



EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS

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Abstract: *The topic of modern migrations and the associated effects have long since ceased to be of importance only to experts in the fields of demography, social and economic policy. The turbulent migration events in the second decade of the 21st century have shown us that modern migration has become a serious security issue for all European countries and the Union itself as never before. The security problems related to the massive wave of migration to Europe, mainly from the Middle East, and also from North Africa, are twofold. One side of the coin concerns general security problem that irregular migration poses for migrant transit countries and migrant destination countries. This is usually presented as a fear of Islamist extremists infiltrating migrant convoys to Europe, or more generally as a fear of the "Islamization of Europe". Another problem related to the dramatic migration flows to Europe is the rise of the radical right in many European countries and the emergence of strong anti-immigration and Islamophobic narratives. European national populist discourses have used the opportunity to emphasize more strongly the threat of Islamization of the Old Continent, and the fact that many of the asylum seekers were Muslims, who made the image of the "Muslim invasion" even more effective. What also benefited right-wing populists were the terrorist attacks on European soil that coincided with the migration wave. Right-wing populism, based on the narratives of anti-migration policies, has also become*

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a part of the electoral slogans of political parties, some of which have also become a part of the executive branch. This paper analyzes the problems faced by European countries due to the increasing insecurity caused by the sudden influx of migrants, and also the spread of rightwing extremism, which is a problem in itself in the complicated security algorithm today.

Introduction

The displacement of people and human communities around the globe has been a part of human history since its beginnings. Sometimes voluntarily, sometimes forcibly, often due to economic problems, sometimes for political reasons, sometimes fleeing wars and sometimes as participants in them, individuals and groups leave their habitat in search of happiness and a safe place in a new geographical, social and cultural environment.

Contemporary anthropologists say that the history of identity has been a succession of migration, chance, and adaptation. One of them, French scholar Michel Agier, the creator of the term "new cosmopolitanism", even claims that no human being has ever been native and that borders have always been unstable, "rebuilt and challenged" (Ažije, 2019), and borders are not just walls, there are many other forms of them. Thus, we distinguish the boundaries of place (here and there), time (before and after, once and now), and the dividing line of the social world (everything that is capable of existing in a social sense and "demarcates" what is intrinsic to it from what is different). Although the ideologues of globalization have often emphasized this in their enticing narrative, globalization (as we live it, not as it is imagined) has not abolished borders. It has only transformed them, shifted them, and separated them. It has multiplied them.

Nor has globalization, though heralded as an important transmission and connection "apparatus", diminished the full range of human differences (cultural, ethnic, religious - general identity). It has only made it easier for us to meet and live with different strangers and to be bothered by some of their characteristics that are foreign to us. The prevalence of people and human communities has conditioned the emphasis on differences, which some like to portray as more significant than ever, and others as different and irreconcilable worlds and civilizations, before which only conflict and clashes are possible. Are we really more different than ever and so entrenched in our rigid views that we should only expect conflict? What is the truth?

Using the example of the relationship between the former colonial power and the former colony and the relationship it represents in the late 19th century, Harari (Yuval Noah Harari) makes a great point when he says, "The difference between Anglo-Saxon England and the Indian Pala Empire was much greater than the difference between

present-day India and Britain, but in the time of King Alfred the Great, British Airways did not offer direct flights between Delhi and London" (Harari, 2017: 184). The increasingly dynamic crossing of borders in search of work, security, and a better future, as well as the need to meet, accept, or reject strangers, "strains our political systems and national identities, which were forged in an age of much less mobility" (Harari, *ibid.*).

Migrations and conflicts have always gone hand in hand, "migrations have created divisions, which in recent times have been characterized mainly by different cultural (some would say civilizational) contexts" (Subotić, 2022: 12). Culture is a faithful companion of the migration flows and their determinant at the same time. Cultures that came from others were accepted or rejected depending on the criteria by which they were evaluated. The risk of declaring universal values to which the "heralds" have become accustomed is a point of view that was characteristic of the ideologists of colonization. They were guided by the idea of the "enlightenment of others" and believed that the whole world should enjoy the benefits inherent in their society. Taking the example of the relationship of the Western countries, primarily the US and the leading countries of the EU, with the countries of the Muslim world, we can see clear inertia from this period.

