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## ***RUSSIA AND THE WEST AS A CONCEPTUAL OPPOSITION AND IDEOLOGICAL RELEVANCE***

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### **Abstract**

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*What makes the current active confrontation of Russia and “the collective West” unique, is that it takes place on the territory of Europe. Although one may ask, if this fact substantiates such a confrontation as inevitable, I hold that the question to be asked is: What is Russia that opposes the West? On the one hand, current political issues are mainly a reaction of both the West and Russia to the rough ideological atmosphere the world lives in. On the other hand, Russia has always been an unalienated part of the Western as well as global ideological, cultural, political discourse, and the reinterpretation of Russia immediately concerns the reinterpretation of the very concept of the West. The paper scrutinizes, what the concepts Russia and the West mean in the current European political discourse. The paper introduces two levels of research: first and foremost, the analysis of an opposition Russia—the collective West concerns an ideological framework in terms of current world order; secondly, such a view is going to be substantiated with the reflection of Russia in respect of the West in perspective of Russian culture. The paper holds, that Russia has always been a dynamic concept of unequal extension for the Western and Russian intellectuals. The West has*

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*represented the reference point for the construction and consideration of Russia in the perspective of inner self-definition and relevance: the more ideologically stable the West is, the more ideologically dynamic Russia is, and vice versa.*

**Key Words:** *Russia, the (collective) West, Russian mentality, twain cosmology, conceptual analysis, traditional values, Modern conservatism.*

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## INTRODUCTION

What makes the current active confrontation of Russia and the collective West unique, is that it takes place on the territory of Europe. Although there is a certain number of local conflicts on the existential borders of the developed and developing countries, the military actions in the heart of European continent is widely regarded as a symbol of reconsideration of the balance of powers in global politics. Several sources written by the Western and Russian analysts in latest 30 years foresaw such a conflict, and explicitly figured out the objective reasons for it, see: (Freidman 2009, 101—119; Tsymbursky 2013a). If one tried to conclude the arguments of investigators, politicians, intellectuals etc., one could say that the expansion of NATO westwards has always been considered as an existential threat by the governments of both the USSR and Russia. Although one may ask, if this fact substantiates such a confrontation as inevitable, I hold that the question to be asked is: What is *Russia* that opposes *the West*? On the one hand, current political issues are mainly a reaction of both the West and Russia to the rough ideological atmosphere the world lives in. On the other hand, Russia has always been an unalienated part of the Western as well as global ideological, cultural, political discourse, and the reinterpretation of Russia immediately concerns the reinterpretation of the very concept of *the West*.

The proper task for philosophers — if only they do not act as ideologists or experts in current political stances — is to clarify concepts. The present paper deals with this task and gives reasons for consideration and comprehension of conceptual basis for such an opposition as *the collective West* and *Russia*. In current perspective, one sees that the process of reconsideration of *Russia* is being provided by both sides of the conflict: the Western countries and Russia itself, not only as

political and economic powers, by also as civilizations with their own foundations and views of the future. It is necessary to claim in the very beginning that I step aside from any discussions of any political or economic aspects of the current events, and focus exceptionally on the conceptual part, which consists of realization of *Russia* as a conceptual opposition to *the collective West*. Please, note, that from now on when *the (collective) West, the East, Europe* or *Russia* are given in italics, I mean them as **concepts** as they are represented in modern public, political and intellectual discourse, **not as** geographic places, states or political or any other kind of actors.

The purpose of my paper is to distinguish the sources of historical-cultural foundations of *Russia* as a conceptual opposition to *the collective West*. To do it, I will focus on two major aspects: on “twain cosmology” as one of the pillars of Russian mentality, and the process of how the values turn to means and instruments in the current field of real politics (or *Realpolitik*). As these aspects intervene one another, I will study them in close connection showing the reasons for *Russia* to consider itself as true heir of the most important achievements of European civilization. It should not be understood, however, as if Russia were a European country involved in current European agenda. The thing is much more complex, for *Russia* tends to be a proponent of the basic and universal value system specifically elaborated by the European thinkers but adopted to and reconsidered in respect with Russian cultural and historical background.

