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DORĐE TASIĆ AND PLURAL VOTING²

ABSTRACT: The basis of the first part of the paper is the article by Đorđe Tasić “On the proposal for the family vote (the right to vote) in France” (1925). In it, Tasić examines the reasons for and against an additional vote in elections for parents, based on the book André Enfière, *Le vote familial: La réforme électorale* (1923). In the second part of the paper, a modern argumentation is presented in support of representative voting of parents on behalf of children. Previously, the emphasis was on the greater influence of families with children on politicians, in order to ensure a more active demographic policy, and today the emphasis is on the right of all community members to be politically represented. In the conclusion, it is pointed out the fact that in Serbian social science there are few discussions about social design, including the debate about parental proxy voting.

KEYWORDS: parental vote, family vote, demographic policy, the right of minors to vote, proxy voting.

TASIĆ’S DISCUSSION OF THE MULTIPLE VOTE

Is it right for society, in case of inappropriate birth rates, to give people with children an extra vote? Đorđe Tasić (1892–1943) discusses this in the article: “On the proposal for a family vote (the right to vote) in France” (Tasić, 1925).

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Before that, Tasić published a study in which he strongly argued for women's right to vote:

“I really cannot understand (...) why a woman with a college or high school education cannot have the right to vote, when a peasant, an artisan, a merchant has it.” The only reason would be that she is a woman. Of course, if those women are given (the right to vote - S.A.), then why not give it to all (women - S.A.) who work economically like a man (man - S.A.). And if these are given, why not mothers who run the house and raise children. Therefore, it should be given to everyone!” (Tasić, 1921: 95).

Tasić also translated part of Barthélemy's book *Women's Suffrage* (Barthélemy, 1920), publishing it as a brochure (Barthélemy, 1921), and he also wrote about the idea of plural voting in the League of Nations - the proposal that larger countries have multiple votes in one from the key bodies of this institution (Tasić, 1922). He also dealt with other proposals related to the “reform of democracy” (Tasić, 1923), which were given by Barthélemy (Barthélemy, 1918) and Chardon (Chardon, 1921) - since he himself noticed that democracy has “the flaw that in it the participation of expert elements is not sufficiently guaranteed” (Tasić, 1923: 455).

When it comes to the parental vote, one of the most serious difficulties of contemporary France, writes Tasić (1925), is the insufficient growth and even the decline of the population. As a means against this evil, a family multiple vote (*vota ponderantur*) is proposed, “giving parents more than one vote, according to the number of children” (Tasić, 1925: 212). This point of view is also advocated by André Enfière, with the book *Family Vote: Electoral Reform (Le vote familial: La réforme électorale)*, Marcel Giard, Paris, 1923). In it, the author strongly advocates that parents get as many additional votes as they have children, and Đorđe Tasić discusses that book.

The plural vote, at the beginning of the 7th century, was nothing unusual. In Belgium, multiple voting was practiced in the elections of 1894–1919. All males over the age of 25 had one vote, and additional votes were given based on property and education, with the highest total number of votes per voter being three (Vauthier, 1894: 722). Out of 1.3 million voters, the number of additional votes was 0.8 million (Vauthier, 1894: 722), 20 percent of voters had two votes, and 15 percent three (Briey, Héraut, Ottaviani, 2009: 144). Voting was mandatory.

A kind of plural vote in the sense of *multiple voting* also existed in Austria (1861–1907), Belgium (1893–1919), France (1820–1830), Ireland (1815–1914 and 1918–1922/1936), Sweden (until 1866) and Britain (1866–1914 and 1918–1948; Bartolini, 2000: 353). In Britain, until 1918, university professors, in addition to their home constituency, could also vote in the university constituency, and property owners could also vote wherever their property was. A university professor with property in three places, he could vote five times. For eight million voters (1911), there were half a million duplicate votes (Lane, 1992: 457). Even today, in municipal elections in Tasmania, the

possession of substantial property brings another vote (Goss, 2017: 1008), and in five of the six Australian states local government suffrage includes property qualifications, votes for corporations and various forms of plural voting (see Goss, 2017: 1016–1029).

