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ELEMENTS AND ROLE OF CULTURAL MEMORY ON POSTERS AND BILLBOARDS AS MEANS OF RAISING NATIONAL AWARENESS AND MOBILIZING NATIONAL COMMUNITIES IN MONTENEGRO DURING POPULATION CENZUS¹

Abstract

The long-anticipated population census in Montenegro was finally held in December 2023, marking the first census since the change of government in 2020. Although relevant political actors had agreed not to conduct a campaign ahead of the population census, some other, mainly anonymous groups attempted to draw citizen's attention to the importance of national and religious issues through posters and billboards, all with the aim of increasing the number of members of these ethnic and religious groups. The question of Serbian ethnicity was particularly significant, as despite representing one of the most dominant national group in Montenegro, they still do not have the status of a national minority. Therefore, the campaign targeted members of the Serbian group in Montenegro was the most prominent.

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Using the method of discourse analysis, it was established that various motifs containing the cultural memory were present on the posters and billboards, all with the aim of developing Serbian sentiment. This included the use of the Cyrillic script and the Serbian tricolor, as well as various historical figures who were born or lived and worked in that area, and who were simultaneously associated with the Orthodox faith. Religion is a very important element for the Serbs in Montenegro, primarily due to the uncertainty regarding the possible creation of the autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church, but also because of the adoption of the Law on Freedom of Religion in December 2019, which led to significant dissatisfaction among citizens and ultimately resulted in a change of government. Such a campaign is linked to the culture of memory as it draws attention to certain individuals who are not as frequently represented when discussing Serbian history and tradition, thus making the entire campaign somewhat educational for the broader public.

Key words: *population census, Montenegro, billboards, slogans, posters, cultural memory, national identity.*

INTRODUCTION

The population census that was conducted in Montenegro during December 2023 is the first population census after the decades-long rule of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and their leader Milo Đukanović, who in fact personified that power. Political changes and the change of government in Montenegro started in August 2020 when the opposition political groups managed to create a parliamentary majority. Those elections in 2020 were preceded by the adoption of the Law on Freedom of Religion in December 2019, which defined that the state of Montenegro becomes the owner of all religious buildings that were built before December 1918. With the change of the parliamentary majority in Montenegro, that controversial article of the law was suspended and later, the Government of Dritan Abazović signed the Fundamental Agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church. Complete political changes in

Montenegro were completed in April 2023, when Jakov Milatović became the new president of that country, defeating Milo Đukanović in the second round of the presidential elections.

First, due to the corona virus pandemic, and then, due to the unstable social and political situation, the population census in Montenegro was postponed several times, so that, finally, it would be conducted in December 2023, more precisely from December 3 to 28, 2023. Many political forces tried in different ways to mobilize the population on the issue of nationality. It was said in public that this topic is too politicized. This is also reflected in the fact that the largest opposition political party, the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), proposed a boycott of the census, but they moderated that position in later agreements with other political subjects. The majority of political and social actors experienced the census as an identity issue for the Serbs in that country, because despite the fact that the Serbs positioned themselves as the most numerous nation after the Montenegrins, the status of a “national minority” was never officially recognized for the Serbs in Montenegro (Jović 2011, 42). Therefore, it remains open to interpretate whether the Serbs in Montenegro represent a minority or an autochthonous people. In particular, we should point out the fact that according to the Constitution of Montenegro from 1992, the official language is “the Serbian language of the Ijekavian pronunciation” (Đukanović 2014, 407). After the constitution of the Montenegrin state as an independent one and the adoption of the new Constitution in 2007, the official language becomes “Montenegrin” (Ustave Crne Gore 2007). However, it should be borne in mind that the countries of Eastern Europe are also faced with contradictory requirements where they are expected to accept state models developed in mononational and monolingual national states and minority rights created in multi-national and multilingual multi-national states (Mesić 2013, 109). This multi-ethnicity, which is a characteristic of most of the countries of the former Yugoslavia, can be the source of various conflicts (Bešić 2005, 219). Especially since one of the main characteristics of post-communist and post-socialist states is “closer approximation to national sovereignty” (Vuković-Ćalasan 2013, 79).