This time, the "exporters of democracy" met a "market", where it is currently impossible to "sell this article" (Subotić, 2022: 12). The peculiar secularism in the Islamic world, embodied in secular-type absolutist monarchies and socialist countries with a strong national narrative, has collapsed with the attempt to import democracy to this part of the world. The Arab Spring is a product of people's desire for change, and also of interventionism, which, on the principle that "the day before the election is tyranny, and the day after the election is democracy", only fueled conflict and brought Islamists to power. Finally, "transitional losers are perfect prey for protagonists of extreme attitudes and ideas" (Milenković, Subotić, 2017: 64).

By the time "democratic Islamism" took an increasingly dominant militant form amid the general decline of the regional economy, it was too late to reconsider all the choices. Evil in the form of the Islamic State was born, conflicts and wars inflamed the region, rising the flow of migrants who moved towards Europe at a drastic rate, creating a series of problems, both for the migrants themselves and for the migrants' "transit societies already burdened with their problems (from the economic to those representing the legacy of the wars of the 1990s - the example of the Western Balkans route). This flood of migration has raised many new questions and revived old ones that have remained unanswered for too long.

The current migratory movements, therefore, bring with them problems that occur in the well-known interregnum, whose main feature is causality, according to which migrants have to adapt to the "host society", which in turn has to adapt to them.

Much of the contemporary literature in this area deals with various problems encountered in the adaptation of immigrants to their new environment. While the newcomers do not usually face the same problems, they often challenge the self-determination of the host society and demand a share in the sources of power within that society (Giddens, 1990).

The other side of the equation, however, is how the hosts of these immigrants respond. National populist discourse in Europe has seized the opportunity to increasingly emphasize the threat posed by the Islamization of the Old Continent. Right-wing populism, based on the narratives of anti-immigration politics, has also become a part of the electoral slogans of political parties, some of which have also become a part of the executive branch. It is precisely for this reason that the following pages analyze the duality in the understanding of security on European soil in the context of mass migration movements. The problem of mass migration to Europe in itself deserves an analysis, but so does the radicalization of European societies, in which the migration crisis plays an important role.

Migration and the "Islamization of Europe"

If we reject the spread of fears among the population, used as a campaign tool by the ideologists of right-wing extremism, the fact remains that migration to Europe from the immediate environment will continue. Compared to its immediate surroundings, the European population is stagnating, and the Old Continent is much more economically developed. At the beginning of the 20th century, Europe had a population of about 400 million, while the population increased only to about 750 million in the entire century (Bülent, 2002). In contrast, the African population has increased tenfold from about 130 million to nearly 1.3 billion over the same period and continues to grow. Since 1950, the population of the Middle East has increased from 92 million to over 350 million, with stagnation predicted for the first twenty years of the new century (PRB, 2001).

Although we have experienced significant benefits related to promoting births in recent decades, European fertility rates are among the lowest in the world. No European country has a rate of 2.1, which is the minimum necessary to replace the current residents with new ones, according to the 2016 World Bank data. In sub-Saharan Africa, the fertility rate is 4.8, and in the Middle East 2.8. On the other hand, the life expectancy of Europeans is among the highest in the world, ranging from 71.5 years in Ukraine to 83 years in Switzerland (Rosser, 2017).

If we assume that the economic gap between these regions and Europe will not change soon, we can expect new waves of migration to Europe in the future. These waves will not be able to change the demographics of Europe, but there is currently no comprehensive strategy to address this future challenge. In the current circulation, "there is a barbed wire of nationalists and ad hoc behavior of the pro-European broader center" (Subotić, 2022: 285).

The Italian right-wing Salvini threatens that Europe will become an "Islamic caliphate" if the right does not win, fake news spreads panic about migrants among the population, conspiracy theories about the massive replacement of "Christian Europeans" with people of other races and religions, barbed wire and pragmatic deals with authoritarian leaders to stop waves of refugees. This is what public opinion in Europe has looked like to a great extent over the last seven or eight years.

Public opinion is certainly one of the most important driving forces for this process, to advance the interests of the nation, the elite, and certain interest groups. How and in what way the interests are represented and to what extent they are fulfilled depends on the structure of the society and the administrative system that governs it. However, the general constant that prevails in almost all modern societies, and that is certainly reinforced by modern media and the Internet, is that public opinion is a manageable and generated category. In any case, it is used as a justification, cover, or motivation for certain decisions made by the political elite, including those related to migration and migrants (Mitrović, Perić, 2022). Above all, populism-inspired public opinion represents a strong potential generator of extremist and destabilizing social potential.

