INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND SUBREGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

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Abstract: *The post-Soviet and post-SFR Yugoslavia space has been sharing some similarities in terms of post-socialist transitional changes and security arrangements related to peacemaking and peacekeeping missions. The arrangements have been dominantly made in the framework of international order. There are a few types of international security presence represented by the United Nations and OSCE, and also some examples of the so-called ad hoc peace operations such are IFOR/SFOR/EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina or UNMIK/EULEX in Kosovo and Metohija. This paper examines which goals, efficiency and future peace missions in Southeastern Europe will have in the light of changes of international order and strategic relations between great global players and international organizations in relations with regional countries and the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian war and its impact on maintaining peace. This changed environment should also be connected with initiatives and acceptance for regional cooperation and impact of international players on establishing regional networks.*

Introduction

The issue of international order is usually periodically actualized since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and essentially depends on relations between great powers. Regional order depends on relations of great powers to their regions and themselves, as well as relations between regional states. "International order refers to the settled arrangements that define and guide relations between states" (Ikenberry, 2014:85). It

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reflects either a set of arrangements or activities that characterize common behavior of states. The main source and basis of contemporary international order has gained its form from the European state system based on the idea and principle of multiplicity and coexistence of sovereign states. Contemporary international order is shaped by two pillars: the United Nations and its principles of maintaining peace as a universal human right. After hundreds of years of relations between sovereign states in the conditions of anarchy, the globalization process has been introduced as "a postmodern state as a relatively new phenomenon, mainly concentrated on the capitalist core… Postmodern states have a much more open and tolerant attitude toward cultural, economic and political interaction, and have by and large convinced themselves that opening their economies and to a lesser extent their societies and politics to a wider range of interactions is good for their prosperity and security" (Buzan, Waever, 2005:23.)

A few years ago the US President Joseph Biden claimed that "international order that the United States had been establishing is just in the process of decomposition" (Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2020:5). The equality of sovereign states as the basic principle of the UN, which creates a unique internationally recognized forum is threatened by geographically limited alliances. Contemporary global processes have initiated the issue of another phase of development of international order. The Russian – Ukrainian conflict has posed several dilemmas when one talks about relations between states. Firstly, the understanding of sovereignty assumed in the conditions of globalization has been questioned.

Are we witnesses to renewing and strengthening a role of sovereign states in international relations? Who has the main impact on defining international relations? How to provide security of states that do and belong to the circle of great powers? Who has the right to intervene in internal processes of sovereign states? What is the role of the United Nations and its possibility to intervene in internal processes of member states and the relation of the United States to interventions, particularly unilateral one and how does it fit in the framework of international moral values? How to define and regulate relations to self-determination, secession and international recognition of new states including territorial issues? How to provide security in the increasing security threats in new environment? Does the new global multipolar world emerge in front of our eyes?

Having in mind the increasing role of international organizations and alliances including regional cooperation initiatives, the objective of this paper is to compare two sides of international suborders: the kind of transition, which is the wider framework of peace missions in the territory of the two dissolved federations: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

Transitional changes, international relations, need for peace operations

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union from 1989 to 1992, a few wars were sparkled among population of ethnic minorities requesting independence from new independent countries, which had earlier depended on Moscow, i.e. Russia.

Regardless of conflicts and tensions, historians and political scientists emphasize the fact that the USSR or "Russian Empire" laid out as the USSR had broken up more than ever with small bloodshed that was not possible to imagine for the break-up of any empire in history. Geopolitical changes had reflected a real character of the Soviet Federation. In the fall of the 1980s only three Baltic countries clearly defined and strongly expressed national politics and organized national movements, defining their statehood. Ukraine followed them, and Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan intended to do the same to some extent. Most of other former Soviet republics were stunned inadvertently with suddenly gifted independence.

In the very beginning Russia, as the central state, was faced with the problems which imposed post-socialist transition of territorial integrity, sovereignty, polity and economy including the necessity of state establishment. There were three types of states – three Baltic states, which were absolutely Western-oriented and viewing Russia as the biggest security threat, but at the same time having a great Russian population as ethnic minorities in them. The second type are Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with strong independence intentions and a bulk of Central Asian 'stans' characterized by the so-called 'oriental democracies' (Parakhonsky n.d.) persecuted as 'islamist' states, usually named 'sultanistic' as the type of personalistic power tightened in family and client cliques and featured by lifetime powers combined with dynastic secession intentions.

