

TANZANIA, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND NON ALIGNMENT

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Abstract: This paper explores the ideology and agenda behind Tanzania's active membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the emergence of a dynamic interaction between the Tanzanian government's foreign policy strategy and the government's domestic policy and legitimacy. The chapter charts Tanzania's evolution "as a stable and important member of the non-aligned group" setting out Tanzania's particular contribution at the NA Meetings at the UN and in other multilateral fora. The paper sets out the importance of the liberation of South Africa from white minority rule. Emancipation of all African brothers from white domination could not be confined to individual nation-states; this was a transnational moral and psychological imperative that encompassed racial justice and social justice; it concerned the right of self-determination of small nations. For Nyerere and his fellow Tanzanians, this was not simply reactive support for liberation movements facing oppression; it was pro-active support. The decolonisation of Africa demanded the structural economic transformation and a corresponding dedication to enhance the African agenda in the workings of the international system, to correct the skewed international political economy and division into antagonistic ideological blocs. The Non-Aligned Movement and the practice of non-alignment were thus a vital counterweight to marginalisation, insidious bias and continued exploitation by the developed European world. The paper provides an analysis of Tanzania's position in the NAM in the latter part of the 1980s and 1990s after President Julius Nyerere stepped down from office. Also, the paper considers the relationship with the superpowers and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Key words: Tanzania, Africa, the Non-Aligned Movement, decolonisation, Nyerere.

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Introduction

During his time in office between 1961-1985, Julius Nyerere rose to be one of the most eloquent and influential voices in the Third World and a leading figure in the Non-Aligned Movement. Tanzania's advocacy and practice of non-alignment evolved as a result of historical and geographical factors, the particular trajectory of nationalism, and a series of international events in the early years of independence (Pratt, 1975).² Under Nyerere's leadership, his country's foreign policy came to embody the ideal of African non-alignment, cultivating international prestige to sustain its regional and continental strategy (Bjerk, 2011). This was not to be passive neutrality: realism and idealism went hand in hand. Indeed, by the mid-1960s, the international strategy of the state was increasingly shaped by and affected its domestic situation and developmental goals, which meant that ideological interests combined with transnational ethnic and economic ties. For Nyerere, these multiple layers of identity and community were moral imperatives, as well as necessary constructs of being part of something bigger - Tanzanian/East African/Pan African/Non-Aligned - to foster confidence and empowerment with which to confront the lasting structural inequalities of the 19th-century European system of imperialism. In short, it was a radical, emancipator, transformative project.

Nyerere's battle for independent Tanzania

Tanzania's particular decolonisation trajectory played an important part in defining the country's foreign policy strategy and outlook. African nationalism had become a political force with the creation of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954, and its leaders had neither been imprisoned nor its followers suppressed (Gifford & Louis, 1982). This comparative freedom to organise, combined with deeply unpopular and coercive colonial policies, were important spurs to nationalism. Tanganyika

² The country gained its independence from Britain as the Republic of Tanganyika in December 1961. Zanzibar became independent from the UK in December 1963 as a constitutional monarchy. In January 1964, the African majority rebelled in a violent uprising against the Sultan, establishing a revolutionary council that was immediately recognised by ten communist countries, including the GDR, USSR and PRC. This was paralleled by a Tanganyika Army mutiny. Following British military intervention at Nyerere's reluctant request, on 24 April 1964 Tanganyika united with Zanzibar to become the United Republic of Tanzania.

was also fortunate that as the United Nations Trust Territory, there was a limit on what the British and settler minority could foist on Tanganyika. Before achieving power, Nyerere was already a central figure in the Pan-African drive for independence (Bjerck, 2011). He had been one of the most prominent spokesmen for the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa and proponent of the East African Federation.³ He was fortunate that his highly diverse country (with over 120 different ethnic groups) had not experienced the violence and colonial repression of the liberation struggle in equally diverse, neighbouring Kenya. Sparse domestic resources meant the country was not in thrall to multinational corporate interests (as in Congo), and its diversity - without the dominance of one particular community - helped save it from toxic politicised ethnicity. Its geographical coastal position, yet lack of external strategic interest in naval facilities, proved another advantage. Indeed, Tanzania's very lack of importance since 1914 gave the new government extraordinary latitude in the post-independence era. There is a debate whether Nyerere should be the sole focus in any analysis of Tanzania's policy of non-alignment, as parliament, party and government ministries were also important actors (Nzomo, 2018). As government and party functions centred on the President, executive and political function, as well as the legacies of colonial authoritarian political culture and his intellect, charismatic personality and political skills, ensured Nyerere dominated his country's external affairs between 1961-1985 (Matthews & Mushi, 1983; Bjerck, 2017).⁴ In newly independent African countries, the small size of the state underlined the importance of leadership. Nyerere was one of extraordinary nationalist leaders who had led their countries to independence (Johnson, 2000). He possessed remarkable personal and political qualities: superior intellect, wit, sophistication, he was an excellent listener and projected an air of incorruptibility and intelligence (Mitchell, 2016). As an African version of Plato's "King of Philosophers", Nyerere reflected deeply on the issues and challenges facing the newly independent African states and published it extensively. He established excellent personal relations with other world leaders and a unique rapport with foreign diplomats.⁵ The role of other leading Tanzanian diplomats must also be acknowledged. Diplomats were

³ The proposal for an East African Federation faltered in 1965, thanks to opposition from Ghana, Kenyan nationalists and Tanzanian minority business interests.

⁴ There were eight different Foreign Ministers during Nyerere's time in office.

