

## THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE SERBIAN AND GREEK NATIONAL UPRISINGS OF THE 19<sup>th</sup> CENTURY

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**A**fter the First Serbian Uprising of 1804 had been unwittingly – but by all means clumsily – proclaimed to be a “Revolution” by the famous German historian Leopold von Ranke in 1829, it seems that intellectual and public opinion mainstream in Serbia inexorably drifted toward “revolutionization” of one of the most important events of Serbian modern history. And much worse. Many have gone too far in equating the First Serbian Uprising with nothing less than the French Revolution. The main argument of such a mainstream in Serbia can be summed up in the following sentence of the prominent Serbian historian Dusan Bataković:

*Because of its basic demands for sovereignty, abolition of feudalism, citizen equality and free peasant holding, the First Serbian Uprising was a Balkan-style version of the French Revolution (...) The jacobin model of nation state (État-nation) was a blueprint for the renewal of the Serbian state according to the principle of national sovereignty...”<sup>1</sup>*

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1 Dušan T. Bataković, “Srbija na putu nacionalnog oslobođenja: ustanci, autonomija, revolucija (1788-1813),” in: *Zbornik radova u čast akademiku*

On the other hand, the similar Greek mainstream regarding the Greek War of Independence boils down to the following sentences of the prominent Greek leftist historian Yanis Kordatos:


*It is well known that throughout Europe the ideas of the French Revolution had created a some kind of revolutionary mindset among the members of the so-called Third Estate. The liberal ideas of democracy, equality, freedom, etc., have had a great resonance outside of France. (...) And because of the pan-European turmoil caused by diffusion and fanaticism of the French revolutionary and democratic ideals, the Greek bourgeoisie embraced the idea of the revolution against the Turkish yoke.<sup>2</sup>*

Before we proceed with refutation of these two aforementioned lines of reasoning, let me briefly mention the main criterion upon which my argument of difference between the French Revolution and these two Uprisings will be based. This criterion asks whether the respective violent political change is *inspired* and *conducted* by some kind of intellectualism, rational constructivism (i.e. scientism) or by tradition (i.e. traditional prudence). The former should be treated as a progressive or leftist revolution criticized by Burke and the latter as a traditionalist, conservative or rightist uprising approved by Burke.<sup>3</sup> This difference can be visualised as presented below in the picture 1.

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*Desanki Kovačević Kojić*, Sveska 1, br. 10 (2015), str. 68.

- 2 Κορδάτος Γιάννης, *Η κοινωνική σημασία της ελληνικής επανάστασης του 1821*, Γ.Ι. Βασιλείου, Αθήναι, 1924, pp. 46-47.
- 3 *The works of the right hon. Edmund Burke – Vol I*, Holdsworth and Ball, London, 1834, p. 417: “It is the first and supreme necessity only, a necessity that is not chosen but chooses, a necessity paramount to deliberation, that admits no discussion, and demands no evidence, which alone can justify a resort to anarchy. This necessity is no exception to the rule; because this necessity itself is a part too of that moral and physical disposition of things to which man must be obedient by consent or force. But if that which is only submission to necessity should be made the object of choice, the law is broken, nature is disobeyed, and the rebellious are outlawed, cast forth, and exiled, from this world of reason, and order, and peace, and virtue, and fruitful penitence, into the antagonist world of madness, discord, vice, confusion, and unavailing sorrow.”



For reasons of expediency, we must further concretize these two dimensions of *inspiration* and *conduct* of violent political change in the form of two questions:

(1) What was the opinion of the leaders of the French Revolution and Serbian and Greek Uprisings regarding traditional religion which unequivocally implied the utmost importance of Revelation? Was it their inspiration or not? If one thinks that traditional religion should not play any role in political life, but on the contrary, that it should be gradually or abruptly oppressed and persecuted institutionally until extinction and other thinks that it should be not only protected, but regarded as a driving force and highest ideal of state and society – then in no way we can equate this Revolution with these Uprisings. Neither can we say that they are similar. And we must underline here exactly traditional religion based on notions of Revelation in order to exclude possible claims that deism also could be treated as a religion. Because, in my point of view, deism is nothing more than a disguised form of atheism, which identifies the so-called deistic God, Supreme Being or “religion” ultimately with human reason, with the very essence of rational constructivism, bearing in mind that many figureheads of the French Revolution

were either atheists or deists.<sup>4</sup> Here we actually have an *ideational* or *ideological* dilemma – whether the main idea which inspired the violent political change came from traditional religion or abstract reason of Enlightenment?


