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Security Relationship Between the European Union and China

Abstract

The relationship between the European Union and China, apart from being dominantly economic, is increasingly taking on a political and a security dimension. The beginning of relations between the European Union and China dates back to the mid-1970s, when China gradually became a strategic partner for the European Union. China's global influence, including its impact on Europe, is expanding. This is primarily the case in the area of economics, through institutionalization within the Belt and Road program, and the 16 + 1 initiative, joined by Greece in 2019. Beginning with the political and economic dimension of the EU-China relations, the paper also considers the security dimension. In the 21st century, security issues are increasingly globalized and affect the political and economic dimension of relations between participants in the international community. This can be especially seen in China's relations with other international participants, both countries and international organizations. The paper analyzes the security aspects of China-EU relations in the context of global relations. The assumption is that the European Union is China's strategically important partner, which makes the security dimension of cooperation increasingly important.

Keywords:

China, the European Union, security cooperation, security.

1. INTRODUCTION – ECONOMIC RELATIONS AS A BASIS FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONS

An increasing economic cooperation and intensive exchange of goods and services between the European Union and the People's Republic of China are both affecting the strengthening of their mutual political relations, and simultaneously forming the framework for the beginning of a security cooperation. Globally, we are talking about two world economic powers with strong bilateral exchanges resulting in increasing interdependence. Specifically, China is the EU's largest trading partner after the United States, and the European Union is China's largest trading partner, with China making a surplus. The strength of their interconnectivity is clearly evidenced by more than 1 billion euros generated by interchange in just one day.¹ According to the data of the European Commission, in 2018, the European Union exported goods worth €209.9 billion to China and services worth €46.7 billion. At the same time, it imported 394.8 billion euros worth of goods from China and 30.6 billion euros worth of services.² With respect to the significant negative sign of trade with China, the European Union's objective is to ensure that its Asian partner adheres to its obligations with regard to WTO membership, in particular, with respect to intellectual property, fair trade practices, further market liberalization, and reducing the role of the state in the economy. The economic dimension of the EU-China relations is particularly interesting in the context of the US-China trade war that marks 2018 and 2019, with the two largest economies³ introducing mutual customs duties on billions of dollars' worth of products. According to some estimates, it is precisely the European Union who could have relative economic benefits of the US-China war, as it could place more of its export products on the markets of both trading partners, given their mutually imposed restrictions.⁴

Also, we should not disregard the fact that the maritime and land routes of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) inaugurated by President Xi in

¹ According to <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/>, Sept. 16, 2019.

² European Union, Trade in goods with China, European Commission, 03. 06. 2019. Available at https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_china_en.pdf, Sept. 16, 2019.

³ Together they make up about 2/5 of world GDP. According to Plummer, Michael G., The US-China Trade War and Its Implications for Europe, *Intereconomics*, Vol. 54, No. 3/2019, p. 195.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 196.

2013, which seeks to ensure greater connectivity between China and sixty countries by major infrastructure and investment projects, encompass a large part of Central, Eastern, Northern and Southeastern European countries that express interest or already began work on specific projects. With the resentment of the European Union, and especially of France, Italy joined the initiative in 2019, as the first G7 Member State to do so.⁵ Namely, many participants of this initiative read Chinese ambitions for changing relationships and geopolitical reality through, first and foremost, economic instruments – first in Asia, then in Europe and globally. In other words, the proclaimed commitment to multilateralism, which should make China a credible partner in international relations from the point of view of other countries (including the European Union), at a time when the United States is striving for unilateralism, is interpreted as only a cover for China's global leadership in the future. When it comes to European countries, it can be seen from a series of analyses that they are in a gap between traditional ties to the US and the economic opportunities offered by the BRI, while also expressing unease about the long-term consequences of China's economic initiatives.⁶

