

## **THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, GHANA AND THE EARLY DAYS OF AFRICAN DIPLOMACY: REFLECTIONS ON A DEVELOPING COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY**

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*Abstract:* This paper is an attempt at reviewing Ghana's foreign policy as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It examines the key tenets of the NAM and juxtaposes it with Ghana's foreign policy directions from the early days of Nkrumah till recent times when virtually all African states have taken sides with one world power or the other. It is about the reflections of what the NAM stands for and how its members have been conducting foreign policy, and the successes and failures in the developing world, and the lessons that can be learnt from its existence in the last six decades. We use Ghana as a case for trying to understand the NAM and the conduct of foreign policy. We realise that though the NAM members such as Ghana still believe in the core principles that underpin the Movement, the country's foreign policy orientation has not always been one of the total non-alignment. Instead, exigencies in the contemporary international system as well as leadership idiosyncrasy and other related matters by and large influence Ghana's foreign policy.

*Key words:* non-alignment, positive neutrality, foreign policy, Non-Aligned Movement, Ghana.

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## **Introduction**

The formation of the Non-Aligned Movement and its application in diplomatic relations was the direct consequence of Cold War politics, which intensified after 1945, following the end of World War II. The end of World War II bequeathed to the global system two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, the formation of the United Nations Organisation (UN) has offered hope for peaceful co-existence as it spearheaded the promotion of peace, international cooperation and human rights. Previously colonised countries gained their independence and global trade expanded significantly as the world became increasingly interconnected. On the other hand, the bipolarization of the global system into two ideological blocks, capitalist West and communist East, and the consequent Cold War rhetoric, punctuated by nuclear stalemate, threatened the world peace and, thus, dispelled dreams of peaceful co-existence. In the wake of Cold War developments, newly independent countries within the third world became highly coveted by the Western and Eastern blocks as they sought allies within the global space. Africa was particularly critical of the Cold War politics. As President of the US, J. F. Kennedy, clearly articulated in 1962, in the competition for allies between the communist and non-communist blocks, Africa was reckoned to be “the greatest open field of manoeuvre” (cited in Meredith, 2011, p. 143). With both the West and the East vying for African allies, some leaders of newly independent African states became skilful at playing one side against the other. Yet, others, such as Gamel Nassar of Egypt, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, joined hands with other newly independent leaders of third world countries, like Tito of Yugoslavia, Nehru of India and Surka of Indonesia, to advocate for and fashioned out what became known as the Non-Aligned Movement. The Non-Aligned Movement, both in its ideological and practical manifestations sought to stay aloof from the sterile quarrels of the Cold War, and thus, provided “the buffer for African nations” (Dumor, 1991) to steer clear of the Cold War politics, safeguard their independence and yet have sufficient space for “independent political action” within the global system (Dumor, 1991). Without a doubt, non-alignment had significant consequences for the diplomatic and foreign policy direction of countries that advocated it. Kwame Nkrumah, who emerged as one of the most forceful advocates of non-alignment in Africa, contended that Ghana intended to adopt a neutralist position in its diplomatic relations, as well as “preserve its independence to act” within the global arena when it was necessary (Dumor, 1991). Subsequent leaders after Nkrumah have all

adopted non-alignment as a diplomatic tool in their foreign policy directives, albeit with significant variations in aims and goals. After six decades of “non-alignment”, questions still persist on whether members of the NAM such as Ghana and other developing countries are truly “non-aligned”. It is in view of this that we turn the light on Ghana’s foreign policy – starting from the days of the country’s first president who was a founding member of the NAM and end with the current president – a capitalist-legal practitioner with long years of experience in foreign policy. In effect, we seek to interrogate whether the NAM members are still staying true to their core principles; what challenges they face in their endeavours to be loyal to their core principles; what successes have they had and what lessons can be learnt from their situation? Specifically, what is Ghana’s current position as far as foreign policy is concerned (particularly in terms of being neutral in world politics)? Though not having a clear-cut or watertight position of how member states ought to conduct their foreign policy as a group, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which is a forum of about 120 developing world states that are not formally aligned with or against any major power block (NAM S&T Centre, 2021), has some general principles that members are expected to exhibit in their dealings with “world powers”. The Movement advocated (and still does) for a middle course for states in the international system in their dealings with the Western and Eastern Blocs, particularly during the Cold War. Ghana is one of such states and has over the years been pursuing policies that seem to reflect (or at least have reflected) the ideals of the Movement (especially in the early days of the country’s independence). Generally, a country’s foreign policy can be defined as its policy orientation that pertains to how it relates and reacts to international issues and external events. These decisions are usually influenced by issues of history, security, and leadership idiosyncrasy, etc. They are also generally underpinned by the question of national interest. Ghana’s external or foreign policy objectives which entail opposition to any military alliance, apartheid, arms race, the establishment of foreign military bases on the territories of member states, the strengthening of the United Nations, the democratization of international relations, socioeconomic development and the restructuring of the international economic system all define the policy and ideology of the Non-Aligned Movement (Bluway, 2003).

