie, 2015). However, the demands for change are becoming more and more intense. According to Yu (2022), today's world bears an unpleasant resemblance to that of eight decades ago, which Bretton Woods's delegates hoped would disappear forever. This was caused by powerful interests that set the rules of the economic game in order to maintain the world of privileged individuals and corporations. Multilateral governance institutions are the drivers of mobile capital and the accumulation of private debt, which narrows the political space available to governments. The original principles of the Bretton Woods system: providing adequate public international finance and punishing economic aggression, have given way to short-term dictates of speculative finance. We see the results through low investments and slow productivity growth, and instability of exchange rates, which all lead to sudden changes in the pattern of international competitiveness, trade tensions, and uneven growth. The global financial crisis of 2008-09 and the health and economic crisis caused by COVID-19 have further exposed the fragility of this system and the world seems to be moving towards a kind of neo-mercantilist system (stronger governments are trying to use international negotiations to advance their interests). Gallagher & Kozul-Wright (2022) argue that without global leaders willing to boldly prescribe rules to promote a prosperous, just, and sustainable world economic order – what they named the new Bretton Woods moment for the 21st century - the world risks climate chaos and political dysfunction. Namely, two authors believe that the system of global economic governance is drastically hampered by the challenges of the 21st century, primarily with the global economic collapse of 2008, and the COVID-19 pandemic. As the main actors of the global economic regime do not want changes in rules, norms, and policies, with the deterioration of trust in governments, the world economy today is reminiscent of the early 1930s, when the world faced unresolved debt problems, growing inequality, and political polarization. Only after realizing the dramatic costs of the Depression and War did the US, along with European allies and delegates from 44 countries, create the World Bank, the IMF, and then the Marshall Plan to rebuild destroyed western economies with the clear political goal of neutralizing power of countries of the so-called real-socialism. The system largely succeeded in achieving its goals until growing distribution struggles during the 1970s encouraged US policymakers to bail out the international dollar-based system by introducing flexible exchange rates, deregulating finances, and lowering tax rates, leading to a world we now live in, full of instability and economic irrationality. In the absence of fixed exchange rates and control of capital movements, the role of the IMF has transformed support for the liberalization of capital movements, price movements and profit motives have become priorities, and inequality, high indebtedness, and insufficient productive investment have become the new norm of the hyper-globalized economic landscape. With all this in mind, the authors believe that it is time for another moment of Bretton Woods, in order to revive international economic architecture and prepare the world for the challenges of the 21st century. Although the UN Agenda 2030 offers a transformative "action plan for people, the planet, and prosperity" for the 21st century, there are no concrete plans for concrete reforms. Namely, the renewed multilateral order must give priority to the role of global public goods needed to provide common prosperity and a healthy planet, and promote cooperation and collective action to achieve fairness and balance in market outcomes. It is necessary to reduce speculative financial flows and increase the amount of capital to support productive investments with low carbon content, including the elimination of illegal financial flows and many hidden subsidies. In addition, when a crisis occurs, the remedy should be expansive fiscal spending and direct financial transfers to households rather than savings that further reduce incomes and cause social unrest. However, for many developing economies, the pressures of servicing their external debts hinder them from mobilizing resources for productive investment; and when disaster strikes, the UN's sustainable development goals and commitments set out in the Paris Climate Agreement are without significance. The world has a decade to drastically reduce carbon emissions and achieve a broader set of complementary development goals. The growing number of climate catastrophes, growing social unrest and right-wing populism are early warnings of what will become the new norm if this is not done. Global rules, protected from capture by the most powerful actors, need to be calibrated against the overarching goals of social and economic stability, shared prosperity, and environmental sustainability. Global regulations need to be designed both to strengthen the dynamic international division of labor and to prevent destructive unilateral economic actions that prevent other nations from achieving their goals. In addition, the reform of the international financial system is needed, primarily the regulation and directing of private capital flows towards a productive economic activity that is low-carbon and socially inclusive. In addition, the international trade and investment regimes should be harmonized, and global market monopolization and "global rent-seeking" should be reduced, all through strong rules of global competition. The abolition of privatized dispute resolution systems (disputes should be resolved by nation states and stakeholders) seems urgent (The Boston University Global Development Policy Center, January 2022). Mandeng (2022) believes that financial sanctions against Russia will serve as an important warning that the international financial system is under the direct control of the West. Namely, despite the fact that Western countries represent about half of the world's production, their currencies are used almost exclusively in international financial transactions, and the fundamental asymmetry between the real and financial spheres is a source of tension. Therefore, the probability that different economic spheres will appear in the midst of significant political and ideological differences increases. The new financial order may no longer be based on the premise of a single financial system and the close economic and financial integration that was characteristic of the Bretton Woods institutions. Namely, Western control of the international financial system has led to