In addition, in the 16 + 1 initiative (most recently 17 + 1), as part of the BRI bringing together Central and Eastern European countries and China, 12 are from 28 EU member states,⁷ which some observers see as starting a new regional context through frequent meetings of high-level political officials. Sharper critics from the European Union refer to the Initiative as a "Trojan horse" by which China tries to incur divisions in the European project.⁸ At the same time, in official European Commission March 2019 documents, China is referred to as both a strategic partner and a systemic rival, and the Member States are called for full unity, without which either individually or as the European Union they cannot count on the realization of their interests in relation to China. In particular, it is stated that the Member

⁵ Miner, L. and Abellan-Mattamoros, C., China's Belt and Road plan: Why did Italy sign it and why is Brussels worried?, Euronews, April 2019. Available at <https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/24/china-and-italy-sign-silk-road-project>, Sept. 15, 2019.

⁶ See, for example, Chatzky, A. and McBride, J., China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative, Council on Foreign Relations, May 2019. Available at <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative>, Sept. 15, 2019.

⁷ Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Greece from 2019.

⁸ Kowalski, E., China's "16+1" Is Dead? Long Live the "17+1", The Diplomat, March 2019. Available at <https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-161-is-dead-long-live-the-171/>, Sept. 15, 2019.

States must adhere to the *acquis communautaire*, rules and policies⁹ either when bilaterally cooperating with China or acting under initiatives such as 16 + 1, thereby expressing some caution as to the possible direction of development of relations between the two strategic partners.

In the context of the political dimension of relations among the European Union, the United States, and China, the European Union and China have different levels of institutionalization of relations with the United States, and in general, different views on cooperation with this leading world power. The European Union and the United States (and Canada) make up a transatlantic security community that is highly institutionalized (a mature, security community),¹⁰ while despite strong economic interdependence, the US-China relations remain marked by rivalry and conflicting interests in the global community. The opinion of the current US administration on China is clearly evidenced by the National Security Strategy (2017), where the focus from international terrorism is directed towards China and the Russian Federation, the “challengers” of the US global primacy. Thus, the very introduction of this document states that China, together with Russia, poses a challenge to American power, influence, and interests, and that it attempts to undermine US security and prosperity by the military, political and economic means.¹¹ At the same time, China is directly labeled as a nation stealing billions of dollars’ worth of intellectual property, which directly harms the US industry and, in the long run, reduces US competitiveness in the world market. In geopolitical terms, the US concludes that China as one of the so-called *revisionist powers* seeks to suppress American interests and presence in the Indo-Pacific region, impose itself as a regional hegemon, which the US considers to be one of the steps in China’s attempt to become a leading global power in the future.¹² The importance of this region is further intensified by the United States in its Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

⁹ EU-China – A strategic outlook. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. European Commission, March 2019., p. 2. Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf>, Sept. 15, 2019.

¹⁰ Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett (1998): *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 48–49.

¹¹ National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p. 2. Available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>, Sept. 16, 2019.

¹² Summary of the 2018 National Defence Strategy of the United States of America, p. 2. Available at <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>, Sept. 16, 2019.

of July 2019,¹³ which specifies that China's militarization of the South China Sea, increased activities around Taiwan, and generally continued Chinese military modernization are the issues which, along with economic and political initiatives in different parts of the world, could significantly affect the existing order.

Unlike the United States, the European Union, in its official documents, mainly refers to China as a strategic partner with whom it deepens its cooperation in a number of areas, which should also lead to a more institutionalized relationship.¹⁴ Efforts to strengthen these ties go hand in hand with the current state of Sino-US relations, President Trump's policy toward the EU, and the growing, global emphasis on unilateralism.

Finally, China is becoming an increasingly active player in the UN's collective security system, especially in peacekeeping missions. Currently, there are more Chinese troops in UN missions than those from all other permanent members of the UN Security Council combined. Specifically, in July 2019, China had 2521 members under UN peacekeeping missions, most of them in South Sudan in UNMISS (1031)¹⁵ while the remaining four had a total of 1405 members.¹⁶ This period of more active engagement began in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War, when China's contribution to this mechanism of maintaining international peace and security was almost negligible, given China's traditional policy of non-interference and inaction in the work of international organizations. As a supporter of the traditional interpretation of state sovereignty and issues considered as an internal domain of states, no sooner than in the late 1970s, after Deng Xiaoping became Head of State, China began to make a financial contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget¹⁷ which was formed in the mid-1960s as a separate part relative to the regular budget. Since then, some major changes ensued, and now China's financial contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget

¹³ The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region), June 2019. Available at <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>, Sept. 16, 2019.