Though the NAM was founded on the Ten Principles of the Bandung Conference of 1955, this paper focuses mainly on only three of these principles. It is a well-known fact that for most NAM members, the fears of further colonialism or future dependence on either of the two conflicting blocs in the Cold War was a major motivation for joining the Movement

(Strydom, 2007). In effect, the principles of “equality”, “non-aggression”, and “peaceful coexistence” were the centrepiece for the establishment of the NAM. These principles connote the idea of mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in domestic affairs of other countries; equality and mutual benefit. It is partly based on this reason that this paper focuses on Ghana’s foreign policy orientation that pertains to these three principles. In the rest of this essay, we try to explore how and to which extent Ghana pursued these principles and what the current state of affairs is. In effect, we explore how Ghana’s foreign orientation reflects the principles of non-alignment in contemporary times as indicated above.

**Kwame Nkrumah:  
Charting the Path of Non-Alignment & Positive Neutrality**

Nkrumah’s belief in the potential of a united and strong Africa formed during the 1930s. During this time, he started writing and giving speeches that usually critiqued colonialism and imperialism. His coming into contact with other like-minded scholars and Pan-Africanists who advocated an end to colonialism and imperialism greatly influenced his foreign policy orientation when he became the leader of independent Ghana. For instance, Nkrumah’s encounter with George Padmore in 1945 at a Pan-African Congress in Manchester was consequential for his adoption of the strategy of non-violent political action and advocacy for Pan-Africanism as an ideology. The activities of Nkrumah coupled with the writings and activism of other intellectuals of African descent, such as Cyril Lionel, Robert James, etc., transformed Pan-Africanism from a seemingly utopian concept into a political project, which after 1957 was projected to other parts of the African continent by Ghanaian public diplomats (Rooney, 2007; Allotey, 2015). That is to say, after independence, Ghana’s foreign policy directives towards other African countries were shaped and conditioned by Pan-Africanism. This foreign policy orientation would subsequently reflect in the aims and objectives of non-alignment, as Nkrumah and other leaders, who were committed to non-alignment, sought through their foreign policy to represent the interests and aspirations of other developing countries, but more so to refuse to be “dependent on the international status quo” and to remain undeterred by the ideological binary between the West and the East (see Dumor, 1991). Indeed, for Nkrumah and many other non-aligned leaders, non-alignment was an extension of the search for independence in alliance with other former colonial territories within the Third World. As

Nkrumah pointed out, "Ghana does not intend to play the role of a silent spectator in the affairs or in matters which affect our country's vital interests and the destiny of the African peoples." (Dumor, 1991 p. 53). Nkrumah remained a staunch advocate of non-alignment and pursued a position of positive neutrality in the global arena throughout the period of his reign as president of independent Ghana. In 1961, when he addressed the non-aligned Belgrade Conference, he articulated what seemed to him to be the "basic principles" of a "non-aligned" policy. In his speech, he urged the Conference attendees to "end colonialism, proposed a reorganisation of the United Nations (UN), and urged the participants to constitute a moral force to avoid war between East and West" (Gerits, 2015, p. 1). Non-alignment, used interchangeably with "positive neutrality", was conceived as the Monroe Doctrine for Africa (Scarfi, 2020, pp. 541-555).<sup>2</sup> Nkrumah had, as a matter of fact, linked the idea of the Monroe Doctrine to the slogan 'Africa for Africans' in a speech in Congress on 24 July 1958 (Gerits, 2014). Thus, just as the United States wanted to keep the Europeans out of the American continent, Ghana (at least under Nkrumah) believed that the Blackman was "capable of managing his own affairs". This was not simply a position of "non-involvement" that enabled Nkrumah to swing his preferences from East to West and back, as some have claimed (Gerits, 2015).<sup>3</sup> We are of the view that this was a pragmatic and result-oriented approach that allowed a relatively young and less powerful country to rub shoulders with world powers without openly creating any avenues of strife, arrogance or confrontation. Consequently, inherent in the whole idea of non-alignment was the need for the member states to "stand on their own feet" instead of "being a plaything of others". Indeed, none of these would have worked, considering all the odds involved, especially during the Cold War era. It was only proper that since isolationism was not a viable option, non-alignment and positive neutrality was the way to go. However, questions remain as to whether successive Ghanaian governments have been able to stay on the path charted by the country's founding president and leading