They are recognizable due to volatile policies, the lack of clear foreign policy, national security and military concepts. Giving advance to ethno-national and clan policies in Central Asian states, then state borders of these republics became concern of Russia and its new concepts of foreign policy. Simultaneously, newly pro-independent states such as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, as well as the government in Moldova, have intended to stress their defiance to Russia trying to avoid direct dependence and Russian impact on their internal foreign policies. Some of them have tended to emphasize non- Russian approach institutionally establishing GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) as an attempt of imposing counterbalance to Russia. Politically, this means that the post-Soviet space is contained in the mostly pro-Russian state Belarus, leading counterbalance to Ukraine, a few pro-independent states in the west side of the Commonwealth of Independent States and some Central Asian states, which are rather dependent of Russia and states in the post-Soviet space.

The post-Soviet countries share Russian as lingua franca, the common Soviet legacy including common roads and railroads, pipelines and electrical power, as well as other parts of infrastructure which mostly go through and around state borders. Apart from Baltic states, the former Soviet space is covered by weak states and powers with very low capacities to develop mutual relations and common regional institutions and policies with relatively low national and ethnic potential. Russia has initiated the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and partly the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as the instruments of providing regional security and Russian interests based on the concept of the 'near abroad', considering their interests in the relative youth of new states.

The former Soviet republics are considered to be the Russian sphere of interest. Russia has the necessity to regulate security in the region, as well as economic interests. The participation of Russia is justified by the necessity to protect Russian minorities in all post-Soviet countries, based on the orientation to multilateralism, an active role in international organizations and international law. "The very term 'near abroad' has revealingly created an in-between category between national and truly 'foreign' affairs, thus suggesting a polity concentrated in concentric circles…At global level, Russia and Russian policy have consistently promoted multipolarity and resisted the US unipolarity" (Buzan, Waever, 2005:405).

The conflicts in the post-Soviet area emerged on four bases – intrastate conflicts, ethno-territorial disputes in the pro-independent countries in the Caucasus and Moldova, ethnic conflicts in Central Asian republics and, recently, the interstate conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which is far from solution at the moment. The first Russian intervention was in Tajikistan in 1992. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the worst conflict broke out in Tajikistan as the civil war in which neo-communists, Islamic and democratic parties, as well as traditional, dominantly family, clans participated. The genuine conflict was ended with agreed cooperation between Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The conflict resulted in the dependence on Russia that increased to such a level that Tajikistan has become a Russian protectorate.

A lot more capacities and dynamics of conflicts have been hidden in the Caucasus and Moldavia, where ethno-national Armenian and Azerbaijani war regarding the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was populated by Armenians, but sparkled deeply in Azerbaijani territory in 1988, when both were firm members of the Soviet Federation. This was the conflict with the most numerous casualties, which had been revived a few times. Until 2020 and Azerbaijani military assault on Nagorno-Karabakh, it was the one of many frozen conflicts. After gaining some Azerbaijani success, Russia mediated the conflict and the peacekeeping mission with 1960 soldiers was introduced. At the same time, Russia initiated the establishment of the Russian-Turkish Joint Monitoring Center (RTJMC) in order to provide surveillance of the Lachin corridor, which connects Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh as a de facto state. In the meantime, the actors agreed to leave Nagorno-Karabakh territorially in Azerbaijan and that should be the first conflict to unfreeze since the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Trans-Dniester case was triggered by the dissatisfaction of citizens living on the left bank of Dniester (Slavic Russians, Ukrainians and Gagauz) in Moldova, when they decided to separate from the state of Moldova, proclaiming their version of secession. Separatism was strongly provoked by the intention of Moldovans to reunify with Romania, which initiated the armed conflict with a few hundred casualties in the period 1989 – 1992. Regardless of the fact that the conflict was frozen by Russian mediation and there was no formalized peace mission, warring parties accepted peacekeeping forces composed of Russians, Moldovans and Trans-Dniester forces. Despite Moldova protested later against the presence of Russian troops, the Russian 14th Army that dominantly enrolled local Russian population was used as some sort of peacekeepers due to the fact that it acted independently of Moscow.