¹⁴ State of play of EU-China relations. European Parliament, January 2019, str. 1. Available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/633149/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)633149_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/633149/EPRS_BRI(2019)633149_EN.pdf), Sept. 15, 2019.

¹⁵ According to: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/china>, Sept. 16, 2019.

¹⁶ France – 743 members, United Kingdom – 557 members, Russian Federation – 71 members, United States – 34 members. Available at: Rankin of Contributions by Country (as of July 2019). Available at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, Sept. 16, 2019.

¹⁷ China's Role in UN Peacekeeping. Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2018., p. 1. Available at <http://isdsp.eu/content/uploads/2018/03/PRC-Peacekeeping-Background.pdf>, Sept. 1, 2019.

is the second largest, just behind the one of the US.¹⁸ After China began deploying troops to UN peacekeeping missions in the 1990s, this process stagnated again in the middle of the decade, and since 2004 a steady increase in the number of Chinese peacekeepers began. Stronger engagement began around the same time the European Union, as a new security participant, began its operations in an international environment within the framework of civilian and military missions in different parts of the world. In this regard, peacekeeping operations certainly represent an area of possible security cooperation between China and the European Union, especially in some parts of the world, such as Africa. China and the European Union are more inclined to use *soft power*, which, in the long run, can have a positive impact on their mutual security cooperation and reconciliation of interests globally, especially in relation to the United States, the Russian Federation, and India. It is precisely this intensified participation in UN peacekeeping missions which is viewed as part of a broader Chinese *soft power* strategy, “by which Beijing can promote its interests abroad, at the same time enhancing its co-operation with other nations while it experiences the so-called “peaceful growth.”¹⁹ China’s involvement in peacekeeping missions and its greater involvement in the United Nations and the international arena, in general, can be perceived as part of a broader strategy that successfully combines military, political, diplomatic and economic resources, so as to achieve its foreign policy goals. Specifically, it is also argued that “Beijing’s current peacekeeping policy helps China expand its diplomacy all around the developing world,”²⁰ which also reverberates positively in the context of the Belt and Road initiative.

¹⁸ China’s share of the total UN peacekeeping budget in 2018 is 10.25%. The total approved budget for the period July 1, 2018, to June 30, 2019, is \$ 6.7 billion. According to: How are we funded? Available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded>, Sept 1, 2019.

¹⁹ China’s Role in UN Peacekeeping. Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2018., p. 2. Available at <http://isdpeu/content/uploads/2018/03/PRC-Peacekeeping-Backgrounder.pdf>, Sept. 1, 2019.

²⁰ Lateigne, M., The Role of UN Peacekeeping in China’s Expanding Strategic Interests. 2018., p. 1. Available at <https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/09/role-un-peacekeeping-chinas-expanding-strategic-interests>, Sept. 1, 2019.

2. COOPERATION DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CHINA

From the 1970s to the present, relations between China and the European Union (formerly the EC) have evolved to such an extent that the two poles of cooperation perceive each other through the prism of strategic partnership formalized in 2003, despite evident differences in size (territory, population) or the values they represent. The European Union (EU) Delegation to China has been active since 1988, and the PRC also has a mission to the EU, both missions bringing diplomatic relations established in 1975 to a new dimension and dynamism. The very next year, in 1989, the then European Community imposed an embargo on China for the import of weapons, due to the violent suppression of demonstrations in Beijing's Tiananmen, which is in force to this day. Nonetheless, as early as the 1990s, the situation normalized, and relations developed further in economic, political and security terms.²¹ Summit meetings were established in 1998 in London, and are held annually. At these meetings, the two sides address different aspects of their bilateral relations, but also global economic, security, development, climate, etc. issues.