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<sup>2</sup> This doctrine recognizes the Latin Americas as the United States' backyard and sphere of influence which should not be open to any other 'World Power', particularly Europeans and China.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, Frank Gerits has argued that "Ghana's public diplomacy tactics switched from targeting political activists to convincing people through a vociferously anti-colonial propaganda campaign, a modification that cast doubt on the sincerity of Ghanaian neutrality at a moment when non-alignment actually began to affect Ghanaian diplomacy on all levels".

member of the NAM (especially in the latter days of the Fourth Republic). It is important to note that during the early years of independence, Nkrumah's ideology and personality were among the key ingredients that shaped the country's foreign policy orientation. However, some have also assumed that "even though Nkrumah publicly declared support for the Non-aligned Movement, his penchant for socialism led him and the nation, to a large extent, to forge closer ties with socialist economies" (Asare & Siaw, 2018, p. 201). Of course, there are divergent views on this issue. But one thing is certain – Ghana as a prominent member of the NAM stood by the principles and ideals of the Movement (if nothing at all in the days of Nkrumah). For people like Nkrumah, the whole idea of strict conformity to non-alignment was the effective tool that could uproot colonialism and enhance protection against neocolonial intrusions. It was for this reason that he sought the total liberation of the African continent while promoting non-alignment and positive neutrality.

#### **At The Dawn of African Independence – The "Osagyefo" and the Redeemed<sup>4</sup>**

As far as Nkrumah is concerned, it has been said that Ghana's leader shied away from exploiting the Cold War rivalry because he believed interference would only draw Africa into conflict since "When the bull and elephants fight, the grass is trampled down." (Gerits, 2015, p. 1) This simply implied that playing the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA) against each other could only result in the destruction of the less powerful states and make it more difficult to attain unity (Asamoah, 1991). As indicated earlier, Ghana adopted an activist foreign policy – predicated on its extroversion politics immediately after independence. This included offering strong support for liberation movements; pursuing conflict resolution in West Africa; the promotion of African unity, etc. These policy orientations reflect the principles and ideals of the NAM which also sought to represent the interests and aspirations of developing countries. It is, therefore, no surprise when on the eve of Ghana's independence Nkrumah proclaimed that "The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up to the total liberation of Africa." (Armah, 2004). Since one of the objectives of the Non-Aligned Movement is to promote

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<sup>4</sup> "Osagyefo" is an Akin word that literally translates as 'The Redeemer' or 'Warrior King'.

and encourage sustainable development through international cooperation, Kwame Nkrumah sought to project the notion that Africa's position in the international system was insignificant without African independence and African Unity – coupled with a common sense of direction. Thus, creating what we may refer to as an African identity tripod. The pursuits of these policies were consequently aimed not just at bringing independence to African countries that were still under colonialism but were also aimed at fostering peace, stability and cooperation of all people that believed in self-determination and equality of the human race. Positive neutrality and non-alignment were also proffered as a shield that protected one from the fiery darts and targeted arrows of the ideological conflict between the West and the East. Indeed, it was Nkrumah's strong and unflinching beliefs in the African personality, emancipation and decolonisation project that made Ghana's commitment to non-alignment and positive neutrality emblematic of the country's identity as the black star of hope and freedom (Botchway, 2018). As a statesman and Pan-Africanist, one of Nkrumah's core beliefs was to contribute to the effective consolidation of the Non-Aligned Movement and to spearhead the developmental needs of African states. He called for and led a common struggle against racism, colonialism, and neo-imperialism in all forms and at every corner. Despite these, some are of the view that Nkrumah's pursuit of non-alignment as "the centrepiece of Ghana's foreign policy turned out to be unrealistic", and that his foreign policy orientation tilted towards the East (socialist ideological bloc and communist countries) (Tieku & Odoom, 2013, pp. 328-329; Gebe, 2008).