At the same time, in previous years, the Republic of Serbia invested a lot of different resources with the aim of sending a clear message to the political elites that its population in that area is very important to Serbia. The events related to the protests, i.e. the religious lity, at the beginning of 2020, and later with the change of power of the Democratic Party of Socialists, which was perceived by the Serbian population as

an “anti-Serbian government”, homogenized the Serbian population in Montenegro. All this contributed to citizens being called on in different ways to declare themselves as Serbs in the census. Based on the 2011 population census, 178.110 citizens who identify themselves as Serbs live in Montenegro, which makes up almost 29% of the total population (Zavod za statistiku Crne Gore 2011). However, it should be borne in mind that during the census, citizens in Montenegro have the possibility not to declare their nationality, religion and mother tongue (Act on Census of Population, Households and Dwellings). So that fact can have a certain influence on the total number of different ethnic and religious groups living in Montenegro.

The census is “one of the most important sources of population data”, with the modern population census beginning in France during the 17th century (Пенев & Маринковић 2012, 22). The very act of the population census is important because it “represents a mirror of the current socio-political circumstances in which it is conducted” (Радушки 2024, 8). In addition, the population census has a special importance in the post-Yugoslav area because there is a constant struggle for the status of ethnic groups, which was intensified by the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia (Jović 2011, 37). That is, all war conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia led to increased “national stratification” and “ethnic intolerance” (Радушки 2011, 419). So it is clear why all political actors in Montenegro have devoted so much interest to the issue of population census. As can be concluded from this part, political subjects, especially political parties and other organizations whose focus is on improving the status of the Serbian population in Montenegro, tried to mobilize as many citizens as possible to declare themselves as members of the Serbian national community. Precisely because of this, this paper examines what the discourse of that campaign was like through the marketing they did through posters and billboards.

THE ROLE OF POSTERS AND BILLBOARDS IN CAMPAIGNS

A political campaign is an “organized communication and marketing activity of political parties and other organizations and candidates, with the intention of influencing public opinion in order to change certain attitudes” (Lalić 2015, 13). Modern political campaigns are based on different communication channels thanks to which the message can reach the widest possible number of people. However, bearing in mind that the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and its leader Milo

Đukanović were in power in Montenegro for several decades, this type of political regime can be classified as authoritarian. One of the basic and most significant characteristics of authoritarian regimes is that they control the most important levers of the system, including the media (Vladisavljević 2018, 84). Due to such a media situation in Montenegro, the opposition political forces had to find alternative media channels in order to succeed in sending the political message to the voters they wanted. This led to the growing number of so-called “mime” page on social media, primarily on Instagram, during the lityies organized by the Serbian Orthodox Church in early 2020, and this type of political communication continued on the eve of the parliamentary elections in August of the same year. The most significant advantage of this type of communication is two-way communication, that is, the existence of the so-called feed back (Vujanović 2021, 344).

In addition to the classical forms of media, which include the press, electronic and social media, political advertising can also be used through certain public spaces, for example, posters and billboards that are visible to a large number of people are often used for campaigns. Posters send a direct message that aims to initiate action among citizens (Jones 2019, 271). The basic role of posters is informative, as well as to provoke a certain type of emotion in the recipient (Славујевић 2002, 181). More precisely, to seduce and convince (Rabrenović 2013, 72). With that, it is clear why it is suitable for sending political messages, because thanks to the messages sent via posters, it affects the emotional component of the attitude. More precisely, they are most often based on convincing (persuasive) elements (Muller 2008, 628). Posters consist of verbal and non-verbal, that is, visual elements (Maksut Deželan 2013, 155). In addition, the posters are characterized by “the massiveness and simplicity of the message, but they are also quickly forgotten” (Vujanović 2021b, 214).

A significant advantage of advertising through posters is the possibility to send a message to a large number of people in an inexpensive way, but also to place the message that certain creators want in different formats (Geise 2017, 15). Although it seems that the content that is marketed through posters is simple, it belongs to a complex media that can be considered as mass propaganda media (Rabrenović 2013, 72). An important aspect that posters make possible is the ability to send a message based on symbols. “Political communication and propaganda is based on the manipulation of symbols to control public opinion in contexts characterized by power, influence and power relations between individuals and groups” (Bryder 2008, 102). Its impact depends on the visual

effects, but also on the verbalized messages because there is usually a correlation between verbal and non-verbal elements within the poster. Also, the success of the messages sent via the poster depends on the position of the poster itself (Maksuti & Deželan 2013, 158).