The economic dimension of this bilateral relationship is in the background of all other types of interaction, including security cooperation, due to the fact that China is the second trading partner of the European Union (after the USA), while the European Union is China's first trading partner. Therefore, the scope of the mentioned arms embargo is often the subject of dispute between Member States over the economic interests of their arms and military equipment manufacturers, especially in the context of the interpretation of the legally binding EU Arms Control Rules established in 2008²² that set eight criteria²³ based on which arms exports to third countries should be suspended.

²¹ Stepan, M. and Osterman, F., *EU-China Relations – Strategic of Pragmatic, Future or Already the Past?* 2011., p. 20. Available at https://www.atlcom.nl/upload/AP%202011%20nr_%2020Stepan%20&%20Ostermann.pdf, Sept. 1, 2019.

²² COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944 / CFSP of December 8, 2008, on defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0944&from=EN>, April 16, 2019.

²³ Among other things, the criteria include respecting human rights and international humanitarian law. See COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944 / CFSP, December 8, 2008, on defining common rules governing the control of military technology and equipment exports. Available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0944&from=EN>, April 16, 2019; The review of the EU

The scale of mutual economic cooperation goes beyond the very question of the nature of this long-lasting embargo and can be said to shape the European Union's views on political, security, development, cultural and technological cooperation. In recent years, initiatives and programs coming from China, an inevitable global economic player, are finding fertile ground in Europe, both among the EU Member States and among countries with varying degrees of institutional ties with the Union on the path to full membership. In this context, as noted earlier, Europe (and the European Union in particular) is the destination of the two continental and one naval arm of the ancient Silk Road, which has been updated in the Chinese Government's official development strategy. Over the last six years, since it was initiated in 2013, it has become the focal point of discussions in bilateral relations between the European Union and China.

Thus, China's Belt and Road initiative, which focuses on building the infrastructure needed for a more dynamic exchange, or expanding the Chinese trading network (as viewed by critics), encounters interest in the European Union, who has given it an institutional form. Specifically, in 2015, the European Commission and China signed the "Agreement on Establishing a Connectivity Platform between the European Union and China,"²⁴ with the aim to achieve digital and actual integration of Eurasia, through the synergistic effect of European policies and projects on the one, and the "Belt and Road" on the other hand. In July 2018, at the EU-China Summit in Beijing, European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, reiterated that this partnership is strategically extremely important for Europe: "I always firmly believe in the potential of the EU partnership with China. And in today's world, this partnership is more important than ever. It is simply reasonable for us to cooperate."²⁵

The most recent 21st China-EU Summit, held in Brussels, in April 2019, confirmed the intention to strengthen this strategic partnership further and to adopt a new post-2020 Cooperation Program. The joint statement adopted at the meeting, related to some extent to the foreign and the security policy as well, gives out the impression that in this area the two sides are much more "reserved" in regards to other areas of mutual cooperation.

common position on arms exports: prospects for strengthened controls. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Nonproliferation7.pdf>, Apr 15, 2019.

²⁴ EU-China Connectivity Platform Short-Term Action Plan. Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/2018-07-13-eu-china-connectivity-platform-action-plan.pdf>, Apr. 4, 2019.

²⁵ EU-China summit: deepening strategic global partnership. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4521_en.pdf, Apr. 12, 2019.

3. SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CHINA

The European Union and China are participants whose importance in international security has grown since the 1990s. Namely, it was only after the post-Cold War period that the European Union began concrete construction of a security component, through the institutionalization of the common foreign and security policy, and China began to move away from its policy of isolationism and to act actively in multilateral fora. The context of their mutual security co-operation is defined by strategic documents, adopted by one or the other party, or in joint documents resulting from an increasingly intense co-operation in different fields.