The multiple vote, however, had a bad reputation, especially on the left, as a covert means of maintaining privileges - and rightly so (see Jovanović, 1990: 304-306). The project of the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Gyula Andrassy, from 1908 envisaged, following the Belgian model, an additional two votes based on property and education. However, the meaning of that project was to maintain the dominance of ethnic Hungarians among Hungarian voters: of the voters with three votes, Hungarians would make up 71.7%, with two votes 63.3%, and with one vote 58.6% (Balázs, 2016 : 34).

In France, however, there was a longer tradition of the idea of an additional vote based on the number of children. Back in 1850, Lamartine suggested that the father, as the head of the family, “has as many votes in elections as there are old men, women and children at home.” Because in a valid society it is not the individual that is permanent, but the family” (Lamartine, 1850: 249; Gesley, 2018). Jouvenel submitted such a bill in 1871 (Jouvenel, 1871: 2811), as did de Guedon (Louis Henri de Gueydon; Laut, 1903). The idea was renewed in 1873 by Lasserre (Lasserre, 1873), and it was also supported by Tarde (Tarde, 1892: 440–442). Tarde says that there are one-sixteenth of unmarried men, but they make up a quarter of the electorate, and it is unfair that the vote of a father who embodies 3, 4, 5, or 10 different heads in a family has the same value as the vote of a 21-year-old bachelor (446–447). In October 1910, the representative of Rilot-Dugage (Henri Roulleaux-Dugage) repeated the initiative to adopt a law based on Jouvenel and Guedon (Van Parijs, 1998: 310), and it was finally seriously discussed by the French Assembly in 1923.

The Roulleaux-Dugage renewal proposal of 1923 was cleverly crafted to reconcile the left’s demand that women also get the right to vote, and the right’s fear that it would strengthen the left. Article 2 of the Roulleaux-Dugage proposal gave the right to vote to women, and Article 3 allowed the father to “exercise the right to vote for himself, for his legitimate, natural or acknowledged children, male or female” (Roulleaux-Dugage, 1923: 3957; Toulemon 1933: 125; Briey, Héraut, Ottaviani, 2009: 144). The Assembly accepted this draft by a large majority (440 for, 135 against), instructing the government to put the bill on the agenda of some of the next sessions. However, Poincaré’s government was not overly warm to this idea and delayed it. Finally, new elections in 1924 erased this proposal from the agenda (Toulemon, 1933: 108–9, 111–113, 115–139, 200–201, 217; Briey, Héraut, Ottaviani, 2009: 144). However, the family vote was still applied in the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco. There, between the two world wars, the father of four or more children received another vote (Toulemon, 1933: 121–122; Van Parijs, 1998: 309).

Having such a tradition behind him, Enfière in his book, which is discussed by Dorđe Tasić, does not start by explaining the reasons in favor of the introduction of the family vote. He focuses on systematically searching and refuting the reasons against it.

The first reason that is usually given against the family vote is that there are fewer children due to a changed mentality, as well as due to economic scarcity or other social reasons. No one will run to have more children because of an additional vote in the elections. Enfière answers that the family vote would encourage politicians to take more care of children and large families. This would push them to adopt appropriate social and economic measures that would protect families with children and thus, in the long run, the birth rate would increase (Tasić, 1925: 212). One of the possible measures would be, for example, a pro-natal tax policy - tax relief for parents with children (213).

Another reason against the family vote is that the children might have different political views than the parent, requiring him not to give “their” vote to the party he himself votes for. It would increase the quarrels in the house. Enfière answers that it is the same with the use of property. Until reaching the age of majority, the parent makes business decisions so, based on the same right, the parent can also make political ones on behalf of the child. However, possible quarrels over business decisions are not a reason for a parent to be the child’s legal representative (213). Tasić, for his part, adds to this that a quarrel in the house is a weak counter-argument, because it could be used to challenge women’s right to vote. The fact that a woman could have a different party affiliation compared to her husband, so there could be an argument, does not mean that she should not be given the right to vote. Education for political tolerance and coexistence of different viewpoints is an important part of civic culture (214).