⁵ Sir Mervyn Brown interview, British Ambassador to Tanzania, BDOHP.

from a small pool of educated Tanzanians, many of whom already knew each other, which enhanced the network of small foreign service and the limited number of foreign missions in strategic capitals, such as Addis Ababa and Delhi (Bjerk, 2011). Nyerere was ably assisted by a series of key diplomatic appointments to the Organisation of African States (OAU), and its Liberation Committee⁶ based in Dar es Salaam (Yousuf, 1985; Temu & Tembe, 2014), and the Tanzanian representatives in New York and Geneva who proved adept at using structures and committees in the Organisation of the United Nations (UN) to further their government's foreign policy agenda. Salim Ahmed Salim played a particularly influential role as Tanzania's Representative at the UN between 1970 and 1980.⁷ Membership of the NAM Co-ordinating Bureau at the United Nations, which reviewed and facilitated activities between the NAM's committees and working groups, was also very important (Cilliers, 2015). Salim was Chair of the UNGA's Special Committee on Decolonisation (1972-1980), and chair of the UN Security Council Committee on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (1975). Tanzania was also Chair of the Drafting Committee of NAM meetings (1972 Georgetown and Colombo 1976). In the 1970s Tanzania's international prestige as a leading non-aligned state was further enhanced by the regionalism of the Front Line States (FLS), established 1975 and (post 1980) the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Limb, 2018).⁸ In addition to his overseas state visits, the OAU heads meetings and attendance of biennial summits, Nyerere met fellow NAM heads outside Africa every three years to debate and proclaim views on world affairs and the international economic order. The Tanzanian Foreign Ministers met other NAM foreign ministers more regularly, formed a caucus at the UNO, and would meet to discuss common challenges - most notably at the opening of each regular session of the UN General Assembly in

⁶ In 1972, Brigadier Hashim Mbita was appointed Chair of the OAU's Liberation Committee and proved an effective and energetic chair.

⁷ Salim Salim was backed by the NAM and the OAU as a rival candidate for the Secretary Generalship of the UNO in 1980. Despite winning the first round of voting, his candidacy was vetoed by the United States which regarded him as a dangerous radical.

⁸ The FLS was characterized by leading Zambian diplomat Mark Chona to 'a crisis management group': 'if it had not supported the national liberation struggle, we would have ended up like the Palestinians' when Pretoria and Salisbury pushed north.

September each year. Given the relatively small foreign service, and in an age when communications were reliant on the (expensive) telephone, telegram and telex, and international travel was onerous and expensive, this underlined the importance and public theatre of Nyerere's physical presence at the NAM summits or on state visits to fellow NAM capitals. Lacking hard power, like other non-aligned states, Tanzania "tried to achieve its foreign policy aims through symbolic performative actions, such as summitry, (visual) public propaganda geared towards a global media, turning NAM summits into media events". (Miskovic, Fischer-Tine & Boskowska, 2014, p. 207).

Tanzania's unique position in the Non-Aligned Movement

Nyerere exploited the political and ideological space for Tanzania to play a unique role in the Non-Aligned Movement. As a nationalist leader before independence, he had been a vocal critic of white settler rule in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, and apartheid in South Africa (in 1960 he threatened that Tanzania would not join the Commonwealth if the Republic of South Africa continued as a member), and had already proclaimed non-alignment in the Cold War, "refusing to bow to "the scarecrow of communism"". (Bjerk, 2011, pp. 243-244). In late 1961, Nyerere made a symbolic trip to Belgrade as a founder member and host of the first meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (Matthews, 1987).⁹ Almost immediately after independence, Nyerere "began the long search for more creative policies and institutions than those he had inherited." (Gifford & Louis, 1982, p. 280). Tanzania joined the UN and became an active member of its "Special Committee of Decolonisation" and the Special Committee against Apartheid. Tanzania also joined the Commonwealth with its expanding cohort of former British colonies. Furthermore, the country was a founder member of the Organisation of African States (1963), which espoused ideals of Pan-Africanism, equality, non-interference in the domestic affairs of African states, non-alignment and prosperity (Matthews, 1987). Membership of these organisations was seen as imprimaturs of sovereign independence and equality of status, as well as providing an invaluable matrix of diplomacy, advocacy and information. Like the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement was akin to "a club", where sensitive issues could be debated and thrashed out, or hotly contested, away from the prying eyes and leaks of the UNO (Graham, 1980). The NAM's consensus non-voting style, and lack of a Secretariat, meant that the network of Tanzanian ambassadors, diplomats,

⁹ Six independent African states attended the Belgrade Summit.

officials and their role in the preparatory meetings, and the presence and input of leaders and connectivity in other high-level fora provided the crossover of membership with the OAU and the Commonwealth.¹⁰ Thus, each organisation's particular patterns of meetings, political and personal networks of leaders, ministers and their officials fed into, and provide a platform for the articulation of Tanzania's stance of non-alignment and its advocacy for decolonisation, liberation, international economic transformation, and against imperialism. For the Nyerere government, membership in the NAM was a declaration of the boundaries and limits of the military balance of power, and that this group of sovereign states was not going to be willing participants in the Cold War struggle. (Nyerere, 1970). However, the impoverished state of Tanzania at independence made its pursuit of non-alignment under Nyerere "somewhat improbable". The new government faced a set of acute dilemmas: debilitating poverty and a political economy heavily skewed to primary commodities, an uncertain geopolitical environment, pressing need for international assistance and capital investment from the Western world and business community suspicious of radical socialism, and reliance on foreign administrative and professional skills. Tanzania was heavily dependent on the United Kingdom and Western financial assistance (Mawabukojo, 2019).¹¹ This close and dependent relationship "generated a tension and strain" for many Tanzanians, including Nyerere. Nyerere pursued a vigorous, assertive and credible non-aligned policy by incremental stages, despite his country's relative weakness (Nnoli, 1978). Immediately after independence, he withdrew Tanzania from the Royal East African Navy (on the grounds that continued membership would infringe the country's sovereignty and independence), refused proposed association with the EEC (because of the implied association with the West), and swiftly took a strong and highly public stance in the UN

¹⁰ The former Guyanaian Foreign Minister Shridath Ramphal, who had been a leading figure in the Caribbean group of Non-Aligned states in the early 1970s, was appointed Secretary-General of the Commonwealth in April 1975.