The first such comprehensive document was adopted by the European Union back in 1995,²⁶ the Strategic Partnership endorsed in 2003, and in 2013, the EU-China Strategic Cooperation Agenda for until 2020 was adopted, which should be replaced by a new and deeper program. In addition, the EU's Global Strategy stresses the importance of cooperation with China, within the platforms mentioned above, and within ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting, which has been operating since 1996 and brings together 53 countries, EU and ASEAN), and also cooperation between the EU and ASEAN.

The area of security is mentioned, for the first time, in mutual cooperation in 1995, in the previously mentioned European Union document "A Long-term Policy for China-Europe Relations", in two ways. On the one hand, it talks about the importance of stability, for China itself, which should continue to be built on the foundations of social, economic and political reform in accordance with international norms, and on the other, it points out that the important security issues in different regions, but also globally, cannot be addressed without China. Then, by noting the growing economic and political influence of China in regional and global contexts, it is stated that the two sides can and should discuss issues of common interest and agree on a range of political and security issues.²⁷

In the following document, "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China", from 1998, the European Union focuses on opportunities for cooperation and China's involvement in addressing security challenges in the Asia Pacific, including drug trafficking, maritime security, arms control,

²⁶ A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations. Communication of the Commission. 1995. Available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/com95_279_en.pdf, Sept. 10, 2019.

²⁷ Ibid.

non-proliferation, and the Korean Peninsula security. ARF, or the ASEAN Regional Forum, is underlined as a favorable pre-requisite for stronger joint engagement in responding to multilateral challenges in the region, as a platform which brings together a number of non-regional actors besides ASEAN members.

By the early 2000s, a series of changes took place on both poles of this cooperation – more precisely, European integration grew deeper (the Amsterdam and Nice Agreements), and China's economic and political influence continued to grow (China became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2001). New instruments have been formed on the European side, which could further deepen and regulate relations with China. Thus, the 2001 Communiqué of the European Commission outlines the potential of mutual cooperation in addressing international, regional and transnational challenges, in the context of mutual political dialogue, issues such as peacemaking between the two Koreas, resolving the situation in Myanmar, resolving territorial disputes in South China Sea, relations with Taiwan²⁸, arms control and disarmament, multilateral dispute settlement within existing fora (ARF, UN, ASEM), support for United Nations peacekeeping operations, etc.

The Strategic Dialogue between the European Union and China,²⁹ which will become one of the three pillars of the implementation of the Strategic Cooperation Program for until 2020, adopted in 2013, began in the same period, in 2005. Apart from the Strategic Dialogue, which discusses possible areas for security cooperation, there are also the Economic and Trade Dialogue and the biennial “People to People” Dialogue. The high-level strategic dialogue, held annually, indicates that the focus of the EU-China relations “is shifting” from economic and trade to broader, global security challenges and problems (human rights, South China Sea, North Korea ...).

Finally, in 2013, the current Strategic Cooperation Program for until 2020 was adopted, in which the area of “Peace and Security” became the introductory chapter of the document, which testifies to the transition of the area of cooperation from trade and economic matters to the area of foreign policy and security. By taking into account the European Union and China, as indispensable participants in the *multipolar* world, the program

²⁸ The EU has no formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and officially supports the One China policy. However, the EU's position on “one country with two systems” (not supported by the Taiwanese authorities) reflects the Union's interest in maintaining and expanding existing economic and trade relations.

²⁹ Last held in March 2019 in Brussels.

identifies a number of initiatives and possible forms of cooperation. Among other things, those worth mentioning are:

- “strengthening mutual understanding, deepening mutual trust, building consensus and providing strategic support for promoting bilateral relations and preserving international peace and development” – so as to improve coordination on strategic, political and security issues;
- Strengthening the dialogue on regional issues which are important for both parties, and may have global implications – Africa, Central Asia and Latin America;
- Strengthening the cooperation within the trans-regional and regional fora (ARF, ASEM) – with the construction of regional architecture in Asia, based on the principles of equality, openness, inclusiveness and transparency;
- Strengthening the cooperation in multilateral fora – recognizes the central role of the UN in international affairs – puts emphasis on multilateralism (China as a member of the UN Security Council, and currently two EU members – the UK and France)
- Nuclear security – support for non-proliferation; cyber-security
- Strengthening the cooperation in fighting organized crime, corruption, transnational crime, illegal migration, cybercrime
- Special consultation on counter-terrorism measures
- Maintaining a regular dialogue on defense and security policy, increasing exchange in the field of training, and gradually raising the level of dialogue and cooperation in the field of defense and security – putting emphasis on practical forms of cooperation;