The Caucasus is a very conflictual region. The North Caucasus is well-known due to two Russian-Chechen wars, rebellions in Dagestan and Ingushetia and the fact that North Ossetia would like to hoover South Ossetia, the territory in internationally recognized borders of Georgia. Three conflicts characterize Russian-Georgian relations. The first and the greatest one is the case of Abkhazia, then South Ossetia that had a special status in the Soviet Union and after its dissolution it made requests for independence, which is the case of the so-called *recursive secession*.[2] After declaring independence of two areas, the violent Georgians reflected an intention to regain control over separated territories. Russia brokered the conflict and the outcome was that Russia had exploited these conflicts to impose itself as a guarantor of an inconclusive status quo (Buzan, Waever, 2003). Georgia succeeded to achieve an agreement on closing down the main Russian bases, but incredibly slow implementation, even not ending, had been retaining Russian 'peacekeeping'. The bases were there in 2008, when Georgia assaulted Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to regain control over its whole territory. Russia recognized Abkhaz independence and maintained military peacekeepers in the region, and provided extensive military support (Concordiam, Vol. 1, Issue 2). Like in Transnistria and South Ossetia, Russia has deployed great 'peacekeeping forces', investing a lot of money in their economies, providing a substantial political influence including security.

The changes in the Balkans

The Balkans as the post-socialist transitional case significantly differs from the post-Soviet countries and processes. Firstly, the majority of the Balkan countries have been more or less established on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in its last decades. Secondly, the powers and interests of external actors are overwhelmingly managing the Balkans to be viewed as the integral part (subregion?) of Europe. The West, the European Union and the United States have taken over the driving processes and political development in the Balkans. Thirdly, as a declared part of the European Union, the entire Balkans was the object of plans for the EU and NATO enlargement. In other words, internal dynamics is dependent on external powers including neighborhood, regional countries and great powers. External actors made the key impact on the break-up of socialist Yugoslavia. Therefore, for any process or event in the region the main concern is how great powers would react. "In contrast to the situation in the 19th century, it was no longer possible for the Balkan nations to draw their great power allies into war over strictly local issues" (Jelavich, 1989:443).

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[2] Recursive secession is the establishment of a state in the already separated state (Aleksandar Pavković with Peter Radan (2007). Creating New States: Theory and Practise of Secession. Hepshire, Aldershot).

The region is characterized by two hotspots, which are, as everything else in the Balkans, ethno-nationally conditioned. The first one are conflictual relations between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks; the second complex one is about North Macedonia, which includes its bordering countries Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, as well as Turkey. International approach is characterized by geopolitically and historically relative unchangeable interests. In the time of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Croats very early felt supporting policies from Germany, the Serbs stared at Russia and the Muslims had the impression that the US was devoted to their assistance (The Balkans 2010:3) and thus did not agree to any compromise regardless of the fact that they were the weakest in the region.

The transitional model in the Balkans was the least efficient. The common denominator for all six Western Balkan[3] countries was the continuation of the old political elites in the cloak of the new, "democratically" elected political leadership and their collaboration with the primitive, irresponsible and criminalized new economic elite (Šolaja, 2007). The state form has some parallels with the situation in Africa in that the states are more an arena for, then the agent of, power in politics (Eide 1999). The region was burdened with a number of issues belonging to the political and societal spheres: ethno-territorial conflicts, internal integrity and sovereignty (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia), de facto independence, national minorities' disputes, etc. Transition in the Balkans has been going on very slowly regardless of the fact that many authors consider Yugoslavia the country that had better preconditions in comparison to "hard socialism" in the Warsaw Pact countries. Economic recovery from the post-communist economic collapse has been stronger, and the share of the private sector in GDP is greater in the formerly state capitalist and nominally 'central planned economies' than in the already nominal economies, at least in semi-marketized former Yugoslav republics (Bideleux, Jeffries, 2007:19).

The Balkans and peace missions

In the last decade of the 20th century, the Balkans has been a huge laboratory for models of peace initiatives, re-examining previous experiences and testing new ideas including different actors. Firstly, besides classic mediation, peace initiatives for Yugoslavia started with international conferences and special efforts made by the European Union, which had felt itself responsible for the peace in Europe since Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos assigned it with words "It is not the hour of Americans, this is the hour of Europe" (New York Times, 1996). While the EU was trying to achieve peace in the internal conflict in former Yugoslavia, the United Nations started its classic peace missions, which are categorized as

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[3] Former Yugoslavia meant 'minus Slovenia' plus Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia (FYROM at the time of its establishment) and Serbia.