METHODOLOGY AND SUBJECT OF RESEARCH

The subject of the research is to determine which elements of national symbols and cultural memory dominated during the campaign for population census conducted by political actors in Montenegro. Therefore, the main research question in the paper is how social and political actors represented their cultural and national symbols through discourses on posters and billboards, within the campaign for population census, in order to have a greater persuasive power and to better evoke national sentiment, thus influencing an increase in the number of members of their ethnic and religious groups and proportionally increasing their share of influence in making various social and political decisions.

As the main method for conducting the aforementioned analysis, discourse analysis will be utilized, as through discourse, the author's intended message can be cognitively understood (Gennet 1990, 43). Discourse refers to the use of language in a particular social practice (Veljak 2019, 48). Discourse encompasses several elements: 1) the author's communicative intentions; 2) the relationship between the author and the recipients; 3) the circumstances (context); 4) stylistic-rhetorical decisions of the message; 5) the prior experience reflected in the message (Kenzhekanova 2015, 192). Additionally, discourse is defined as "a concrete manifestation of language and arises necessarily in a specific context that takes into account not only linguistic elements but also the circumstances of their production: interlocutors, time and place, existing relationships between these non-linguistic elements" (Тодоров 2010, 7). So, discourse analysis as a method does not approach language to merely identify elements of meaning, but to discover how individuals use language to create reality (Bešić 2019, 248). A closer explanation is provided by Stanojević and Mirkov (2018, 65), who note that discourse represents a system of interpretation and the continuous creation of meaning. McCarthy (1994, 5) indicates that in fact discourse analysis represents "the relationship between language and the context in which it is used". So, the method of discourse analysis allows us to "find and determine the connections between language

and its social relations” (Bešić 2019, 250). Because of all the above, the method of discourse analysis is the most suitable for the analysis that will be carried out in this paper.

THE SERBIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY QUESTIONS IN CAMPAIGN FOR THE POPULATIONS CENSUS IN MONTENEGRO IN 2023.

As has been emphasized, the announced population census in Montenegro was postponed on several occasions. It was originally supposed to be organized in 2021, but due to the corona virus pandemic, it was postponed. It was then announced that the census would be conducted in November 2023, but due to the announced boycott called by the Democratic Party of Socialists, it was agreed that the census would be held in December 2023. All relevant political actors in Montenegro have signed the Agreement on Census, which agreed on the most important elements of the implementation of the population census process: 1) expansion of census commissions; 2) control of input of collected data; 3) development of software that would be used to enter collected data; 4) prohibition of political parties to conduct a campaign related to the population census (Kosovo Online 2024). Regardless of the fact that there was an agreement between political actors not to carry out a census campaign, that campaign existed among certain national groups living in the territory of Montenegro. During the entire campaign, it was not confirmed that any political subjects were behind any content related to the census on posters and billboards, which did not violate the Agreement on the Census.

The campaign was dominated by posters calling on the citizens of Montenegro to declare themselves as members of the Serbian nationality as much as possible. It was similar in 2011, when the previous census was conducted. Various political actors, non-governmental organizations and many institutions participated in the pre-census campaign (Politika 2011). On that occasion, billboards were placed with the Serbian tricolor (red, blue and white) on which there was a photo of tennis player Novak Djokovic with a large inscription in Cyrillic script: “Don’t be afraid! Be what you are”. In that example, we see a clear combination of a verbal message with a combination of the flag of Serbia and one of the most successful Serbs in history, such as Novak Djokovic, who, apart from one of the first associations with Serbia, often expresses his patriotism and participates in certain “identity issues” that are important for residents

of Serbia. Namely, in 2008, Novak Djokovic sent a video message that was broadcast at the “Kosovo is Serbia” protest organized in Belgrade on the occasion of the declaration of Kosovo’s unilateral independence. Djokovic also supported the protests and processions organized by the Serbian Orthodox Church in early 2020 through social media (RTS 2020). Also, Djokovic is an important figure for the Serbian people, because he reflects many different, and at the same time, important factors for the Serbian people. First of all, it is thanks to him that a – “beautiful image” of Serbia is created in the world (Spasić i Petrović 2012, 26). At the same time, Djokovic personifies the winning mentality, as well as the oppression of world powers, with which a large number of members of the Serbian people identify (Dašić 2013, 71). To all that, we should add the fact that Novak Djokovic is originally from the area of Kosovo and Metohija, and that way he causes an additional sentiment. It is known that the – “Kosovo myth” represents one of the – “central factors in the construction of Serbian national identity and statehood” (Пешић 2018, 26). What can be considered the greatest strength when it comes to Novak Djokovic’s personality is that he also has a distinctly homogenizing capacity, even when his actions and communication are within the public sphere. However, Novak Djokovic never publicly confirmed that he allowed his image to be used in the pre-census campaign in Montenegro in 2011. His recognition was used for this purpose, as can be seen that more and more often individuals from public life become politically active. One of the most important reasons why public figures become politically active should be found in the fact that citizens will rather identify with a figure in the field of art or sports than with a politician or political party (Pels and Corner 2003, 7).