### **Ghana's Foreign Policy Then and Now: Reflections on Foreign Policy in the Early Years of Independence & the 4th Republic**

It has been said that Ghana's foreign policy (under Nkrumah) was guided by a set of systematically expressed ideas, rather than a set of narrow national concerns, and this makes known the non-aligned nature of Ghana. In effect, Nkrumah had very clear objectives as far as the country's foreign policy was concerned. His were not that of knee-jerk reactions that were narrowly conceived for only a season. The country was also believed to have been the author of in-depth proposals at a number of international conferences and gatherings. Moreover, though it is said that "African leaders were subjected to the Cold War order" and were consequently "unable to reconfigure the constantly changing set of alliances that constitute the international system", the evidence suggests that even in the midst of such a quagmire Nkrumah

“adopted a more flexible form of non-alignment to safeguard his pan-African objectives”. It has been equally argued that the whole idea of non-alignment “offered the only sure route to African unity” for Nkrumah and his dream for a united Africa (Gerits, 2015, p. 2). Over the years, scholars have argued that Ghana’s policy of non-alignment was adopted because Ghana’s first president – Nkrumah, felt that as a relatively small country (lacking both the military and economic wherewithal), aligning with one of the then great powers meant compromising the country’s independence and ability to act for peace. It was thus argued that the maintenance of world peace was attainable through positive neutrality and non-alignment, but not isolationism (Thompson, 1969) (Tieku & Isaac Odoom, 2013, pp. 323-345; Arrnah, 2004; Thompson, 1969). Available literature and official accounts reveal that Kwame Nkrumah developed and formulated Ghana’s foreign policies as “part of a broader nation-building exercise”. Such policies were accordingly “designed to help Ghana find an independent voice on the international stage”. The argument is that Ghana’s foremost president was “shrewd enough to realize that it was risky” for the country “to try to speak as an independent voice in the international system at the peak of the Cold War” – a period when the so-called superpowers were anxiously in search of unbolted allegiance from newly independent states in different parts of the globe (Tieku & Isaac Odoom, 2013, p. 337). It has thus been opined that the country’s contribution to the liberation of most countries on the African continent made it to experience both “the delight” and “the dangers of being wooed by both the Western powers and the Soviet bloc” (Tieku & Isaac Odoom, 2013, p. 337). When Nkrumah was overthrown by the National Liberation Council (NLC), the direction of the country’s foreign policy shifted – it was no longer in the middle ground – there was visible evidence of a shift towards the West. This shift continued when an elected government was ushered into office in 1969 under Kofi Abrefa Busia and the Progress Party. Some scholars are of the view that though Busia’s long years in opposition predisposed him to negate the Nkrumahist legacy, he did not alter the foundation of Ghana’s foreign policy (Chazan, 1984). The point is that there were visible elements of departure from the Nkrumah days and even from the erstwhile capitalist-oriented, western-inclined military junta (the so-called National Liberation Council - NLC) since at least the junta did not ask “non-Ghanaians” to leave the country. Thus, immediately after the overthrow of the Nkrumah administration in 1966, Ghana’s position of non-alignment was to some extent tilted as the military junta of the NLC and the successive Busia-led Progress Party was openly identified with the West and capitalism. Moreover, Busia’s policies such as the Aliens Compliance Order and the dialogue with Apartheid South Africa



to some extent betrayed the cause of non-alignment.<sup>5</sup> Among the several foreign policy objectives of the Busia administration was the desire to help in efforts that targeted the liberation of colonial territories to full-independence status; offering support aimed at dealing with problems associated with imperialism in Africa by means of negotiation and agreement with the imperialists, and to help build high prestige for Ghana in the comity of nations. Though the Progress Party and the Busia administration were capitalist-oriented, these objectives were to some extent in tandem with some of the ideals and principles of the NAM. It is in this regard that some have even argued that the administration's Aliens Compliance Order, which gave all foreigners two weeks' notice to either process their immigration documents or leave the country, was not entirely against the ideals of non-alignment. Thus, among the rationale used in justifying the order was the argument that the aliens in Ghana at the time violated the country's immigration laws. Moreover, it was claimed that the undocumented foreigners were sabotaging the country's economy and that they were the major cause of crime in the country. All these reasonings aside, the policy defeated the purpose of African unity and made the "Osagyefo's" trailblazer – Ghana – a laughing stock in global politics. As indicated above, the Busia administration also sought to dialogue with the Apartheid South African regime. On the surface, this policy seems to be in tandem with NAM's principle of non-intervention or non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. It is, however, interesting to note that the policy at the time was a deviation from what most Pan-Africanist and the NAM members believed. It was even seen as a betrayal on the part of the country that under Nkrumah had fought imperialism and apartheid anywhere on the continent. It was, therefore, not surprising that the National Redemption Council and the Supreme Military Council subsequently rejected the Busia dialogue policy with Apartheid South Africa and also reversed the Aliens Compliance Order with the view of regaining Ghana's lost image as a NAM member after the Progress Party was overthrown in a military coup. As indicated by Tieku and Odoom (2013, p. 328), "Ghana, in fact, became extremely pro-West and anti-communist, especially under the Busia regime." However, the overthrow of the Busia administration by the National Redemption Council (NRC) in January 1972 meant a virtual u-turn to non-alignment and positive neutrality as the

