Boris Bratina*

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Prishtina with temporary headquarters in Kosovska Mitrovica, Serbia

Sibin Bratina**

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Prishtina with temporary headquarters in Kosovska Mitrovica, Serbia

WHO NEEDS A RETHINKING OF RUSSIA?

Abstract

Usually an incorrect territorial understanding of the term "West", say as the west of Europe and North America (sometimes along with Australia. New Zealand, and many seas), i.e., the one that does not know that the "West" is west of Jerusalem, and the "East" is east of it, has its meaning and momentum despite its formal-historical invalidity. Along with the countries of Eastern Europe that have entered the crematorium of nations under the abbreviation EU - but without Belarus, Russia and what in the Balkans represents the "Serbian world" this pseudo-union gets its meaning in the words of the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, who designates the area as a "collective West". On the other hand, there is no doubt that the "West" has determined itself this way at this moment (if we don't count the attempts to establish an "Asian NATO"), since in the last iteration almost all European countries were stripped of their integrity. Just in this way, the misunderstood "West" tried to "paint over" the racist nature of its history by its own identification with ancient Greece, of course by tendentially taking its cultural significance as, at the same time, its identical political and military aspect and almost

^{*}Bokibor@yahoo.com

^{**} Sibin.bratina@pr.ac.rs.

literally "gluing" it onto the sense of its characteristic essence. Thus, a general falsification of the total history of the "West" was committed and its true ethical and narrative essence was established, and all in the name of absolute domination and self-justification.

Key Words: the West, racism, Russia, takeover, ethics.

When we ask the question about a renewed attempt to rethink the concept of Russia, we must at the same time ask ourselves who needs such a rethinking in the first place. Is it necessary for the Russians themselves? Certainly, for them it is, so to speak, an intimate question, which is asked again and again, one could even say for hygienic reasons. There is no doubt that this rethinking in current affairs has its own reason, which points to numerous other reasons, but at the same time to the reason of all reasons, which is the question of changing the real order of the world, that is, changing the power relations in the world. This is where the question of Russia's role lies, i.e., in the new movements of the inner world reality, and not in the empty desire to understand Russia better.

Is a new rethinking of Russia necessary for us, the Balkan Serbs, and for other peoples of this region? There can be no doubt about that either. Here we are firmly buried in various levels of our anterooms, blinded, and guided by the manipulation of truths about our interests, which is why, if we still want to survive as a subjectivity in the world, we ultimately need a sharp insight into the possibilities of world development. The question of the perception of Russia among Serbs repeatedly confronts us with the disparity of feelings about it, and they were formed in different periods of recent Serbian history in different ways, but always in accordance with the leadership interest of the current authorities and the general trends of international relations. For example, until seventy-five years ago, Serbs had a brotherly relationship with Russians, and not only with Russia as Russia, but also when it comes to the USSR (for example, in the case of ideological communists and leftists in general). This relationship was mutual, but not the same, since even ordinary Russian consciousness contains something of the so-called imperial posture. Such a mutual attitude was supported not only by feelings, but feelings were the result of both common origin and specific historical events, even if they were individual. We see some of that mutual love even today, aware that our people go, even against the current law, to help their brothers on the

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Ukrainian battlefield; and *vice versa*, the Serbian side had a significant number of Russian volunteers on the battlefields of the former SFRY (especially while the Russian state was still on its knees due to the consequences of losing the "Cold War").

However, in the meantime, the resolution of the Informbiro took place in Serbian-Russian relations in 1948, which brought a great rift into our fraternal friendship. The Serbian leadership at the time, and even the entire nation, put themselves in the alleged defense of freedom, which was a deception, against the USSR; this led to new suffering of the Serbian people, mainly in the form of physical suffering in the concentration camps of the Croatian island due to the crime of opinion, which clearly distinguished *friend from enemy*¹.