In addition, we should refer to the verbal message that the author wants to indicate that, regardless of the current government at the time, which was embodied in Milo Đukanović, who is often characterized as an – “authoritarian figure” who, in the previous decade, was labeled as a politician who leads an – “anti-Serb policy”, citizens should not be afraid to freely express their affiliation in the population census. During that campaign on the eve of the 2011 population census, billboards were noticed showing the eagle, one of the symbols of Serbia because it is on the national coat of arms of Serbia, with a mountain landscape that symbolizes the territory of Montenegro. The poster also has a quote from Petar Petrović Njegoš written in Cyrillic script: – “My Serbian nation”. On the other hand, the Public Media Service of Montenegro (RTCG) often broadcast videos where citizens were invited to declare

their ethnic affiliation to Montenegrins and to speak the Montenegrin language, and billboards that could be seen in certain parts of Montenegro also contributed to this, such as, for example, billboards with distinct motifs of – “Montenegro independence” dominated by the color red, in accordance with the flag of Montenegro. Also, on the billboards there was a man dressed in a Montenegrin costume and it was written in Latin script: – “Oh poor Stanko, you should be killed by rust, don’t you like Montenegro!”. Mihailo Radojčić is signed at the bottom of the billboard as the – “author of the idea”. In addition, there were also billboards signed by – “Guardians” where, also on a red background, it was written in Latin letters: – “Do we need billboards to know who we are?!”. All this caused a counter-campaign of Matica Srpska on the commercial television – “Vijesti” (Politika 2011).

A similar type of campaign continued ahead of the recent 2023 census. Certain media in the Western Balkans region stated that the – “IN45” portal was behind the placement of those posters (RSE 2023). The dominant way of communication on those billboards were various figures from history who were in a certain way related to Montenegro, and can be characterized as members of the Serbian nationality. On each poster, below the name of the person, a short biography is highlighted, that is, information that the authors considered relevant and most important to raise the mobilizing aspect among the citizens. That version will be used in this work when the names of the persons are listed, while later it will be explained to what extent these data are correct. So, the personalities who were depicted on the posters are: Baltazar Bogišić (– “Serbian legal historian, Minister of Justice of Montenegro. Born in Cavtat.”), Lazar Tomanović (– “Serb, publisher, writer, judge of the Great Court in Cetinje. Prime Minister of the Government of Montenegro. Born in Lepetani, Boka.”), Ruđer Bošković (– “Serbian philosopher, poet, diplomat, scientist and travel writer. Born in Dubrovnik.”), Spiridon Špiro Bocarić (– “Serbian academic painter, manager of the Vrbavska Banovina Museum in Banja Luka – victims of the Ustasha genocide. Born in Budva, Boka.”), Mitrofan Ban (– “Serbian, Metropolitan of Montenegro, Hills and Littoral, warrior and diplomat. Born in Glavati, Boka.”), Marko Martinović (– “Serbian, littoral, mathematician and poet. Born in Perast, Boka.”), Stefan Uroš IV Dušan Nemanjić (– “Serb, king and emperor of the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians and Arbanas, warrior, founder of the Duljevo monastery, benefactor and protector of Boka.”), Andrija Zmajević (– “Serbian Baroque writer, Archbishop of Bar and Primate of Serbia. Born in Perast, Boka.”), Visarion Ljubiša (– “Serbian, Metropolitan of