Nevertheless, leaving aside opportunistic and populist platitudes towards migrants, this issue will remain one of the main issues on European soil, because the issue of immigration is not only a question of the number of people who will come to European soil, but also an issue that is divided into economic, cultural, religious and demographic areas.

At present, there are few constructive voices on this phenomenon in the European political arena. Even if migrants are no longer such a burning issue as they were in 2014 and especially in 2015, immigration will not disappear as an issue in Europe; in fact, it will be one of the most important issues in the future and, consequently, will influence the future appearance of the European political scene.

While there is currently no proposal in the pro-European mainstream for a comprehensive and long-term solution to the immigration problem, anti-immigrant sentiments and conspiracy theories are rampant on the right. They are characterized by different variants of right-wing identity politics that refers to the "danger" of white Christians being forcibly replaced by people from other continents, especially the Middle East and Africa.

In general, violence is the main cause of the abuse of ethnic or ethnonational identity, either in the usual sense of supporting the nation or forcing people to change or hide their identity, which is rarer, but not uncommon (Subotić, Mitrović, 2018: 25). Thus, the inertia and ignoring problems prevail on one side of the political spectrum, while ultra-populism prevails on the other.

Since the outbreak of the migrant crisis in 2014, just over 2 million people have arrived in Europe. Of these, as many as 1 million arrived in 2015. For the Continent, this represents slightly more than 0.3% of the population, which can hardly change anything demographically (Subotić, 2022: 286). Theories about the "great population shift" and similar discourses fall short in the face of concrete numbers. However, conspiracy theorists and disinformers on the Internet have shown that the data of the UNHCR or the European Commission is an important tool.

The Islamic population, constantly targeted by the far right, is far from establishing a "caliphate" in Europe, as Matteo Salvini claims. According to the 2016 estimates by the Pew Research Center, Muslims constitute 4.9% of the population in the EU.³ Most of them live in Bulgaria - 11.1%, France 8.8%, Sweden 8.1%, and

³ The data also includes the EU non-member countries: Norway and Switzerland.

Austria 6.9% (Lipka, 2017). National (Serbian) conspiracy theorists such as Dejan Lučić often mention phrases such as the "Islamic Republic of Germany", since in Germany Muslims constitute only 6.1% of the population, or in Italy only 4.8%. They also rarely mention Russia, where this religion makes up a much larger share of the total population, around 10% (Lipka, 2017).

With an optimistic estimate of the average level of immigration, the Islamic population could represent only 11.2% of the EU population in 2050. This means that the situation where the "Islamic population takes over Europe" has no factual basis. Even if the entire Middle East moved to Europe tomorrow, the Islamic population would not have been the majority, let alone with moderate or lower immigration trends.

Taking into account the fact that the "baby boomer generation" (Baby Boomers) will soon be retiring *en masse* to Europe, a multitude of concrete problems arise about which there is hardly any constructive debate. In the countries of the European Union, the working population continues to grow, and stable financing of pension funds is becoming impossible. One solution is to continue to adjust the retirement age to increasing life expectancy, and both of them would be wrong. The question is whether workers are still productive at 67 or 68, and these measures are also quite popular politically.

On the other hand, 2 million migrants who have arrived to Europe and who can only meet a part of the current and future needs have caused a real upheaval on the European political scene. The united migrant population, the narrative of Islam as a religion prone to extremism, is a powerful weapon of right-wing populists, who often surround themselves with the so-called New Christianity.

On the waves of the crisis, "anti-Islam and anti-immigration populists, as well as various Eurosceptic parties, become the structural difference of the political landscape in the size of European countries" (Subotić, 2020: 312).

Thus, although immigration is already economically beneficial to the country receiving new residents in several ways in the medium term, it proved to be quite unpopular in the short term. The natural skepticism of people towards foreigners was helpful and fake news, such as the disinformation that the increase in crime is directly related to migrants, although in the countries used as examples, such as a data for the Italy premises, minimized.

This environment and real challenges, however, pose a major problem in Europe, where cultural right-wing populism and economic left-wing populism increasingly rule rather than policies based on action and evidence. On the one hand, Europeans are intimidated into not accepting immigration that would compensate for the lack of the people of working age, and any postponement of the retirement age or correction of the level of state benefits of the nationalist population."