¹¹ In 1961, nearly 75% of the upper ranks of the civil service were British. (Pratt, 1975) In terms of net official developmental assistance, in the mid-1960s foreign aid represented more than 50% of government expenditure, primarily from the UK and the West. After 1967, there was a reduction, but Tanzania never stopped depending on foreign aid to finance government operations. In the 1970s, nearly 60% of the country's developmental budget came from foreign aid. Thus, despite Nyerere's declared agenda of self-sufficiency, Tanzania was a prime case of dependency theory. (Official Developmental Assistance in Tanzania, 1960-2006, using IMF, 2009).

on Southern African issues (Niblock, 1971). Through the astute use of ideological soft power, legitimacy and limited use of force, Nyerere sought to offset his country's post-colonial material deficiencies; indeed, the enactment of sovereign autonomy was "a major diplomatic accomplishment" (Bjerk, 2011, p. 217). In late 1963-1964, Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai's tour of African countries included Tanzania and initiated Chinese medical, technology and economic support.¹² Nyerere also formed a close relationship with Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander and his adviser Olaf Palmer during his visit to Sweden in 1961, founded on their shared views on the decolonisation process in Africa, the role of solidarity and the possible role of Swedish financial and humanitarian support for Tanzania (Sellstrom, 2003). This personal relationship was backed up by strong links between the TANU and the Swedish Social Democrat Party (Sellstrom, 2003).¹³ Non-alignment reached a "high water mark" at the Second Summit in Cairo in 1964. African states constituted nearly 60% of the 47 participants and succeeded in "giving non-alignment an African outlook" (Matthews, 1987). As a loose affiliation of diverse countries, the NAM was valued as a reassertion of independence of power blocs, and as a forum for reiterating an independent view of world affairs. Increasing attention was given to eliminating colonialism and neocolonialism, and the principal concerns of the conference were decolonisation, self-determination and racism. In addition to its leverage as a coordinating lobbying tool in the UN system, the value of the NAM to Tanzania was the association's role as a focus for Third World pressure on economic and developmental issues of acute concern. The parallel work to set up the UNCTAD in 1964 as a quadrennial meeting of economic and development ministers to discuss programmes for LDCs was particularly valued, together with the associated creation of the Group of 77, in the hope that this would promote reconfiguration of the international political economy

¹² This was part of the PRC's drive to be recognised as China's sole representative at the UNO. This did not mean that the subsequent relationship between Beijing and Dar es Salaam was smooth: angered by Chinese recognition of the Boumedienne government, Nyerere rescinded his agreement that China could ship arms through Tanzania to Congolese rebels in 1965.

¹³ In 1966 Tanzania was one of four African countries selected as priority countries for Swedish development aid, and eventually became the principal recipient of Swedish bilateral assistance [20.3bn Kr]. 505 of Sweden's global bilateral aid were directed to southern Africa. Although a one-party state, Tanzania was regarded as democratic, non-aligned and concerned – and Nyerere's opinion carried considerable weight in Stockholm.

and address the structural problems inhibiting development in Tanzania (Williams, 1987). Nyerere was increasingly determined not just to issue declarations or support NAM communiqués, but to be at the vanguard of solutions to complex problems connected to colonialism and imperialism. Tanzania took a public standpoint on the Cold War issues that confronted and often wracked the Non-Aligned Movement: Germany, Indo-China, the Middle East conflict, and nuclear weapons commenting “Chinese nuclear weapons would make the world safer in general”, siding with the radical members of the NAM who were jubilant that the PRC had broken the superpower monopoly on nuclear weapons capability in October 1964 (Luthi, 2016). For Tanzania, non-alignment meant diplomatic freedom of choice and action to craft foreign relations, the autonomy of decision making on international assistance, and latitude to criticise in public foreign governments. This was combined with a determination to enhance and give an “effective voice” to less developed countries and smaller powers.¹⁴ A series of events between 1962 and 1967 demonstrated Tanzania’s lack of voice in international affairs which Nyerere was determined to rectify (Nzomo, 2018). This was in addition to a widely shared belief that a conscious ideology was necessary for governance in the form of a compelling transformatory agenda to win peasant loyalties. His moral and highly public stance on African liberation and associated support for nationalist movements formed part of his broader strategy of mass mobilisation at home and use of moral indignation as a nation-defining value using the diplomatic finesse and tactical prudence (Bjerk, 2011). Nyerere was profoundly disillusioned by the British failure to prevent Southern Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence under white minority rule in November 1965 (Pratt, 1975). Tanzania led a number of radical African states in severing diplomatic relations with the UK in late 1965, although Tanzania did not withdraw from the Commonwealth.¹⁵ Nyerere also rejected a £7.5m loan from the UK - foregoing much needed foreign aid was indeed an extraordinary demonstration of Tanzania’s commitment to the anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle. The government in Dar es Salaam did not restore diplomatic relations

¹⁴ Tanzania also recognized secessionist Biafra in 1968, because of Nyerere’s doubts about the viability of the Nigerian federation as well as his profound concerns about the looming humanitarian disaster.

¹⁵ Nyerere stayed away from the emergency Commonwealth heads’ meeting in Lagos in January 1966 and the subsequent London summit in September 1966. Tanzania’s estrangement from Britain was exacerbated by disputes over the payments of pensions to retired British officials.

with the UK until July 1968 (BDEE, 2004, docs. 254, 275).¹⁶ In a further demonstration of non-aligned principles, Nyerere agreed that the GDR could maintain a quasi-diplomatic mission in Zanzibar (Pratt, 1975); this led to the withdrawal of substantial West German military assistance, whereupon Nyerere requested the withdrawal of all economic aid (US\$4m) and technological assistance (US\$3m). Relations with Washington had also soured. Whereas in 1963 Nyerere's bid for an East African Federation (a political and economic unit of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania) had been praised by the US as a positive step for African development, Tanzanian pressure on the US Administration to resolve the problem of Portuguese colonialism in Africa had not achieved results, leading to an escalation of African efforts at the UNO, proposing an embargo against Portugal. Nyerere was also increasingly critical of the Johnson Administration's policy in Vietnam.¹⁷ American intervention in the Congo (Pratt, 1975), and the Tanzanian arrest of two American pilots for their alleged involvement in an attempted coup against Nyerere further soured relations with Washington. The ensuing diplomatic crisis saw both countries withdraw their diplomatic missions. The US and World Bank also refused to consider funding the TaZara railway project, linking Zambia to Dar es Salaam (Song, 2015). Consequently, the Tanzanian government embraced closer ties to Beijing, as well as to the Swedish and Canadian governments (Nugent, 2004). This shift also reflected the Tanzanian leadership's desire to escape perceived continued dependency on foreign aid, which compromised the government's freedom to manoeuvre. At home, Nyerere was deeply troubled that economic development policies followed since independence were failing to deliver the promised improvement in rural living standards (Nyerere, 1966). His philosophical outlook drew on a wide variety of African and European theories

¹⁶ Despite the rupture in diplomatic relations, British diplomats continued to Nyerere as a leader "just as trustworthy with selected secret information as are our Commonwealth colleagues like (Canadian Prime Minister Lester) Pearson, (Australian Prime Minister Harold) Holt and (New Zealand Premier Keith) Holyoake". The British had high regard for Nyerere's intelligence and sincerity ("even if not always agreeable to us") concern to maintain and strengthen the multi-racial Commonwealth, together with respect for his "importance as perhaps the most significant of contemporary African leaders because he may well remain ... Tanzania's president for the next dozen years or more, with increasing influence throughout Africa"; and because of the impact Nyerere's presence had on other African leaders, pushing them to be more engaged and constructive."