(2) What was their view concerning possible reversal of any of the newly created political, economic or any other institutions whatsoever during the respective turmoil – were these innovations regarded as something dogmatic according to rational constructivism that was not possible to restore back to the older version of itself, just because it would have meant complete betrayal and regression of the cause for which they had been fighting? Or to put it in simpler terms – what was their stance toward adaptability or rigidity of any of the non-religious novelties of their struggle? Here we have an opposite dilemma in comparison to the previous question – here we want to ascertain whether dogmas and highest values of society and state are to be found in pure secular, non-religious domain. If they are to be found in such a domain, than we have a true progressive revolution, not a conservative uprising. This is actually a *structural dilemma* – whether the nascent constitutional order was spontaneous, as defined by Hayek (evolutive, adaptive, contextual, flexible and prone to “downward causation”) or planned-planified, as defined by rational constructivism of the French Enlightenment (rigid and prone to one-directional laws of cause and effect).<sup>5</sup>

These two dilemmas can be visualised as presented below in the picture 2.

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4 Charles Lyttle, “Deistic Piety in the Cults of the French Revolution,” *Church History*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Mar., 1933), pp. 22-40.

5 Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Political Order of a Free People*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979, pp. 141, 152, 158, 163, 168; Ilija Vujačić, *Politička teorija*, Čigoja štampa, Beograd, 2002, str. 86.



Picture 2: Ideational vs. structural dilemma

### IDEATIONAL-IDEOLOGICAL DILEMMA

The fact that the French revolutionaries were imbued with atheistic, anti-clerical or deistic ideals of Enlightenment is beyond any doubt. What is less known is the fact that these revolutionaries had started to implement into practice these ideals very early, at the beginning of the Revolution. The Constituent Assembly nationalized the property of the Roman Catholic clergy in november of 1789.<sup>6</sup> After that came the interdiction of monastic vows, dissolution of clerical orders and the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which broke up any relation between Roman Catholic clergy in France and the Pope. The clergymen who were reluctant to take an oath of allegiance to this Constitution had to undergo discrimination, persecution, torture, mass killings and exile. And the fact that few days after this Constitution, one of the main instigators of all these attacks on Roman Catholicism – the Bishop Talleyrand – officiated a mass during the *Fête de la Fédération* should not be seen only as a matter of hypocrisy or irony, but also as a tactical maneuver, devised in order to temporarily appease possible counterrevolution. Which was soon proved to be true, when Talleyrand was defrocked and excommuni-

6 Pierre Chaunu, “La sécularisation des biens d’Église: signification politique et conséquences économiques,” *Le livre noir de la Révolution Française*, Les éditions du Cerf, Paris, 2008, p. 10.

cated by the Pope. The thing that didn't bother him at all, since he resigned forever, even as a fictitious bishop.

In the end, the revolutionaries decided to transform temples of Roman Catholicism into so-called Temples of Reason, where altars were demolished and crucifixes replaced by female figures of the so-called Goddess of Reason or symbols of the deistic Supreme Being of Robespierre. The French revolutionaries in this way tried to abolish Roman Catholicism and any belief in Revelation or in traditional religion, religion which was incompatible with their constructivist worldview. And we observe this revolutionary, linear tendency of ever-greater enmity toward traditional Roman Catholicism all the way up to the Thermidorian Reaction. Day after day with the French revolutionaries meant only less and less traditional religion in public domain. And almost all of these leading personalities, responsible for the persecution of Roman Catholicism, had lost their lives or gone to exile until the Thermidorian Reaction. This Reaction was due to some other historical figures. There are no traces of eventual volte-face of those who had started religious oppression. Those who used to gradually persecute Roman Catholicism back then, now try to utterly destroy it. On the other hand, we have absolutely opposite situation concerning traditional religion in the Serbian and Greek cases.