However, the great untruth that those pointed out wanted to threaten our people's freedom again, was used as a real post-truth back in those days. In addition, the campaign against Russia itself was designed to lay a coward's egg on the entire block of countries then labeled with the phrase "real socialism", and that transition "to the other side", or rather that betrayal of the socialist movement, represented the other side of the common interest on the way to lifelong survival in power for the future Yugoslav "pharaoh".² From that time until the beginning of the conflict in SFRY (which, like the kingdom, was actually created by the Serbs through their struggle for freedom), the state, despite some features of socialist development, functioned as a pro-Western collaborationist in relation to the countries of the Warsaw Pact, especially the USSR. This deception has its global effect, which culminates in the establishment and practice of the "non-aligned movement", with the aim of blunting the class and anti-colonial struggle throughout the world. Even the famous Korčula school of philosophy served as a platform for allegedly considering alternative possibilities of socialist development (wherein the main alternative was supposed to be simulated "self-governing socialism". Let's also add that the overall media situation in practically all its broadcasts permanently suggested what was later (after the "Cold War") sung globally as "Go West" (Pet Shop Boys, 1991). In this sense, perhaps the last such act of domestic media represented a direct

¹ The biggest concrete crime against the Serbs in the SFRY happened, therefore, when the communists killed the communists.

² Sometime after the death of the "pharaoh", K. Nikolić, S. Cvetković and Đ. Tripković called the era of his rule "anti-Stalinist Stalinism" (Nikolić, Cvetković, Tripković, 2010, p. 64), which describes that period much better than E. Kardelj's current phrase "self-governing socialism" (Kardelj, 1975, p. 65).

transmission of "preventive counter-revolution" in Romania in 1989. Herbert Marcuse, dealing with the idea of this kind of counter-revolution, believes that "fear of revolution connects different stages and forms of counter-revolution ... Capitalism is reorganized in order to (ready) welcome the revolution" (Marcuse, 1972, p. 2). In the name of what the domestic "communists" stand against Romania? Eleven years later, we were "transmitted" in the same way.

In everything, the twentieth century seems to have passed in an induced "self-inflicted immaturity", or, as with Kant, "immaturity for which they themselves are to blame" (Kant, 2004, p. 263). In Serbia's relations with Russia became the subject of other historical subjectivities. In a way, one could speak of the regularity in the breakdown of our relationships as a kind of constant movement in the opposite direction. Let us recall that when the Russians began to create socialism in 1917, testing what Badiou would call the "political inventiveness" (Badiou, 2001, p. 15) of the collectivity, the king received a mass of defeated White Russians and prepared them for the fight against the new form of the Russian state.

Then, let's repeat once again, in 1948, we renounced the international labor movement in the name of the anti-Serb government of one man (whose Alter Ego, it is likely to be assumed, was Louis XIV with the sayings "*L'Etat, cest moi*" and "*Apres moi, le deluge*") and his camarilla, a man who almost destroyed the fraternal relations of Serbs and Russians, and had personal hatred for Stalin and the Serbs. His robust campaign against the USSR - with an emphasis on the Russians - over the course of forty years created a real disturbance in the feelings towards the Russians. Even today, the "historical" lies about the Russians that were uttered at that time still work, in addition to the media practice that is still used today - at a minimum based on Freud's "repetition compulsion" (Freud, 1984, p. 274) which on the subliminal level, in general, appears as relatively effective.

Finally, when the Russians in 1991, after the "collapse" of the USSR, set out on the path of establishing a new capitalist civil society, the authorities of that time supported the forces of the previous *status quo* and, so to speak, denied themselves any help during the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. As it is known, during the pro-Western rule, the SFRY disintegrated, and the people of Serbia were put under the most severe sanctions unseen in history, and in the end, Serbia was bombed to seize territory. Therefore, if the Serbs would still see the Russians and

the states as allies in the fight for freedom, important social movements would have to be subjectively synchronized in the future. If not, then not only the historic friendship falls, but also the joint struggle for the freedom of sovereignty. Therefore, the Serbs and the state are extremely in need of a mature "rethinking of Russia".