the Serbian Orthodox Church of Montenegro and Littoral. Born on St. Stefan, Boka.”), Stefan Mitrov Ljubiša (– “Serb, writer and diplomat. Born in Budva, Boka.”), Antun Fabris (– “Serb, director of Dubrovnik’s Matica Srpska and writer. Born on Korčula.”), Medo Pucić (– “Serbian nobleman, writer, scientist and politician Born in Dubrovnik.”). The constant of all these posters and billboards with these personalities was dominated by the Serbian tricolor and the text in Cyrillic script: – “Proud of your Serbian”. It is noticeable that there is an insistence on national symbols such as the national flag. It is believed that no national symbol evokes national feelings like the national flag, because it represents the hallmark of a community that has won independence and diversity from others through joint efforts and sacrifices (Jaskulowski 2016, 561). Also, the flag has a communicative role, and with its colors, shape and other symbols, it also develops feelings of – “glory, pride and loyalty” (Marshall 2017, 78). In addition, it is noticeable that the slogan insists on – “Serbia” and that no one should be ashamed of that.

What caused a certain controversy in the public is that Ruder Bošković and Baltazar Bogišić were among the selected personalities. This was precisely the reason for the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs to send a note of protest to Montenegro, because in their opinion, – “an attempt to reach out and attribute the historical heritage of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian people to Serbian culture is absolutely unacceptable” (RSE 2023b). In the professional literature, it can be found that Baltazar Bogišić was born in Cavtat in 1834. in a Catholic family, but also that he declared himself a Serb on the national issue and advocated the position that Serbs and Croats are – “two halves of one nation” (Luković 2008, 176–178). On the other hand, Ruder Bošković was born in a mixed family because his mother is Italian and his father is Serbian. Bošković was a Catholic, and he called himself a – “Slav” (Antić 2022). So it is clear that when appropriating these personalities from different nation-states located in the Western Balkans, it represents the – “narcissism of small differences” in Freudian terms.

Analyzing the text on the posters, certain similarities can be observed, and this is primarily the insistence on ethnic affiliation to Serbia, with the term – “Serbian”, as well as the fact that almost all persons were born on the coast, more precisely in the area of Boka or Dubrovnik. When people who are not from that area are encountered, some other connection with that area is attributed to them, as can be seen in the example of Stefan Uroš IV Dušan Nemanjić, who is described as the – “protector of Boka”. In addition, it is insisted that they were persons

from respectable professions such as: lawyers, artists, clergy, scientists, etc... There is a noticeable discourse that emphasizes biographical information related to having suffered certain types of accidents in the past which is best exemplified by the example of Spiridon Špira Bocarić, where it is said that he held the position of – “manager of the Museum of Vrbavska banovina in Banja Luka – victims of the Ustasha genocide”. In the history of the Serbian people, there is a particular emphasis on the victimization of the entire nation, and the roots of that should be sought back to the period when the Turks ruled over this territory, but also in all subsequent wars where a large number of Serbian population suffered (Kuljić 2006, 72). Such an approach can be characterized as – “strengthening national identity through recalling collective trauma” (Jovanović & Petrović 2015, 71). That is, through a campaign that was based on individuals, the creators wanted to – “connect an individual to an individual through a connective structure and in this way, through a symbolic world of meaning, create a common space of experience, action and expectation that provides a sense of trust and orientation with its binding and binding power” (Assmann, 2005, 18).

Another poster that appeared during the 2023 pre-census period was designed with the Serbian tricolor and the slogan: – “If you don’t know, ask grandpa.” Again, the national symbol of the flag dominates, but also the reference to tradition. One of the key social functions of traditions is the – “constitution of intergenerationality”, that is, the shaping of generations (Jakovljević 2019, 93). In that process, the ancestors play a key role, enabling those elements of tradition to be preserved and passed on to new, young generations (93). So it is clear why the author refers to – “grandfather” in this slogan. Another interpretation of this word should go in the direction of the nickname that the previous Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović had, namely – “Grandpa”. Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović was an important figure for a large number of Serbs living in Montenegro, who saw him as the protector of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the guardian of – “Serbia” from the – “anti-Serb government” of Milo Đukanović. It should be noted that Amfilohije Radović played one of the most significant roles in the change of government in Montenegro, because he was first one of the leading leaders of the lityies organized at the beginning of 2020, and later that year he proposed that the holder of the – “For the Future of Montenegro” list Zdravko Krivokapić is a non-party person, and he gave public support to that electoral list and voted for them in the first and only elections in which he voted.