The spiritual beacons of the leaders of the Serbian Uprising were not haughty intellectuals or philosophers, but simple priests of the Orthodox Church. One Serbian historian of the Uprising reminds us who was an ideological prime mover during the first preparatory meeting of the Uprising:

*A key protagonist of the gathering was not Karadžić (a soon-to-be main secular leader of the Uprising), but the Priest Atanasije. On that occasion, he delivered a speech from which the basic ideas of the Uprising can be grasped.<sup>7</sup>*

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<sup>7</sup> Although Ljušić wrote here literally “revolutionary thoughts” (“revolucionarne misli”) it is more suitable terminologically to translate

The priest spoke in medieval and religious terms and cursed all the potential traitors and he was present at the next meeting a few months later, which marked the very start of the Uprising. We should bear in mind that the list of almost all of the Uprising's goals had been constantly in a state of flux, but one of the first goals proclaimed was a full respect of Serbian religious traditions and a right of Serbian people to erect Orthodox Christian temples and monasteries with a degree of ecclesiastical autonomy greater than before.<sup>8</sup> Also, one of the last proclamation of the main leader of the Uprising Karađorđe in 1813 urged soldiers on the front to continue the fight for their Faith, People and Fatherland in order to enter the Kingdom of Heaven.<sup>9</sup> Priests and theologians of the Church had been endowed with the task of spiritual guidance and encouragement of Serbian soldiers before their departure for the front lines.<sup>10</sup> Institutionally speaking – Church, Orthodox Christianity and clergy were protected, highly valued and promoted as the most precious pillars of the Serbian society. Quite contrary to the French Revolution.<sup>11</sup> Besides, the leaders of the Uprising were illiterate peasants, merchants or – in the eyes of the Turkish authorities – outlaws. Therefore, there

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these words as “basic ideas of the Uprising,” precisely with the intention to avoid any sort of conceptual overlap of the French Revolution and First Serbian Uprising. See more: Radoš Ljušić, *Vožd Karađorđe – prva knjiga*, Udruženje za srpsku povescnicu, Beograd, 2000, str. 49.

8 Dušan Perović, “Osnovni ciljevi Prvog srpskog ustanka,” *Istorijski časopis – knjiga XXIII*, Istorijski institut, Beograd, 1976, str. 53.

9 Radoš Ljušić, *Vožd Karađorđe – druga knjiga*, Udruženje za srpsku povescnicu, Beograd, 2000, str. 162-163.

10 Ibid, str. 154-155.

11 Except for rare quarrels between Karađorđe and the Greek Metropolitan Leontios regarding necessity of further resistance to the Turks (in fact, a highest clergyman was a Greek after 1766 who had been aloof from Serbian people because of language gap and Serbs usually circumvented him by working shoulder to shoulder with Serbian bishops in Austria) and one case when one priest was threatened with death by Karađorđe (as was once a Metropolitan himself) because that priest refused to read last rites to one poor peasant contrary to Orthodox tradition, I don't know any other case of similar disagreements between the Uprising's leaders and the clergy.

was an obvious mental and physical obstacle that prevented them from being in any way influenced by contemporary Enlightenment and European rational constructivist intellectuals. One Russian envoy during the Uprising even noted that almost all the Serbian leaders as former swineherds and outlaws possessed very meagre conceptual-categorical apparatus.<sup>12</sup>