¹⁷ At the 1965 Commonwealth conference in London, heads decided to send a Commonwealth peace mission to Vietnam and Washington.

of societal development, developing a unique variant of African socialism in *ujamaa* [family-hood]. This was to be an ideology to unify the nation, to transform rural society and to prevent the emergence of ethnic or religious cleavages; its implication for governance was the integration of rural communities into a modern state, to foster democratic involvement and communal empowerment through an ethos of public service (Nugent, 2009). In the 1967 Arusha Declaration Nyerere set out a political strategy of “self-reliance”, founded on *ujamaa* as a fusion of socialist ideals and traditional African rural community values, embodying Maoist ideas of economic development. Nyerere’s vision of indigenous socialism as a new paradigm of development in Africa attracted a great deal of international attention and controversy (Bjerk, 2010). The model did not depend on foreign capital investment or economic diversification and industrialisation. Nyerere publicly rejected the idea that the Western models of development were appropriate for his country’s conditions; this included rejecting multi-party politics, on the grounds that traditional African political methods favoured consensus. Through the highly astute use of the nationalist card, Nyerere was able to persuade his domestic critics in the TANU of the benefits of socialism, the need for nationalisation of key industries, but reduced the emphasis on industrialisation since this produced “urban bias”. (Nugent, 2009; Bjerk, 2017).¹⁸ Nyerere accelerated the search for foreign links that would support his drive for economic self-reliance, a transition to a socialist society, and its profound commitment to African political liberation and economic emancipation. The construction of the 1000-mile TaZara railway used Chinese investment and labour to circumvent Southern Rhodesia’s stranglehold on Zambian trade (Yu, 1971, pp.1101-1117; Hall, 1969; Meneses and McNamara, 2018, p. 131).¹⁹ The railway finally opened in 1976 but was “plagued by problems” and only carried 20% of the anticipated freight (Mitchell, 2014, p. 55). The British government also paid close attention to Chinese involvement in the construction of a naval base in Tanzania, which together with the increased

¹⁸ While *ujamaa* helped to forge a communal sense of national identity, with the one-party system fostering political stability, Nyerere’s African socialist agenda failed to deliver rural regeneration and increase productivity of state-owned industries and business. Despite his commitment to participatory government and social equality, Nyerere’s efforts to create this unique brand of African socialism led to the creation of the police state, deepening economic problems and social compulsion.

¹⁹ When international oil sanctions were introduced against Rhodesia in December 1965, Zambia lost oil supplies which had previously transited through the

Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, and Soviet activity in Aden and Somalia, appeared to be altering the strategic situation (FRUS, 2011, docs. 35, 87). Non-alignment was thus not a single foreign policy, but an attitude towards policy (Brown, 1966). To Nyerere, the choice confronting Tanzania “really amounts to offering to all countries genuine friendship based on equality or becoming reliable allies to certain large power groups and being therefore hostile to others”. Tanzania, therefore, rejected “reliability” in the Cold War international environment. Nyerere firmly believed Tanzania’s non-aligned foreign policy should be based on “an examination of what we do, more than what is said publicly” (Brown, 1966, p. 35). As foreign policy practice, non-alignment was also a political elite project in Tanzania, supported by more militant elements within the ruling party TANU (and as a means of party management), with broad public support for its ideals of anti-colonialism (decolonisation) and anti-imperialism (liberation and African solidarity) within the wider Tanzanian diverse population.²⁰ Thus, the philosophical and ideational appeal of non-alignment for Tanzania should be seen as a fusion of the domestic modernisation project and the determined pursuit of a fundamental recalibration of international relations in the post-colonial era. Nyerere strongly believed that Tanzania had a moral responsibility to assist other liberation movements achieve independence, and this proved a defining feature of his government’s foreign policy. The Non-Aligned Movement certainly provided an important platform and forum for discussion about the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. At Nyerere’s insistence, the OAU’s Liberation Committee (The Committee of Nine) was established in Dar es Salaam, with its remit of

territory; the governments in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka had originally approached the UK, but British officials doubted its economic viability and were deeply pessimistic that it would take years to build. At over \$401m, it was Beijing’s largest foreign and technical assistance programme. This venture was deemed deeply suspicious by South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia: their ALCORA Countries Military Strategy Concept claimed it formed part of a ‘joint plan against Southern Africa, to which Russia and China are committed’ in which infrastructure developments might be used to underpin a conventional conflict. Chinese investment in TaZara was seen as gaining leverage in Tanzania and as a future springboard for penetration into Mozambique, and Botswana, before targeting Rhodesia.

²⁰ Solidarity for other African liberation movements was more decentralized than in other Front Line states, borne out by the interviews carried out by the Hashim Mbita Research Project with army personnel, peasants, workers, intellectuals, educators and journalists who had contacts with exiled freedom fighters and refugees.

support to recognised liberation movements.²¹ This brought the leaders of most militant nationalist groups to Dar es Salaam. The Liberation Committee had a number of key objectives which echoed the agenda of the NAM: in addition to channelling financial and material support to recognised liberation groups, it was responsible for promoting coordination between the militants, as well as publicity. With the breadth of diplomatic representation in Dar es Salaam and the presence of most liberation movements' offices enabling contact between neutral countries, the coastal city became a crossroads of the Cold War and decolonisation movements (Roberts, 2016). The Soviet Union became the country's principal arms supplier, and Nyerere's government enjoyed excellent relations with Moscow. Tanzania's bilateral support for liberation movements was more significant than the OAU's rhetorical support for liberation (Somerville, 2015). All the African liberation movements – MPLA, FRELIMO, ZAPU, ZANU, SWAPO, ANC and PAC – established offices and military camps in Tanzania (Johnson, 2000; SADET 2008; Sllstrom 2002; Sapire & Saunders, 2013; Ellis, 2012, p.84).²² Official sustained support for African liberation was popular in wider Tanzanian society, seen in regular donations of money or gifts in kind (Mazrui & Mhando, 2013), creating a virtuous circle for Tanzanian policy. Nyerere's parallel drive for African unity was made clear in Tanzania's contribution to the drafting of the Lusaka Declaration of 1969 (BDEE, 2004, docs. 277, 280).²³ Tanzania advocated negotiations between liberation movements and white minority governments, yet armed struggle

²¹ The work of the Liberation Committee improved after 1972 with the replacement of George Magombe by Hashim Mbita as Executive Secretary. See Mohamed Omar Maundi on how the membership and strategy of the Liberation Committee changed over time.