Do the Russians themselves need a suggested self-reflection? Of course, this happens permanently in the post-modern era, and otherwise such a practice is a permanent reflexive act of this *culture-civilization*. The ultimate balance analysis of the acute state of global relations and Russia's position within them certainly appears as an element of *self-reflexivity*, just as necessary in practice. Although such analyses can lead to Hegel's "bad infinity" - because the analysis of the state itself is practically infinite - they are nevertheless carried out in detail. Thus, for example, the old and well-known discussion between the Russian so-called Westerners and Slavophiles is reduced to the utilitarian moments of both positions when it comes to the current situation, because both have Russia's welfare at their core. Nevertheless, we must not deny the existence of a pro-Western financial elite, as in other parts of the former USSR, created on its ruins, which to a certain extent - and that is at the cost of Russia's existence - only look out for their personal interests.

Their attitude represents only the degenerate attitude of the previous "pro-Westerners", post-modernly rearranged in the spirit of absolute egoism. Such structures exist in all countries of the world, in addition to the ones we know in Western Europe and the US, and in Serbia. No matter how they are organized, they do not reflect the interests of the people of the "global south" and, as in Russia, they must be disbanded for the purpose of preserving the identity of the people and/or use their political potential for the benefit of the respective countries. One of the last condensations of historical experience finally happened in 2022 with the realization of Russians that Western nations sincerely hate them, so not only their governments and elites, but to a dominant extent also the ordinary population, poisoned by anti-Russian propaganda. Therefore, we can also say here that the Russians themselves do not need advice on the "new thinking" of Russia, since it is a permanent function in this culture, but of the realized level of awareness and reflexivity, which it seems some other cultural areas no longer or do not vet possess.

Who, therefore, needs a new rethinking of Russia at all? Indisputably, not Africa or Latin America - with the Caribbean - nor India and China; their population certainly needs more knowledge about Russian history

and culture, or their science and technology, and even philosophy, but not existential reflection about who among the nations of the world is in the background of their aspirations that is a fixed variable, or, rather, a constant.

In this context, all of them are dangerous to someone specifically because of their awareness of the previous time. These days, by the way, former US administration official Fiona Hill noted, as reported by Daniel Kovalik, "that the conflict in Ukraine has caused a global "proxy rebellion" led by Russia" (Kovalik, 2023) against the West, especially American hegemony. The one who worries like this announces trouble, problems. And the problem lies in Lenin's question: "What is to be done?" (Lenin, 1949, p. 3). When such a question is asked today, a kind of impasse usually appears on the horizon, which warns us not only that we have gone down the wrong path, but that by our actions we have placed ourselves in front of the near certainty of the apocalypse. That's why we get the answer to the question posed by Aquinas's via negativa: namely, when those who consider Russia by themselves are rejected, as well as those who possess prior certainty about "past times". All that remains is that the new true reflection of Russia, especially in the context of its historical subjectivity, is needed only by the contemporary Western spirit. Moreover, we consider this reflection to be a transcendental condition for the survival of this culture.

Why do we say *cultures and not civilizations*? Because the concept of culture indicates *a cult*, and civilization refers to *a city* and *a citizen*. But that's not all. Even if we are talking about civilization, Occidental culture contains an element that other civilizations do not possess. There were civilizations that destroyed one another; for example, the still completely wild Greeks of the fifteenth century AD destroyed the more advanced in everything, but already weakened due to a natural disaster, Cretan civilization. It happened in other places as well. The Hungarians thus destroyed almost the entire Slavic male population of Pannonia, when they came to the area they still occupy today. But, let's say, those who held the largest land territory in history until now, the Mongols Genghis Khan, Kublai Khan and Tamerlane did not exterminate anyone, fulfilling Tungra's mandate of conquering the world. *Western culture*, however, has *a peculiar nature that everything it touches dies.*³ For such

³ At the time, Tacitus (Publius Cornelius Tacitus) wrote: "Where they make a desert, they call it peace" (Tacitus, 2013, p. 30). We believe that this characterization is not insignificant even in the ultimate reality.