Although it is true that – in contrast to the Serbian pre-Uprising context – in Greece, before the Greek Uprising, had existed one full-fledged intellectual, Greek liberation movement known as the Modern Greek Enlightenment (Νεοελληνικός Διαφωτισμός) which was headed by progressive secular minds, such as Rigas Feraios and Adamandios Korraï, and by some clerical figures enchanted with the ideals of the French Enlightenment also, nevertheless, we cannot argue that the Modern Greek Enlightenment as a whole was a mere duplication of the French Enlightenment. It was a mimetic movement, but at least partly and publicly it was not atheistic nor deistic movement. Let's take just two aforementioned secular leaders of the Greek Enlightenment for example. If Adamandios Korraï was an unswerving admirer of the French atheistic or deistic principles, Rigas Feraios was an Orthodox Christian, although some of his political ideas could have been unconsciously influenced by some progressive or masonic authors, notions and works. Although he cites the French *Encyclopedia* regularly in his works, Rigas personally believes that marriage is a sacramental bond, that human reason is not perfect and infinite, that God has created nothing evil, that the future Greek national flag should depict crosses, that the national oath should be given above the cross, he considers the Serbs to be “fellow brothers of the Greeks in Christ.”<sup>13</sup> Also, as Rimikis has shown,<sup>14</sup> the main Greek secret organization which had prepared

12 Radoš Ljušić, *Vožd Karađorđe – prva knjiga*, Udruženje za srpsku povescnicu, Beograd, 2000, str. 244.

13 Δημήτριος Απ. Καραμπερόπουλος, *Ρήγας και Ορθόδοξη πίστη*, Επιστημονική Εταιρεία Μελέτης Φερών-Βελεστίνου-Ρήγα, Αθήνα, 2005, pp. 37-46.

14 Nicholas Michael Rimikis, “Filiki Etaireia: The rise of a secret society in



the Uprising known as *Filiki Etairia* was not a masonic organisation, because the majority of its members were not freemasons, even though it was influenced to some extent by the freemason minority, especially regarding its secret foundation and arcane work methods.

But, even if someone assumed that all the individuals and groups that had prepared the Greek Uprising had been devout, fanatical and strict adherents of the French Revolution, freemasonry and French Enlightenment, and that, therefore, the Greek Uprising was a mere repeat of its French counterpart – all further developments of this Uprising would refute such kind of assumption. The preparation and very outbreak of the Uprising in the Peloponnese happened under the aegis of three local bishops, especially the Bishop of Patras Germanos who was a member of *Filiki Etairia*, one of two members of the War Council of the Uprising in the Peloponnese, he was present together with other secular leaders in the monastery of Agia Lavra when the flag of the Uprising “*Eleftheria y thanatos*” (Ελευθερία ή θάνατος) with a cross was raised and he performed a doxology in the honour of the Uprising.<sup>15</sup> All three temporary constitutional acts of the Greek Uprising contained several traditional Orthodox Christian concepts that would have been completely incompatible with the basic ideas of the French Enlightenment and Revolution. The first words of two of these acts in the preamble are actually an invocation of the Holy Trinity: “In the name of the Holy and Indivisible Trinity” (*εν ονόματι της Αγίας και Αδιαίρετου Τριάδος*). The first article of all three constitutional acts is dedicated to religion (Περί θρησκείας). That article says that the official religion of the Greek nascent state is Orthodox Christianity as defined by the Eastern Orthodox Church. The next few articles

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the making of the Greek revolution,” *Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects – Senior Projects Spring*, 2017, pp. 85–86. ([http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj\\_s2017/317](http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2017/317))

15 Απόστολος Ε. Βακαλόπουλος, *Ιστορία του νέου ελληνισμού: Η μεγάλη Ελληνική Επανάσταση (1821-1829) – Οι προϋποθέσεις και οι βάσεις της (1813-1822)*, Σταμούλης Αντ., Θεσσαλονίκη, 1980, pp. 330, 334-335.