'interposition peacekeeping' (Fortna, 2008). These were the 'classic' UN missions with the aim to provide restraint of an armed conflict and opposing parties based on the political and moral authority that the UN has, but not on the power of blue helmets' units, whose task was to accomplish goals related to the separation of warring parties.

The UN peacekeeping has opened a few principle questions: who is authorized to initiate peace missions in member states in the case of internal conflicts? Can the UN intervene in these conflicts without the permission and invitation of sovereign countries? How to create peace forces, particularly in a case of sensitive relation to some countries? These and other questions were raised in the beginning of the establishment of the "New World Order", as it was called by the US President George Bush in 1990, taking into account the unipolar US world. The UN missions in the beginning of the break-up of Yugoslavia were the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia, firstly in Croatia and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it lasted until the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA)[4] in December 1995, but the UN mission UNCRO replaced it in Croatia from March 30, 1995 until January 1, 1996.

All these missions were the so-called 'traditional missions', well-known due to their role of the deterrence of the United Nations in conflict resolution since its founding. More precisely, they are called "interposition" (Farna, 2008). Their main aim was sustaining worrisome parties and preserve opportunities for further political actions of parties involved in conflict.

The things in the Yugoslav retorts started with giving the UN peace mandate even during the existence of former Yugoslavia, firstly in Croatia and then broadening it to Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, a 'new generation' of peace initiatives started with the role of the European Economic Community (since 1992 the European Union). The first peace plan was submitted by a Portuguese diplomat and writer José Cutileiro, then the special European and the US envoys David Owen and Cyrus Vance. After these two, the EU represented by David Owen and Norwegian Thorvald Stoltenberg offered once more the version of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into three autonomous units. The end of the peace process started with the Contact Group plan in 1994, when Americans anticipated division into two territorial units. The peacemaking process was completed by the DPA, when the vast "NATO-led" peace forces of 62,000 soldiers that were confirmed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) were introduced.

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[4] The peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina was achieved in two steps. The first one were multilateral negotiations in the US military base Wright-Patterson in Dayton, Ohio since November 1 until November 21, 1995, when 11 annexes of the agreement were signed by the participants. The agreement was formally signed under the official title "General Framework Agreement for Peace" (GFAP) in Paris, France, in December 14, 1995. This process reflected the EU wish to be recognized as an important factor in the peace process for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was done by the Contact Group established by the UNSC, whose members were the US, Russia, Germany, France and Great Britain.

Since the DPA established 'new Bosnia and Herzegovina' with only international continuity, but, based on constructivist approach' declared break with any type of previous system, and imposed an absolutely new political system, a new type of peace operations, which were the best characterized as 'multidimensional' was introduced (Fortna, 2008). Such types of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations were established by the consent of actors. Their goal was the accomplishment of substantive effects oriented to preventing the renewal of fighting, which means the duration of peace. Multidimensionality is usually achieved through protection of human rights, monitoring entire processes, even organizing elections, monitoring reform of judicial systems, effective functioning of polity and other processes aimed at functional institutions and peaceful resolution of any danger threatening to a 'newly-shaped state.' In politics, this approach is recognized as the 'nation building' in the US terminology. However, in the Balkans ethno-national embroilment is much more recognizable than 'state building'.

The initial and the greatest 'NATO-led' troops under the name IFOR–Implementation Force contained soldiers from the entire world, and Americans were the most numerous. After the expiry of a year mandate, this Mission continued in 1996 under the name SFOR (Stabilization Force) until April 2004, when it was replaced by EUFOR (European Union Force) known as Operation Althea.

Although the European Union peacekeeping mission under the name Operation Concordia of 327 members in North Macedonia was the first one in the history of the European Security and Defense Policy, it was launched two weeks before Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was the first serious 'comprehensive approach' as a 'civil-military operation' rather than a purely military one that could be used as a 'testing ground' for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Boštjančič Pulko, Muherina, Pejič, 2016) of the EU on the European soil in the state building process.

A very similar model was implemented in Kosovo as the self-declared independent territory. Initially, Kosovo Force - KFOR started as the 'NATO-led' military mission with the mandate of the UNSC in compliance with the Resolution 1244 passed in June 1999. The implementation of civil aspects of the Resolution 1244 that was used as the 'state building' mission began with UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) and continued with additional, but de facto full mandate given to European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). It became the huge EU challenge, which was strongly criticized by Serbia, particularly because of not obeying the UNSC Resolution 1244 and neglecting sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija as its autonomous province and even more - deregulating the Serbian state system institutions in the northern part of the province and the south enclaves settled down by Serbs. On the other hand, the EU and the US have strongly been supporting and assisting in 'bottom-up' state building, practically from the ground-zero of the self-proclaimed state of Kosovo, neglecting and cancelling the previous Serbian state institutions (Šolaja, 2018). Even some agreements like the Brussels Agreement in 2013 accepted by both parties – Serbian and Kosovo governments have still not been implemented without a chance to be completed soon.