excessive dependence on the US dollar, and financial decentralization can be an effective way to reduce dependence between international institutions and their clients. Instead of division, decentralization should be a new foothold in international financial relations, and the new order should be based on more currencies, more equal relations and loose ties to reduce dependencies (which should encourage most countries to join without bearing the potential negative effects). That such changes may be in the interest of the West, believes Byrne (2022), who suggests that the US make a plan to equip the IMF and the World Bank with tools to stabilize poorer economies. With the IMF Executive Board approving as much as $650 billion of new SDRs to IMF shareholders on April 13, 2022, by ceding allocations from western countries to those in the Third World, the West could curb the influence of China, which is becoming a growing lender to developing economies (China owns almost 40% of the debts of poor countries). Namely, the economic disturbance caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed as many as 124 million people worldwide into extreme poverty, while a dozen developing economies may not be able to service their debts in the coming months. The situation is urgent, given the rising prices of wheat, corn, and energy due to the war in Ukraine (wheat and corn rose by over 80% and 40% of their average for January 2022, while the price of oil has doubled since last year). In the article "It's Time for a New Bretton Woods", Rana Foroohar (2022) emphasizes the words of Janet Yellen, the US Secretary of the Treasury, who believes that the war in Ukraine and China's refusal to join the US and the West in sanctions against Russia are key points for the global economy. According to Yellen, free and fair global markets require common values, and therefore a new Bretton Woods framework is needed, i.e., new roles for the IMF and the World Bank. US trade policy, which is reportedly no longer focused on free markets, should uphold certain principles — from national sovereignty and "rule-based order" to security and labor rights. Emphasizing "secure and only free trade", Yellen says states should not be allowed to use their market position in key raw materials, technologies, or products to have the power to disrupt other economies or use it as a geopolitical lever (apparently referring to Russian petro politics, Taiwanese chip production, or China's accumulation of "rare earth" minerals or personal protective equipment during a pandemic). In this post-neoliberal era of "keeping friends", the US would favor "friendship with a large number of trusted countries in supply chains" (similar alliances in digital services and technology regulation are proposed). According to Yellen, free trade can only be truly free if countries operate with common values and "at a level playing field". Yellen hopes that the world will not end in the bipolar system, emphasizing China, which relies on state-owned companies to the detriment of US national security interests. Multinational supply chains, while highly effective in reducing operating costs, appear to be becoming an unbearable potential risk to America due to their dependence on them. Similar thoughts are shared by Petro (2022), who points out that the catastrophe caused in part by Germany's high reparations of 1919 led allies, including the Soviet Union, to devise a global financial order based on a neutral reserve instrument — gold — which everyone believed would provide a balance of power. However, after 1971, the US abandoned the gold standard, strengthening its influence as the dollar became the world's reserve currency replacing gold, with the financial order becoming increasingly globalized, which encouraged the growth of wealth inequality. The war in Ukraine ended any hope of an orderly consensus among the conflicting states on a new financial order, as the current US-centric global financial order has done irreparable damage to Russia and its allies, including China. The West is now again trying to redefine global finances in line with its geopolitical goals. This is evident in the G7 agreement on the attempt to expel Russia from the IMF and the World Bank. Equally important is the formulation of a new doctrine for global finance embodied in the US President's March 2022 executive order which aims to establish a US digital asset policy construct that underscores significant benefits for economic and national security due to the central role of the dollar and Washington-controlled financial institutions in the global financial system. The same document emphasizes that the US will cooperate in global efforts to redefine money and the payment system, but only if it preserves "basic democratic values". In this new framework, global finance would provide a new form of transnational, responsible and far-reaching measurable investment in the public good that transcends environmental programs (promoting vital needs such as accelerating biomedical treatments, improving infrastructure, reforming agriculture, building localized production and improving child and geriatric care). The key idea of Washington is to give strengthened political credibility to the reformed "Bretton Woods", allegedly based on values, of course with the goal of maintaining the existing American-centric order.

CONCLUSIONS

In the last two decades, Serbia has had intensive cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank, and it is expected that arrangements with these two Bretton Woods institutions will continue. Regarding the IMF, the "Policy Coordination Instrument" began to be implemented in June 2021 and will last until the end of 2023. The World Bank currently has 17 active projects in Serbia worth 865 million dollars. It is expected that a new arrangement with the IMF will be established after 2023, while the cooperation with the World Bank will continue, given that the existing projects are being implemented relatively well. However, with the development of multilateralism in the global financial order, which leads to the increased importance of non-Western countries, especially China (from which Serbia intensively withdraws loans) and consequently implies a reduced relative role of Bretton Woods organizations, the trend of decreasing the relative importance of these institutions for Serbia is expected. Of course, such a development is not certain, especially if efforts are made to ensure that non-Western countries are proportionally represented in the work of the Bretton Woods institutions, naturally according to their growing economic strength.

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