²² The historian Stephen Ellis speculated that perhaps 'the wily President Julius Nyerere fearing the Soviet influence that was transmitted via the ANC, wished ... to keep the movement at arm's length. It was probably for that reason that the Tanzanian government had earlier declared [Joe] Slovo to be a prohibited immigrant. 'The same factor ... caused the Tanzanian government to continue supporting the PAC as well as the ANC, so as to play off a Chinese-backed movement against a Soviet-backed one, whilst simultaneously flaunting its own liberation credentials.'

²³ Nyerere was equally determined to put a non-aligned stamp on the Commonwealth with his joint drafted Declaration submitted before the Commonwealth heads' meeting in Singapore in January 1971. This Declaration echoed the Lusaka Manifesto with its affirmation of international peace and order; individual liberty and equality, the need for social justice.

appeared inevitable given the intransigence of their opponents. As Nyerere pointed out, “they could hardly fight colonial armies – well-equipped by certain Western states – with bows and arrows. The Western countries simply gave them no option.” (Sellstrom, 2002, p. 137). The Declaration was later endorsed by the UNO and the OAU. The US State Department fundamentally misunderstood the motives behind Tanzania’s policies, believing these reflected “fear and suspicion deeply rooted in their colonial experience that southern African whites represent a genuine danger to their security; frustration over intractable internal political and economic problems; and deep concern about forces at work in the region which they are unable to control.” (FRUS, 2011, doc. 89)

The Non-Alignment Movement as an equal factor of World Affairs

Tanzania played a pivotal role in the NAM in the 1970s along with Yugoslavia, Algeria, Egypt and India. For Nyerere, non-alignment was not and had never been a question of neutrality. “Non-alignment is a policy of involvement in world affairs”. With this firmly in mind, Tanzania was one of the states working expressly to revitalise the NAM and inject new content into the organisation (Kochan, 1972). Together with Zambia, Tanzania was a driving force in the run-up to the Lusaka NAM meeting in 1970 to establish better methods of engagement and institutional machinery. This highlighted the frustrations and limitations of the NAM states in world politics, underpinned by the appreciation that the widening economic gap between North and South and acute frustration that the UNCTAD discussions were stalling (Kochan, 1972). The NAM states still saw their organisation as valuable – indeed indispensable – despite superpower detente: by the beginning of the 1970s, the UN resolutions on Namibia and apartheid South Africa were ignored by Pretoria, Portugal seemed firmly ensconced in its African colonies, and appeals for Western implementation of effective universal sanctions against Rhodesia were being ignored. Similarly, American military aggression in Vietnam was escalating. In his address to the preparatory meeting of the Non-Aligned countries in Dar es Salaam in February 1970, Nyerere acknowledged the forthcoming NAM conference was facing a more difficult task and a more challenging international climate than earlier summits. Further changes within and between the two blocs, and developments in the PRC, meant the Cold War was “less simple” with the emergence of a three-sided power game. “Those wishing to stand outside it have further complications to contend with.” (Nyerere, NAM Preparatory Meeting 1970). To Nyerere, the real and most urgent threat to the

independence of non-aligned states came from the economic power of big states, not the threat of military power or possible invasion; yet the need for injections of foreign capital was also fraught with difficulty since international assistance and developmental money was neither neutral nor unconditional. He, therefore, recommended avoiding, as far as possible, becoming dependent on any single big power - there lay "the great threat to freedom and non-alignment". Counteracting this required collaboration and cooperation for mutual benefit. In his powerful plea for South-South cooperation, Nyerere urged that the Lusaka meeting address specifically the question of how to strengthen non-alignment by effective economic cooperation and economic self-reliance. "It does not demand an economic strength which we do not have. It requires only a political consciousness and a political will." (Nyerere, 1970). His address summarised his outlook of the need to challenge international racial hierarchies and arguments for alternative visions of international relations, with the reconfiguration of regional economic federations in an egalitarian post-imperial world. Besides, apartheid and decolonisation, "fundamental African concerns were given topmost priority" at the Lusaka Summit, including greater and more efficient aid to liberation movements through the OAU (Matthews, 1987). It was also agreed at the Lusaka meeting that the NAM should have "a machinery of a flexible character which at the same time having no financial implications" (Kochan, p. 505). Along with other members attending the three-day conference, Tanzania reaffirmed its commitment to assist international efforts at disarmament; to combat colonialism, imperialism, and pledging their moral and material support for liberation movements, as well as to intensify efforts to achieve major structural change in the world economy (NAM, Final Document, Lusaka Declaration, September 1970). The influence of Nyerere and Tanzanian diplomats on the final Declaration's sections on NAM and Economic progress is evident, with the rhetoric of "cultivating the spirit of self-reliance", "ensuring that the external components of the Developmental progress further national objectives, and 'broaden[ing] and diversify[ing] economic relationships with other nations so as to promote true interdependence", as well as the elaboration of a specific Programme of Action, leading to a period of intense activity. The Lusaka meeting established a 16-member Standing Committee and agreed that the NAM Foreign Ministers would meet before the annual General Assembly to coordinate their positions. It was also hoped that there would be an annual meeting of Heads of State. However, opinion was deeply divided within the NAM on the merits of establishing a permanent Secretariat. Two other questions generated considerable controversy - the representation of the Cambodian government