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<sup>5</sup> Though the Apartheid regime also claimed to be a NAM member, we, like many people, question the true identity of its membership at the time since it was an oppressive occupying settler oligarch administration.

Acheampong regime favoured “Nkrumahism”. It is instructive to note that in the formation stages of Ghana’s foreign policy, the country under the first elected president – Nkrumah – was very pragmatic as far as the country’s foreign policy orientation was concerned. The need to preserve the country’s independence coupled with the president’s “desire to rid Ghana of outside influence and assert the persona of the Ghanaian state, made him choose a pragmatic, almost opportunistic, approach to foreign policy” (Tieku & Odoom, 2013, p. 331). Nkrumah thus seemingly leaned towards the East in terms of ideological orientation without abandoning the West (until in later years of his administration when he witnessed some skirmishes from the West that led him to also openly ‘attack’ western-oriented policies). Under Nkrumah’s regime, Ghana was actively involved in fostering and promoting African regional peace and security. This was underpinned by his strong belief in Pan-Africanism, which called for the total liberation of African states from any form of colonialism and neocolonialism – a policy orientation that has been continued by subsequent governments, despite changes in the strategies adopted. Thus, since independence, Ghanaian governments have persistently pursued policies that foster cooperation and integration among African states. Over the years, Ghana has also been supporting countries whose territorial integrity has been threatened in diverse ways (Birikorang, 2007). As far as Africa is concerned, Ghana’s foreign policy objectives are based on the belief in the promotion of friendly relations and good neighbourliness, as well as the commitment to maintain international peace and security which in effect ensures economic cooperation and diplomacy. It is common knowledge that “one ground rule” that usually “guides the formulation and conduct of foreign policy” is the notion that “foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy” (Birikorang, 2007, p. 3). This is generally true for all countries, including Ghana. Thus, national interest, as well as the politics and general conditions of domestic events, have been key determinants of Ghana’s foreign policy. Despite assuming the mantle of leadership on the continent of Africa in the early days of her independence, and being the trailblazer in African foreign policy and diplomacy, Ghana’s influence began waning with the overthrow of its charismatic founding president – the “Osagyefo” Dr Kwame Nkrumah – a scenario that eventually has led to the continuous marginalization of the country in global affairs.<sup>6</sup> Since Nkrumah’s overthrow, Ghana has had several heads of state, including military administrations. The

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<sup>6</sup> This was Nkrumah’s title that had been conferred on him by the Ghanaian populace. It is an Akin word that literally translates “War Leader”/“Mighty Warrior” or “Redeemer”.

longest military regime was Rawlings's PNDC (1982–1992), which metamorphosed into the NDC, which ruled Ghana for two conservative terms under the Fourth Republic. After serving for eight years, the NDC lost power to the New Patriotic Party, marking the first smooth transition of power from an incumbent to the opposition under the Fourth Republic (Botchway, 2018; Botchway, & Hamid Kwarteng, 2018, pp. 1–12). Thus, the third successive general election in Ghana under the Fourth Republic saw the transition from the NDC to the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Consequently, at the beginning of the new millennium, the country had a switch from a socialist-oriented<sup>7</sup> military-trained president to a capitalist-inclined democratic president – John Agyekum Kufuor. This notwithstanding, available information indicates that though there was a change in power for the first time under Ghana's Fourth Republic from one political party to another, the change of government from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in January 2001 did not involve any significant changes in foreign policy orientation. This stems from the fact that both parties held similar worldviews despite the difference in “the perception of foreign policy implementation strategies”. Thus, whereas both parties were capitalist oriented, the NPP placed much emphasis on economic diplomacy than the NDC government (Boafo-Arthur, 2007).<sup>8</sup> And all these are happening many years after the fall of Nkrumah. There is also the idea that with the end of the Cold War, economic imperatives have superseded and continue to trump everything as far as Ghana's post-Cold War relations and foreign policy towards non-African states, especially the developed western countries are concerned (Akokpari, 2005). This idea presupposes that despite its great intentions and achievements over the years, non-alignment and positive neutrality may just be popular slogans or empty shout outs in contemporary times. This view, however thwarted it may sound, cannot simply be glossed over. It is partly for this reason that after six decades of existence there is the need to interrogate the reality of non-alignment and positive neutrality (a daunting task that