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a conclusion, the well-known historical facts about the extermination of the population of North America and Australia are sufficient. They undoubtedly prove *the exterminating, obliterating practice of this culture that applies to everyone - including Russians*. Colloquially speaking, it is obviously a "genocide" culture, which attributes this feature to the Other through the mechanism of projection. Therefore, perhaps it would be more correct to call it anti-civilization.

For someone, this would be enough to conclude that it is *an exceptional culture*, with the characteristic of annihilating all others it meets. It would be an ordinary lie to say that "mistakes"⁴ happened to this culture, as well as others; it is certainly about the acquired character of culture. Among Russian scientists, such as Narochnickaya, the so-called Russophobia exists from the sixteenth century onwards, but it can also be found in earlier phases of history. In any case, it is about enough time for the action to become a habit, i.e., the character of a certain spirit. Indeed, already from the first "Germanic grammars" and their records about the Slavs, for example from Jordanes, from the sixth century, who from the point of view of "warriors" speaks badly of "non-warriors", we see an underestimating attitude towards the latter as if they were not people; and we can follow that literally until the contemporary condition.

There are similar statements by other medieval chroniclers of the same origin. In the seventeenth century, a book about Russia was printed by the Marquis de Custine, and that book is perhaps a benchmark for the attitude of people of Scandinavian origin towards the Slavs. There is no stereotype or racist slur that doesn't exist; since he found himself insulted by the ridicule of the Russians due to his artificial courtly behavior. Among his other conclusions, it is said that the Russians as servants "fight under the principle of submission" (de Custine, 2016: 78), or that "all in all, the Russians are four centuries behind the world". (de Custine, 2016: 103). Skipping the mass of anti-Slavic writings and the time in which it happened - a practice that has not stopped even in contemporary times - we should not leave out, for example, the historian Francis Conte, a true intelligentsia of the EU, who in his two-volume book Slavs, is permanently attempting to prove their innate totalitarian

⁴ To consider such historical actions as mistakes is hypocritical or stupid. Often, for example, we had the opportunity to read and hear how the monstrous horrors of Nazism were just one historical mistake of the German people. One simply forgets how many such mistakes there are, which the German people are still ready for today (as well as the American, English, and other peoples of Western Europe and North America), as well as the fact that it is precisely the acquired character of the people, i.e., about always the same action and intention in very specific situations.

nature. Moreover, Conte attributes to Slavs the myth of the Amazons, to strengthen his thesis.

It is known in philosophy that Leibniz's father had to change his surname to Lubinich in order to keep his position as professor of "moral philosophy" in Leipzig; even Leibniz himself i.e., the man who founded practically all German academies and was "intimate" with Louis XIV and Queen Elizabeth I, as well as with Isaac Newton, had problems, because about half of his signatures contained one "t". Because of this, the Germans called him "Slavic t", which clearly testifies to the racist pressure of the Germans on the Slavs. This attitude is also found in Montesquieu, as well as in the champion of American "democracy" Alexis de Tocqueville, who both see that the world will develop in opposition of the US to Russia. Comparing these two states, de Tocqueville believes that "The first has freedom for the principle of action: the other has servility" (de Tocqueville, 2000: 390). Montesquieu believes that "all subjects of the empire are slaves" for Russia of his time (Montesquieu, 2001: 424).⁵ Also, in John Locke, we find the justification of slavery in Two Discourses on Government, when he says that "by his own guilt he wasted his own life, he to whom he gave it may hesitate to take it, and use it for his own purposes, thereby causing him no harm" (Locke, 1978: 22), probably because he does not kill him. It is even more difficult to accept the same, even radicalized, attitude of perhaps the greatest thinkers of Western European culture, such as Hegel and Marx. Even earlier, Fichte, in his Speeches to the German Nation, observes a moment that he calls Deutschtung - an integral part of every humanity - which is at the base of every nation; hence, for those who do not possess it significantly, we can only speak of subordination in terms of originality.