The third reason against the family vote is that large families are often the result of recklessness and irresponsibility of parents, who are unable to match the number of children with their economic capabilities. They are also often an indicator of dysfunctionality - the father, for example, is a drunkard who abuses his wife and neglects his children. The family vote would only reward such parental recklessness and irresponsibility. Enfière answers that every right is tailored according to the majority, and that a number of cases of social pathology cannot be an excuse to deny all others their rights or social support (213).

The fourth reason concerns precisely the deviation from legal equality. If, according to one criterion, a certain group of people is given more rights, then the space opens up to give more rights to another group according to another criterion, to a third group according to a third criterion, also to grant special rights, and so on indefinitely. Anfier answers that what is just is equal with the equal, and unequal with the unequal. An example of the latter is proportional and even progressive taxation. If society treats people differently according to the size of their property, then it has the right to treat people differently according to the size of their family (213). In fact, says Enfière, the family vote increases equality, because it allows an entire category of the population that was not politically represented - children - to have at least indirect political representativeness (214).

For his part, Tasić adds to this the opinion that an additional vote in the name of children is not a violation of equality in the same sense as an additional vote in the name of property, or a vote in the name of education - which, as we have seen, was the practice

in previous electoral systems. A plural vote based on property or education, Tasić says, is additional class privileging (since education is often associated with wealth). On the contrary, the aim of democracy is to balance in the sphere of politics the disharmony between social groups resulting from the economic privilege of the possessing classes. An additional vote on behalf of children is a non-class category and does not politically further privilege any particular class. Secondly, the family vote is not obtained on the basis of a private property, but as an authorization on behalf of another (215).

The fifth counterargument is that property can be bought and sold, but the vote cannot. Therefore, the vote cannot be transferred to another, as can the disposal of property. Enfière answers that if voting is a personal and non-transferable authority to make political decisions that the state gives to every adult citizen for the sake of the general social interest, then that authority can be extended precisely in accordance with the recognized social interest. It is not the children who authorize their parents to vote on their behalf, but the state, and it has the right to do so (214).

Sixth, the question of dividing the child's vote between father and mother arises. In France, at that time, universal suffrage, as in most other countries, applied to men. But what will happen when women also get the right to vote? How to determine who will vote on behalf of the child - father or mother? Enfière answers that it is not an insurmountable obstacle either. In the case of an even number of children, the votes are divided in two between the father and the mother. In addition, with an odd number of children, the father votes for boys and the mother for girls (214). In multi-generational families that were created by the father having children until he had a son, the man would have two votes and the woman four, five or six...

Having presented Enfière's point of view, Đorđe Tasić subjects him to a careful search. He, firstly, thinks that Enfière expects too much from this measure. Without a whole package of other measures, the question is how much the family vote can improve demographic conditions in society (214). Second, the concept that parents politically represent children until they reach adulthood is not a good one. "Children do not have the right to vote and therefore no one can represent them" (215). The family vote, in principle, can be obtained by voters as parents due to the general interest of social reproduction. That is exactly the main problem, according to Tasić - it contradicts "the spirit of equality, as it is understood by people" (ibid.). While in terms of property and income inequality is allowed in the broadest public opinion, "in political matters an absolute and undifferentiated equality is strictly enforced" (ibid.). Because, as Tasić writes elsewhere:

"plural vote has proven to be an institution that modern democracy cannot bear. And where it was misled, it was abolished. It is not that you cannot find an objective criterion - it cannot be found in general when it comes to social values - but equality of social functions is in the spirit of democracy. All ranks, from the lowest to the highest, are equally valuable in a democratic society. Such a system normally meets with the distrust and protest of the masses: it offends the developed sense of equality, which

ultimately has its basis in the sense of equality of functions. And isn't it aristocracy when someone is given more rights than others? The criterion that would be taken would always be a criterion in favour of the powerful in society" (Tasić, 1922: 196-197; original emphasis).