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<sup>7</sup> Though Rawlings in his later years adopted a lot of capitalist-inclined policies, he remained a ‘socialist’ at heart as most of the supposed Western-sponsored programmes he pursued sought to alleviate the plight of the masses.

<sup>8</sup> In the latter days of his administration, Rawlings and the NDC – though being social democrats – had implemented a lot of capitalist-directed policies from the World Bank and IMF. These include a number of poverty reduction strategies and the Structural Adjustment Programs. They still ironically remain ‘social democrats’ till this day.

cannot be achieved in a single piece such as this). Indeed, Ghana's foreign policy under the First John witnessed some of the strongest evidence of non-alignment in the country's history.<sup>9</sup> Among other things, the Rawlings administration, which lived in the cold war era, formulated a policy of positive neutrality during those days. His administration also promoted South-South cooperation; called for the lifting of the US economic embargo on Cuba; and was the only African country that condemned the Reagan administration for attacking Libya in 1986. Whereas the Second John focused on rebranding Ghana's image through economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness, the Third John's major foreign policy orientation did not deviate much from that – though the administration was that of a socialist democracy (except for the 'dzi wo fie asem').<sup>10</sup> The Fourth John, who was previously the vice president of the Third, continued with the foreign policy of his former boss. Thus, the Mills and Mahama administrations committed to the country's long history of non-alignment. Consequently, they promoted trade relations with the Breton Woods institutions to ensure the economic development of the country while also strengthening the country's relations with China and other bilateral and multilateral partners include the NAM member states.

### **Conclusions:**

#### **Ghana's Foreign Policy in Contemporary Times – Where We Stand Today As A Nam Member State**

The fifth president of Ghana's Fourth Republic, Nana Addo-Dankwa Akufo-Addo, on the whole, has not deviated much from his predecessors, particularly the Kufuor administration. He has been focusing on economic diplomacy through the "Ghana beyond Aid" mantra. He had also initially

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<sup>9</sup> Under the Fourth Republic, Ghana has had four consecutive presidents all bearing the name John. The First John was the first president of the Fourth Republic – Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings. He was succeeded by John Agyekum Kufuor, followed by John Evans Atta Mills, and then John Dramani Mahama.

<sup>10</sup> This policy basically sought to call on Ghanaians to literally "mind your own business". It was occasioned by questions on Ghana's response to election-related violence in the neighbouring Ivory Coast. The president at the time told Ghanaians that his concern was Ghana, and that we ought to address our problems as a people and stop poking our noses into other peoples' businesses. The implication of such a policy for a country like Ghana basically puts a question on the country's foreign policy orientation as compared with some previous administrations.

paid much attention to good neighbourliness and supported efforts aimed at finding suitable political solutions to the political impasse in neighbouring states including Togo. However, despite contrary views on the subject, the president's closure of borders, especially the land borders during the COVID-19 pandemic raises a number of questions for analysing good neighbourliness and the implications for international obligations (Hlovor & Botchway, 2021). Interestingly, despite being a "non-aligned", the Akufo-Addo administration is alleged to have expanded Ghana's military pact with the United States. This implies that US troops are to be stationed in the country for the so-called purpose of maintaining "peace and security" within the sub-region and also to enhance the country's defence capabilities. The so-called deal also allows US troops to use Ghana's airport and have access to the country's radio spectrum. Yes, these are indeed interesting days for "non-alignment" in the Osagyefo's Ghana – the former haven for positive neutrality. From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that Ghana's foreign policy orientation has not always followed a "straight line" of non-alignment in the strictest sense. Thus, despite incessant efforts to stay true to the NAM, the country has over the years had an undulating path as far as non-alignment and positive neutrality are concerned. Ghana's foreign policy has not always been determined by non-alignment alone (though it is an essential determinant). Instead, what we see is pragmatism – examining the needs and aspirations of the Ghanaian and following the path that yields the best returns for the moment and for generations to come.

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