This is perhaps an introduction to Hegel's opinion about all Slavs, including Russians. Namely, Hegel considers not only the Russians, but also the Balkan peoples, almost without distinguishing them, as "*Asian hordes*", even though he is aware that they, like Russia, appeared as states as early as in the Middle Ages. And while he christens the latter with "*broken barbarian remains*" (Hegel, 1966, p. 368), he sees Russia as *a pseudo-creation* - not a state, which for him is the criterion of historical presence - arising from an alleged spirit, but also for and for himself, of the long-gone Mongolian era. Despite his refinement of modern dialectics

⁵ For the purposes of this topic, it may not be necessary to develop the idea of Locke as the "doyenne" of racism, for whom Theresa Rickardson notes that he "represents colonialism and early forms of entrepreneurial capitalism, including the formation of colonies based on slave labour" (Rickardson, 2011, p. 101).

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and all his philosophical contributions, like many others before and especially after him, he remains a national chauvinist. After all, the very construction of the *Philosophy of History*, which places all historical movement in the triad "Greeks-Latins-Germans", is exclusive and is such in its essence that it negates its Other: Indians, Chinese, Africans, all others, and especially the Slavs, who for the Germans represent the *arch-enemy*.

In addition, this is where "the end of history" is justified for the first time - a fallacy that today in Fukuyama's version experiences its historical defeat for the second time, this time in pure empiricism.⁶ If for Hegel the Russians are "unhistorical" people, it is no different in Marx. Firstly, Marx shares Hegel's position on the origin of the Russian state, which is a historical falsehood derived from German historiography. This is not surprising, given the depth of his belonging to the German identity. Communism, which dreamed, only dreamed of the "civilized" countries of "old Europe" (≈EU?), while for the rest - including the Russians – it intended the fate of all "unhistorical" peoples, calling them "barbaric and semi-barbaric" peoples (Marx, 1976, p. 7). It is obvious that the noble idea of the equality of all people in Marx remains tied to the traditionally racist idea of who is human, which itself originates from Greek racism. Moreover, this concept has been equally present in Plato and Aristotle and can, perhaps, be best illustrated by Plato's idea of "golden children" (Plato, 2002: 100) as well as Aristotle's idea of "the living property" (Aristotle, 1973: 8). Many similar ideas appeared in the line of classical Marxism, and this attitude towards the Russians also prevailed later in the so-called communist parties of Western Europe.

Heidegger - practically like all relevant philosophers of the West - of course does not give way to the tradition of the Germanic-German perception of Others. Moreover, in his work it is incorporated as racial superiority within *the very idea of Being*. Heidegger, therefore, not only openly turns his students to the study and practice of the life of the ancient German-Deutschers (*Introduction to Metaphysics*), but, examining the etymological origin of the word "Being", among the typically Indo-European roots of this word - expressed by signs such as "*es*" and "*bhu*" - he adds the root "*wes*", which he claims will be called invocation supposedly only within the corpus of Germanic languages

⁶ A detailed analyses of Hegel's attitude towards the Slavs can be found in the text "Hegel on the Slavs" (Bratina, 2015, pp. 63-73).

- which has been relatively easy to disprove.⁷ As in mentioned cases, the racial attitude is very pronounced in Heidegger. Here we must stop in citing contemporary applications of this position in philosophy, because although the series of authors who advocate it is not endless, it would be too long to list, since it is clearly not just one among other features of the Occidental character that can be found in the works of great contemporary philosophers like Foucault or Derrida.