and the admission of the provisional revolutionary government of South Vietnam. Tanzania joined a 5-member subcommittee to investigate the complex Cambodian situation and tasked to report back to heads (Singham & Hune, 1986). Supported by Tanzanian diplomats, Nyerere continued his efforts to revitalise the NAM structures and focus. In the summer of 1971, the Standing Committee of 16 NAM states was set up at Lusaka expressly to prepare for the next summit; this committee held a series of meetings in New York culminating in the Foreign Ministers' regular ministerial meeting at the UNGA in September. This was followed by preparatory meetings for the forthcoming summit in Georgetown (February) and Kuala Lumpur (May) 1972. As the governments in Dar es Salaam and Lusaka agreed, the NAM "was meaningless unless its members assumed a more active role in world affairs".²⁴ "They hold that the concerted action of the non-aligned countries should be directed towards the following objectives: first that they should challenge the developed nations who, in their opinion, are in possession of the world's wealth to the detriment of the less developed countries; second, that they should try to alter a situation in which the super-powers appear to monopolise decision making on all vital issues, both countries demanding (...), redistribution of representation in all UN organs and a more formal structure for the non-aligned movement; third, that greater emphasis should be placed on economic cooperation between Third World countries themselves, in order to reduce their present dependence on either West or East" (Kochan, p. 503). Although the NAM Foreign Ministers in Georgetown, Guyana, in August 1972 was held against a backdrop of relative international calm, there were furious debates over the decision to admit the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, and recognition of the Sihanouk government in exile as the legitimate government of Cambodia (The NAM decision provoked acute displeasure in Washington.). The meeting also adopted an Action Programme for Economic Cooperation. In a series of resolutions, the meeting called for peace in the Middle East conflict, and Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, as well as decolonisation of Zimbabwe, Puerto Rico and Western Sahara.

Inconsistencies within the Non-Aligned Movement

Disagreements within the Non-aligned Movement reached a high point at the Algiers meeting in 1973, with the defeat of the moderates who argued

²⁴ Dodoma became the capital of Tanzania in 1974.

there should be criticism of both Western and Soviet imperialism. Tanzania was firmly in the radical camp and aligned with the G-77's demands for the New International Economic Order in the UN framework; the economic work of the non-aligned South focussed on the UNCTAD framework, with the political agenda directed through the NAM process. These converged with the call for a New International Economic Order at the summit (Alden, et al, 2010). The oil crisis and the realisation that developmental efforts had failed to bridge the widening gap between G-77 developing economies and industrialised countries obliged the conference to devote substantial attention to economic issues (Matthews, 1987, p. 46).²⁵ "Leaders of the NAM requested a special session of the UNGA to address issues associated with international trade in raw materials." Thanks to the G-77 Group, the Declaration and Programme of Action for the NIEO was adopted under UNGA Resolution 3201 in 1974. Tanzania played an active role in lobbying for the NIEO and North-South dialogue, firmly convinced that the presence of the NAM at the UN "played a key role in pursuing the agenda of developing countries and raising press and public attention of the challenges and injustices they faced" (Cilliers, 2015). However, the alternative proposed by Nyerere and other Third World leaders for the formation of a South-South "Trade Union of the Poor" failed to gain traction (Nzomo, 2018). The decision to establish a NAM News Agency Pool was a reflection of members' support for the New International Information Order, a parallel demonstration against the Western hegemonic influence over the media landscape. As the 1970s progressed and as the organisation itself grew to 86 member states (comprising two-thirds of the UN membership), the NAM debates and optimism about NEIO were increasingly frustrated. The 1976 Colombo NAM Summit took place against the backdrop of the international crisis, and issues on which Tanzania had taken a public stance: firstly, the South African intervention in the Angolan civil war in 1975 and forced withdrawal. Although Nyerere was "a firm opponent of widening the conflict in Angola and of Soviet active involvement", he believed "that the South African intervention made external support for the MPLA necessary, although he expected it to come from African countries" (Filatova, 2013, p. 272; Kissinger, 1999). Deng also told President Ford on his visit to Beijing in December 1975 that Tanzania

²⁵ Most of the statements and resolutions of the Tenth OAU Summit in Addis Ababa in May 1973 'found their way into the resolutions and declarations of the Algiers summit.'

was refusing to allow Chinese shipments of arms to UNITA to pass through its territory because of South Africa's involvement (Shubin, 2006). In December 1975, Nyerere proposed to Washington that if "the US ceased support to FNLA/UNITA, restrained Mobutu from further intervention in Angola and applied public pressure on South Africans to withdraw back across their border, Tanzania, Zambia and other African governments could induce Neto simultaneously to refuse further Soviet assistance and expel Cuban and other foreign helpers." (FRUS, 2011, doc. 156). The Americans were sceptical and felt that the proposal (which they believed to have been heavily influenced by China) was too late. Secondly, the latter part of the 1970s saw repeated rounds of negotiations to resolve the long-running Rhodesia crisis, and intensification of the liberation war; domestic violence and oppression in South Africa, and continued stalemate in negotiations over South West Africa/Namibia's future (Wood, 2012; Kweke, 2015). Tanzania had consistently called for other African states to help generate new momentum for negotiations, urging leaders to pressure the foreign power with which they had particular links for the enforcement of sanctions and to increase support for liberation movements. As the Chairman of the Front Line States, Nyerere held a particularly influential position. Tanzania had been consistently at odds with the US Administration until 1976 when the Kissinger Initiative obliged Washington to pay greater attention to the country and court Dar es Salaam (Kissinger, 1999; Mitchell, 2014). Nyerere hoped to use Kissinger's agreement to attend the UNCTAD IV meeting in Nairobi in May 1976 to achieve a breakthrough in international economic collaboration. However, this conference proved a bitter disappointment to African developing countries. Nyerere was a vital diplomatic player in the Anglo-American initiative crafted between the British government and the Carter Administration to resolve the long-running Rhodesia UDI crisis (Mitchell, 2014). Although the Tanzanian government was deeply sceptical about Carter's efforts, it was recognised that Washington had an important role to play; "we need the United States (...), to make sure the British did Right in Zimbabwe" (Mitchell, 2014, p. 146).²⁶ For their part, the British knew that they had to get Nyerere's support on any proposals (Roberts, 2014;

²⁶ Nyerere was scathing about Rhodesia and South Africa's self-justificatory declarations that they were fighting communism in Southern Africa, warning American Ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, 'If you want to fight communism in Africa, don't pick South Africa as your ally.'