Once the principle of equality is violated, there will be no end to the demands for privilege. Why is it that prominent scientists should not have an additional vote - if the general social interest is the development of science? Or, why should war heroes not have an additional vote - if the general social interest is the successful defense of the country? (Tasić, 1925: 216). The problem with this differentiation is that it necessarily makes a difference between voters: socially better - socially worse. "And once this system is presented in this way, then it is easily placed among all those systems in which individuals are given a greater number of votes for their own sake, i.e. the better" (216-217).

The urgent problem of society, and then of democracy, continues Tasić, is the concentration of capital and social power in a few hands, rather than fewer children than is necessary for the reproduction of society. "Economic contrasts are related to the concentration of capital and the creation of large and powerful economic organizations of capital", writes Tasić, so the burning "question of democracy appears as a question of (...) socialization of certain economic branches" (217). Moreover, when the state takes over the management of a part of the economy, a problem arises - can a parliament elected on a party basis successfully lead a socialized economy.

"Political elements are not competent for all issues and always (...). It is recognized and requested that expert elements ensure permanence and independence, and, in accordance with this, it is even requested that the composition and organization of the parliament be radically reorganized (permanently in the sense of democracy)" (217).

In his earlier work on the reform of democracy, Tasić already opened "the question of how to balance the political elements with the professional elements" (Tasić, 1923: 456), "in the sense of the emancipation of the professional elements from the political elements" (Tasić, 1923: 536), and here he already leaves the impression that he is no stranger to the idea of industrial democracy (social self-management). Nevertheless, the article ends with a pessimistic assessment that it is still far from that:

"In such a system (socialized economy - S.A.) it may be possible or even necessary to make distinctions between people according to their social value or function - in a democratic goal and sense, and, among other things, also according to family and number children. But it is difficult, very difficult today" (ibid.).

TODAY'S MODELS OF MULTIPLE PARENTAL VOTE

The debate about the parental representative vote for children is still very active today, both among social scientists and among politicians in more developed countries. Usually, two types of reasons are given in support of this solution, of which - conditionally speaking - the first is closer to the right, and the second to the left.

The demographic reason is renewed by Demeny, at the end of his article dedicated to low population growth in more developed countries, where he advises: "Strengthen the influence of families with children in the political system." Let the parents (custodial parents) exercise the voting rights of the children until they come of age" (Demeny, 1986: 354). According to him, Sanderson and Scherbov will call parental voting Demeny voting (Sanderson and Scherbov, 2007: 548), supporting his idea. In general, the demographic argument points out that increasing the political influence of parents with children would balance the intergenerational imbalance that exists among voters. In Japan, according to the census (2005), 24% of voters are parents with children, while 43% of voters are over 55 years old (pre-retirement and retired), which is why politicians pay more attention to the bloc of older voters (Aoki and Vaithianathan 2009: 12). The introduction of the demeny system, however, would automatically increase the voting power of parents to 37%, and reduce the share of power of the elderly to 35%, which would encourage politicians to focus more on family policy (Aoki and Vaithianathan 2009: 13).

In Germany, only 27% of the electorate are raising minor children, while 36% of voters are 55 years and older (Hinrichs, 2002: 42). Politicians pay more attention to the elderly than to the younger, so in a quarter of a century the share of those receiving social assistance among the elderly decreased from 2.8% to 1.3%, and the share of children and youth (up to 18 years old) increased from 1.9% to 6.8% (Hinrichs, 2002: 36). If minors were added as a vote to parents, the parental share in the electorate would increase from 27% to 41%, while the share of those over 55 would decrease from 36% to 29% (Hinrichs, 2002: 42). Then the politicians would also change their behavior.