## **INSTRUMENTAL AND TRANSCEDENT STATUS OF VALUES IN TERMS OF REALPOLITIK**

The ideologeme of *the collective West* has deep roots in the history of Russia’s cultural self-consciousness and dramatical relationships with Europe. Nowadays one can see that the concept of *the collective West* is an important source for realization and manifestation of Russia’s mental and spiritual independence from the Western moral stances and social practices, which has in turn to provide and substantiate political and economic sovereignty and the unity of the nation. Hence, *the collective West* and *Russia* taken in their conceptual aspect could be considered as correlating concepts with the common denominator of European civilization. By the latter I mean the highest achievements of culture, philosophy, economics, political institutions, and legal consciousness, that the Western counties had developed during the Renaissance and Modern Age.

By the period of the Cold war, the West became an objective political and later existential threat to the countries of the Warsaw tract, and eventually made the ground for ideological and political collapse of the USSR possible. However, it is important to consider that European achievements cannot be imagined or represented without the influence of Russian culture, science and thought, which became a significant part of a European's (and certainly *not only* European's) background. Another important dividing line between *the West* and *Russia* is certainly the idea of social constructions that embraces the notions of race, nation, gender, modern religious movements, etc., unacceptable in traditional Russian discourse because of the manifested strife for unity and return to traditions on each level of social and political sphere of the latter.

Interestingly, such a distinguishing of *the West* and *Europe* became an important element of current political discourse. For instance, in 2014, Russian political scientist S. Karaganov claimed that Europe “is also worried by Moscow’s readiness to defend the old European values such as Christianity, the family, the state, nationalism, and sovereignty, which are still supported by most Europeans, while their elites are rejecting them or trying to leave them behind. The overwhelming majority of other nations share these traditional values as well” (Karaganov 2014, 13). Such a statement is even more intriguing because of a classical alternative of *Europe* and *Russia*, known due to the writings of the Slavophiles and especially those of N. Danilevsky. Thus, *the West* appears to be an inglorious heir or even traitor of its spiritual and mental roots, which were formulated as universal values in 14<sup>th</sup>—18<sup>th</sup> centuries. Consequently, such an expansion of the term to *the collective West* instead of previous *Europe* seems to be conceptually novel. Current Russia, although politically and economically definitely oriented to the East rather than to the West, still considers as a part and parcel of *European* world and becomes the true heir of Europe’s highest achievements.

Does it mean that *Russia* and *the collective West* do not differ principally, being the products of “old good Europe”? Although one now sees that the economic development of the Russian Federation has many features of capitalist market system, it still has its own historical and cultural background, which appears to be instrumental in distinguishing Russian society from any concrete Western society. As R. Inglehart and W. E. Baker put it, “[e]conomic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritages” (Inglehart

and Baker 2000, 49). S. Huntington developed a similar discussion of whether the traditional cultural values could be decisive for democratic changes in Confucian and Islamic cultures (Huntington 1991, 298—311). Hence, one sees that the values formulated by the European thinkers of the Modern Age as universal cannot be simply adopted as moral or worldview consequence of capitalist economic principles but should rather be reconsidered in the perspective of historical and cultural path of certain countries.

Russian mentality could be described as messianic because of many factors. Scholars figure out three principal doctrines that substantiate Russian messianic mentality: chiliasm; twain cosmology; social, political, and economic monism and/or collectivism (Murvar 1971, 283). For my topic, the second, namely, twain cosmology, deserves a comprehensive commentary. It means a recognition of the principal difference between two orders of things, which could be named the “order of history” and “the order of truth”. The former represents the way of everyday life, the level of efficient decisions, the immanent humane world. The latter refers to a transcendental level of real and perennial values, which could not be corrupted or reconsidered — it is the higher order of things, given as constants of being. Such an understanding of reality could be traced back to Plato; however, many Russian philosophers see the Orthodox religion and the doctrines of the Eastern Church Fathers as its breeding ground, see: (Vysheslavtsev 1929, 25ff.). It is important to mention that such a cosmology establishes the hierarchy between two orders of things: what is on Earth should be subdued to what is on Heaven, i.e., the decisions and acts we produce in everyday life should correspond with the perennial values as their vindication and endorsement.