The problem of the fact that the European population has traditionally been accustomed to a high level of social benefits is reflected in the fact that this model was introduced during a period of great population boom, when a large number of people absorbed a great number of workers. The current demographic trends in Europe have reversed, and this model is already unsustainable. Any minimal correction will lead to mass revolts, especially in countries like France and Italy.

Therefore, the implementation of real policies in the future of Europe will be very complex, as the population of European countries will neither reform nor immigrate.

Although populists in power are likely to face the reality of their demagogic policies, they can do considerable damage both to the already "wounded" multiculturalism in Europe and to the budgets of the member states. On the other hand, the pro-European center (left and right) has little room for maneuver in the medium term. Either to allow immigration and risk the influx of populists, or implement reforms that cushion the effects of negative population trends and also risk the influx of populists due to social discontent. This is a task that is anything, but easy.

Where is room for sober reflection on this problem, apart from the rationalization inherent in the expiring liberal model (precisely because of its open flirtation with right-wing - ultimately corporatist - approach), even if it may sound strange at first sight, particularly in the field of religion? Is the impossibility of the coexistence of Muslims coming to Europe and people residing here (mainly Christians) exactly what the two extreme narratives (Islamist and right-wing - European) aim at in their expressions of hatred? The answer is yes, especially considering the differentiation of their hatred, which ultimately refers to those who would like to "put out the fire" rather than those who "set the fire".

The theological concepts based on love and forgiveness are not "fire accelerants", on the contrary. Everything that happens in the violence along the migratory route is not a product of religion or of the nation. It is a product of their abuse, that is, of the fact that these identity elements have made it convenient to start and (or) complete dreams of various psychopathological traumas or brutal financial benefits, easily obtained in troubled times, in their name. A person (and consequently a collectivity) who serves God out of fear does not see themselves as a relative subject in their relationship with God, but primarily as an object of religion. Such a person (collectivity) constantly has in mind the image of the God who is ready to punish those who do not fulfill norms, laws, and various ecclesiastical or other religious rules and customs (Subotić, 2019: 493). These persons do not see the God who is love, but consider him as a form that has to be appeased from time to time, before who something has to be earned. Therefore, "religion understood as love can contribute significantly to peace and cooperation, not only between groups belonging to the same faith, but also between different religions and denominations" (Subotić, 2019: 493). The idea of religious tolerance as a product of religion, which is in essence love, was created precisely with the aim of saving lives, reducing conflict and, consequently, giving people the freedom to choose their religion.

One of those who believe that religion and culture should be a factor of cohesion and growth rather than discord and regression is certainly Bassam Tibi, who because of this orientation has become a target of militant Islamists who, like moderate Europeans with their articulation and influence, consider far-right populist leaders and their followers to be enemies. Tibi rightly argues that most of the problems the world faces today when it comes to relations and conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims in the West are not due to a "clash of

civilizations”, but to the clash of two universalisms. The large influx of Muslims into Europe and the clash of these universalisms have produced a multitude of problems, including Islamism as not the only one, from which other problems branch off, at whose top is the real threat - terrorism. These challenges could be overcome by a different attitude of Europeans and Muslims when meeting on European soil. Tibi believes that Europeans have to renounce exclusivity and Eurocentrism, which has reduced Muslims in Europe to an ethno-religious underclass, hence the emergence of parallel societies and Islamic enclaves (Tibi, 2020: 157-174). Tibi also points out that Europeans have created two extremes: on the one hand, a populist anti-Islam approach and, on the other, a non-discriminatory multiculturalism based on the cultural relativist understanding that “everything is possible, everything passes” (Tibi, 2008: 191). Euro-Islam, which Tibi offers as a way to a peaceful and sustainable way out of this antagonism, implies the politics of integration that is simultaneously distinct from multiculturalism and assimilation. It is necessary that Europeans and Muslim migrants share the same basic values. Otherwise, Tibi argues, we will continue to see Islamists and Salafists seeking a place for Islam in the Western society while refusing to accept the European idea (Tibi, 2008: 180). “Being a European citizen”, Tibi concludes, “is much more than a passport”, it belongs to a state system based on the culture of democracy and individual human rights, implying the acceptance of secular civil society (ibid.).