Based on a detailed analysis of posters and billboards aimed at increasing the number of Serbian ethnic population in Montenegro, it can be concluded that the personalization of various individuals from history who are directly or indirectly connected to religion or other emotive areas that evoke national sentiment among citizens dominated. At the same time, it is noticeable that the authors of the posters also wanted to depict certain contemporary significant figures. For this reason, the slogan – “If you don’t know, ask grandpa” was created, where – “grandpa” has a clear allusion to Metropolitan Amfilohije Radović, whose nickname it was, and who was simultaneously associated with religion. Emphasizing religious motives is not unexpected, as religion plays a significant role in the Balkans and represents a very important factor in the development of national identity (Шљивић 2021, 331). Additionally, there was a presence of figures symbolizing fearlessness in the face of any obstacles, such as Emperor Dušan. The Nemanjić family is significant for the development of the Serbian identity because, along with various churches and other types of monuments, it represents the continuity of the presence of the Serbian people in the Balkans (Шуљагић 2023, 60). A large number of members of the Nemanjić dynasty have been canonized, which is another religious connection that is noticed.

THE PRESENCE OF THE BOSNIA AND ALBANIAN NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS ISSUES IN THE CENSUS CAMPAIGN

Representatives of other minority groups, such as Bosniaks and Albanians, requested the first postponement of the population census so that the census material could be printed in all languages that are in official use in Montenegro. Members of the Islamic community displayed posters and billboards with the inscription in Latin script: – “Write down what we are!”. A very clear invitation to declare in the census according to their national and religious feelings. The color green dominates the poster. In Islamic culture, the color green has the status of a – “cult” because the descriptions of the Koran are dominated by the color green, where it is said that this color (green) dominates paradise, and some interpretations say that green was introduced into the Koran thanks to the fact that this color dominates landscapes. Arabian desert oases (Bejtić 2002, 131). In addition, the flag of Sandžak was displayed on the posters. Sandžak is a territory that includes parts of Serbia and Montenegro,

where the majority of the Islamic population, who declared themselves as – “Bosniaks”, often have certain preferences to create an independent territory in that area (Finkel 2006, 485). The word – “sanjak” originates from the Turkish language and translates as – “flag” (Savić 2012, 6).

It should be remembered that even the Bosniak community in Montenegro did not always have good relations with the ruling political elites in that country. Namely, during the creation of independent Montenegro, when the national Montenegrin symbols were presented, the Bosniak party protested against the religious symbols on the Montenegrin coat of arms, i.e. they opposed the cross on the crown (Đukanović 2014, 404). An additional argument of that social group went in the direction that such state symbols can be connected with the monarchist arrangement, and Montenegro decided for a republic (404). So, based on this, the motives of the Islamic group, which includes Bosniaks and Albanians, can be explained to try to influence as many citizens as possible to declare themselves as members of their minority and thereby increase their capacity and potential to influence various social and political movements in Montenegro. According to data from 2011, when the previous population census was conducted, 8.65% of Bosniaks and 4.91% of Albanians live in Montenegro, and 3.31% of the total population declare themselves to be members of the Islamic religion (Zavod za statistiku Crne Gore 2011).

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that certain ethnic groups living in Montenegro have tried, through campaigning and mobilization of population groups that are sympathetic to them, to influence as wide a circle as possible to participate in the population census and to declare themselves as members of certain national and religious groups, but also the use of the mother tongue. The Serbs, Bosniaks and Albanians took the lead in that campaign. Considering which aspects of the population census the posters and billboards were supposed to influence, it is clear that the most important aspect was to develop national identity. The Serbian national group in Montenegro was the most active in these efforts to mobilize as many citizens as possible to declare themselves as members of the Serbian nation. This should be interpreted through the fact that there is an inseparable connection between ethnicity and national identity (Пешић 2023, 27). The mechanism that

dominated in influencing national identity was the cultural memory through the personalization of significant individuals from history, as well as through various religious symbols tasked with reminding of the tradition of that ethnic group.

To what extent they succeeded, the results of the census will show when those data are published, more precisely to what extent the number of members of the Serbian nation has increased, and whether it has increased at all. The discourse on the posters and billboards was dominated by certain verbal and non-verbal motives that aimed to indicate and awaken national sentiment. First of all, the Serbian tricolor and the Cyrillic alphabet took precedence. The campaign was based on different figures from history, and certain figures were not too well known to the general public, which enabled the cultural memory to be further developed. So from that perspective, it can be considered that this campaign also had an educational aspect, which enables the wider interested public to become familiar with certain historical details, because in Serbian society there is a crisis of the cultural memory (Колаковић 2020, 61). It can be considered problematic that part of that cultural memory and memory is based on distorted images and alternative memories, but this is becoming a common feature for peoples and countries outside the Balkan area as well (Stanković & Topalović 2023, 140). However, it is believed that culture and memory can be a – “powerful tool for change” (Assmann & Shortt 2012, 4). Precisely certain changes have befallen the Montenegrin political scene and the entire society in the past years, where key roles were played by different national and religious entities in that country. So the degree of influence of the cultural memory on almost all the most important socio-political events in the previous period in Montenegro cannot be ignored.