Such an attitude of doubling the reality is by no means special within the Russian Orthodox discourse, but a commonplace for the traditional Christian worldview. One could find its illustrious examples in the writings of St. Augustine (especially his idea of *civitas Dei*), and several Medieval intellectuals, patristic and scholastic thinkers. However, the process of secularization and the development of historical consciousness started in late Renaissance disproved the idea of transcendent reality as a model and reference for people’s actions in the course of history. After G. Vico’s writings and those of his followers within the tradition of German philosophy (Berlin 2000, 48ff.; Collingwood 1994, 63ff.), it became a commonplace that the human beings live their real life in history and are indeed responsible for everything that happens to them,

because they belong to this immanent reality. Although Vico tried to form the opposite view to the Cartesian quantifying method in the field of the Humanities, such an idea of history as studying *res gestae* became very influential during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially after the works of the positivists. As for the Russian history, there has never been developed such an idea, that the historical and, consequently, political reality is the only one or at least our prime reality. What unites many Russian thinkers from different parties, is the demand for the spiritual or philosophical foundation of supported doctrines or movements. Without such a foundation no doctrine could be considered as solid — either political, or scientific. Interestingly, many scientific doctrines were heavily criticized from the worldview positions (in the works of N. Danilevsky, P. Kropotkin or V. Vernadsky): even the supporters of such ideological movements as socialism or anarchism should have done their best to bring their ideas to the conceptual ground relevant to the Russian classic literature and culture.

B. P. Vysheslavtsev coined in a comprehensive distinguishing of these two orders, naming them as an initial and ideal order of essence (οὐσία), and real and empirical order of history (Vysheslavtsev 1929, 55—56).<sup>1</sup> It brings my analysis to a crucial position of the difference between of the means that now are used by *the collective West* in its political practice, and the values, which *Russia* appeals to. As mentioned above, Russian mentality stands for the relevance of the means and the values, or putting it in other way, for the adequate denotative relationship between a signifier and its signified. Such a viewpoint supposes, that when one claims for democracy, freedom or whatever, they should not be considered as the instruments to achieve the inconcrete or momentary political goal, but to use the adequate means to bring the current situation to the formal relevance to the concepts of “democracy”, “freedom”, or whatever. To use religious terms, the most appropriate would be “incarnation” — the same as for the traditional Christian thinkers Christ is the incarnation of God, or the heart is the incarnation of the “inner man”, or consciousness in Christian mysticism. Without such a relevance with its signified, any signifier loses any use. For the secular West it is on the contrary: J. Baudrillard demonstrated it illustriously in his collection of essays *The Gulf War Did Not Take Place* and *Simulacra and Simulation*.

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<sup>1</sup> Although Vysheslavtsev spoke about the nature and meaning of human heart in Christianity and Indian spiritual tradition, it is also correct to apply his approach to the discerning of the values, which are perennial and self-sufficient and the means, which could be instrumental in terms of the practice of *Realpolitik*.

The current reality, including the space of political opportunities, is the one in which simulacra, i.e., pure signifiers without any signified, can exist and influence decisions. Simulacra, thus, plays a crucial part in *Realpolitik*, by which I understand the space of opportunities to effectively reach the desired political goals by any possible means. In turn, the difference between values and means demolishes, and one can obviously see that the classic European values formulated during Modern Age are now widely used by *the collective West* to achieve the goals in their instrumental, not axiological function.

On the other hand, Russian culture represents a unique amalgam of the elements of western and eastern origin. This determines the self-understanding of *Russia's* spiritual mission, produced by Russian intellectuals and intelligentsia, in “all-human” perspective (Levitt 1989, 127—128). In the course of its history, Russia had always turned to the most civilized, culturally developed, and powerful states to adopt and accumulate their achievements. Moreover, Russia had reconsidered and developed some crucial patterns, which described and considered it by the means of the advanced cultures, — from its very name (“Россия”, which is of Byzantine origin — “Ρωσία”) to the Orthodox religion, literary tradition, cultural and juridical concepts, and the elements of everyday life. It does not mean at all that there is nothing original in Russian culture; the history of any culture is the history of adoptions. On the contrary, Russian culture showed a great power to accumulate and develop the achievements of the world spiritual heritage, starting from translations of the classics and finishing with national schools and movements in science and art. H. Kissinger eloquently grasps such a political, ideological and cultural amalgam of Russian mentality in his description of the concept of *Russian soul*: “A conviction lingered in the expansive, brooding ‘Russian soul’ (as Russian thinkers would come to call it) that someday all of Russia’s vast exertions and contradictions would come to fruition: its journey would be vindicated; its achievements would be lauded, and the disdain of the West would transform into awe and admiration; Russia would combine the power and vastness of the East with the refinements of the West and the moral force of true religion; and Moscow, the ‘Third Rome’ inheriting fallen Byzantium’s mantle, with its Czar ‘the successor of the Caesars of Eastern Rome, of the organizers of the church and of its councils which established the very creed of the Christian faith,’ would play the decisive role in ushering in a new era of global justice and fraternity” (Kissinger 2014, 68).