of these acts define who is considered to be a member of the Greek nation – namely, only those who believe in Christ (*Όσοι αυτόχθονες κάτοικοι της Επικρατείας της Ελλάδος πιστεύουσιν εις Χριστόν, εισίν Έλληνες*). What a striking difference between this and constitutional activity of the French revolutionaries! In the French Constitution of 1791, God is mentioned only in reference to the king’s right to proclaim laws by the grace of God. The preamble doesn’t invoke God or the Holy Trinity – btw. Roman Catholicism, religious dogmas or the Pope are not mentioned at all – and all the other public institutions have nothing to do with religion, even symbolically (as the king has). The second revolutionary Constitution of 1793 abolished the French monarchy and with it, any symbolical reference to God disappeared from the French revolutionary law. The rule of less and less traditional religion was once more corroborated in the context of the French Revolution.

We should also debunk the myth of the alleged “anathema” of the Greek Uprising by the Patriarch Gregory V in 1821, since the leftist propaganda in Greece used it to fabricate a history of fierce enmity between the leadership of the Uprising and the Church. Actually, the anathema was artificial inasmuch as it was a desperate maneuver of the Patriarch to prevent large-scale atrocities. The Patriarch considered it possible, with this extorted anathema, to avert a *fatwa* from the Shaykh al-Islām against all Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, a *fatwa* that could have caused an unbridled tide of total extermination of civilians. The Patriarch succeeded—the *fatwa* was not issued. Nevertheless, the Sultan’s wrath against him was not mitigated. The Patriarch was executed precisely for complicity in the preparation of the Uprising (“... ήτο και ο ίδιος αυτός, ως αρχηγός, μυστικός συμμετοχος της επαναστάσεως...” – a charge that was actually founded, the Patriarch had close connections with members of Filiki Etairia and other Greek leaders). Shortly before the execution, the anathema was revoked by the Patriarch and his bishops synod-

ically in secret.<sup>16</sup> Everyone interested in this topic concerning the anathema of 1821 should read the book of the professor emeritus of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Father Theodoros Zisis, under the title “Leaders of the Church and Nation” (*Ιεράρχες εθνάρχες*) in more detail. The Father Zisis is a cleric of the Greek Orthodox Church, renown for his anti-progressivist, anti-ecumenist and patriotic activity, who sharply criticizes the contemporary left-leaning Orthodox bishops and who therefore is not in the slightest bit interested in praising the Patriarch Gregory V by definition.

#### STRUCTURAL DILEMMA

The problem of the second question, or structural dilemma from the introductory part of this article, is much easier to solve.

In the course of the French Revolution, in parallel with an ever-decreasing role of traditional religion in politics, one can observe an ever-increasing wave of modernization of political institutions in the spirit of rational constructivism. And this trend was unidirectional – the gap between the *Ancien Régime* and newly established institutions was continuously widened. It is impossible to think otherwise even in terms of counterfactual conditionals. The revolutionaries were willing to make some tactical compromises, but only in the sense of temporary delay of some of the progressive reforms, in order to gain strength or consolidate power. But by no means did they want to empower the king again, or to restore any of the old institutions which had been extinguished previously by themselves. The same or higher level of leftist progress is allowed, but less of it – is out of the question.

As we have already said, almost all of the secular goals of the

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16 Θεόδωρου Ζήση πρωτοπρεσβύτερου, *Ιεράρχες εθνάρχες*, Εκδόσεις Βρυέννιος, Θεσσαλονίκη, 2003, str. 15-50; Emmanouil G. Chalkiadakis, “Reconsidering the Past: Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory V and the Greek Revolution of 1821,” *Σύνθεσις*, Τμήμα Θεολογίας (Θεολογική Σχολή) – Αριστοτέλειο Πανεπιστήμιο Θεσσαλονίκης, Θεσσαλονίκη, 2017, str. 182-192.