What else can be said about a culture that during almost its entire historical duration uses the name of an entire race as a name for a slave, made two continents its slaves, and practically exterminated two? Let's start - even though it is obvious to everyone - it is not about the Latin *servus*, which already perhaps hides the root trace of the sacred name of a people, but about a word *"invented"* precisely in the area of Western languages, e.g., deutsch. *sklave*, Eng. *slave*, fr. *esclave*, sp. *esclavo*, Swtch. *slav*, nor. and dan., *slave*, ita. *schiavo* or por. *Escravo*. If we add to that the English "slavic" - an adjective meaning "dirty" or "sloppy" - it is clear to what extent the relationship between the Slavs and their Germanic neighbors is fixed even in the language, of course, when viewed from the perspective of the latter.⁸

It is, therefore, about a culture whose morality since ancient times was such that robbery - and robbery of every kind - was a matter of pride. Obviously, even nowadays, it is the "safe background" that provided a means for war. As practice inevitably dictates both individual and collective character, it is not surprising that in the final version pragmatism appears as the dominant "wisdom of the West" (Bertrand Russell); *this would not have been possible if this culture had not dominated the world*. Subsumed by the logic of global, world power, it is not philosophy in the strict sense, but as Heidegger himself would say - only *conceptual "logistics*" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 12). Even today, the Greek ideal theory of the desire for "*knowledge for its own sake*" does not exist nor has it ever existed as an active agent (Aristotle, 1985, p. 6).

We see that in the ultimate reality of "postmodern times", once separated areas of culture have become inclined to merge, losing their heuristic moment at the expense of the applicative, i.e., technical aspect of

⁷ More about Heidegger's attitude towards Others - as well as criticism of Heidegger's etymology of the word "Being" in Bratina (2017), p. 109-151.

⁸ It should be added here that not even the name of those Nordics is German, because "German" only comes from the Latin "germ", which in ancient Greek corresponds to the spelling " $\sigma\pi\rho\rho\sigma$ ", both meaning seed, spore, but also those who are scattered, relatives. The real name for all of them is Deutsch, supposedly from Old German "Diot", meaning "child".

knowledge. The age in which for Lyotard (Jean Francois Lyotard) every "great story has lost credibility" (Lyotard, 1988: 62), is only the result of a long-term practice, and this state of mind follows the fluidity of consciousness, organization, and knowledge. This weakness, especially in the light of recent events in Eastern Europe, which stems from the total exhaustion of the spirit of Western culture, prompts us once again to ask a question: who needs a new rethinking of Russia today, if not its western part? Perhaps that hateful Russia is still the straw for the salvation of a culture? We do not believe in such a salvation, namely because the estranged group of powerful people has exhausted their life and spiritual potentials, but we believe that if this "rethinking" were to be carried out to the end and if one experiences *catharsis* which is always offered to others, i.e. self-critical reflection, it could lead to the salvation of individuals or groups who reach this level of self-awareness. Whether this will happen, respecting the human subject despite the ubiquity of desubjectivization by various means, we cannot predict. What we can do is to anticipate with a "spiritual eye" the movement in Western culture which - provided that the collectivity there does not reach this level of self-reflection - leads to the destruction of human subjectivity. At the same time, it has the sense of disaster for all Others, both cultures and civilizations; otherwise, it would no longer have a constitutive meaning for anyone. The only thing that keeps the world tied to relations with this culture is the very possibility of general destruction. Paradoxically, despite every material benefit that has always inspired this culture, "the death drive" (Freud, 1984, p. 288), a concept that we do not accept as a "natural phenomenon" but as a cultural creation derived from historical practice, i.e., from the "compulsion to repeat", turns out to be its truth. But even without its cultural origin, it is hard to believe that the almost certain direction of the future course of this culture will change, because it, like Baron Munchausen, tries to pull itself out of a situation that is more than dubious by dragging its tail, which pushes it ever deeper with the consequences for its own collective character.