Conclusion

The post-Soviet and the Balkan cases show some similarities, as well as essential differences in terms of peace missions and other peace activities.

Firstly, some transitional processes and diseases related to the post-socialist changes could be interconnected in terms of social situation, values, state building capacities, transition of sovereignty to new independent countries, security and other problems. The first troubles that affected the former federal units of the Soviet Union and socialist Yugoslavia as multinational federations have a political character. It includes the impossibility of liberal stabilization, elite competition, the absence of democratic building process and populist policies available for ethnic mobilization (Iveković, 2000).

Furthermore, both fields are comparable in terms of political, military and ethnic mobilization and regional wars for territories, ethnic discrimination and weakness of civil society, populism, historicism and abuse of religion. Another important characteristic are external pressures and international brokering in disputes with neighborhood, territories intensively caught up in international competition. Dominantly, power and regimes in both post-federal countries are presidential and featured as the authoritarian ethnocracy or at least partly monopoly governing.

In economic terms, they are characterized by more or less planned economy, which could not regulate an increasing number of the unemployed, technology lagging and dependence on the West and their banks (Berend, 2012). State bureaucracies could not deal with economic problems, multiparty democratic regimes, interest of people and economic competition in foreign, eventually global, markets. Depopulation, as well as inadequate and not sufficient modern education has not been the convenient environment for transcending difficulties and hurdles. The break-up of large socialist federations has brought up the necessity of the transition of sovereignty, demanding the need of new regimes to position in international order. On the other hand, they belong to the unregulated regional as the part of international order and relations between newly declared independent countries.

The post-Soviet space differs from the post-Yugoslav Balkans geopolitically and geostrategically, and by international approach and ways of the control of the space including peace missions. Two Balkan countries, the former members of the Soviet bloc, have become the EU and NATO members. The former non-aligned countries that were a part of former Yugoslavia – Slovenia and Croatia have emerged and become the EU members. Some became the NATO members such are Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and recently North Macedonia. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have declared military neutrality regardless of their status of candidates for the EU membership.

The most former Soviet Union republics, particularly in Central Asia and partly in the Caucasus, have gained independence without their particular will and wishes, and they were even surprised with the series of events. Their process of state building started to flow independently, mainly depending on the leaders, the former members of 'state and Communist Party' nomenclature, who became the

authoritarian leaders in the meantime. The ground borders did not play such a crucial role in their statehood like the importance that ethno policies have, including ethnical, religious, clan and other population divisions. Wars between and inside them were much less horrible comparing to ethnic wars between former Yugoslav republics. Internationally, they became the actors of international relations and specifically in the space that contemporary Russian foreign policy assigns as the 'near abroad' and the sphere of the Russian interest. Almost all peace missions in the former USSR territory were Russian in different sorts of arrangements. These missions, parallel with influences on leaders, political parties and other actors including the Russian language as the common communication tools were the part of the Russian policies to provide strategic control of the space of the former Soviet Union. The Western influence was much weaker, as some scientists claim. "The US moved in with bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and, although it had limited presence with an unclear long-term outlook, this was sufficient to trigger yet another regional realignment centered on Uzbekistan" (Buzan, Waever, 2003:428).

Later on, Americans were defeated in Afghanistan and lost the important point for influence in the region. The other actors intend to be more present in the area like Iran, Turkey and China. Therefore, Russia tends to keep strategic presence in the space. Apart from peace missions and other agreements with particular countries, initiating and co-leading the Shanghai Cooperation Organization represents keeping the US and other Western countries far away of the area which was traditionally the space of interest of the Russian Empire (70 years in the shape of the Soviet Union) and contemporary Russia. In the political strategy and processes, the role of the concentration on the dependence on Russia was not convenient for internal strengthening of new states and their political systems, but it was unavoidable. Russia has been more dealing with the focus on the former Soviet infrastructure including contemporary devices which connect states between them, security interests and personal links. Foreign interference was roughly rejected as witnessed by Georgian and Ukraine cases. Neither the direct US and NATO support, nor Ukrainian signing of the agreement on partnership with the EU in the frame of the "Eastern Partnership" initiative was accepted by Russia. In that period Russia understood that crucial importance for its security is in the states in direct neighborhood – the former members of the Soviet Union. The new ruling elite has consciously been developing relations on the new foundations, knowing that they are of utmost importance because Russian economy depends on energy resources in the surrounding countries and mutual connectivity (Cipek, Boban, 2017:307).