The relationship between the European Union and China is defined in terms of strategic partnerships. Therefore, the partnership in the field of security matters is subsequent to the establishment of cooperation in other functional areas. Having in mind this relatively new dimension, i.e. the fact that the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is relatively young (it’s been developing since the Maastricht Treaty and it’s been in its current form since 2009 – the Treaty of Lisbon), and that there are also different types of political order, with a different understanding of civil and political rights, different political cultures and traditions, it is not surprising that it takes decades to integrate security into the areas of cooperation. At the recent April meeting, Iran’s nuclear deal was discussed, with both sides supporting the US-North Korea dialogue, along with the full implementation of the Minsk in Ukraine Agreement, and the co-operation and coordination of the peace process in Afghanistan has been agreed upon. However, when it comes to the situation in Venezuela, a certain re-

straint can be detected in a joint statement – both sides are monitoring the situation and advocating a peaceful and diplomatic solution.³⁰ Thus, in addition to intensifying security cooperation, the European Union and China still have different views on global crises and crisis areas, both in Asia and in Africa. Nevertheless, an effort is made to prevent these different views from adversely affecting the development of general relationships. When it comes to the territory of Europe, China advocates a non-interference policy or a policy based solely on the United Nations documents. This can be seen in the example of Kosovo, whose independence China does not recognize, guided by the United Nations resolutions. Finally, Kosovo is not recognized by five EU member states.

4. CONCLUSION

Although the diplomatic relations between the European Union and China are relatively new, (as they were established in 1975) their overall political, economic and security relations are highly developed and incredibly dynamic. This is the case primarily because of both parties' interests, who want to position themselves in the global community, especially in relation to the United States of America. Political changes in China, and its open politics from the mid-1990s, also affect the cooperation with the European Union, especially some of its members. The pre-requisites for the political co-operation development have gradually been built, and also served as a basis for a more intense economic co-operation within which both sides could quickly recognize their long-term interests. The specific character of China's and the EU's cooperation lies in the fact that China is a state, while the European Union is a community of countries assembled in it. This also affects China's relationship, not only with the European Union, but also with some of its members, or candidates for membership. Thus, China develops special relations with the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe through the Belt and Road and 17 + 1 Initiatives, or with individual members of the European Union, such as Germany, France or Italy. Since security issues have been particularly important from the very beginning of the 21st century, China and the European Union have also started developing a more intensive cooperation in the field of security. This is based on the assumption that the European Union is China's strategically important partner and that a strategic partnership is not feasible, let alone without a security dimension. A particularly important issue in the China-

³⁰ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2019/04/09/>, Apr. 16, 2019

EU cooperation is the relationship with the United States. The European Union and the United States are developing a strategic partnership within the Euro-Atlantic community, while the relations between China and the United States, despite the developed economic cooperation are marked by opposite viewpoints in the global community. This tendency to use soft power conditions the development of security cooperation between China and the European Union in many ways. The beginning of their cooperation within the United Nations is particularly important, along with conducting the peacekeeping missions, in which both sides are exceptionally engaged. Achieving security cooperation had become more intense, despite different views on some global security concerns, in order to realize a better position in relation to the United States, the Russian Federation, and India. General relations between China and the European Union are expected to continue to develop and significantly impact relations in the global community. This does not mean that there will be no problems or misunderstandings in these relationships. In this respect, China, unlike the European Union, is in a better position, because it can shape and implement its policies more easily. The success of the cooperation, especially in the area of security, will also depend on the benefits both parties have from this cooperation.

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