Somerville, 2015).²⁷ Between the NAM leaders' meetings in Colombo (1976) and Havana (1979), negotiations and events in Southern Africa accelerated, with Nyerere and Tanzania at the forefront. The assembly of 17 African leaders in Zanzibar in February 1977 reflected Nyerere's convening power, all of whom met Ambassador Andrew Young on his African tour of Tanzania and Nigeria. Tanzania was less concerned than President Kaunda at the possible expansion of the Soviet and Cuban presence in sub-Saharan Africa. In March 1977, Fidel Castro visited Tanzania having toured Cuban troops in Angola on his way to Mozambique. "Cementing relations with southern African states" was swiftly followed by a large Soviet delegation led by Nikolai Podgorny (chair of the Soviet Presidium of the Supreme Soviet). Nyerere visited Washington in August 1977 – the first head of state from sub-Saharan Africa to visit the US since Carter's inauguration. The Americans hoped to persuade Nyerere to back the US version of "maintenance of law and order" in the transition period in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Nyerere was resolute and focussed in his discussions with the Americans: "One [army] will have to go, and that is Smith's army." "The army is key! Which of the two armies is to be the base army? This is a serious question... The Zimbabwean army must be the base army." (Mitchell, 2014, p. 311). Nyerere was consistent in his attempts to encourage unity and collaboration between the rival Zimbabwean nationalist movements, as well as Tanzania's and the OAU Liberation committee's efforts to persuade PAC to reconcile and unite with the ANC (early 1978). At the NAM meeting in Havana in September 1979, together with President Machel of Mozambique and Kaunda, Nyerere was forthright in discussion with the Patriotic Front that they should attend the London all-party conference on the future of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. ZANU's political leader Robert Mugabe was determined to continue the revolutionary war and was lobbying for a resolution from militant NAM states which would repudiate the Lusaka agreement. Nyerere and Machel sternly informed Mugabe that if he refused to go to London and explore the constitutional path, they

²⁷ Notwithstanding Tanzania's trenchant criticism of British policy towards Rhodesia, the Nyerere government did make private soundings of the British Embassy in mid-1978 to explore whether Britain might be prepared to intervene in neighbouring Uganda to overthrow the homicidal regime of Idi Amin. When the British declined, pointing out that if they were to do so, the Tanzanians would be the first and loudest in voicing objections, 40000 Tanzanian troops and Ugandan exiles invaded the country in January 1979, in violation of the OAU Charter (Sir Mervyn Brown interview, BDOHP).

would effectively close down the liberation war (Charlton, 1990). The final NAM declaration condemned the continued military, diplomatic, technological, economic support and other forms of aid "that imperialism gave the racist regimes", the alliance between the Zionist regime and racist regimes in Southern Africa, and called on states to increase their efforts to counter this danger". Just as he was publicly dedicated to the cause of African liberation, Nyerere was similarly consistently principled on the entitlement of the Palestinians to political representation and land. Before 1967 Tanzania had enjoyed a good relationship with Israel, which had provided a sizeable technological assistance programme. After the 1967 war, Nyerere switched support to Nasser. Like other African states who could not countenance Israel's occupation of Arab territory set against their own struggles against colonialism, Nyerere embodied the shift in thinking in the UN with his call for Israeli withdrawal and advocated peace based on mutual recognition. At the height of the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973, he closed the Israeli embassy in Dar es Salaam and authorised the establishment of a Palestinian diplomatic mission in the Tanzanian capital the following year. At the Havana meeting, Nyerere also strongly resisted the attempt by some Arab countries to eject Egypt from the NAM because of the Sadat government's peace deal with Israel, although Nyerere regarded the Camp David Agreements as "an American supported offensive" (The highly divisive issue split the NAM Co-ordinating Bureau which was unable to report on the issue (Rajan, 1982). His logic was Egypt was a member of the OAU and thus could not be expelled from the NAM - unity was paramount, despite profound differences of policy and outlook. (Nyerere, 2010). For Nyerere, unity was not merely a political slogan; it was a central pillar of his belief system and a domestic and international strategic imperative. In Havana, he declared "the Non-Aligned conference is not an organisation of neutrals bound in some kind of neutrality in international arguments. On the contrary, we have positive policy commitments of our own. First, we are a group of States committed to fighting against imperialism in all its forms. The non-aligned states are, by definition, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist, and we are committed to the struggle against those forces" (Nyerere, 1979). The bitter experience of the UNCTAD IV reinforced Tanzania and other developing countries' preoccupation with economic matters and the NIEO, demonstrated at the non-aligned summits in Havana, Colombo and New Delhi. Strains had already emerged in the NAM with Cuba's claim that non-alignment could be equated with support for the Soviet Union. The choice of Havana as host for the Sixth Summit, and consequently Cuba's chairmanship for the next

three years, symbolised a dramatic shift to the left in the NAM's centre of gravity (LeoGrande, 1980), and the clearest manifestation of the NAM's anti-imperialist agenda (Matthew, 1987). The increase in membership further strained the practice of decision-making by consensus. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the NAM countries at the UN voted 56-9 to condemn the Soviet action, with 26 abstaining (Rajan, 1982). This vote in the UN General Assembly reflected the deep split in the movement (Afghanistan is a member of the NAM). At the subsequent NAM Foreign Ministers' meeting in New Delhi, there were heated debates on a number of highly contentious issues: the Kampuchea question, Afghanistan, Egyptian membership, and the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone. Tanzania joined the four-member special Committee to prepare a final draft that reflected a consensus on the highly contentious issue of whether or not to mention the withdrawal of foreign troops. After intensive discussions, the position was reached, calling for a political settlement "on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops" and full respect for the territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan (Rajan, 1982).