Migration and the strengthening of right-wing extremism

The unification of Islam implies several basic premises: the absence of differences between factions (especially between Sunnis and Shiites), the ignorance of various sources of Islam, the perception of the Islamic holy book as a document used primarily to justify the fight against infidels, an immanent warrior ethos, the ossification of patriarchy and traditionalism in the culture of Muslims (Jovanović, Ajzenhamer, 2017: 262). In the next step, Islam is associated with concepts such as fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism, which gives the recent monotheism the prerogative of a monolithic, violent religion, “although the entire history of Islam is marked by polemics and differences within the religion itself” (Subotić, 2015: 89).

Therefore, in order to portray Islam as hostile – “The Other” - it is first necessary to erase all distinctions, so that the next step would be the derivative identification of Islam with certain terrorist-organized movements. Who insists on establishing such a narrative in Europe today? The answer is usually simple: right-wing populists, who often cloak themselves in the so-called “New Christianity”.

The medium-term trends in contemporary Europe, reflected in the weakening of party democracy, the mediatization of politics and the commercialization of the media, and the seemingly widening gap between citizens and the “places where

decisions are made”, can explain the success of populism in recent decades. They also help explain the tendency of political actors to address directly “the people” and to adopt at least some elements of the populist communication style.⁴ Given these circumstances, it is easier to understand why anti-Islamic and anti-immigration populists, as well as various Euroskeptic parties, are becoming a structural feature of the political landscape in most European countries. Crisis is not a neutral category in social analysis, rather “it is a category of social and political practice mobilized to accomplish a particular political task” (Brubaker, 2011: 102), or as Moffit states more explicitly: “Crisis does not precede populist politics and is not independent of it; on the contrary, it is a central component of populist politics” (Moffit, 2016: 111).

Apart from Spain and Greece, where the populist pattern temporarily “went left” and is a clear product of the economic crisis, right-wing populist reaction was most directly and obviously caused by the migrant crisis, which “more than any other geopolitical process shook the European continent” (Despotović, 2017: 169). The number of immigrants in 2015, although large, was not objectively insurmountable and could not be channeled. The number of 1.3 million asylum applications filed in the EU countries is almost double the previous high number of 1992, but it is still only “a quarter of one percent of the EU population” (Pew Research Center, 2016).

The most immediate political impact of the migrant crisis was felt in Germany, Sweden, and Hungary. In Germany, the crisis led to a moment of unusual openness, by Angela Merkel’s decision in September 2015 to open German borders to all asylum seekers, who entered it via Hungary and Austria. At the same time, there was a strong reaction against this openness, which “manifested itself in the transformation of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland - AfD) from a neoliberal party to an anti-immigrant populist party that achieved previously unimaginable electoral success in the 2016 local elections and the 2017 federal elections” (Goeres, et al., 2017). The Social Democrats also won the 2019 state elections in Brandenburg, and the Christian Democrats in Saxony. However, these two parties achieved their worst results in these eastern provinces since the reunification of Germany. The right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in second in both provinces with record results (Bojić, 2019).

In Sweden, which took in more refugees per capita than Germany in 2015 (Rydgern, Meiden, 2016), the far-right, anti-migration “Sweden Democrats” party won 17.6 percent of the vote in the 2018 elections, a significant increase from 12.9 percent they received in previous elections (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2018). In Hungary, one of the main stops on the Western Balkans route at that time, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took an anti-immigration initiative by erecting barbed wire

⁴ In the part that refers to the populist aspect of the anti-immigration narrative, the authors will use the work: Subotić, M. Dimitrijević, I. (2019). Ivan Dimitrijević, „Populizam kao generator desnog ekstremizma na primeru migrantske krize”, Novi Sad, *Kultura polisa* no. 38. pp. 295-310.

fences. Following Orbán's lead, leaders in Poland, Slovakia and Czechia have adopted this rhetoric. The futility of "deideologization of ideology" today is also illustrated by the example of the Slovak Prime Minister who, as a nominal social democrat (!), promised that "the country will not accept Muslims" (Matharu, 2016). In Austria, another important stop for migrants on their way to Germany and the northern countries, the support for the radical right-wing, anti-immigrant "Freedom Party" has skyrocketed, with the Party regularly topping Austrian party charts in recent years. This is also true for Geert Wilders' eponymous party in the Netherlands, which "even inspires the populist right with the stridency of its anti-Muslim rhetoric" (Vossen, 2016: 26).