In Britain half a century ago, 60% of the population was under the age of 20, but by 2020 that percentage will drop below 25% (Thomas and Hocking, 2003: 79), and in many EU countries after 2050, a third of voters will be over 65. (Bovenberg, 2007: 17). It is known that older voters block necessary long-term reforms (21), so the solution is "to give parents with children an additional right to vote for each child" (Bovenberg, 2007: 23).

Moreover, in the US, childless adults make up 34% of the population, but control 46% of the vote. Voters from households without children as a group have been calculated to have 140% of the voting power in Congress relative to households with children (Rutherford, 1998: 1512). Where is the political equality of people, equality of vote and the rule of one man - one vote (one person, one vote)? "Parental voting provides a remedy: the balance of power shifts to equalize per capita votes" (Rutherford, 1998: 1512). In addition to the reason of fairness (equality), politicians in the USA are less concerned

about children, due to the lower voter representation of children or their parents. As a result, for every dollar given to children, the federal government spends another \$7 on the elderly (Hinze, 2020: 154). That is why, in the last five decades, poverty among the elderly has decreased from 70% to 9%, while poverty among children has increased to 18% – the highest rate among all age groups (Hinze, 2020: 154–155; cf. Peterson, 1992; Pantell & Shannon, 2009 : 139). In addition, politicians in the USA do not take enough care of the interests of the poor, because they know that they vote much less often than the better-off anyway. Parental voting would also help here: a single mother with two children would have three votes - she, armed like that, would go to the polls sooner, and politicians would automatically start to take this into account (Rutherford, 1998: 1522). In general, the demeny system would increase the power of women, who, as a rule, are left with children after divorce, or raise children alone (the same).

It is argued that it is also a matter of social justice. The payment of pensions always depends on the next generation, so even when the pension is pure rent from dividends, the next generation has to do something so that the dividends can be paid at all. Parents who have children spent a large part of their time raising them, so they had less time to earn and set aside for a pension fund. Nevertheless, it is precisely because of this additional parental work that future pensions will exist at all. The injustice that family work, although substantial for society, is not valued enough, is corrected by an additional family vote (Aoki and Vaithianathan, 2009). In this sense, there was also a proposal that a parent with children would have one more vote for life, even when his children become voters themselves.

Along with the advocacy for the introduction of family or parental vote - for demographic reasons, or for reasons of social justice and balance - an argument in favour of the direct vote of minors and even children has also developed (for example: Brando 2022; Wall, 2022; Weinstock, 2021; Umbers , 2020; Lau, 2012, etc.). If minors pay taxes and are not politically represented, this violates the principle of “no taxation without representation”. Moreover, in the USA, the number of deputies in the House of Representatives is determined not according to the number of voters, but in proportion to the total population - therefore, children are also counted, although they are not politically represented (Bennett, 2000). The formal age threshold for voting was created based on the principle of (in)competence, but that principle must be symmetrical, for all age groups, otherwise it is unfair and discriminatory (Brando 2022: 18–19; Wall, 2022: 178).

This point of view requires not only to lower the age threshold for voting, but also to enable all minors to vote directly, if possible through their parents (when it comes to younger ages). In this second case, *the parental vote (family vote; French vote familial, suffrage familial; German. Familienwahlrechts)* would actually be *a proxy vote on behalf of children (surrogate voting; Bennett, 2000; Kinderwahlrecht–vikarisch ausgeübt; Grözinger, 1993: 1261)*. The parent would be obliged to talk to the child about his preferences (Grözinger, 1993: 1264; DBD, 2003: 4; Schickhardt, 2015: 223), and a minor over the age of 14 would, according to some proposals, even have the right of veto if would judge that

the parent represents him politically inappropriately (Schickhardt, 2015: 223). Parental proxy voting, since it is a public authority (not a right), would be mandatory: the parent as a voter would not have to vote, but for the child he would have to (Semashko and Devit, 2004: 19; Schickhardt, 2015: 222) – otherwise they will be fined, in favour of the child protection organization (Schickhardt, 2015: 239). Therefore, a parent with five children would not have six votes (as follows from the perspective of plural voting), but five minor citizens, who are an integral part of the political demos, would be given the opportunity to vote by proxy (proxy-claim voting; Wall, 2022: 169) and thus realize their legitimate political right (Schickhardt, 2015: 227) - thereby ensuring true equality (Wall, 2022: 184).