Efforts to establish a New Economic Order and limit the Arms Race

Although multilateral negotiations around a New International Economic Order (NIEO) stalled in the Cancun meeting in 1981, the New Delhi NAM Foreign Ministers conference "served the main objective of the majority of members of the non-aligned movement of pulling it back into a more balanced and "equidistant" position between the two Cold War blocs" after the Havana Summit. (Rajan, 1982) Increasingly beset by economic problems at home and the failure of *ujamaa*, Nyerere was still committed to the NAM as the advocate of a new global political and economic order. At the outset of the decade, he was very optimistic about the prospects for Namibian independence and felt that apartheid South Africa was on the defensive. However, as Pretoria launched its counterinsurgency strategy, paralleled by the 1983 constitution granting a degree of broader racial representation and an accompanying diplomatic offensive, South Africa went "on the attack" against the FLS. Nyerere firmly believed that the Reagan Administration was backing Pretoria and was "jubilant" (Nyerere, 2010, p.10). There were modest advances: the NIEO stalemate led to a mini-NIEO between Nordic countries and the nine members of the new organisation the Southern African Development Coordinating Committee (SADCC), of which Tanzania was a member. SADCC's declared purpose

was the fostering of regional economic cooperation and reliance against South Africa's economic and political domination of the Southern African region. The 1983 NAM meeting in New Delhi devoted considerable attention to the deteriorating economic situation in many developing countries and noted that the levers of power in the world economic system remained firmly in the hands of a few developed nations. There were renewed calls for a new international economic order through global negotiations, and the NAM members reaffirmed their solidarity and support for liberation struggles (Shaw, 1989). Nyerere also introduced a disarmament initiative in the NAM, supported by three other NAM countries (Argentina, Mexico, India). The Six Nations Initiative, founded in 1984, made an appeal at the UN and lobbied for disarmament together with Sweden and Greece. This appeal called for "the nuclear powers to cease all work on, to cease the production and dissemination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery". Founded at a time of stalemate in the US/Soviet disarmament discussions on nuclear arms and conventional force reductions, it was unanimously approved by the NAM in the Final Declaration adopted at the Luanda meeting in 1984. This led to an Indian initiative drawing together the six heads in Delhi in January 1985, who issued a Declaration called on all countries to adopt a resolute measure to end the arms race, to prevent it being expanded into space, and to conclude a treaty totally banning nuclear testing (Allison & Roy, p.103). In addition to Nyerere's work to try to coordinate a united front against South Africa in the early 1980s, Tanzanian diplomats were also active in the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-aligned countries meeting in New York and subsequent convening of an extraordinary Ministerial meeting of the Bureau of Non-Aligned countries in New Delhi (April 1985). This was part of continuing work against the backdrop of South Africa's refusal to implement UNSC Resolution 435, to consider ways and means by which the Non-Aligned Countries could further intensify its solidarity with and assistance to [the Namibian freedom struggle. Meanwhile, Nyerere's vision of fundamental restructuring of the international economic system was dimming. The decade saw the rise of neoliberalism and faith in the "rational market", and associated termination of international assistance supporting African governments' drive to nationalisation, diversification and economic protectionism. Nyerere was not alone in his profound suspicions that this was a Western conspiracy to force African governments to abandon socialistic policies. These deprived sovereign governments of their independent power of decision making: The [IMF] has an ideology of economic and social development which it is trying to impose on small

countries irrespective of our own clearly stated policies. (McMahon, 2014, p.114). Although he resisted this counter-revolution in economic and developmental thinking, the acute economic crisis in Tanzania confronted the Tanzanian government with unpalatable but irresistible pressures (Southall, 2006): after Nyerere stepped down from power in 1985, the Tanzanian government accepted IMF strictures and fundamentally transformed the country's political economy (Holtom, 2005). The 8th Summit of the NAM was held in Harare in 1986, and crucial African issues dominated the speeches, resolutions and declarations: apartheid, the situation in Southern Africa, the critical economic situation. Although the international intellectual tide had moved inexorably against the NIEO, the new NAM chair, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, "put all the focus on sanctions against South Africa", which had long been one of Nyerere's key policies (Matthews, 1987, p. 47).²⁸

Conclusions

Tanzania's membership and activities in the Non-Aligned Movement was part of the Nyerere government's assiduous development of its position in a matrix of multi-lateral organisations and international institutions underpinned by personal networks of Tanzania's small foreign policy elite, and the growing reputation and standing of Nyerere and key highly capable officials. These were mutually reinforcing networks, providing platforms for public advocacy and private access. Thanks to Nyerere's activist foreign policy, Tanzania was "at the centre of the Third World struggle for the NIEO through the forums of the UN, the NAM, the Group of 77, the UNCTAD [and] the North-South dialogue" (Matthews, 1987, p. 49). Nyerere subscribed to the Non-Aligned Movement as a rejection of marginalisation in the international corridors of power, and a determination to enhance multilateral collaboration and pressure to address the economic structural inequalities of the mid-late 20th century. Non-alignment offered a multi-dimensional boost to Tanzania's soft power: domestically, to underpin the appeal of national independence, territorial integrity, and struggle against colonialism and imperialism; as a symbol of Third World unity, and the

²⁸ 'In addition to proposing a Non-Aligned "Solidarity" Fund for Southern African Liberation Movements, there was also discrete canvassing for a Southern African Defense Force which, at the disposal of Zambia and Zimbabwe particularly would provide the muscle to resist South African invasions.'

organisational manifestation of solidarity. With its emphasis on detente, disarmament, development, and determination that the countries of the global south would shape their own futures, Nyerere focussed on strengthening South-South cooperation and leverage in international affairs, “to have an effective voice (...)”. “Together we can reduce our separate weaknesses”. For the Tanzanian leader and his country, non-alignment was a global manifestation of demanded political, racial and social rights to equality, dignity and respect from former colonial powers which had sought to shape the world in their own image. Tanzania’s visibility in the NAM diminished in the 1990s, as a product of the changed international environment of the 1990s, the size of the organisation and its diverse membership which militated against swift coordinated action. Furthermore, after the departure of Nyerere from office in 1985, Tanzania was not as active in discussions and debates in the UNO.²⁹ The international visibility of the NAM was eclipsed with the dominance of the Washington Consensus and unipolar world, although now former President Nyerere continued to hold a prestigious position as chair of the South Commission, which was established to promote the case for fairer terms on international trade. The NAM also redefined itself, shifting its emphasis to multilateralism, equality and mutual non-aggression. There was renewed energy, focus and advocacy against imperialism and the needs of the Global South with the advent of the Millennium Goals and the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003. With this realignment of the declared goals against foreign occupation, came a re-emphasis on absolute sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs, the need to address the disadvantages of globalization and asymmetry in the international political economy and developmental needs of its members. However, unlike the 1970s, the NAM failed to establish a vigorous non-aligned coalition – the result of its growing size, and the death and loss of office of inspirational champions and charismatic trendsetters, such as Julius Nyerere.

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²⁹ The Commission’s Report was published in 1990.

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