Religious motives and symbols dominated because they represent *objective factors* for a sense of belonging to a particular ethnic group (Шљивић 2021, 330). The religious issue gains further significance in Montenegro since the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church is not entirely resolved due to the intentions of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church to gain autocephaly. From all this, it can be concluded that – “the population census is one of the stronger instruments in the struggle for ethnic status in order to consolidate the positions of real sovereignty in the newly created nation-states, and minorities to confirm their presence in those states” (Jović 2011, 43–44). Односно, „национализам добија облик етнонационализма који настоји да обезбеди доминацију

појединачне етнокултурне заједнице– “ (Vuković-Ćalasan 2013, 79). However, we should bear in mind the fact that was presented at the beginning of the paper, namely that citizens of Montenegro have the right not to answer questions related to national and religious affiliation, and mother tongue. The importance of establishing the number of members of a certain nation and religion is additionally influenced by the fact that Montenegro is the country that was the last to gain independence from all the former Yugoslav republics and wants to completely break away from Serbian preferences, while all those processes that have been undertaken by the official Montenegro so far cause a counter-effect among the majority of members of the Serbian nation and the implementation of various activities aimed at pointing out the “Serbian question– “ in that country. More precisely, ethnicization of political life and functioning in Montenegro is developing, which is a common feature in post-communist and post-socialist states (Vuković-Ćalasan 2013, 79). Therefore, we have a very polarized and electrified atmosphere in the social and political life of Montenegro, which can be observed within the various electoral processes taking place in that country, but also on other important issues such as last year’s population census.

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ЭЛЕМЕНТЫ И РОЛЬ КУЛЬТУРНОЙ ПАМЯТИ НА ПЛАКАТАХ И БИЛБОРДАХ КАК СРЕДСТВО ПОВЫШЕНИЯ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОГО СОЗНАНИЯ И МОБИЛИЗАЦИИ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ ОБЩИН В ЧЕРНОГОРИИ ВО ВРЕМЯ ПЕРЕПИСИ НАСЕЛЕНИЯ

Аннотация

Долгожданная перепись населения в Черногории наконец состоялась в декабре 2023 года, ознаменовав первую перепись после смены правительства в 2020 году. Хотя соответствующие политические силы согласились не проводить кампанию накануне переписи населения, некоторые другие, в основном анонимные группы пытались привлечь внимание граждан к важности национальных и религиозных вопросов с помощью плакатов и рекламных щитов, и все это с целью увеличения числа членов этих этнических и религиозных групп. Вопрос сербской этнической принадлежности имел особое значение, поскольку, несмотря на то, что они представляют одну из наиболее доминирующих национальных групп в Черногории, они до сих пор не имеют статуса национального меньшинства. Поэтому кампания, направленная против членов сербской группировки в Черногории, была наиболее заметной. Методом дискурс-анализа установлено, что на плакатах и рекламных щитах присутствовали различные мотивы, содержащие культурную память, и все с целью развития сербских настроений. Сюда входило использование кириллицы и сербского триколора, а также различных исторических деятелей, родившихся или живших и творивших в этой местности и одновременно связанных с православной

верой. Религия является очень важным элементом для сербов в Черногории, в первую очередь из-за неопределенности относительно возможного создания автокефальной Черногорской Православной Церкви, а также из-за принятия Закона о свободе вероисповедания в декабре 2019 года, что привело к значительному недовольству среди граждан и в конечном итоге привели к смене правительства. Такая кампания связана с культурой памяти, поскольку она привлекает внимание к определенным людям, которые не так часто представлены при обсуждении сербской истории и традиций, что делает всю кампанию в некоторой степени познавательной для широкой общественности.

Ключевые слова: перепись населения, Черногория, рекламные щиты, лозунги, плакаты, культурная память, национальная идентичность.