One of the most common emphases the social scientists and politicians make when speaking about the traditional values in Russia, that they are immaterial and transcendent. For many, it is one more point of distinguishing between idealistic *Russia* and *the* empirical or even materialistic *West*. When taking and adopting the crucial ideas and ideological patterns from the Western cultures, Russian intellectuals have never taken into consideration the “terrestrial”, “material” circumstances of their existence. Those ideals were taken and acknowledged through the prism of the orientation to universality of truth, and it is easy to notice that the most important intellectual achievements of the Western culture became specific and original on the Russian mental soil. It means that the Russian way of understanding *the West* as ideological and artistic is of extreme importance. There certainly are the elements of *Realpolitik* in making decisions and understanding of political benefits in relations between the Russian Federation and the Western countries. However, Russian mentality is not pragmatic, but it tends to be broad-minded and spiritually founded. N. Zernov demonstrated this as a burden of the Russian nation: “Universalism, interdependence, humility and believe in resurrection are the four corner-stones of Russian culture, and the view of life presented thereby explains how it is that the Russians seem to hold aloof from the rest of Christendom, and why they themselves describe their distinct contribution under the curious name of ‘Moscow, the Third and Last Rome’” (Zernov 1945, 179). This is the source of the proverbial universality of reception and cultural adaptation of Russian soul, as it was claimed by F. Dostoyevsky in his Pushkin speech, and V. Tsymbursky was right, when he tended to compare the understanding of *Realpolitik* of the Russian political elite with the European idea of political theology (Tsymbursky 2013b, 374—375).

However, besides the geopolitical or ideological stances, Russian intellectuals have always tried to substantiate their predictions and projects metaphysically. This is in a way a manifestation of twain cosmology as an objective mental paradigm for those who do not agree with reduction of historical processes to mere economic or political (“innate”) reasons. According to V. Bibikhin, Russian history shows the perennial strife of Russia to reach the ultimate goals of the world history, to fulfill the destiny of the great empire. That is why Europe as well as the whole world dramatically recognize themselves in Russian historical developments like in a mirror. Such a manifestation leaves no compromises: either Russia is a great empire, or the whole world cannot



exist. Metaphorically speaking, in the course of Russian history, one hears the coda of any European historical motives, and Russia, being a European antipode and periphery, turns to demonstrate the dramatic fate of European tendencies. Bibikhin calls it “the law of lightening”, for any Russia’s shifts towards this goal throws light to the universal state of things. Any historical project, thus, finds its ideal justification or rejection and hence redemption in the movements of Russian history (Bibikhin 2003, 8—70).

The President of Russia’s Edict №809 “On Approval of the Fundamentals of State Policy for Preserving and Strengthening Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values”, published on the 9<sup>th</sup> November, 2022, illustrates the same strife for deriving the essential values from the number of any political means or instruments. These values are listed out in article 5: life, dignity, civil rights and liberties, patriotism, civil consciousness, service to Motherland and responsibility for its future, high moral ideals, strong family, creative work, priority of spiritual over material, humanism, mercy, justice, collectivism, mutual respect and helpfulness, historical memory and succession of generations, unity of the peoples on Russia, see: (Kropachev, Shmonin 2023, 212ff.). For me it is important to emphasize that the given list of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values is not occasional — on the contrary, it shows deep intellectual connection between Russian legislative thinking and the European legacy of humanism and people’s rights. One cannot help noticing that in the quoted above paper by S. Karaganov, some of the listed values had already been mentioned. Although the social scientists debate some positions in the list or clarify the categories of the given values (Kudryavtsev 2023), I think I will not be mistaken if say, that the given list expresses the universal character of the given values as they are understood in terms of Russian culture. The same is correct for the discussion of the Strategy of National Security, adopted in 2015 (Rudakov 2021). In general, it manifests a very congenial idea for Russian mentality that *Russia* is a stronghold of the real spiritual and intellectual achievements of European civilization, which *the West* has discredited and rejected because of the inner inconsistency. Noteworthy that the mentioned Strategy and the Edict became the basis for reconsideration of many processes in various spheres, from foreign policy to education and economy, see: (Chervenчук 2017; Gorina and Saulina 2022; Trukhan 2022).