To conclude, the entire Western culture thought and presented to the world *the idea of law* which it subverted from the beginning, so that today *there is no law either in international relations or in domestic relations.* Today, the idea of *superiority* and "*exceptionalism*" of the Occidental spirit can no longer be asserted with any plausibility - nor can it be referred to in the future as a connection with Greek philosophy. It is only a pretext for future domination, and *the true philosophy of*

the West begins only in the Middle Ages. In that history, the concept of difference was born, which in philosophy has gained precedence over the concept of being for more than 250 years.

The concept of difference, over time, does not follow the timelessness of the mind, but despite its essence, the concept takes on the face of the historical flow. The difference as a difference is accepted as an exceptional difference not only in the procedural sense of contemporary dialectics, but as a difference not of exceptionality but of *exceptionality from the* validity of the law. Thus, the concept of difference was misused - with the aim of approving the destruction of difference, in the name of difference. In this way, the difference itself as a concept lost its strength in favor of a "racist difference", which weakened its philosophical status as a fundamental philosophical concept in the name of *the ideology of the* material and spiritual possession of the Other⁹. This can be recognized in the philosophical key of Derrida (l' difference, Derrida, 1982, p. 3), as that which is lost in its own "letter" on the other side of all existence, or, in a certain simplification, as another name for the racism of the concept. That is why it is not at all strange that, even before the advent of postmodernism, the difference is produced as explicit exceptionalism, i.e., as *cultural racism per se*. Let us recall that this exception is valid as an exception to the validity of the law e.g., international law. This term - as a euphemism for open racism - could often be heard in recent years both at the UN (Barack Obama) and in the statements of high officials of the FBI and NSA (James Clapper or James Comey), and other exponents of collective racism. It has its own prehistory, but for modern usage it is not relevant since today it is just another modern guise of the same thing.

In conclusion, it can be said that the history of all kinds of Germans presents us with a delicate task: it is by its very nature *non-philosophical* in the technical sense and puts us in a dilemma about how it is possible to avoid the destruction not only *of subjectivity* but of *rational life in general*. The struggle between *anti-civilization and civilization* continues. It is a battle of mind and mindless rational power, and the stake is *nothingness or intelligence*.

⁹ On this aspect of the concept of difference, see Bratina (2021), p. 102-158.

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Борис Братина

Филозофски факултет, Универзитет у Приштини са привременим седиштем у Косовској Митровици, Србија

Сибин Братина

Филозофски факултет, Универзитет у Приштини са привременим седиштем у Косовској Митровици, Србија

КОМЕ ЈЕ ПОТРЕБНО ПОНОВНО ПРОМИШЉАЊЕ РУСИЈЕ?

Апстракт

Обично нетачно територијално схватање термина "Запад", рецимо као запада Европе и Северне Америке (некад уз Аустралију, Нови Зеланд и бројна мора), тј. оно које не зна да је "Запад" западно од Јерусалима, а "Исток" источно од њега, има свој смисао и моментум упркос формално-историјској неваљаности промене значења овог појма. Уз земље Источне Европе које су ушле у крематоријум народа под скраћеницом ЕУ, али без Белорусије, Русије и онога што на Балкану предстаља "српски свет", овај псудо-савез добија свој смисао у речима председника Русије Владимира Путина који то подручје означава као "колективни Запад". Са друге стране, нема сумње да је "Запад" сам себе у овом тренутку тако одредио (уколико ту не бисмо рачунали покушаје заснивања "азијског НАТО-а"), будући да је у последњој итерацији одузет сваки интегритет скоро свим земљама Европе. Управо тако погрешно схваћени "Запад" покушао је да расистичку природу своје историје "прекречи" сопственим поистовећењем са старом Грчком, наравно тако што је њен културни значај тенденциозно узимао као, у исто време, њен истоветан политички и војни аспект и

готово дословно те садржаје "лепио" на смисао своје карактеристичне суштине. Тако је почињен општи фалсификат тоталне историје "Запада" и успостављена његова права етичка и наративна суштина, и све то у име апсолутне доминације и самооправдања.

Кључне речи: Запад, расизам, Русија, преузимање, етика.