Serbian Uprising had been constantly changing. The only immutable goal of this kind could be formulated as follows – maximum possible independence from the turkish occupation, given the current circumstances. But, the question of what to do with new political, social and economic institutions, was a whirlpool of virtually never-ending debates, reversals and changes, not only at the level of factions and groups, but at the individual level also. It was a process of perpetual going back and forth. Very often, one and the same personality had alternating doubts, perceptions or ideas about the same subject, influenced by different external and contextual factors that could have been even mere rumours, prejudices, personal insults or just news about looming foreign interventions and meddling. Not a single theory, book or philosophical principle could be attached to any of the factions or leaders of the Serbian Uprising who had been predominantly illiterate and cut off from all kinds of intellectual circles. For example, the claim that the leaders of the Uprising had been fanatically against feudalism as a principle from the very beginning, just doesn't hold water. According to their own confession in a letter sent to the one Serbian bishop in Austria soon after the outbreak:

*We have obeyed righteous laws until now (i.e. the turkish feudal laws), but turkish perpetrators transgressed them and neither the Sultan nor the Grand Vizier have proved to be capable of protecting us from their violence.*<sup>17</sup>

Of course, the Serbs quickly demanded full abolition of turkish feudalism, but on the eve of the collapse of the Uprising, they again were ready to consent to turkish feudalism under few

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17 Dušan Perović, op. cit., str. 55; It is interesting to note that what angered the leaders of the Uprising – at least at the beginning of the Uprising – was not the turkish feudalism as such, but its distortion through illegal doubling of the feudal masters to whom the Serbian people was obliged to pay cumulative taxes: Miljana Todorović, “Hatišerifi iz 1830. i 1833. i zemljišna svojina u Srbiji,” in: *Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Nišu – Zaštita ljudskih i manjinskih prava u evropskom pravnom prostoru*, Pravni fakultet, Niš, 2012, str. 471-472.

conditions.<sup>18</sup> And let's take the topic of centralization/decen-  
 tralization of political power. Nobody had a clear and consistent  
 idea as to who should be politically dominant – the main leader  
 of the Uprising Karadžorđe (Вожд) or the Council of Leaders  
 (Совјет) and even decisions and laws issued by provisional bod-  
 ies of the Uprising were often ambivalent or contradictory.<sup>19</sup> As  
 Karadžorđe himself acknowledged:

*I don't know how to govern, my task is to wage a war...<sup>20</sup>*

This situation led the Serbian leadership to frustration and at-  
 tempts had been made to obtain advice on this matter from foreign  
 Russian ally:

*We had no our own ideas how to legislate or govern (...) there-  
 fore we are seeking advice on this point first by God and then  
 by you and your Emperor...<sup>21</sup>*

This is as spontaneous an order as can be.

Apropos this structural dilemma in Greece, it is less pronounced  
 than in the Serbian case. Probably because the Greek leadership was  
 more susceptible to the ideas of intellectuals from the West than  
 its Serbian counterpart. By comparing three constitutional acts of  
 the Greek Uprising, one can notice a gradual democratization of  
 the nascent Greek polity. The legal borrowings from the western  
 legal systems are indisputable. For example, the principle of pop-  
 ular sovereignty (λαϊκή κυριαρχία). But, we should be careful not  
 to argue flippantly that every constitutional article which could be

18 Radoš Ljušić, *Vožd Karadžorđe – druga knjiga*, Udruženje za srpsku  
 povesnicu, Beograd, 2000, str. 139-140.

19 Ljušić, *Vožd Karadžorđe – prva knjiga*, Udruženje za srpsku povesnicu,  
 Beograd, 2000, str. 196, 122-123, 219-220, 235, 240; Radoš Ljušić, *Vožd  
 Karadžorđe – druga knjiga*, Udruženje za srpsku povesnicu, Beograd, 2000,  
 str. 24, 81.