The Balkans is much more complicated case because of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The conflicts were much stronger in the space, where six republics felt equal in the former Yugoslav federation. The new coined space and terminology of the "Western Balkans" – former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia, but plus Albania – reflects that there is no state capable of fighting for the control of the entire region. The interest of the West was to dismantle Yugoslavia in order to exert control over the space more easily (Šolaja, 2013). During the period of non-alignment

Yugoslavia was not a confident player and neither the West nor the East was satisfied with its role. Its break-up was welcomed in the West, which recognized separated Yugoslav republics very fast. Peace management was gradually introduced in the region, monitoring through types of peace missions and by the power and role of actors. The first period was significant due to the UNSC efforts to impose a halt in fighting and separation of parties without any deep insight and attempt to put states in order. Due to the lack of morals, responsibility, political knowledge and mutual mistrust results were very poor until the US 'coercive diplomacy' forced parties to negotiate in Dayton in 1995 in the same way like Serbia – Kosovar rebellion movement negotiations in Kumanovo in 1999. Afterwards the period of 'state building' started, and which was related to the policy of implementation of 'civil aspects' of peace agreements. This aspect of peace missions[5] was the innovation that was introduced in order to create a state due to the model of liberal multiparty democracy and free market economy. The part of the process is the policies of the European Union and NATO enlargement, which is almost completed. Only Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (exclusively because of the standing point of the Republic of Srpska as the state-shaped autonomous 'entity' in Bosnia and Herzegovina) have remained good relations with Russia, and recently with China, which is not well-accepted in the West, as well.

After the initial UN peace missions where Russia participated, Russia continued to join IFOR and later on SFOR peace troops under the supreme command of Americans. These troops executed the mandate given by the Dayton Peace Accords asserted by the UNSC until 2004 when European Union Force – EUFOR handed over the mission. The EU was the 'new actor' on the scene of peacekeepers. Its security identity was not defined enough and the EU searched for the more active and important role in the European security. It is hard to define the power of the EU. In practice, European Force is not so much autonomous as it has been developed for such symbolic efforts as peacekeeping or special missions involving a few risks (Kissinger, 2003:52).

The processes in the Balkans in the last decade of the 20th century were the signpost to the layout and functionality of unilateral world order. The processes in the post-Soviet space revealed the other side of the coin. Finally, peacekeeping missions in two studied regions have become the part of establishing regional order with very diverse actors and plenty of their interests. Belonging to the globalized world, these two regions, as well as other regions, too, are the aim of interest of many great and regional powers. Countries individually and also as the part of initiatives of regional cooperation are not only pure members of the United Nations and other international organizations, but active participants and creators of new international order in which Russia has the importance. Every serious student of history recognizes the importance of a significant role of Russia in establishing a new international order without encouraging it into its historic patterns (Kissinger,

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[5] Peacemaking missions differ from peacekeeping missions in terms of the concepts of 'imposing peace' and 'keeping peace'.

2003:71). The 'new multilateralism' needs new alliances and power centers. The regional processes in the Soviet and Balkan space announce the redefinition of interests and roles of regional countries related to positions of great global powers. It was very hard to hide value diversities on the line which divides the culture of classic hierarchical organization of states and societies such is the dominant one in the East (including Far East) from values of liberalism, transcending classic state and imposing modern visions through new forms of political cooperation, security and free market.

It is clear that immediately after the Cold War ended in the frame of good relations between great powers in the processes of liberalization, globalization, war against terrorism, security guaranteeing and free markets, the embryo of a post-Cold War order was hidden in peace initiatives and repositioning of actors in different parts of the world. Even some ideas of reforming the United Nations Security Council were based on regions and differentiation of new regional and great powers. The Russian – Ukrainian war should relatively soon give a new light on the essentiality of sovereignty and the role of individual states and their positions as great powers in the process of the contemporary world multipolarization including certain institutional shaping of G7, BRICS and other groupings of powerful countries.

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