Consequently, one could hold that Russia has recognized itself as a successor and stronghold of powerful and profound *Europe*; Bibikhin formulated it as the common task of the Renaissance that Russia and Europe share in the historical and metaphysical perspective (Bibikhin 2007, 363). At the same time, it has always born what would be called a messianic worldview, one of the pillars of which is twain cosmology. European civilization was a conceptual model for Russian intellectuals and politicians during the 18<sup>th</sup>—20<sup>th</sup> centuries, but not in terms of “promised land” or a better place for living, but a fruitful “thinktank”. It produced the image of ideal dimension of what we could call universal values, articulated in ecclesiastic and secular writings, art, and culture. The latter, however, still demand revision in accordance with the principles of Russian Orthodox worldview and self-representation. What is dangerous nowadays is the following: what used to be considered as values, is now being treated to reach definite political or economic purposes by the proponents of *the collective West*. The domain of values has become the domain of *Realpolitik*. The discussions have been turned into decisions by order. But is it the real order of things? For the Russian mentality, the answer is negative; and the rejection from the current world order or cancelling Russia and Russian culture simply justifies the idea of *the corrupted and imperialistic West*, to which a certain conceptual and — further — ideological alternative should be produced.

Russia’s current turn eastwards to find its allies mainly among the number of Eastern countries can be regarded as sharpening the conceptual opposition to *the collective West*. But the character of such a sharpening is not historically unique: since late 19<sup>th</sup> century, many thinkers turned to *the East* to find true tradition there, and their search was an ideological manifestation of the rejection of *the West* as modern and liberal (i.e., the civilization that had lost its spiritual roots and established egalitarianism). For example, K. Leontiev was such a prophet of anti-egalitarianism and reprover of the current mechanistic way of life typical for European bourgeoisie, who stood for ideals of “Byzantism” (Leontiev 2007, 127—237); M. Scheler supported the First world war as the struggle against British-American liberal power in order to defend real European values and the very spirit of German nation (Scheler 1917); J. Evola was among the other traditionalists, who studied the Eastern spiritual doctrines and practices to formulate an opposition to *the West* and claimed the “revolt against modern world” (Evola 1995). The studies of *the East* had a romantic character of finding the ways

and means to wake the national spirit of their own countries up. At the same time, it manifested the disagreement with the liberal principles that were considered as mere instruments to establish the domination of imperialistic states and find the sources for national autarky based on transcendent values. Nowadays one sees the rising interest of Russian intellectuals to both the legacy of the traditionalists of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the search for the national, or better to say, spiritual sovereignty as well as the rise of academic studies of Russian conservatism (Dugin 2023; Kamnev and Osipov 2023).

Thus, it is obvious that the opposition of *the West* and *Russia* continues the spiritual search for true foundations of culture and national self-understanding that took place in early 20<sup>th</sup> century. It means that Russia “is coming back to history” (as G. Shchedrovitsky put it) after the period of the USSR. The Marxist project had an aim to overcome the historical phase of capitalist society and create another type of relations between people in the entire world. However, being again a part of modern history, *Russia* should have considered its conceptual basis in modern terms; that is why the opposition to *the West* has been formulated very closely to the ideas of the traditionalist thinkers. It is important to emphasize that traditionalist views are various, and their proponents can be found in different spheres, from academic research to politics. One has many reasons now to label such an opposition as the alternative of the idea of *Ex oriente lux* (V. Solovyov’s concept) to the idea of *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (O. Spengler’s concept). Only time can show, if this project is successful or not — but it bears an existential character for both *the West* and *Russia*.

## CONCLUSIONS

Each catastrophic event makes the contemporaries think about the worldview problems. On the level of the state powers, it manifests in the demand for ideology. The current situation is certainly a catastrophic (in Greek meaning of *καταστροφή*) situation: the balance of powers and relations in global politics as they were even 10 years before is no more possible, the same way as *Ancien Régime* was not possible after the French revolution happened in 1789. There could be no way back to the previous world order. However, there is a question about a possible conceptual framework for Russian ideology.