The refugee crisis, as Offe correctly notes, "like the economic crisis before it, has triggered a broader crisis of European institutions" (Offe, 2016: 19). The Dublin system, which governs asylum applications, begins to be overwhelmed, and the Schengen Agreement on free movement within the EU is on the verge of collapse. Free movement, which was one of the most cherished values of European integration, depended on the seemingly permeable external borders of the Union. In parallel with these events, there have been growing demands from migrants, who speak of the need to protect the jobs, cultural identity, and way of life of people often referred to as "domiciliary", "indigenous", or "native". In recent years, the need for protectionism on the oldest continent has most often been associated with protection against the Islamization of Europe.

The wave of terrorist attacks in 2015 brought new "support" to populist responses to an increasingly complex crisis. The total number of victims of recent terrorist attacks is about 400, which is significantly less than nearly 3,000 killed in the September 11, 2001 attacks or nearly 2,500 killed by IRA and ETA in the United Kingdom and Spain (Table 1).


However, the increasing frequency and symbolic resonance of the attacks in Paris, Brussels, Berlin, London, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Barcelona, as well as the enormous media attention they attracted, enabled the populist right to amplify and dramatize the sense of insecurity and vulnerability, and to link the semantics of friend and foe to Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilizations. This happened most directly and immediately in France, where there was the highest concentration of attacks and where a state of emergency was officially declared in November 2015 and extended six times.⁵ In response to religiously motivated extremism and terrorism, the extreme right is gaining strength and has been gaining ground on the French political scene in recent years (Đorić, 2018: 54). While the September 11 attacks, Madrid 2004 and London 2005 attacks are interpreted as acute and unrepeatable events, the wave of terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015-2017 supports right-wing populists' claims of chronic insecurity.

⁵ On how human rights become a hostage in the fight against terrorism, on the example of France, see: Subotić M, Milenković M. (2018), Borba protiv terorizma iz ugla redefinisane bezbednosne paradigme i teorije politike, *Vojno delo* 2/2018.

Terror's toll

Major attacks in western Europe, September 11th 2001 to March 23rd 2017*

Attacks causing two or more deaths[†] by: ■ jihadists ■ other ■ unknown/no affiliation □ =1 killed



Sources: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland; press reports

*At 11am GMT †Excluding perpetrators

Economist.com

Table 1 – The number of victims in terrorist attacks in Europe 2001-2017
(The Economist, 2017)

Another important companion, some would say a crisis generator, is the crisis of public knowledge, evident in debates about fake news, alternative facts, and the "time after truth". As Huxley (Huxley, 2014) notes in *Brave New World*, "the abundance and seemingly democratic hyper-availability of 'information' in a hyperconnected digital ecosystem, exacerbated by the proliferation of disinformation marketed for profit or as propaganda, has weakened the authority of the intermediary institutions that produce and disseminate knowledge: universities, academia, and the press" (Persily, 2017: 67-68).

Certainly, management and, in a negatively motivating context, manipulation of the media is one of the instruments of manifestation of strategic communication, and as such it is read not only in the formation of public opinion, but also in the strategic areas of communication relevant to and based on defense and security - propaganda, public diplomacy and advocacy (Mitrović, 2019). The crisis of public knowledge opens the door to populists, especially the populist right. At the same time, it is also an opportunity to create and disseminate not only "alternative facts", but an entire alternative worldview that is not only protected from any challenge, but also receives ample confirmation through a constant stream of new "information".

A particularly influential channel for creating attitudes, marketing alternative truths, and creating strongholds of public attitudes based on manipulations and half-truths is certainly the Internet. Therefore, it is very important to recognize the need for proper training, compliance with procedures, control and necessary restrictions to

avoid manipulation and misuse of information in the information sphere, especially on the Internet (Mitrović, Vasiljević, 2021). Otherwise, through manipulation it is possible to create or deepen the meaning of the very crises that populists claim to respond to, as well as the power to exacerbate and deepen the division between the "people" and the "elite", which is the main populist weapon today.

Conclusion

Mass migrations in contemporary Europe are mostly perceived as "a retrograde and paradoxical novelty and an extraordinary scourge, when in fact they represent a general historical phenomenon occurring at uneven intervals" (Simeunović, 2016: 10). Besides the undeniable negative, they also have a justified positive historical role as the main medium of interaction between different civilizations. Migrations are also a repetitive process, and when someone artificially interrupts them, they tend to renew, continue and complete themselves. Modern migrations are not only due to the usual migration factors, but also an inevitable consequence of the world globalization and the introduction of the principle of free movement of people, goods and capital on a broad international scale.