Various solutions are proposed, which, when added to the classic parental vote, look like this:

1. a child acquires the nominal right to vote from birth, but must go through a strictly formal procedure of registration as a voter when he feels capable of doing so (Kiesewetter, 2009; Cook, 2013; Tremmel, 2014; Tremmel and Wilhelm 2015: 138–140; Hinze, 2020: 151; Wall, 2022: 175; 186);
2. a minor acquires the right to vote before coming of age, but his vote is weighted according to age (fractional vote): 12 years $1/7$ vote, 13 – $2/7$, 14 – $3/7$, 15 – $4/7$, 16 – $5/7$, 17 – $6/7$ votes (Rehfeld, 2011: 158); or 14 and 15 – $1/4$, 16 and 17 – $1/2$ vote (cf. Rehfeld, 2011: 163–164);
3. the child and parents share the child's vote in proportion to the age of the minor: up to 14 years old parents 100% - child 0%, from 14 years old parents 80% - child 20%, from 15 years old 60%-40%, from 16 years old 40% –60%, at 17 years 20%–80%, and at 18 years 0%–100% (Dukach, 2012);
4. the parent, for a time, helps the child to vote at the polling station (Olsson, 2008: 70–71) or directly votes for the child, until he passes the minimum political knowledge test (Grözinger, 1993; Semashko and Devit, 2004: 17), or does not go through the formal election registration procedure (Wall, 2014: 109; for representatives in Germany, see Schickhardt, 2015: 215), or simply does not give a formal statement that from now on it votes (Wall, 2022: 175; 186);
5. the parent votes as the child's representative until the legal deadline when the child acquires the right to vote (Rosmini, 1848: Art. 59; Lamartine, 1850: 249; Jouvenel, 1871: 2811; Lasserre, 1873; Tarde, 1892: 442–446; Laut , 1903; Roulleaux–Dugage, 1923: 3957; Sauvy, 1945: 213–14; Landry, 1949: 634; Löw, 1974; Carballo, 1981; Demeny, 1986: 354; Bayer, 1997; Rutherford 1998; Van Parijs, 1998 ; Hewlett and West 1998: 240–41; Annemans, et al., 1998: 9; Bennett, 2000; Semashko, 2000: 45; Bovenberg, 2007: 23; Sanderson and Scherbov, 2007: 548; Olsson, 2008; Aber, 2008: 202; Pantell and Shannon 2009; Antičić, 2014: 38; Wolf, Goldschmidt, and Petersen, 2015; Ringressi and Bernabei, 2018; Douthat, 2018; Modi, 2018; 2020);

6. the same as under 5, but in order to ensure that the parent votes strictly in the interest of the child, the parental vote is partly public: the vote is taken in a separate booth, so that the way the parent voted can be recorded by an independent agency, and the entire submit the records to the child when he reaches the age of majority (Schickhardt, 2015: 232).

When it comes to how to distribute votes for children between parents, there are the following proxy voting models.