20 Ljušić, *Vožd Karadžorđe – prva knjiga*, Udruženje za srpsku povesnicu,  
 Beograd, 2000, str. 210.

21 Ibid, str. 216.

interpreted as democratic is certainly a mere borrowing from the western, progressive legal systems. Let's take the article 7 which says that all Greeks are equal before the law (Όλοι οι Έλληνες είναι ίσοι ενώπιον των νόμων) or the article 27 which prohibits political power from bestowing noble titles (Κανέννας τίτλος ευγενείας δεν δίδεται από την Έλληνικήν Πολιτείαν...). The first of these two articles was actually a part of the medieval byzantine tradition, since the concept of equality before the law of all the subjects of the Byzantine Empire had been recognized at least from the VIII century, thanks to the compilation of the byzantine law known as *Ecloga*,<sup>22</sup> while the second one only reflected social relations which go back centuries, since during the Turkish occupation the medieval aristocratic circles had been completely extinguished. At any rate, a single rupture of this trend toward "democratization" and turnabout toward "monarchization" would suffice to dispel any doubt about dissimilarity of the Greek Uprising and French Revolution. And such a rupture or turnabout happened when – by consent of the newly formed Parliament – Ioannis Kapodistrias suspended the Constitution for an indefinite period of time (the next convocation of the Parliament happened 16 years later) and concentrated all power in his hands.<sup>23</sup> The Parliament accepted his justification for this – the national liberation and salvation are higher than any other positive law, that is to say the present circumstances do not allow the Greeks to stick to the Constitution and positive law.<sup>24</sup>

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22 Alexander A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire (324-1453)*, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1952, str. 242.

23 Δημακόπουλος, Γ., "Αι Κυβερνητικά Αρχαί της Έλληνικής Πολιτείας (1827-1833)," Ο Εραμιστής – *The Gleaner*, The Greek Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies, 4, 1966, str. 121-122.

24 Ανδρέου Ζ. Μάμουκα, *Τα κατά την αναγέννησιν της Ελλάδος* (Τόμος εκτός), εκ της του Ηλία Χριστοφίδου τυπογραφίας, εν Πειραιεί, 1839, str. 40; Γιώργος Κοντογιώργης, "Το 'κράτος' του Καποδίστρια – Μια συγκριτική αποτίμηση σε σχέση με την απολυταρχία της εποχής και το κράτος έθνος," *Πάπυροι - Επιστημονικό Περιοδικό*, τόμος 3, Η Ακαδημία Θεσμών και Πολιτισμών, Θεσσαλονίκη, 2014, str. 37.

## CONCLUSION

On the basis of the above, I feel free to conclude that the Serbian and Greek Uprisings of the 19th century are ideationally or ideologically and structurally different from the French Revolution. The up to date attempts of scientists, journalists, politicians or educational system as a whole to identify these Uprisings as younger and Balkan-style versions of the French Revolution are nothing more than a conscious or unconscious leftist propaganda. And it seems to me more than suitable to finish this article with the words of one of the most distinguished leaders of the Greek War of Independence – Theodoros Kolokotronis. He himself gave the most precise answer about the alleged similarity between these Uprisings and the French Revolution:

*Our own Uprising doesn't resemble anything that is going on now in Europe. The Revolutions in Europe are directed against their own respective regimes and they represent a form of civil war. Our own fight was the most righteous one, it was a war between two nations... My dear children! You should defend and support your Faith, because when we took up arms we said – first we fight for our Faith and then we fight for our Fatherland!<sup>25</sup>*

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25 Θ. Κολοκοτρώνης, Απομνημονεύματα, εκδόσεις Ωρορά, Αθήνα 1992, στρ. 214; Ο Λόγος του Κολοκοτρώνη στην Πνύκα, <https://www.sansimera.gr/articles/565>: “Η Επανάσταση η εδική μας δεν ομοιάζει με καμιά απ’ όσες γίνονται την σήμερον ημέραν εις την Ευρώπην. Της Ευρώπης αι επαναστάσεις εναντίον των διοικήσεών των είναι εμφύλιος πόλεμος. Ο εδικός μας πόλεμος ήτον ο πλέον δίκαιος, ήτον έθνος με άλλο έθνος... Πρέπει να φυλάξετε την πίστη σας και να την στερεώσετε, διότι, όταν επιάσαμε τα άρματα είπαμε πρώτα υπέρ πίστεως και έπειτα υπέρ πατρίδος”

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