Migration, especially the so-called irregular migration, has significant security implications. When it comes to the type of violence that is growing as a security issue with the influx of migrants, the answer is seemingly simple and straightforward: the danger that is growing is the danger of Islamist-motivated terrorism, since a large percentage of modern migrants are Muslims. However, things are not quite that simple. The future that awaits us in Europe will certainly be marked by the rise of Islamist extremism, but its rise will be accompanied by another type of extremism, namely right-wing extremism, which will increasingly have a reactive character in relation to migration. Simeunović (2016: 7) points out that "vigilantist right-wing extremists now gloat over the failure of the EU and its late response to the challenge of migration, offering themselves as salvation from this scourge, while the fact that migration is always accompanied by a high degree of politicization is undoubtedly in their society, as well as the inevitability of emotional reaction".

Security and general geopolitical issues also tend to go hand in hand somehow with a wide variety of conspiracy theories. Proponents and opponents of conspiracy theories argue about the current migration movements to Europe, i.e., about the answer to the question of whether there is a conspiratorial element in the last great wave of migration. However, those who make fun of conspiracy stories are not right, nor are those who claim that everything that happens is the result of a conspiracy. Conspiracies exist, but not all of them are serious or sufficiently functional, even if they are true. It would be irrational, however, if some forces did not try to use these migrations to carry out their secret plans. "While the so-called Islamic State is unhappy with the fact that a large number of young Arabs are fleeing to Europe instead of fighting for its goals, it makes no secret of the fact that it is infiltrating its own people into the ranks of migrants in order to later carry out terrorist attacks in Europe, and this practice can be expected to take on further dimensions in the future" (Simeunović, 2016: 14).

It is undisputed that migration can have positive economic consequences, not only for the countries that receive the migrants, but also for the countries from which they come, because their departure relaxes unemployment, reduces unresolved social problems, and the remittances they send to their families bring them great financial benefits. Due to the fact that immigrants are more mobile and more efficient in taking advantage of opportunities in the labor market, they have greater potential to close the gap between supply and demand and thus have a positive impact on the labor market. In this context, a common, carefully planned immigration policy is proposed, which would lead to rejuvenation and economic growth of Europe.

With respect to the "permissible" passage of migrants, particularists usually take the hard-line position that the state sets a criterion by which it determines who is "let in" criterion that defines what is a family or close family, what are the refugees who can settle there and start new life, what is a legitimate asylum claim, etc. In addition to these two categories, family migrants and refugees, there is a large number of migrants who are also judged on certain criteria. "Do they have a criminal record; could they pose a threat to national security; what is their health status and how could it affect public health; what is their financial situation, is there someone to support them, or would they be a burden to the state; and finally, what is their education and cultural background, and whether they would be able to find a job and integrate successful" (Đorđević, 2008: 245). Moreover, for the majority of particularists, the ethnic, religious, and cultural view blurs the real differences in the basic sense of social class, as well as those of status in the sense of citizenship. It fails to recognize that the danger is not so much from foreign workers and refugees, but from a system of aggressive capitalism that disenfranchises locals and foreigners alike and further erodes the labor and social base, as well as the rights of all (Župarić - Iljić, 2016). It is very easy to use the ethnonational and religious key and blame foreigners for all social problems in society. Extreme, but more and more often, moderately right-wing conservative currents use discourses of exclusivity, as well as numerous ideologues in order not to justify the closing of borders and discrimination.

At the same time, in a state of economic and moral crisis, the majority of the population is in an existential convulsion, which leads to individualistic atomization and withdrawal into themselves. People forget the need for empathy, humanity, and solidarity, equally towards the neighbor as towards the stranger in need, even when this clearly represents the main value determinant of their culture and religion. If we add to that that the state responds to the arrival of people by changing the law in the direction of further criminalizing solidarity and sanctioning helping people in need, it is not surprising that the support base for migrants and refugees is declining. However, this is precisely where the greatest area of struggle and responsibility for changing the situation lies - in raising awareness of the fundamental causes of this situation, as well as the activism that would contribute to the reduction of such inequalities. Yet this is where the greatest area of struggle and responsibility for changing the situation lies - in raising awareness of the root causes of this situation, and in activism that would help reduce these inequalities.

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