1. all children's votes go to the father (Lamartine, 1850: 249; Jouvenel, 1871: 2811; Lasserre, 1873; Tarde, 1892: 442–446; Laut, 1903; Roulleaux–Dugage, 1923: 3957);
2. all children's votes go to the mother (Ringen, 1997a: 14; Ringen, 1997b; 53; Campiglio, 2009: 244; Fidesz 2011; Corak, 2012);
3. the mother votes for each child in the first half of the time until obtaining the right to vote, the father in the second half; for example, if the right to vote is acquired at the age of 18, the mother votes until the age of 9, the father from the age of 9 to the age of 18 (Sauvy, 1945; Ringressi and Bernabei, 2018);
4. fathers vote for sons, and mothers for daughters (Michel Debré, 1978 - cited according to Kandell, 1978; Grözinger, 1993: 1264–1265; Demeny, 2012: 700);
5. half the vote goes to each parent (Hattenhauer, 1996: 16; Rutherford, 1998: 1506; Bennett, 2000: III, G; Pantell and Shannon 2009: 142; Dukach, 2012; Sacconi and Fuksia 2014: 3; Antonić, 2014: 36; Schickhardt, 2015: 223; Wolf, Goldschmidt, and Petersen, 2015);
6. with an even number of children, the votes are shared between the father and the mother, and with an odd number, the father votes for the boys, and the mother for the girls (Enfière, 1923);
7. one vote for the father for each odd child in order of birth, and one vote for the mother for each even child (Toulemon, 1933);
8. one vote for the mother for each odd child, one vote for the father for each even child; at the time of the promulgation of the law, since some children are already of legal age, it is counted as the odd first next minor child (Van Parijs, 1998: 312);
9. father and mother vote alternately for each child, with a random selection of the beginning that can be made, for example, based on the (odd) parity of the child and the (odd) date of birth of the parents (Eufemi et al. 2004: 3);
10. mother and father mutually decide who will vote for the child (Thomas and Hocking, 2003: 14; 80–81; Semashko and Devit, 2004: 18–19); in case the parents cannot agree, the law determines a simple way for both parents to get equal rights to the child's vote (DBD, 2003: 2; DBD, 2008: 4).

WHAT WOULD ĐORĐE TASIĆ SAY TODAY?

We have seen that Tasić's consideration of the parental vote is still very relevant today, at least when it comes to European thought and political practice. What about Serbia?

Unfortunately, there is almost no discussion of plural voting in Serbian social science today. When it comes to electoral reform, among our experts the most thought is the electoral system (majority-proportional) and the number of constituencies, while feminists are, of course, only interested in increasing women's quotas. Politicians are equally interested almost exclusively in the method of determining the order of deputies on the list (see Vučićević and Jovanović, 2020: 829–835), as well as in reducing the electoral censure (Marković, 2020: 132–137; Škundrić, 2020: 275–281), while female politicians are, of course, only interested in female quotas (Marković, 2020: 140–141; Škundrić, 2020: 285–286).

In contemporary Serbian sociology, there is still no talk of considering the concrete improvement of social design. In that respect, it seems that there are only two engaged topics: 1. criticism of (Serbian) nationalism and 2. feminist criticism of patriarchy. The questions that are more general are soon abandoned and forgotten by our sociologists, immediately after receiving their doctorate (when general topics are usually examined for the last time). They deal with the production of knowledge about ever smaller topics, which have less and less connection with *the world of life* (Lebenswelt), i.e. with truth-and-meaning, so our scientific journals often look like collections of insignificant and impersonal *ramblings* (Antonić, 2012: 39–68; 2022: 8). Points are collected on the basis of published works in foreign and domestic scientific journals, all in the function of personal academic career, while responsibility towards society is evaded by ritualistic, but politically correct, cursing of Serbian nationalism and patriarchy – all of which, in fact, only lends legitimacy to the global system of domination. There is an implicit *sociological ideology* – according to which we just need to consistently imitate what “Europe” is doing, so that Serbia will one day become a developed and rich West (“modernization theory”).

We see, however, that even a hundred years ago, Đorđe Tasić was, even for the current state of the debate in Europe, far more “modern” and “progressive” than we are today. Because, as he beautifully explained it:

“We should never stop talking about the need for experimentation in politics and social life. Perhaps social sciences will never be able to tell us definitively about the results of an institution and it will be necessary to take risks. When this is always the case, when there is a question of removing evil, one should be progressive and conduct an experiment - of course, as a precaution and with the possibility of going back in time - one should really conduct experiments in social matters” (Tasić, 1921: 94).

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