Russian history provides us with many examples, or a set of possibilities of such an ideological orientation. Can *Russia* now simply choose one of the possible ways to formulate its ideology? Or should such an ideology be a combination of “the best” or “the most suitable” ideas, picked up from the writings of Russian philosophers, authors and intellectuals? The problem is that any efficient ideology should fit the historical and cultural experience of the culture, and it is not possible just to pick anything up without considering the previous history and mutation of the ideas. It means that one cannot simply return, for instance, to the Orthodox doctrine as it was given in the texts by the Church Fathers and manifested in practices in the period of Moscow state, because it was seriously reconsidered during the period of Imperial Russia, the Soviet period, and the original explanation of Christian principles in Russian philosophy and literature. In terms of dramatic paths of Russian history, an ideological amalgam is obviously not enough.

I avoid producing any conclusion or providing any recommendation on how the ideology should be formulated. My goal is to notice the conceptual foundation for the positive project of the future. One of the mandatory aspects of an original ideological program should be a variant of a big project, which was a cornerstone of any projects of that kind. The examples of such a project are given in the course of Russian history. I will mention just three of the most obvious. The first is “Moscow — the Third Rome”: the core statement is that Byzantium gave Russia Christianity, and Russia must stay the only and ultimate Christian, i.e., Orthodox state. The idea of *translatio imperii* (thoroughly discussed in historical and legal perspective by C. Schmitt — see: Schmitt 2006, 59ff.) became possible due to idealistic and mythological interpretation of Byzantium as the second Rome, which Russia heired Orthodoxy from, combined with a Trinitarian principle. The second example is Peter the Great’s project of Russian Empire: the first Russian Emperor did his best to make the country, its nobility as well as all types of institutions more Western than the Westerners themselves were and had. The imperial project later led to the idea of “a special path”, and count S. Uvarov’s triad “Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality” formed the foundation of imperial ideology, representing the image of the Russian Emperor as the defender of true faith and the gatherer of all the Slavs. Thirdly, the USSR brought the idea of a universal opposition of Communism to unfree and exploitative capitalistic *West*. An important consequence of the Communist project was the Soviet space program, curiously enrooted

in the doctrine of Russian cosmism — one of the most outstanding interpretations of Christian tenets. Russia of nowadays is in demand for a great project; the first, reactive step has been made in formulating the opposition to *the West*. But what will be the other, positive step? In my opinion, it is too early to introduce any solid forecasts.

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## **РУСИЈА И ЗАПАД КАО ПОЈМОВНА ОПОЗИЦИЈА И ИДЕОЛОШКА РЕЛЕВАНТНОСТ**

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### **Апстракт**

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*Оно по чему је садашња активна конфронтација Русије и „колективног Запада“ јединствена је то што се одвија на територији Европе. Иако се може поставити питање да ли ова чињеница потврђује такву конфронтацију као неизбежну, сматрам да је питање које треба поставити следеће: шта је то Русија која се супротставља Западу? С једне стране, актуелна политичка питања су углавном реакција и Запада и Русије на грубу идеолошку атмосферу у којој живи свет. Са друге стране, Русија је увек била неotuђени део Запада, баш као и светског идеолошког, културног и политичког дискурса, а реинтерпретација Русије се одмах тиче реинтерпретације самог појма Запада. У раду се испитује шта појмови Русија и Запад значе у актуелном европском политичком дискурсу. Раd уводи два нивоа истраживања: пре свега, анализа опозиције „Русија – колективни Запад“ тиче се идеолошког оквира у смислу актуелног светског поретка; друго, такав став ће бити поткрепљен рефлексijом Русије у односу на Запад у перспективи руске културе. У раду се истиче како је Русија увек била динамичан концепт неравноправног проширења за западне и руске интелектуалце. Запад је представљао референтну тачку за конструкцију и разматрање Русије у перспективи унутрашњег самодефинисања и*



*релевантности: што је Запад идеолошки стабилнији, то је Русија идеолошки динамичнија, и обрнуто.*

**Кључне речи:** Русија, (колективни) Запад, руски менталитет, двојна космологија, појмовна анализа, традиционалне вредности, савремени конзервативизам.

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